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Abstract 
 
This study explores how a concentrated ownership structure and the underlying firm 
strategies/activities or practices influence the performance of family-controlled publicly-
listed firms in Malaysia. Specifically, it aims to enhance our understanding of how differing 
types of significant owners, control-enhancing means, business groups and firm 
diversification affect firm performance within a national corporate governance system 
characterized by pervasive political involvement in business. It also aims to enhance our 
understanding of the role of board independence in moderating the above effects. The 
distinctiveness of this study arises from its approach of considering ownership structure and 
the underlying firm strategies/activities or practices in an integrated manner with particular 
emphasis on their inter-relationships. Multivariate with moderated regression analyses were 
utilized as primary tools of analysis. Based on a sample of 314 firms, major findings include 
(i) the proportion of family equity ownership positively influences corporate performance, (ii) 
group-affiliated firms generally underperform non-group affiliated firms, (iii) the 
heterogeneity of business groups results in considerable differences in performance. 
Specifically, size of business group has a negative moderating effect on the firm 
diversification-performance relationship, (iv) profit redistribution occurs in firms that have a 
high level of family ownership and that are affiliated to large business groups, (v) board 
independence in general lacks effectiveness in moderating the influence of firm strategies or 
activities on firm performance. In terms of practical/managerial implications, the study 
demonstrates (i) the importance of conceptualising corporate governance in a broader sense, 
particularly in emerging economies such as Malaysia, (ii) how policymakers and regulators 
may identify and better monitor firms that are more likely to expropriate investors and/or 
exhibit governance problems, and (iii) a potentially fruitful approach to be adopted by 
investment professionals in selecting firms with better overall governance structures and 
performance that enhance their investment returns, particularly in the long term. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
 
This thesis examines the influence of concentrated share ownership and the underlying firm 
strategies/activities or practices on the performance of publicly-listed family-controlled firms 
in Malaysia. As opposed to the „widely-held‟ ownership structure in Anglo- Saxon countries, 
concentrated ownership structure is the norm in East Asia including Malaysia (World Bank, 
2005; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Zhuang et al., 2000). It refers to the concentration of share 
ownership being held by a few substantial shareholders (known as the block-holders). In the 
case of family-controlled firms, the families (either consisting of a single person or multiple 
family members) act as the largest substantial shareholders who also exert control power 
through their direct involvement in the senior management or directorship of the firms. The 
families are termed as the „controlling families‟ in this study. The presence of other block-
holders in the family-controlled firms such as institutional investors and the government may 
also influence the performance of the firms (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000; Filatotchev et al., 
2005; Borokhovich et al., 2006).  
  
Family ownership may bring along some significant benefits or advantages to the firms and 
the advantages could be enhanced with an increase in the level of ownership (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008). This is because concentrated family ownership is able to 
alleviate the agency problems commonly found in the dispersed ownership structure and in 
addition, it also provides the controlling families with both the power and incentive to 
improve firm efficiency and performance. Families as the largest block-holders also exhibit 
unique attributes which could not be found in other types of block-holder. Such attributes are 
believed to be able to give rise to greater competitive advantage to the firms and improve 
their performance (Habbershon et al., 2003). However, at the same time, an increase in 
family ownership also means an increase in the control (voting) power of the families. 
Therefore, as the largest shareholders with substantial concentrated ownership and control, 
the controlling families have the „ability and inclination‟ to carry out strategies/activities or 
practices that benefit them but may not benefit, or may even be detrimental to, the efficiency 
and performance of firms and thus minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Young et 
2 
 
al., 2008).
1
 These „governance-concerned‟ strategies/activities/practices underlying 
concentrated ownership include: (a) the use of certain methods of enhancing the families‟ 
control power (hereafter known as the control-enhancing means) such as appointing family 
members into both the board chairmanship and CEO positions; (b) the interference of 
controlling families in the appointment of independent directors so that the board of directors 
loses its independence (hereafter a board independence issue); (c) the formation of a network 
of publicly-listed firms controlled by the families (hereafter known as business group 
affiliation) and; (d) the venture and expansion of the firms into various business lines 
(hereafter known as firm diversification).  
 
From the above discussion, this study makes an attempt to explore the following research 
question
2
: Coupled with the benefits brought about by concentrated family ownership, in 
what way will the concerns of concentrated ownership and the outlined underlying firm 
strategies/activities or practices in family-controlled firms influence the firm’s 
performance? Following the research question, the broad objective of the study can therefore 
be stated as follows: To examine the influence of concentrated ownership structure and the 
outlined underlying firm strategies/activities or practices on the performance of family-
controlled firms. There are three points to be noted from the objective: Firstly, in order to 
gain more insights into the issues, the study examines not only the direct influence of the 
issues on firm performance, but also how the performance could be influenced or moderated 
by the interplays between some of the variables involved. In other words, apart from direct 
influence, moderating influence is also part of the focus of the study. For instance, not only is 
the direct influence of family ownership on firm performance examined, but also in what 
way is the influence on performance affected or moderated by the extent of board 
independence in the firms.  
 
Secondly, the influence of ownership structure is examined in terms of the extent as well as 
the identity of the ownership. In other words, besides the ownership of the controlling 
families, the study also examines the influence of other block-holders in the family-
                                                          
1
 Details of the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of family-controlled firms are available in 
subsequent chapters. 
2
 Details of the research questions are discussed in Section 1.4 
3 
 
controlled firms. Thirdly, the above broad objective of the study is broken down into five 
specific objectives in which each objective is accompanied and supported by its respective 
hypotheses. Details of the specific objectives of the study and the associated hypotheses are 
stated in Section 1.5.  
 
Overall, findings from this study provide clarification on issues surrounding concentrated 
ownership structure and the associated policy implications for family-controlled firms in 
Malaysia. Some of the notable findings from the study show that although there is a positive 
relationship between the extent of family ownership and firm performance, the relationship 
subsides once the controlling families attain outright ownership control. Findings on the 
influence of other block-holders on the performance of family-controlled firms are mixed. 
Notably, the extent of block-holdings by foreign institutional investors and government is 
found to be positively influencing the performance of family-controlled firms. The findings 
also suggest that control-enhancing means are not all the same and their effects on firm 
performance are dissimilar. Put differently, not all control-enhancing means are ill-intended. 
For instance, though the findings show that firm performance tends to be worse in the 
absence of a second block-holder to balance the power of the controlling families; the 
findings also suggest that firm performance improves as the proportion of family directors on 
the board increases.  
    
Further evidence from the study suggests that generally, the strategies/activities of firms 
operating under concentrated ownership bring about more harm than good to firm 
performance. For instance, it is shown that the strategy of forming business groups leads to 
poorer performance of group-affiliated firms compared to firms without group affiliation. 
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that controlling families in business groups engaged 
in the redistribution of resources/profits from group-affiliated firms that are well-performing 
to group-affiliated firms that are underperforming. In addition, the findings also show that the 
size of business groups negatively affects the influence of firm diversification on 
performance. Finally, it is found that board independence in general lacks the effectiveness to 
moderate the relationship between the governance-concerned firm strategies/activities (such 
as diversification) and firm performance. This suggests that the board of directors may not be 
4 
 
„truly independent‟ from the influence of the controlling families and thus unable to exert 
effective monitoring.  
 
Policy implications can be drawn from the findings to help policy-makers be more informed 
in making decisions on governance-related policies so that they are both effective in getting 
family-controlled firms to embrace the substance of good governance and at the same time 
accommodating to the unique features of these firms.          
      
1.1  Chapter Outline    
 
Having introduced the thesis and addressing the „what is the study all about‟ question, 
Chapter 1 continues with a discussion on the background of the study. It discusses overall 
corporate governance development and concerns in Malaysia with a focus on concentrated 
ownership structure and the issues surrounding it. The chapter then proceeds to the 
subsequent section on the research problem and issues, where gaps in the literature and the 
main themes of the study are explored and discussed. As explained in the discussion at the 
beginning of the chapter, the overarching theme of the study is concentrated ownership 
structure and associated firm strategies/activities or practices within the context of family-
controlled firms. A detailed discussion in this section is necessary in order for the readers to 
appreciate why the problems and issues raised deserve further investigation. Justification is 
provided in sub-section 1.3.3 on why firm performance is chosen as the outcome variable of 
the study. Based on gaps in the literature, specific research questions are then formulated in 
the subsequent section followed by the specific objectives of the study. It should be noted 
that the main research question, together with the broad objective of the study, have been 
introduced at the beginning of the chapter.      
 
Following that, the conceptual framework of the research is developed and presented with a 
flowchart diagram illustrating the conceptualization of the entire study. The conceptual 
framework illustrates how all the conceptual variables of the study are linked together under 
the general theme of the concentrated ownership structure of firms. By depicting the location, 
5 
 
each hypothesis is placed within the framework. The conceptual framework is also useful in 
understanding the development of the hypotheses as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Having established the conceptual framework, the chapter proceeds to the section on the 
scope and significance of the study. The purpose of the section is to set the parameters in 
terms of the subject of research and the institutional context in which the study takes place, 
and by doing so, explains why choosing family-controlled firms as the subject of the study is 
important as well as why Malaysia should serve as an interesting country with which to 
examine governance-related issues. This chapter concludes with a section outlining the 
chapter plan of the thesis.    
 
1.2   Background of Study   
 
Corporate governance development in Malaysia can be basically divided into two different 
time frames - before and after the infamous 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Before the 
AFC, the term „corporate governance‟ was seldom heard of in corporate Malaysia and the 
importance of corporate governance was often overlooked. Even international bodies such as 
the World Bank (World Bank, 1993) did not consider corporate governance as a matter of 
concern in East Asia including Malaysia in its influential study, The East Asian Miracle in 
1993 when evaluating the success of economic growth in East Asia from the period 1965 to 
1990. However, the 1997 AFC revealed the serious weaknesses of corporate governance in 
the region. It has been acknowledged that weak corporate governance is one of the factors 
that caused the impact of the 1997 AFC to become more serious in many countries in the 
region including Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Beh, 2007). The performance of many 
firms was seriously affected during the crisis period and minority shareholders were among 
the victims that were particularly hurt by the crisis.  
 
The cause of weak corporate governance specifically in Malaysia is attributable mainly to the 
concentrated ownership structure of firms operating in the relatively weak enforcement 
environments (OECD, 2004). World Bank, in its 2005 assessment of corporate governance in 
Malaysia (World Bank, 2005), pointed out the nature of concentrated ownership by stating 
that in half of the ten largest publicly-listed firms in Malaysia, over 60% of outstanding 
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shares are owned by the top five largest shareholders. Fazilah et al. (2002) also states that the 
largest shareholder of a typical listed firm in Malaysia (with the majority of them family 
shareholders) on average holds close to one-third of the firm‟s shares and the top five 
shareholders own around 60% of the firm‟s shares. This indicates that not only is the 
ownership structure of firms highly concentrated, the nature of that high concentration also 
did not change much and remains the same after the 1997 AFC.    
 
The AFC is considered as the watershed that caused the „paradigm shift‟ in the way that 
regulators and businesses view corporate governance. Today, 14 years after the crisis, 
corporate governance has become one of the most mentioned phrases in the vocabulary of 
anyone interested in corporate news; from journalists to investors, regulators and corporate 
managers and directors themselves. The crisis instigated an impetus for corporate governance 
reform in the region.
3
 The Malaysian government initiated a series of corporate governance 
reforms after the AFC to improve and strengthen the corporate governance system in the 
country. However, it has been a frequent criticism that the governance environment in the 
country has caused corporate governance reform in Malaysia to produce nothing more than 
an impressive set of corporate governance rules, regulations and codes of best practices, on 
paper only (Yeoh, 2010). Many firms that follow the codes of best practice in corporate 
governance have managed to achieve the status of firms with good governance only in „form‟ 
but not in „substance‟. One criterion of good governance that may appear in form but not in 
substance is to merely have a higher proportion of independent directors on the board without 
establishing whether the directors are truly independent.  
 
The type of corporate governance reform that focuses purely on form may hinder the 
progress of corporate governance development in a real sense in Malaysia. Public investors 
continue to be fed with news of minority shareholder expropriation and even corporate 
scandals. Though major corporate scandals may not happen often, anecdotal evidence shows 
that expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is not uncommon in 
                                                          
3
 An important episode of corporate governance reform in the region was the release of „Code of Conduct‟ 
related to corporate governance to supplement the legislative reforms. For instance, Korea introduces its Code 
of Best Practice for Corporate Governance in 1999, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore 
with a similar type of corporate governance code between the year 2000 and 2001 (Sharif and Zaidansyah, 
2004).       
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this country. Firms‟ efficiency and performance are being jeopardized as a result of these 
agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens and Fan, 2002). Expropriation of 
minority shareholders is something that is often heard of and it occurs continually.  In fact, it 
is always a major on-going corporate governance concern for authority and public investors.  
  
The root cause of the expropriation of minority shareholders is the excessive control power 
that resides with the controlling shareholders as a result of their concentrated ownership in 
the firm. This is especially true in countries with relatively weak law enforcement and where 
political interference in business is prevalent. Very often, controlling shareholders in 
Malaysia are made up of family members (including individual persons from a family) who 
act collectively and concertedly as the ultimate owners with the largest control (voting) rights 
and exert their controlling power through the family members‟ direct involvement in the 
management/directorship of the firm. The controlling families in this case are known as the 
owner-managers of the firm and the firm is known as a family-controlled firm. Even when a 
professional CEO is hired to manage a family-controlled firm (which is seldom in Malaysia), 
his decision-making power and scope are often quite limited by the exertion of power of the 
controlling families (Joh, 2003).   
 
Essentially, concentrated ownership in the relatively weak enforcement environment of 
Malaysia enables owner-managers to implement policy - or strategy - related corporate 
activities or practices that generate for them private benefits of control at the expense of 
minority shareholders, firm efficiency and performance. For example, the practice of forming 
business groups or strategies to diversify a firm can be used by controlling families to 
facilitate their expropriation activities. Control over the firms by owner-managers can also be 
enhanced by different choices of corporate practice. For example, a controlling family can 
practice having the top two positions in the firm, namely the CEO and chairmanship 
positions, served by family members.                
 
Nevertheless, concentration of ownership structure is not all „bad‟. The literature has 
documented that concentrated ownership structure, particularly when a family is the largest 
controlling shareholder, can be beneficial to reducing agency problems and improving firm 
performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Concentrated ownership, as mentioned earlier, 
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provides the controlling shareholders with both the incentive and the sufficient control power 
(voting power) to improve firm performance, as improved firm performance simultaneously 
increases their wealth. In addition, firms owned and controlled by families have positive, 
unique attributes which do not exist in other types of firms. Finally, policy - or strategy - 
related corporate activities or practices underlying concentrated family ownership may also 
exert positive influence to improve firm performance. The details of this discussion will be 
covered in the subsequent sections.     
 
In short, according to Bennedsen et al. (2010), the main governance issue facing family-
controlled firms today is balancing the advantage related to having a controlling family with 
the challenges this structure imposes on minority shareholders and firm performance. It is 
thus the theme of this thesis to examine the resultant influence of concentrated ownership 
structure and the underlying policy - or strategy - related firm activities or practices on the 
performance of family-controlled firms in Malaysia. The next section will explain these 
policy - or strategy - related activities or practices which have important implications in 
corporate governance in Malaysia.                                                     
 
1.3   Research Problem and Issues 
 
1.3.1   Concentrated Ownership Structure 
 
The legal and judiciary system of a country, the board of directors and the ownership 
structure can be considered as the three main pillars of corporate governance. This, together 
with market-based governance mechanisms - namely the market for corporate control, the 
market for executives and the product market - form an integrated system of corporate 
governance. Though the judiciary system in Malaysia is one based on common law, its 
enforcement is still lacking (La Porta et al., 1999). One of the main reasons for relatively 
weak law enforcement is the political patronage in business: firms which are closely 
associated with influential political figures or the ruling political party may have privilege 
under „selective imposition of rules and regulations‟ (Gomez, 2006). Details of political 
interference in Malaysia will be discussed in Section 2.2 in Chapter 2.      
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Due to concentrated ownership, the market for corporate control through takeover and 
acquisition as well as the „market for executives‟ are at best described as inactive and there is 
little role for hostile takeovers to discipline managers who are not performing to a 
satisfactory level (World Bank, 1999). Under such ownership makeup in an environment 
where the families also hold the positions of CEO and/or executive chairman of the firms, it 
“serves as an effective deterrent mechanism to outside hostile takeovers” (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006, p.1035). The bankers are also unable to play their roles in corporate 
governance because banks in Malaysia “are poor governance agents because they are weak 
or have distorted incentives” and “are hardly able to take care of themselves” (Thillainathan, 
1999, p.5 and p.18). In such an institutional setting, concentrated ownership becomes the 
single most important corporate governance mechanism in Malaysia.  
 
By maintaining a high concentration of ownership, the controlling shareholders have both the 
control power (voting power) and incentive to play an important role in monitoring 
management; in Shleifer and Vishny‟s (1997) words, “enough control over the assets… to 
have their interests respected” (p.754). In fact, in Malaysia, most of the largest shareholders 
are themselves managers. Increased shareholder monitoring reduces the costs associated with 
the standard textbook principal-agent problem and hence firm performance rises. More 
importantly, the literature highlights that concentrated ownership structure has the advantage 
to generate the „incentive or alignment of interest effects‟ particularly when the controlling 
shareholders are themselves entrepreneurs who have a long-term commitment in the firm. As 
mentioned earlier, these controlling shareholders are usually known as controlling families 
(Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
 
However, controlling shareholders can themselves engage in entrenchment and expropriation. 
Controlling shareholders may act in their own interests without considering the impact of 
their actions on minority shareholders and other investors. This conflict of interests between 
the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders is known as the „principal-
principal‟ agency problem4 (Dharwadkar et al., 2000; Young et al., 2008). Zhuang et al. 
(2000) from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) suggest that weaknesses in corporate 
governance in East Asian countries (including Malaysia) appear to owe much to “highly 
                                                          
4
 Or simply known as „Principal-principal Problem‟. It is also known as „Type II Agency Problem‟. 
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concentrated ownership structure, excessive government interventions, under-developed 
capital markets, and the weak legal and regulatory framework for investor protection” (p.2). 
Due to the weaknesses as outlined by Zhuang et al. (2000), it can thus be concluded that 
conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is the most important 
corporate governance problem in countries with relatively poor shareholder protection (La 
Porta et al., 1999).  
 
As introduced in Section 1.2, families are the most common type of controlling shareholders 
in Malaysia. A controlling shareholder is referred to as the largest shareholder who has the 
capacity to influence the policies and course of action of the firm. It is reported that up to 
67.2% of the publicly-listed firms in Malaysia have family as the controlling shareholder 
(Haslindar and Fazilah, 2009). In general, it is contended that the inclination of controlling 
shareholders to extract private benefits increases with the increase in their controlling interest 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). In other words, 
the higher the ownership concentration and therefore control, the more likely is the 
expropriation of minority shareholders or the firm‟s resources going to occur.  
 
A large controlling family may be wealthy enough that they prefer to maximize their private 
benefits of control (for instance diversifying into unrelated activities for various non-value 
maximization purposes such as empire building), rather than maximize their wealth. Unless 
the family owns the entire firm, they will not internalize the cost of these control benefits to 
the other shareholders (Thillainathan, 1999). Expropriation activities may subsequently 
jeopardize firm efficiency and performance.  
 
Thus far, the literature does not come to a consensus on the influence of family ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Nonetheless, more recent studies have indicated that 
concentration of ownership in the hands of controlling families initially enhances a firm‟s 
performance but the performance declines once expropriation is extensive and the family 
becomes clearly entrenched (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010; Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Thomsen and Pederson, 2000; Morck et al., 1988).  
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Another interesting question in ownership structure is with regard to how the presence of 
other types of block-holders would affect the expropriation and performance of the family-
controlled firms. For instance, the establishment of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) in 2000 by the top five public institutional investors in Malaysia, shows the 
efforts by the institutional investors to instil good governance practice in publicly-listed firms 
so that the interest of minority shareholders can be protected (Effiezal et al., 2008). It is thus 
intriguing to establish the influence of the shareholdings of various types of block-holders in 
family-controlled firms. Some studies show that expropriation of minority shareholders is 
less serious in family firms where the stake of the family is not so pronounced and therefore 
the family control is more vulnerable to contest by other types of block-holders in the firm 
(Maury et al., 2005). The presence of other block-holders (who could form an alliance 
amongst themselves) would propose effective monitoring of the controlling families.  
 
1.3.2  Governance Concerned Firm Activities/Practices underlying Concentrated 
Ownership 
 
1.3.2.1   Control-Enhancing Practices  
 
Controlling families generally enhance their private benefits by engaging in non-value 
maximization policy - or strategy - related activities or practices underlying concentrated 
ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Specifically, the application of various family 
control-enhancing means, business group affiliation, extensive firm diversification, and 
deliberately influencing the appointment of independent directors could all be part of the 
strategy of controlling families to facilitate their expropriation activities and strengthen their 
power for further expropriation. For instance, Claessens et al. (1999c) find that firm 
diversification strategy is used to facilitate expropriation in firms in East Asian countries. 
Studies find that firms with expropriation problems, owing to their ownership structure, have 
lower efficiency and value (Claessens et al., 2002).     
 
As the largest controlling shareholders, families have a major influence on the appointment 
of board directors. In this case, control over the firm (through board directorship) would be 
12 
 
associated with the ownership structure. This relationship has considerable impact on various 
corporate activities/practices and the performance of the firm (Loh and Ragayah, 2007). 
Specifically, the influence of controlling families on director appointments may raise the 
question of whether independent directors are truly independent. If independent directors are 
not truly independent, they may not be able to play an effective role in monitoring the policy 
- or strategy - related corporate activities or practices engaged in by the controlling 
shareholders. For example, it is common in Malaysia for the controlling families to „invite‟ 
retired senior government officials and politicians to join the firm as independent directors 
and the independent status of these directors is often questionable.         
   
Due to the dominance of their ownership and control coupled with their superior knowledge 
about their firms, it is not difficult for controlling families to exploit minority shareholders by 
expropriating resources out from the firm in pursuit of their personal/family benefits (Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009). Control simply refers to the ability of a particular individual 
or group to dominate the decision making process within a firm. To have control over a 
corporation is to have the capacity to determine the policies and course of action of that 
corporation (Loh and Ragayah, 2007). According to Lim (1981), a high concentration of 
ownership affects potential control in that it enables the controlling shareholders to obtain 
and exert more control than is reflected by the actual amount of stocks they actually own, 
while minority shareholders‟ control ability is minimized. This implies that controlling 
shareholders, under the high concentration of ownership may have nearly absolute control.  
 
Controlling families also rely on various control-enhancing means to increase the control to 
be more than that of their ownership right. This control-enhancing means inflates the power 
of the controlling family and the inclination of the controlling family to expropriate increases. 
For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) and Morck et al. (2005) provide international evidence 
that through exploiting the pyramidal structure, family-controlled firms are able to exert 
disproportionate control compared with their cash-flow rights. Similarly, the authors also 
find that families are able to enhance their control by active participation in management 
positions. In Malaysia, 85% of family-controlled firms have managers (CEO or chairperson) 
who belong to a member of the controlling family. Even in developed economies such as the 
US, family-controlled firms are found to be relying on means such as excess board 
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representation and dual-class shares to enhance their control (Villalonga and Amit, 2009). 
Control is also enhanced when a family is the sole block-holder in the firm without the 
presence of a second block-holder. The control power of the family in this case is nearly 
unchallengeable. 
 
In Malaysia, cases of acts of expropriation by controlling shareholders are not unheard of. 
For instance, one of the relatively recently, questionable transactions highlighted, involved 
one of the large family-controlled business groups in Malaysia, the Genting Group. The 
transaction involved the acquisition of the 25-storey office building for RM259 million, and 
lands for RM24.5 million, by one of the affiliated firms, Genting Malaysia (Resorts) from its 
parent company, Genting Berhad in September 2009.
5
 The Genting group operates under the 
pyramidal ownership structure in which Genting Malaysia‟s ownership is controlled by 
Genting Berhad whose ownership is controlled by the founding family. Several issues of 
concern have been raised by the investors in the particular related party transaction (RPT) 
(Business Times, 16 December 2009): (i) the Malaysia‟s Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG)
6
 criticized that Genting did not portray the spirit of good corporate 
governance in the RPT as it did not seek the approval of its minority shareholders for the 
RPT, (ii) since both companies are publicly-listed (Genting Malaysia and Genting Berhad), 
they should appoint their own „independent‟ property valuer/advisor instead of sharing the 
same independent advisor as they did, (iii) the fact that several directors were serving as 
independent directors in both companies at the same time raises the question of the 
independence of these directors, (iv) the fact that Genting Malaysia (Resorts) is a cash cow 
causes the investors to link the RPT as the act of cash extraction by Genting Berhad, the 
parent company (a divergence of cash flow to control right issue).  
 
The Genting example is particularly relevant to the research problem of this study as it 
involves the activities of a business group that are believed to benefit the controlling family 
at the expense of the public minority shareholders, including the alleged profit redistribution 
from the cash cow company.          
                                                          
5
 The Genting group is one of the large family-controlled business groups in Malaysia.   
6
 MSWG is a non-profit organisation set up by the government with the help of the five largest public 
institutional investors in Malaysia in 2000 aimed to protect the interest of minority shareholders and to enhance 
foreign investors‟ confidence in Bursa Malaysia (The Star, 9 Sept 2001).  
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1.3.2.2   Business Group Affiliation and Activities  
 
Within the corporate sector, forming business groups is a common practice in family 
businesses in Malaysia. A family-controlled business group is formed when two or more 
publicly-listed firms are simultaneously controlled by the same family. In other words, the 
family acts as the common controlling shareholders for the firms.
7
 Family-controlled 
business groups in Malaysia often operate across a diversified range of activities within a 
sector, as well as across many sectors as diverse as plantation, manufacturing, trading, 
services, construction and property development (Thillainathan, 1999). The formation of 
business groups by controlling families can bring additional agency problems which do not 
exist in Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly in US and UK corporations (Morck and Yeung, 
2003). It is believed that a specific type of expropriation known as „tunnelling‟ of resources 
out from the listed member firms is more prevalent in family business groups than non-group 
affiliated family firms (Bertrand et al., 2002, 2008; Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).  
   
How a business group facilitates private benefits of control can be illustrated by the 
phenomenon of profit or resource redistribution in business groups. Creating a business 
group allows controlling families to redistribute profits or resources from one member firm 
to another member firm at the expense of certain groups of minority shareholders. Profit 
redistribution can be carried out, for example, in the form of business loans which are 
injected from one member firm which is more profitable to a member firm which is less 
profitable, so that the less profitable firms can continue to survive, therefore ensuring the 
survival of the entire business group (Estrin et al., 2009). The survival of the business group 
provides continuous opportunity to enjoy the private benefits of control to be gained from 
running a business group for controlling families.  
 
Essentially, the low transparency of sprawling, loosely-affiliated business groups makes it 
hard to determine where control resides, as well as identifying and challenging unfair intra-
group transactions (Chang, 2003) in which “such networks provide significant opportunity 
for collusion or other unethical transactions” (Young et al., 2008, p.206). The expanded 
                                                          
7
 Detailed discussion of business group affiliation is available in Chapter 2.  
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control (over a number of listed member firms) made possible by business groups increases 
the chances of expropriation of minority shareholders. The more complicated the structure of 
the business group, the more serious the problem outlined above may be. This is especially 
true in Malaysia where it is widely known that the controlling families of many business 
groups, particularly the large ones, have close relationship with influential senior politicians 
or government officials (Gomez, 2006; Gomez and Jomo, 1999). The relationship provides 
„political patronage and protection‟ to facilitate the expropriation activities by the owner-
managers. The principal-principal problems can therefore be more serious in this case. Qian 
et al. (2010) find that firms with political connections perform poorer than firms without 
such connections because controlling shareholders who have political connections “steal 
more than political ties can bring in” (p.5). In other words, political connection is more 
detrimental than beneficial as far as the public minority shareholders are concerned. 
According to Claessens and Fan (2002), in countries where politicians and businessmen 
collude to extract or protect „rents‟, it is unlikely to achieve high quality corporate 
governance practices.  
 
Thus more in-depth understanding of the agency problems facing family-controlled firms can 
be achieved by examining the business group affiliation issue in some detail.  
 
1.3.2.3   Firm Diversification Strategy  
 
Family firms may also be more inclined to reduce their risk exposure in the business because 
usually a significant proportion of the wealth of the owners is tied to their business. One such 
strategy to reduce risk is to diversify into unrelated business lines. Should a market segment 
not perform well, there are always other business segments to cover the losses. Chinese 
family firms in South East Asia (including Malaysia) have a tendency to diversify, as many 
of them are more widely diversified compared to firms from the West (Bruton et al., 2003).  
 
Though firm diversification is not a corporate governance mechanism per se, previous 
research has suggested that firms in Asia have been active in using firm diversification for 
private benefits and entrenchment. Thus agency problems can be different within diversified 
firms (Claessen et al., 2002; Mitton, 2002). The lower transparency of diversified firms in 
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emerging economies gives rise to a higher level of asymmetric information that may allow 
owner-managers or controlling families to take advantage of minority shareholders with ease 
(Lins and Servaes, 2002; Lins, 2003). Mitton (2002) documented that loss in firm value 
could be particularly pronounced for firms with high diversification during periods of 
economic or financial crisis. This implies that expropriation of minority shareholders 
increases in diversified firms during periods of crisis (Mitton, 2002).    
 
1.3.3   Why Examine Firm Performance? 
 
It is exceptionally difficult to directly quantify the minority shareholders expropriation 
activities in the real world as these activities/transactions are normally conducted in a subtle 
manner or are tied together with other activities/transactions as a package for the board or 
shareholders to approve, whilst reducing attention from the authorities. Nonetheless, the 
effect of expropriation is manifested by the reduction in firm performance. Numerous past 
studies in concentrated ownership such as Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Lins (2003), 
Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Qian et al. (2010) approach expropriation of minority 
shareholders or firm resources by examining the influence of ownership - or governance - 
related firm attributes on performance or value. Firms with expropriation will underperform 
firms without expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Lins, 2003; 
Dahya et al., 2008) and the greater the expropriation, the lower the firm performance, taking 
into account other factors affecting performance. This is because the expropriation activities 
carried out by the controlling family/shareholders to maximize their family/personal benefits 
will bring about suboptimal firm policies which subsequently subdue a firm‟s total earnings, 
growth prospects and therefore the firm‟s market valuation (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Bennedsen et al., 2007; Maury, 2006; Perez-Gonzalez, 2006).       
           
The significance of linking governance-related corporate activities or practices to firm 
performance is that poor performance, due to expropriation of minority shareholders and firm 
resources, has important consequences to business and the economy. Poor performance of 
firms caused by governance-related issues could lead to loss of reputation and shakes the 
confidence of public investors to invest in publicly-listed firms. Tunnelling which can take 
the form of expropriation of cash flows or assets or the combination of both (Atanasov et al., 
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2008), would over time, result in loss of earnings for the firm, either directly or by way of 
loss of productive assets (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010). Additionally, any perception of 
expropriation by the market can, in turn, adversely affect outside investment and thus the 
market performance of those firms.  
 
The concerns outlined above have an implication for the mechanism of capital-raising from 
the public. Poor performance of firms may even threaten their very survivorship. The 
investment returns of public minority shareholders could be seriously affected if the 
performance of a firm deteriorates as a result of the decline in their corporate governance 
quality. This is especially true during periods of economic turbulence where the owner-
managers of firms will be more inclined to abuse their position and expropriate the minority 
shareholders (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). The market may not be 
able to fully anticipate and capture the potential expropriation of all firms and as such the 
effects of decline in performance will be borne by the public investors. Thus, a sound 
corporate governance system is important, not only for protecting investors, but to also help 
reduce the risk of increased agency problems during times of crisis and therefore promote 
financial stability. An environment more conducive to the efficient and sustainable growth of 
the corporate sector can be created as a result.  
 
Efficient use of resources can be promoted and firms‟ cost of investment capital can be 
reduced when both domestic and international investor confidence is boosted. Corporate 
assets will be utilized as agreed regardless of whether that capital investment is debt or equity 
financed when good corporate governance is practiced (Loh and Ragayah, 2007). A lower 
cost of capital translates into higher earnings performance and market valuation for the firms. 
On the contrary, misallocation of resources due to the resource expropriation and agency 
problems underlying the poor governance system will affect not only firm performance but 
eventually the economic growth and social welfare of a country.  
1.4   Research Questions 
 
From discussion of the „research problem and issues‟ in the previous section, it can now be 
summarized that the main concern of corporate governance in East Asia including Malaysia 
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is the principal-principal agency problems that have been exacerbated by low transparency 
related to rent-seeking and relationship-based corporate culture; the use of control-enhancing 
means; extensive use of business groups and firm diversification. Thus the main research 
question (RQ) of this study is stated as follows:  
 
Main RQ: Coupled with the benefits brought about by concentrated family ownership, in 
what way will the concerns of concentrated ownership and the outlined underlying firm 
strategies/activities or practices in family-controlled firms influence the firm’s 
performance? In short, the study is interested in examining the consequences of the 
concentrated ownership structure and the underlying firm strategies/activities or practices on 
the performance of family-controlled firms.   
   
It is the intention of this study to examine the above-mentioned research question in a direct, 
as well as indirect, manner. In other words, emphasis will be placed not only on the direct 
influence of one particular variable on another variable, but also the indirect influence of a 
variable through its moderating influence on the relationship between two variables. A 
deeper and richer understanding of the issues involved may be obtained by so doing.  
 
The main research question stated above can now be broken down into several specific 
research questions (RQs) as follows:   
 
RQ1: Coupled with the benefits brought about by the concentrated ownership structure, in 
what way (for example, favourably or unfavourably) will the concerns of the concentrated 
ownership structure in family-controlled firms influence the performance of the firms? It 
should be noted that „ownership structure‟ refers to both „concentration‟ and „identity‟ of 
ownership [i.e. the level of shareholdings („concentration‟) by each type of block-holders 
(„identity‟) in the family-controlled firms].     
 
RQ2: Will the firm activities or practices underlying concentrated family ownership, namely, 
the practice of relying on control-enhancing means and the activities associated with 
business group affiliation and firm diversification, be beneficial or harmful to the 
performance of family-controlled firms?  
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RQ3: What will be the moderating influence of board independence on the effects of family 
ownership as well as the underlying business group affiliation and diversification activities 
on firm performance?  
 
RQ4: What will be the moderating influence of ownership structure as well as control-
enhancing means and business group affiliation on the firm diversification-performance 
relation?  
 
Table 1.1 below provides a summary of past studies together with the theoretical basis that is 
used to help justify and formulate the research questions. The table also provides a brief 
explanation of the importance of the study in contributing to the literature. More detailed 
discussions pertaining to the literature, theoretical basis and contribution of the study are 
covered in subsequent sections or chapters as annotated in the table.             
 
1.5   Objectives of Study 
 
Following the research questions, the broad objective of this study is: to examine the 
influence of concentrated ownership structure and the underlying firm strategies/activities or 
practices (that give rise to corporate governance issues) on the performance of family-
controlled firms. This broad objective can be satisfied by achieving the following specific 
individual objectives:  
 
a) To provide a detailed examination of the influence of the firms‟ ownership structure 
on firm performance. Specifically, the influence of the controlling family‟s ownership 
as well as the ownership of other block-holders in the family-controlled firms on firm 
performance is explored. (Hypothesis 1) – answering RQ1. 
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Table 1.1: Justification and Formulation of Research Questions  
Main 
Research 
Question 
Sub-Research Questions Theoretical Basis 
of the Study 
(Covered in Section 
2.3, Chapter 2) 
Some Previous Studies Associated with 
the Research Questions  
(Covered in Chapter 2 and 3 of the study)  
Why Is This Study Being 
Conducted?  
(More Details in Section 1.7, Chapter 1) 
Coupled with 
the benefits 
brought about 
by 
concentrated 
ownership in 
family-
controlled 
firms, in what 
way will the 
concerns of 
concentrated 
ownership 
structure and 
the outlined 
underlying 
firm 
strategies/acti
vities or 
practices in 
family-
controlled 
firms 
influence the 
firm‟s 
performance? 
RQ1: Coupled with the benefits brought 
about by the concentrated ownership 
structure, in what way (for example, 
favourably or unfavourably) will the 
concerns of the concentrated ownership 
structure in family-controlled firms 
influence the performance of the firms? 
 
 
Main: 
Agency Theory – 
Principal-
principal Problem 
(also known as 
Type II Agency 
Problem)  
 
Complementary: 
Resource-based 
View 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. 
(1999, 2000), Claessen et al. (2000, 2002), 
Claessens and Fan ( 2002),  Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), Pederson and Thomsen (2003), Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006), Tam and Tan (2007), Young 
et al. (2008), Andres (2008), Jara-Bertin et al. 
(2008), Bennedsen et al. (2010) 
 Analysis within the framework of 
concentrated ownership that 
explicitly incorporates the 
underlying firm activities/strategies 
or practices and their interplays, 
such as the explicit analysis of 
business groups in the domain of 
governance-related and 
performance study (to the 
knowledge of the researcher) has 
not been attempted in Malaysia.    
 
 Malaysia presents an interesting 
and important institutional context 
to examine the research questions 
in situation where the evidence of 
close link between corporate and 
politics is pervasive and well 
documented (for instance in 
Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Faccio et 
al., 2006 
8
; Faccio, 2006; Gomez, 
1999).  
 
 Focusing only on „family firms‟- a 
promising area for governance-
related study and not mixing with 
other types of firms such as state-
controlled or widely-held firms.    
RQ2: Will the firm activities or practices 
underlying concentrated family 
ownership, namely, the practice of 
relying on control-enhancing means and 
the activities associated with business 
group affiliation and firm diversification, 
be beneficial or harmful to the 
performance of family-controlled firms? 
Lincoln et al. (1996), Ang et al. (2000), Khanna 
and Palepu (2000a), Joh (2003), Morck and 
Yeung (2003), Gomez (2006), Claessens et al. 
(2006), Cheung et al. (2006), Khanna and Yafeh 
(2007), Florackis (2008), Estrin (2009), Berkman 
et al. (2010), Bhaumik and Gregoriou (2010), 
Almeida et al. (2011), Masulis et al. (2011) 
RQ3: What will be the moderating 
influence of board independence on the 
effects of family ownership as well as the 
underlying business group affiliation and 
diversification activities on firm 
performance?  
 
Rakider and Seth (1995), Filatotchev et al. 
(2005), Nazli and Weetman (2006), Bru and 
Crespi-Cladera (2006), Gani and Jermias (2006), 
Dahya et al. (2008), Kim et al. (2008), Chen et 
al. (2009), Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), Prabowo 
and Simpson (2011), Chen and Chen (2012) 
RQ4: What will be the moderating 
influence of ownership structure as well 
as control-enhancing means and business 
group affiliation on the firm 
diversification-performance relation?  
Amihud and Lev (1981), Claessens et al. 
(1999c), Chen and Ho (2000), Lins and Servaes 
(2002), Hoskissson et al. (2005), Zuaini and 
Napier (2006), Chakrabarti et al. (2007), Singh 
et al. (2007), Zunaidah and Fauzias (2008), Chu 
and Song (2011) 
                                                          
8 In Faccio‟s et al. (2006) study on political connections among 35 countries in the world, Malaysia is the country with the highest percentage of firms with political connections.    
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b) To examine aspects of family-controlled business group affiliation pertaining to 
governance and firm performance. Specifically, the effect of group affiliation on firm 
performance against the non-group firms (also known as independent firms) is 
examined. This is followed by examining the phenomenon of profit/resource 
redistribution in business groups and the efficiency of profit/resource redistribution in 
group-affiliated firms compared to non-group firms (as efficiency can impinge on 
firm performance). (Hypotheses 2a and 3) – answering RQ2. 
 
c) To examine the influence of family control-enhancing means on the performance of 
group-affiliated firms as well as non-group firms. The control-enhancing means to be 
examined are: the use of pyramidal structures to diverge the cash flows-to-control 
right; the forming of complicated business group structures; increase of family 
directors on the board; monopoly of family members in both the board chairperson 
and CEO positions; and the presence of the controlling family as the sole block-
holder of the firm. (Hypothesis H2b-2g) – answering RQ2. 
 
d) To examine and compare the relationship between firm diversification and firm 
efficiency and performance in group-affiliated firms and non-group firms. In addition 
to the direct effect, focus is also directed towards examining the contributory effects 
of governance-related firm attributes; namely the ownership structure and the control-
enhancing means in influencing the firm diversification-performance relation. 
(Hypothesis 4) – answering RQ2 and RQ4.    
     
e) To examine the moderating role of board independence on the influence of 
governance-related firm attributes or activities on firm performance. Specifically, the 
moderating influence of board independence on the effects of family ownership and 
diversification on firm performance is examined. The moderating influence of board 
independence on the efficiency of profit redistribution in group-affiliated firms is also 
examined. (Hypotheses H1c, H3d, H4j) – answering RQ3. 
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1.6   The Research Framework 
 
The conceptualization of the entire study and the relationship between the objectives of the 
study and the hypotheses can be seen in the flowchart diagram of research conceptual 
framework (see Figure 1.1). The diagram depicts all the conceptual variables
9
 involved in the 
study and their influences on firm performance are indicated by the numbered hypothesis. 
The development of all the hypotheses as numbered in the diagram is fully explained and 
justified in the section on hypotheses development in Chapter 3. The flowchart starts with the 
concentrated ownership structure of family-controlled firms in a relatively weak law 
enforcement environment where political interference in the corporate sector is prevalent. 
Four areas of firm activities or practices underlying concentrated ownership structure which 
may give rise to corporate governance concerns are identified and developed into four main 
themes of the study.  
 
As shown in Figure 1.1 (from the solid lines that branch out from the „Concentrated 
Ownership‟ box), these areas of activities or practices are: i) the ownership holdings of 
controlling families and other block-holders; ii) business group affiliation and other control-
enhancing means; iii) profit redistribution and related issues in business groups; iv) firm 
diversification activities. These firm activities or practices are either made possible by the 
concentrated ownership structure or at least highly influenced by it.           
 
Four sets of hypotheses from set H1 to set H4 are then developed to form the conceptual 
framework, with each representing an area of governance concern underlying concentrated 
ownership structure. As mentioned earlier, not only is the direct influence of each conceptual 
variable on firm performance examined; the effects of the interaction amongst the variables 
(through the use of moderating variables) on firm performance are also examined so that 
more insight and a deeper understanding of the issues involved can be obtained.  
 
Hypotheses in set H1 (highlighted in purple) concern the influence of ownership structure on 
firm performance. The diagram shows that in addition to the hypotheses on the direct 
                                                          
9
 The operational variables pertaining to the conceptual variables are discussed in Chapter 4 – Data and 
Methodology.  
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influence of ownership structure on firm performance, the moderating influence of board 
independence on the relationship between controlling family ownership and firm 
performance is also examined. Set H2 (highlighted in blue) concerns the influence of 
business group affiliation and other family control-enhancing means on firm performance. 
The dotted line #1 indicates that control-enhancing means are in part associated with business 
group affiliation as some of the control-enhancing means, namely the pyramidal ownership 
structure and the complexity of business group structures, are available only to the group-
affiliated firms.  
 
Set H3 (highlighted in red) concerns the profit redistribution phenomenon in family-
controlled business groups and the influence on firm performance. It also examines the 
influence of profit redistribution on the capital expenditure ratio in which the outcome could 
then be linked back to explain the relationship between business group affiliation and firm 
performance (as indicated by dotted line #2).  
 
Set H4 (highlighted in green) concerns the influence of firm diversification on performance. 
As shown in the green area of Figure 1.1, the emphasis in this area is the use of numerous 
hypotheses to examine the moderating influence of other governance-related firm 
activities/practices on the firm diversification-performance link. These activities/practices 
include the areas of ownership structure, board independence, business group affiliation, and 
control-enhancing means.  The influence of firm diversification on asset utilization (which 
refers to the asset turnover ratio) is also examined in which the outcome on asset utilization 
could be linked back to explain the relationship between firm diversification and 
performance (as indicated by dotted line #3).  
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Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework of the Study   
 
 H1a – H1b H1c 
  
     H1d – H1j 
 
    H2b – H2g 
    #1 
H4c  H2a 
 
 H4a – H4b  
 H4d – H4e H3a H3b 
  H4f-H4h   H3c 
 H3d 
 H4j H4i #2 
 
   #3 
 
                                                                                                                                Main Variables                         Moderating Variables 
 
       
Concentrated Ownership 
of Family-controlled Firms 
Asset Utilization 
Profit Redistribution 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
Performance 
CAPEX Ratio 
Control-Enhancing 
Means 
Business Group 
Affiliation  
Firm 
Diversification 
Other Block-holders 
Controlling Family 
Ownership 
Board Indp. 
Board Indp. 
Board Indp. 
OS & BG 
Size 
 
OS 
BG Affl. 
 
C. E. M 
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Notes to Figure 1.1: 
1. OS = Ownership Structure.  
2. BG Affl. = Business Group Affiliation.  
3. C.E.M. = Control-enhancing Means. 
4. Board Indp. = Board Independence. 
5. OS & BG = Ownership Structure and Business Group Affiliation. 
6. Arrow lines (            ) coming out from the main (moderating) variables indicate that the variables are 
hypothesized as having an influence (moderating influence) on firm performance. 
7. Dotted line (             ) #1 indicates that Control-Enhancing Means are in part associated with business 
group affiliation as some of the control-enhancing means, namely, the pyramidal ownership structure 
and the complexity of business groups are only available to the group-affiliated firms and not the non-
group firms.   
8. Dotted line (             ) #2 indicates that Capital Expenditure-to-Total Assets (CAPEX ratio) [which is 
used to examine the efficiency of resource redistribution in group-affiliated firms] could be linked to 
explain the relationship between group affiliation and firm performance.  
9. Dotted line (             ) #3 indicates that Asset Utilization (which refers to the asset turnover ratio) could 
be linked to explain the relationship between firm diversification and performance.  
10. Solid lines joining two variables (             ) indicate association between the variables.   
  
   
1.7   Scope and Significance of Study 
 
First and foremost, concentrated ownership and its underlying governance-performance 
issues in this study are investigated and discussed from the perspective of a shareholder 
rather than a stakeholder. This does not mean to discount the importance of the stakeholder 
theory of corporate governance but is to essentially keep the scope of the study manageable. 
Thus discussion on the effects on stakeholders other than shareholders such as employees, 
creditors, and consumers will be minimal and they may be considered for future, post-
doctoral research.    
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This thesis examines the relationship between concentrated ownership and the underlying 
firm activities or practices and firm performance in a single legal and institutional 
environment, therefore allowing the study to hold constant a number of important contextual 
factors. Put differently, undertaking a single country ownership study instead of a cross-
country study has the advantage of avoiding endogeneity problems between ownership 
structure and other related variables and country-specific institutional characteristics (Joh, 
2003; Filatotchev et al., 2005). In other words, the relationship between ownership-related 
variables and firm performance may be caused by the difference in political and corporate 
environments, legal systems and enforcement, taxation or accounting rules. By focusing on a 
single country - Malaysia - this study can control for the outlined country-specific factors.   
 
Though research on family-controlled firms and their performance is burgeoning, they are 
mostly based on examples from the West. Given their different environmental systems, the 
results of studies in these countries are not generalisable to emerging economies such as 
Malaysia. Though family business is the most common type of ownership structure in 
Malaysia, little research has been conducted in the area and many issues related to family 
ownership and underlying firm activities or practices such as the use of control-enhancing 
means, board independence issue, and group affiliation and diversification activities are yet 
to be sufficiently explored. Since there have been increased efforts only in recent years to 
investigate issues in emerging economies (e.g. Prabowo and Simpson, 2011 in Indonesia; 
Charkrabarti, 2007 in India; Tan and Tam, 2007 in Malaysia; Guest and Sutherland, 2010 in 
China; and Almeida et al., 2011 in Korea), the pool of literature pertaining to issues in these 
economies is still limited. As such, this study intends to fill the gap and in so doing, 
contribute to the better understanding of the influence of family ownership and the 
underlying firm activities or practices on firm performance. This will also help policy-makers 
to draw up effective guidelines or codes that are, at the same time, accommodating of the 
unique features of family firms.
10
 
 
To the best of the researcher‟s knowledge, this study is one of the first to provide a 
comprehensive empirical analysis in an approach that integrates ownership variables and 
respective underlying governance issues (business group affiliation, control-enhancing means, 
                                                          
10
 The policy implications of the study are discussed in detail in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7.  
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and firm diversification) with corresponding interaction terms for family-controlled firms in 
Malaysia. According to Claessens and Fan (2002), business group affiliation and firm 
diversification are among several corporate governance issues underlying concentrated 
ownership structures which are specific to Asia, or at least more important in Asia.  
 
Little is currently known on the interacting influence, or the interplay of, ownership and these 
underlying firm activities or practices on firm performance. For instance, while the 
relationship between firm diversification and performance has been widely researched in the 
literature with no definite conclusion, there are few studies which have examined the impact 
of the interplay between firm diversification and other governance related or concerned 
variables such as ownership structure, control-enhancing means, board independence, and 
group affiliation on firm performance. Studying the interacting effects of these firm activities 
and practices helps us to increase our understanding of the governance issues involved and 
gain richer insights into these issues so that more meaningful implications can be drawn. This 
study thus contributes to filling the gap in this context by providing a new spectrum of 
knowledge with regards to concentrated ownership, underlying firm activities or practices as 
well as their interaction effects on firm performance in Malaysia.   
 
1.7.1   Why Publicly-listed, Family-controlled Firms? 
According to a recent paper by Bennedsen et al. (2010), „family-controlled firms‟ is a fertile 
ground for corporate governance and performance research. One of the reasons is because 
family-controlled firms are associated with significantly more dispersion in the measure of 
their performance than other types of firms and the corporate governance mechanisms that 
lead to such extreme performance outcomes are at present only partially understood 
(Bennedsen et al., 2010). Thus, by focusing on the influence of the concentrated ownership 
structure of family-controlled firms and underlying firm activities or practices on firm 
performance, this study contributes to our understanding of the extreme governance-
performance outcome as stated by Bennedsen et al. (2010), and by so doing; fills the gap in 
the corporate governance, as well as family firms, literature. 
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The interest of the researcher to focus on family-controlled firms in this study is also because 
family is the most common block-holder controlling two-thirds of publicly-listed firms in 
Malaysia (Claessens et al., 2002; Business Times, 2010). Family-controlled firms are also the 
most common type of corporations in many other countries around the world (Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou, 2010). They represent a special class of large shareholders that have a unique 
incentive structure and strong motivation of owner-managers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) 
which is not found in other large shareholders such as institutional investor-controlled firms. 
This is because the owner-managers have the tendency and obligation to pass on wealth to 
the next generation and thus they possess longer-term commitment compared to non-family 
firms where the professional managers may be short-termist in their management approach. 
Thus it is important to conduct more governance-related research in family-controlled firms 
in order to have a deeper understanding on the governance-performance related issues in this 
type of firm which are currently much under-researched in Malaysia. Moreover, the decision 
to focus on family-controlled listed firms only is based on the assumption that mixing them 
with other types of listed firms could cause loss of focus to the study. This focus also helps to 
make the study manageable.  
 
Though research into the problems of firms that are widely-held is abundant, research on 
family business groups is in its infancy due to the fact that this type of business group 
structure is absent in the US and UK, where most corporate governance research is carried 
out (Morck and Yeung, 2003). Business group affiliation is a significant governance feature 
of particular relevance in many East Asian countries including Malaysia and it forms part of 
the wider research domain of family business governance. Thus a substantial portion of this 
study is devoted to examining governance-related issues in family-controlled business groups, 
and by so doing, contributes to this promising area of corporate governance research.      
 
Finally, this study focuses only on publicly-listed family-controlled firms and does not 
include privately-held family-controlled corporations in order to avoid the difficulty of 
obtaining data in privately-held corporations. Data on publicly-listed firms are publicly 
available and more importantly trustworthy as their source is mainly audited company annual 
reports. As shares of listed firms are publicly traded, market-based performance measures 
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can also be employed in the study and therefore the problem of performance measures being 
constrained only to accounting-based measures can be avoided.  
 
1.7.2   Why Malaysia? 
 
The Malaysian corporate sector represents an interesting research laboratory that presents an 
opportunity to expand further prior research and to make a number of contributions. First, it 
enables us to analyze the influence of concentrated ownership and the underlying firm 
activities or practices on firm performance, in situations where the managers are frequently 
family members, where family members also serve on the corporate board, and where they 
have the largest equity ownership of the firm (the largest provider of capital), either directly 
or indirectly through relational shareholdings in other firms (Bruton et al., 2003; Filatotchev 
et al., 2005).  
 
Second, research on the influence of concentrated ownership and the underlying firm 
activities or practices; namely, the business group affiliation, the use of control-enhancing 
means, and firm diversification on firm performance in small emerging economies such as 
Malaysia is very limited as most of the previous studies in this area are targeted either at 
firms in advanced economies or large emerging economies such as India and China. Thus the 
findings in this study are useful to reflect upon in relation to other similar-size emerging 
economies.  
 
Third, Malaysia offers a unique institutional setting for the research. Due to the 
implementation of a peculiar affirmative economic policy since 1970,
11
 the line between the 
corporate sector and politics in Malaysia becomes blurred. Corporations with political 
connection, including family-controlled ones, are prevalent in Malaysia compared to 
elsewhere in the world. Therefore the findings in this study are particularly relevant to the 
emerging economies with considerable business-political connections. The study thus adds to 
the corporate governance literature in this particular context. Moreover, the relationship-
based corporate culture makes it an intriguing study because this environment has produced 
its own variants of principal-principal problems. Strategic choices of firms such as decisions 
                                                          
11
 A review of Malaysia‟s economic policy is provided in Chapter 2.  
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on the diversification and business group affiliation strategies may produce different 
outcomes under different institutional contexts. Therefore, study conducted in this rich 
institutional context may provide more insight into how institution shapes the outcomes of 
the findings compared to countries with different institutional settings, particularly those in 
developed countries. According to Scott (1995) [as cited in Young et al. (2008)], “it is 
difficult if not impossible to discern the effects of institutions on social structures and 
behaviours if all our cases are embedded in the same or very similar ones” (p.210). 
Therefore, this research with its focus in Malaysia, a small emerging economy, can enlighten 
management study and practice not only in Malaysia, but also in developed economies such 
as that of the UK.  
 
Fourth, in keeping with the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia, all the listed firms in 
Malaysia are required to prepare their financial statements according to the accepted 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the Ninth Schedule of Malaysian 
Companies Act, 1965. In other words, data based on the annual reports are consistent with 
the accounting standards. The firms are also required to abide by the disclosure standards of 
the listing requirements. The data lodged with Bursa Malaysia would also need to be certified 
by qualified auditors and made accessible to the public. It is thus reasonable to consider that 
accounting data/financial information disclosed by the firms is consistent in quality (Fraser et 
al., 2006). This, together with the relatively developed stock market in Malaysia, provides an 
opportunity to conduct a relatively rigorous empirical study using firm-level accounting and 
stock market data.       
    
Finally, since Malaysia is the researcher‟s home country, apart from being more familiar with 
the Malaysian corporate world, choosing Malaysia as the country of research focus helps to 
contribute to the empirical findings and literature of corporate governance in Malaysia. Thus, 
the compilation of knowledge can be used by relevant parties in Malaysia to help create more 
awareness in the corporate sector on the importance of embracing the substance of good 
corporate governance, particularly so if Malaysia were to be brought to the forefront of the 
world‟s economies in the future.   
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1.8   Structure of the Thesis  
 
The remaining chapters of the study are as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review provides a review of current literature and other relevant 
sources that guide our understanding of the issues of interest in the study. It outlines the 
salient features of the Malaysian governance and institutional environment and explores the 
extant literature around ownership structures and the associated business group affiliation 
and board independence issues. Attention is given to the review of literature associated with 
East Asia and Malaysia. The chapter also provides an explanation of the theoretical basis of 
the study.  
 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review with Corresponding Hypotheses is a continuation from 
Chapter 2. It focuses on the part of the literature review that is directly utilized to establish 
and justify the hypotheses in the study. Specifically, justification is made of the hypotheses 
that are developed and centred around the direct, as well as moderating, influence of 
concentrated ownership structures and the underlying firm activities/strategies or practices on 
firm performance. Hypotheses are introduced and stated sequentially as the review of 
literature progresses.  
 
Chapter 4 – Data and Methodology provides a detailed discussion on the process of data 
collection and construction of variables. It also explains the methods of analysis used in the 
study and the justification for using them. The hypotheses introduced in the previous chapter 
are subjected to empirical testing by using model specifications as constructed and explained 
in this chapter. The chapter also contains a brief description of the philosophical stance and 
ethical issues of the research.  
 
Chapter 5 – Findings and Discussions I: Descriptive Statistics represents the initial stage of 
analysis in the study. It provides quantitative description and comparison on the main 
statistical features of the variables in the study (e.g. percentage, mean and median, and 
standard deviation) in order to prepare for the subsequent analysis and inferences in the next 
chapter. Some univariate tests are performed accordingly.  
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Chapter 6 – Findings and Discussions II: Multivariate Analysis presents the analyses and 
findings based mainly on the multiple and moderated regression techniques. It aims to 
answer and respond to all the hypotheses and consequently the research questions developed 
in the study. Discussions from the analysis and findings are undertaken and inferences and 
implications are drawn and presented. 
 
Chapter 7 – Conclusion offers an overall discussion on the findings followed by an overall 
evaluation on the policy implications of the study. It also discusses the contribution of the 
study to professional practice. Lastly, the chapter outlines the limitations of the study and 
suggestions for future research.     
 
1.9   Chapter Summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to conceptualize the entire study. It began with a „quick view‟ 
of the study and addressed the question, „what is this study all about?‟ It contains a brief 
explanation of the main research question and the broad objective of the study. It also 
provided a brief summary of findings. The chapter then proceeded to explicate the 
background for the study. Emphasis is given to the corporate governance development and 
concerns in Malaysia after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Among the concerns of corporate 
governance reform in Malaysia is the highly concentrated structure of ownership in family-
controlled firms operating in an environment of weak rule enforcement coupled with 
emphasis on the „form‟ but not the „substance‟ of governance. All these result in excessive 
control power in the hands of controlling families and allows them to make decision on 
strategies/activities or practices that privately benefit them at the expense of overall firm 
performance and thus minority shareholders.  
 
The ensuing section of the chapter explained the research problem and issues. Gaps in the 
literature were identified and major themes of the study were explored and discussed. The 
section is divided into several sub-sections according to the major themes of the study. It 
began with the explication on why concentrated ownership structure is the single most 
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important corporate governance mechanism in Malaysia. It then discussed some of the 
advantages and disadvantages of concentrated ownership. The discussion also included the 
importance of other types of block-holders in family-controlled firms. The next sub-section 
explained the various means available to controlling families to enhance their control over 
the firms. They include the use of pyramidal ownership structure; the direct control of family 
over the two top positions of the firm; the increase of board representation; and when the 
families appear as the sole block-holder of the firm. The consequences of the availability of 
such means are an increased tendency of expropriation of the firm‟s resources and minority 
shareholders‟ interests. The real world case study of the Genting Group is provided to 
illustrate the potential expropriation by a controlling family.          
 
The subsequent sub-section explained the potential of business groups to facilitate activities 
that could provide private benefits to controlling families. These include activities such as 
„tunnelling‟ and „redistribution of profits/resources‟. The close connection of business groups 
with politics is also illuminated. This is especially true in business groups that are large in 
size and complicated in their group ownership structure. Firm diversification as a potential 
means to create private benefits was explained in the next sub-section. The chapter then 
proceeded to explicate why firm performance is chosen as the output variable in the study. It 
is noted from the literature that one method to approach the issue of expropriation of 
minority shareholders is by examining the influence of the governance-related firm attributes 
such as ownership and underlying activities on firm performance. Since expropriation 
activities are associated with sub-optimal policies and decision-makings, increasing 
expropriation is thus associated with decreasing firm efficiency and performance.  
 
Following detailed explanation of the research problems and issues, the main research 
question, together with the specific sub-questions, was then formulated and presented in the 
subsequent section, followed by the objectives of study. Five objectives of study were 
identified, each with its respective hypotheses. The conceptual framework of the study was 
then presented in the following section where the conceptualization of the entire study is 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. The chapter then presented a detailed section on the scope and 
significance of the study. The section justifies the importance of studying governance-related 
issues on publicly-listed family-controlled firms. It also justifies the reasons for choosing 
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corporate Malaysia as the research laboratory. The chapter concluded with an explanation on 
the structure of the thesis.  
 
In the next chapter, literature relevant to ownership structure and associated firm activities or 
practices is explored and reviewed. The theoretical basis for the study is also explained. Prior 
to that, attention is drawn to the discussion on the development of the Malaysian corporate 
environment and political involvement in business.   
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
 
2.1   Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a review of the governance environment and corporate culture in 
Malaysia. Firstly, the development of Malaysian economic policy since independence is 
presented. Emphasis is given to the development which has resulted in the establishment of 
affirmative economic policy from 1970 to the current day. This development has a crucial 
impact on the blurring of lines between politics and the corporate sector which 
subsequently adversely affects the corporate governance environment in the country. The 
section reviews how the public governance, weakened by money politics and corruption, 
coupled with relationship-based corporate culture and cronyism, has impacted upon 
corporate governance development in the country.  
Having examined the corporate environment in Malaysia, the following section presents the 
theoretical basis for the study before proceeding to a review of the ownership structure 
literature. Attention is drawn to ownership structure in East Asia and Malaysia. The 
subsequent section reviews the issue of board independence, from the perspectives of 
„agency theory‟ and „resource-based view‟. The next section is devoted to the review of 
business group affiliation which forms a substantial part of the study. Highlighted in the 
section are the different ways in which business groups are being defined in the literature, as 
well as in East Asian countries. The focus of the section is on family-controlled business 
groups in East Asia including Malaysia. A sub-section touches on the pyramidal structure, a 
characteristic that exists in some of the business groups in this country.  
2.2 The Malaysian Governance and Institutional Environment: Political 
Involvement in Business and Relationship-based Corporate Culture 
 
Principal-principal problems that exist among corporations in East Asia including Malaysia, 
as introduced in Chapter 1, are exacerbated by a corporate environment of low corporate 
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transparency, rent-seeking activities and relationship-based corporate culture (Claessens and 
Fan, 2002). This prevailing corporate environment in turn has a direct bearing on the 
opportunity of controlling shareholders to expropriate through firm activities or practices 
underlying concentrated ownership. It is thus important for us to understand from a historical 
viewpoint the development of the governance and institutional environment in this country, 
in which family-controlled firms operate.   
 
The review in this section serves two purposes: i) an appreciation of the development of 
Malaysian governance environment and corporate culture will provide the reader with 
sufficient background knowledge to better understand the research problem and issues as 
outlined in Section 1.3 in this study and, ii) the study attempts to make the case that 
interference of politics in corporate Malaysia caused by the government‟s unique affirmative 
economic policy (to be explored below) has profoundly influenced corporate governance 
quality in the country. In other words, political connections have caused the controlling 
shareholders of firms to have greater inclination to expropriate firm resources and minority 
shareholders. This is particularly true among the controlling shareholders of large business 
groups where the nexus between politics/state and business is most clearly displayed (Yeoh, 
2010).  
 
The corporate culture in Malaysia and many other East Asian countries is one that is 
relationship-based (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This is opposed to the arm‟s length corporate 
culture in Anglo-Saxon countries. Family-controlled listed firms in Malaysia are located in a 
unique institutional setting and governance environment which differ from other countries. 
This is because apart from South Africa, Malaysia is the only country in the world that has an 
affirmative action policy for the majority (Adam, 1997), with the aim of improving the 
economic status of the majority of ethnic Malays. As a result, many family-controlled listed 
firms in Malaysia in general embrace the culture of rent-seeking encouraged by the 
government‟s long- term economic affirmative action policy. A review of the impact of the 
policy on the governance environment and corporate culture in Malaysia is provided in the 
subsequent paragraphs.  
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The close link between business and politics in Malaysia is well documented (for example in 
Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Faccio, 2006; Gomez, 2006). According to Gomez and Jomo (1999), 
two forms of political favouritism exist in corporate Malaysia today. They are (i) where 
official status is awarded to firms that are managed by ethnics Malays and (ii) where 
informal ties exist between senior politicians and firms that are controlled by either the 
Chinese or Malay individuals/families. Firms with official status are also known as 
government-linked corporations in which the government itself is the largest shareholder and 
has absolute control over the firms. The discussion of political connection in this study 
focuses on the second form of political connection: firms which are family-controlled but 
where the controlling families are linked to prominent government officials or political 
figures.  
 
2.2.1   The Pre-New Economic Policy (Pre-NEP) Period 
 
Political favouritism in corporate Malaysia can be traced back to 1957 when the then Malaya 
gained independence from the British. As in many other British colonies during the British 
colonial period, the people in Malaya were subjected to the „divide and rule‟ policy (Verma, 
2004). The Malays, being the indigenous people of the country and forming over half the 
population, were mostly confined to the villages and lived as peasants, working as fishermen 
and civil servants. Chinese and Indian people have migrated to Malaya since the nineteenth 
century, and have therefore been part of the Malayan society for over a century. Naturally 
entrepreneurial, the Chinese mainly settled in urban areas and were involved in businesses; 
trading and tin mining, and the Indians mainly worked and lived in the rubber estates 
controlled by the British (Verma, 2004).  
 
Among the three main ethnic groups (Malays, Chinese and Indians), the Chinese were the 
most economically dominant as many of them were actively involved in productive economy 
activities. Income inequality among the races started to become a cause for concern. The 
Malays were mindful of and insecure about the economic dominance of the Chinese. For 
example, in 1957/58, the average monthly household income for the Chinese was, in 
Malaysian Ringgit (RM), 300 followed by Indians RM237 and Malays RM139 (Snodgrass, 
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1980). The Malays (particularly the pre-colonial Malay ruling class) were more interested in 
political power and colonial administrative services and occupied positions immediately 
subordinate to those held by British administrators.  
 
The United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was founded in 1946 as a political party 
to protect the Malays‟ interest and many of those who led UMNO actually began their 
careers in colonial administration (Jomo, 1988). Due to the weaker socio-economic position 
of the Malays compared to other ethnic groups, especially the Chinese, when Malaya gained 
independence from the British in 1957, the Special Rights status for the Malays was 
incorporated as Article 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaya to safeguard Malays‟ 
interests by reserving quotas to Malays in certain areas as stipulated in the article. Upon 
independence, the Malays had gained political power from the British but economic power 
resided with the Chinese. As stated by Jomo (1988), political power without an economic 
base was essentially fragile and untenable in the long run.  
 
To promote Malay capitalism, UMNO, the dominant ruling party since independence, carried 
out some „economic development‟ programmes and activities for the Malays under the 
Malay Special Rights. For instance, in 1965, the First National Bumiputera
12
 Economic 
Congress was held and Bank Bumiputera was established, both aiming to improve the 
Malays‟ economic status and accumulation of Malay capital (Jomo, 1988). Despite these 
efforts, actual progress did not bring satisfactory results. Moreover, due to the practice of the 
laissez-faire system after independence from 1957-1970, the Chinese economic dominance 
continued to grow and expand whereas the majority of Malays continued to be economically 
subordinate. The income inequality between the Chinese and Malays became even more 
serious.  
 
By 1970, the average household monthly income for the Chinese had increased to RM399 
while the Malays remained lowest at RM177 (Heng, 1997). Chinese ownership in the 
corporate sector in 1970 was 34.4%, while the Malay ownership was negligible at a mere 2.4% 
(Heng, 1997). After over a decade‟s accumulation of discontent and frustration over uneven 
                                                          
12
 Bumiputera is a term used to refer to the indigenous people of Malaysia which consist mainly of ethnic 
Malays.  
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economic development among different ethnic groups, the inter-racial antagonism finally 
resulted in the post-election race riots of 1969. The government was convinced that the 
economic deprivation of the Malays was one of the main causes of the riots.  
 
2.2.2   The New Economic Policy (NEP) Period 
 
Fundamental changes to the Malaysian socio-economic, political and corporate landscape 
took place after the riots with the implementation of the ambitious 20-year New Economic 
Policy (NEP) (1970-1990), whose aims was to rectify the socio-economic imbalance among 
races (Horii, 1991). The two-pronged objective of the NEP was to eradicate poverty and 
restructure Malaysian society so that race dictating status within the economic function could 
eventually be eliminated. UMNO‟s hegemony in the government gave the Malay party 
leverage to pursue a series of ethnic affirmative actions under the NEP involving subsidies, 
licenses, credit schemes, ethnic employment quotas, tertiary education opportunities and 
federal scholarships etc.  
 
More importantly, in the corporate and commercial sectors, various steps and measures were 
taken with the aim of rectifying inter-ethnics imbalance in the equity ownership and control 
of ownership in the country so that by 1990 “at least 30% of the total commercial and 
industrial activities in all categories and scales of operation should have participation by 
Malays and other indigenous people in terms of ownership (including the corporate equity 
ownership) and management” (Malaysia, 1971, p.158). It is said that the NEP had led to 
“partial abandonment of the previously more laissez-faire (economy)…in favor of greater 
state intervention, primarily for ethnic affirmative actions, including the accelerated 
expansion of the Bumiputera middle class…and the creation of Bumiputera capitalists” 
(Gomez, 1999, p.37).  
 
From the perspective of the Chinese businessmen, the implementation of the NEP forced 
them to realize that in order to continue to have access to the means to accumulate wealth; 
they needed to cultivate ties with the influential Malays in UMNO. The Chinese capitalists 
began to recruit Malay politicians, politically influential Malays, and Malay ex-civil servants 
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as company directors; some businessmen even began funding UMNO and its leaders (Gomez, 
1999). Crony capitalism, whether acknowledged or not, is believed to have been promoted 
during the NEP era. Both Chinese businessmen and the Malays political elite found the 
informal ties mutually lucrative. Some Chinese capitalists have been known to finance 
ambitious politicians as a means of gaining access to government patronage.  
 
2.2.2.1   The Mahathir Era 
 
In 1981, the appointment of Mahathir Mohamad as the president of UMNO and prime 
minister of Malaysia further strengthened the promotion of Malay Capitalism (Gomez and 
Jomo, 1999). Though Mahathir was disappointed at the mentality of some Malays 
businessmen and their overdependence on the government for contracts/concessions and 
subsidies as well as their „Ali Baba‟13 way of doing business, he still relied on the „internal 
way‟ of addressing the problem. Fearing that the Malays would pass their new-found wealth 
to the Chinese, Mahathir mentioned that “the best way to keep shares between the 
Bumiputera hands is to hand them over to the Bumiputera most capable of retaining them…” 
[Far Eastern Economic Review (13 April 1979)]. Due to Mahathir‟s effort to explicitly 
promote Malay Capitalism, many Malay corporations (including publicly-listed corporations) 
that were set up to implement government projects during the 1980s and 1990s had close 
links to the Malay political elite including Mahathir himself.
14
 In other words, such 
continuous effort has led to the emergence of numerous crony capitalists and the proliferation 
of „money politics‟15 (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Political patronage has created avenues for 
politicians to gain access to large sums of money for party and general election campaigns.  
 
A group of politically influential „new rich‟ emerged in the mid-1980s, many of whom were 
UMNO members (Malay businessmen-cum-party members) and some Chinese 
                                                          
13
 Ali Baba is the practice of using companies owned by Malays (Ali represents a Malay) to secure tenders for 
government projects/contract and later on pass on the contracts/projects to the Chinese (Baba represents a 
Chinese) to actually run the projects. In return, Ali will get a mutually agreed amount in payments or a certain 
percentage of the profits for the deal (Heng, 1997). „Ali Baba‟ is commonly known as the way to „get rich 
quick‟.    
14
 Gomez and Jomo (1997) provide a list of publicly-listed corporations that are closely associated with the top 
three most powerful politicians in the 1990s; Mahathir himself, Anwar Ibrahim (the then Deputy Prime 
Minister), and Daim Zainuddin (the then Finance Minister).     
15
 According to Gomez and Jomo (1999), money politics refers to a number of related issues, including political 
party involvement in business, abuses of power for corrupt purposes, and political patronage.  
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businessmen.
16
 The emergence of this „new rich‟ has led to a concentration of corporate 
wealth, while selective distribution of state-controlled concessions has resulted in corruption, 
business scandals and conflict of interest involving senior government leaders. Business 
groups and firms controlled by well-connected business owners have been involved in 
corporate insider trading and manipulation of stock prices, as well as in obtaining large 
amount of questionable loans on favourable terms from the banks or financial institutions 
controlled by the government
17
 (Gomez, 1999).  
 
In summary, the way in which the NEP had been implemented (especially during Mahathir‟s 
era) resulted in an intimate relationship being forged between the state, the political party 
(UMNO) and business (Searle, 1999). It is contended that this growing intimacy resulted in 
the enmeshing and blurring of boundaries between business, politics and the state. Gomez 
and Jomo (1999) also opine that the spheres of government, party or private interests are no 
longer considered as distinct entities. National, political and private interests may be pursued 
in tandem, an arrangement described as „commonness‟ rather than „conflict of interest‟.  
 
2.2.3   Political Interference and Weak Enforcement of Rules and Regulations 
 
The political business environment discussed above has an implication to the development of 
corporate governance in Malaysia. The very existence of money politics and the complexity 
of political patronage networks mean that it will be very challenging for regulators to reform 
corporate governance and promote good governance systems to corporations, whilst at the 
same time penalizing those errant corporations who do not abide by the law. Very often, law 
enforcement and reform of corporate governance, cannot be fully carried out due to political 
interference and politically influential businessmen as La Porta et al. (2000) comment “what 
the reformers see as protection of investors, the founding families call “expropriation of 
entrepreneurs”. No wonder, then, that in all countries… – the families have opposed legal 
reform” (p.21).  
                                                          
16
 Mahathir believed that it is also imperative to channel some of the state concessions to Chinese businessmen. 
He also recognized the importance of Chinese capital for sustaining growth and industrialization (Gomez, 1999).   
17
 The extent to which banks had been abused by politicians became evident when two state-controlled banks, 
Bank Bumiputera and SIME Bank, incurred huge losses in 1998, believed to be associated with questionable 
loans.   
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In Malaysia, though regulatory bodies such as the Securities Commission (SC) are given 
sufficient power vested in the Malaysian Securities Acts 1993 to act upon errant companies 
or directors, as mentioned above, law enforcement is still lacking
18
 as put forward by Low 
(2004) in his comments on the performance of corporate governance practices among East 
Asian nations
19
:  
 
…given the perception of a dichotomy between the “rules on 
the books” and the extent of enforcement by regulators of 
capital markets…  While Malaysia scored the highest amongst 
the ten countries surveyed in both 2002 and 2003 for the rules 
and regulations it has implemented, the perception of its 
enforcement of the same was abysmal. (p.193-194) 
 
Low‟s comments are shared by Gunasegaram (2007b) who opines that law enforcement is 
critical if laws are to be implemented effectively and in this area Malaysian regulatory bodies 
fail miserably, the cause of the failure being significantly related to political interference. The 
Malaysian regulatory environment is found to be the „weakest factor‟ in the overall corporate 
government framework in Malaysia according to a report released by the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF) in August 2007 (Tat, 2007). 
 
Gomez (2006) also shares the same view with Gunasegaram (2007a) that the low 
achievement of enforcement in Malaysia is to a certain significant extent associated with the 
„selective imposition of rules and regulations‟ by the political executives in power when he 
says:    
 
These politicians can determine if regulatory institutions 
should act against businessmen, even when there is evidence of 
corruption. By ostensibly enforcing corporate governance 
provisions, politicians in control of the executive have 
transferred corporate assets into the hands of their allies… 
(p.132) 
                                                          
18
 See Appendix 2 for statistic relating to the enforcement scores of Malaysia according to the Asian Corporate 
Governance Association (ACGA).  
19
 The country‟s performances was measured based on scores obtained from the annual surveys carried out by 
the Asian Corporate Governance Association, an independent non-profit organisation, and CLSA Emerging 
Markets, a leader in brokerage and investment banking.       
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In short, the controlling shareholders who have close political connection may have a higher 
tendency to expropriate minority shareholders because political protection can shield them 
from the risk of any serious legal punishment from the regulators (Berkman et al., 2010). 
Moreover, controlling families also want to seize the benefits that their connections bring to 
the firms to at least cover the costs of building such connections (Qian et al., 2010; Morck et 
al., 2004). Some may argue that the value of the ownership that controlling families hold 
would increase if protection for minority shareholders is improved. So why would they want 
to lobby against legal reform?  The answer provided by La Porta et al. (1999) is straight 
forward – if the potential to expropriate the minority shareholders diminishes, so does the 
value of control, which may be a significantly larger part of the controlling shareholders‟ 
total wealth. 
 
The World Bank (2001), in its report on the Malaysian capital market, comments that “there 
has been criticism about lack of autonomy and transparency of the regulatory authorities in 
Malaysia” (p.6). The relevance of considering the political structure and norms in Malaysia 
and their impact on the governance of listed firms is substantiated by the fact that “the very 
strength of resistance to many of the changes needed significantly to enhance the protection 
of minority shareholders‟ rights and to improve corporate governance often exerts itself most 
strongly through clientelistic relationship-based systems of political governance” (Yeoh, 
2010, p.112). Thus political preconditions must be suitable in the first place in order for 
effective reforms to take root. Reform that sounds impressive on paper but not in spirit is a 
key concern in many Asian countries including Malaysia. As Park (2005) notes, although 
there is no major distinction in the rules and regulations of corporate governance in many 
Asian countries, there is significant difference in relation to the market perception of their 
governance practices.          
 
2.2.4   Cronyism, Rent-Seeking, and Governance 
  
Cronyism has been criticized for the misallocation of resources in the Malaysian economy, 
bringing overall waste and inefficiency to the corporate sector. As mentioned earlier, 
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Malaysia, as with many other East Asian countries, is considered as having a relationship-
based corporate system as opposed to the arm‟s length based system in Anglo-Saxon 
countries (Rajan-Zingales, 1998).
20
 Rent-seeking, which is expenditure of resources to 
procure government-endowed rents (Khan, 2000) is considered inefficient from an economic 
perspective but provides the main income of the relationship-based system. Politically-
connected business groups or firms are often labelled as rent-seekers who attempt to gain as 
much unearned reward as possible through their connection with politics and the state 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). It is claimed that politically-connected business groups or firms 
have many privileges which are otherwise unavailable, such as preferential access to state-
controlled concessions, subsidies, preferential or „soft‟ loans, preferential bailouts and 
barriers to foreign competition. Rent-seeking behaviour is, however, regarded as leading 
towards inefficient use of a firm‟s resources 21 , low transparency, over-reliance on the 
government and having an adverse impact on the market performance of firms. Such inherent 
problems in the relationship-based system make the privileged firms unprepared and unable 
to withstand any external shock in the environment. For instance, Johnson and Mitton (2003) 
find that politically-connected firms in Malaysia were more seriously affected compared to 
non-politically connected firms during the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) assert that political relationships are potentially harmful to 
shareholder value. The authors opine that the politician‟s „helping hand‟ may also be a 
„grabbing hand‟ which causes the minority shareholders to be expropriated.22 Specifically, 
empirical evidence (for instance, Bertrand et al., 2002; Friedman et al., 2003; Cheung et al., 
2006) shows that business groups are particularly conducive to expropriation such as 
tunnelling or related party transactions (RPTs) at the expense of the minority shareholders of 
the member firms in the group. This is particularly true for large business groups with close 
political connections in developing countries in which the elite controlling families often 
control a substantial portion of the country‟s wealth. Authors such as Searle (1999) and Yeoh 
(2010) also suggest that political connections are more prevalent in large publicly-listed 
                                                          
20
 The relationship-based system is also known as relationship-based capitalism and the arm‟s length-based 
system is also known as market-based capitalism.  
21
 As substantial company resources are being used to seek and secure rents.    
22
 See Yeoh (2010) for a compilation of some of the examples of political involvement in Malaysian publicly-
listed firms and mistreatment of minority shareholders.    
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businesses when it is commented that “it is in big publicly-listed businesses that the nexus 
between business, politics and state is most clearly displayed” (Yeoh, 2010, p.97). The 
consequences of letting a small number of large business groups control a large portion of a 
country‟s wealth are explained by Morck et al. (2005, p.657): 
 
…entrusting the governance of huge slices of a country‟s 
corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias capital allocation, retard 
capital market development, obstruct entry by outsider 
entrepreneurs, and retard growth. Furthermore, to preserve 
their privileged positions under the status quo, such elites 
might invest in political connections to stymie the institutional 
development of capital markets and to erect a variety of entry 
barriers.  
 
 Due to the close link between politics and business, this proliferation of money politics and 
cronyism
23
 has adversely impacted the corporate governance because as put forward by Yeoh 
(2010, p.102): 
 
 …they culminated in a culture where the ruling elite and their 
corporate patrons/clients/proxies (most being major 
shareholders/owners of public-listed firms) as well as captive 
market regulators are involved in numerous blatant scandalous, 
manipulative and even fraudulent activities in the capital 
markets, often to the detriment of minority shareholders.     
 
In short, it should be highlighted that corporate governance practices are closely associated 
with the standard of public governance of a country. As outlined, rent-seeking activities 
which create and protect corporate profits can be rampant in countries with unsatisfactory 
public governance. Thus, it is doubtful that quality of corporate governance can be improved 
if the public governance level is still at an unsatisfactory level whereby businesses collude 
                                                          
23
 The latest development in the political scenario in this country shows that money politics, corruption and 
cronyism in UMNO have become rampant over the years. As an illustration, the number of cases of complaint 
regarding money politics/corruption during the UMNO party election year has increased over the years and in 
the most recent UMNO party election which was held in 2009, a staggering 900 cases of complaint regarding 
money politics were reported to the party disciplinary committee. Ironically, the Malaysian Anti Corruption 
Commission (MACC) has not been engaged to investigate the cases, including high profile ones (The Star, 9 
November 2008, 17 March 2009).   
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with politics „in search of rents‟ and „in protection of rents‟ for their businesses (Claessens 
and Fan, 2002).   
 
It should also be noted that the principal-principal relationship in the context of conflict of 
interest between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders remains the core concern 
in this study, even though a number of contextual or institutional influences are introduced 
above. This is consistent with the viewpoint of Gomez-Mejia et al. (2005) that “there must 
be a balance between recognizing unique contextual factors and the theory of principal-
agent relations” (p.1512). Thus similar to Yeoh‟s (2010) study, the arguments presented 
above attempt to present a more socialized variant of the principal-principal problem.  
 
The following sections will include a brief discussion of the theoretical basis for this study, 
followed by detailed literature related to concentrated ownership and relevant company 
attributes with a focus on family-controlled firms.     
  
2.3   Theoretical Basis for the Study 
 
The theoretical basis of the principal-principal problem, as introduced earlier in this study, is 
originated from the agency theory of organisations as pioneered, among others, by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). According to the authors, organisations can be defined as “legal 
fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” 
(p.310). The relationship between various parties of a company (which is a form of 
organisation) can be viewed from the contractual agreement which denotes the rights and 
duties of each party. Nonetheless, a perfect contract is impossible due to the uncertainty of 
the future. Thus corporate behaviour may deviate away from value maximization as a result 
of the nature of the incomplete contract (Berglof, 1994). 
 
In the context of a corporation where the capital owners (the principal) delegate 
decisions/work and corporate control to managers and the board of directors (the agents), 
conflicts of interest may exist between these parties as the agents may have goals that are 
different from those of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The conflict known as the 
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principal-agent problem or agency problem is the result of the nature of incomplete contracts. 
Agency theory is thus the theory developed to deal with agency problems.  
 
The premise of agency theory (AT) is that “agents are self-interested, risk-averse, rational 
actors, who always attempt to exert less effort (moral hazards) and project higher 
capabilities and skills than they actually have (adverse selection)” (Ekanayake, 2004, p.49). 
Due to the asymmetric information problem, the principals may be unaware of the details of 
the business activities carried out by the agents. Accordingly, agency theorists have “focused 
on identifying situations in which the principal and agent are likely to have conflicting goals 
and then describing the governance mechanisms that limit the agent‟s self-serving behavior” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p.59). For instance, Jensen and Meckling (1976) study how share 
ownership by managers helps align objectives of managers with those of owners, and Fama 
and Jensen (1983) study the role of the board of directors in monitoring management. 
However, as mentioned earlier, the version of agency problem encountered in concentrated 
ownership structure such as those found in Malaysia and elsewhere in East Asia, is the 
conflict between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders with the majority of 
them families. Thus the difference between Principal-Agent Problem (also known as Type I 
Agency Problem) and Principal-Principal Problem (also known as Type II Agency Problem) 
can be illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.     
 
The upper section of the figure shows that in the standard textbook principal-agent problem, 
the potential conflict of interest exists between a large number of minority shareholders and 
the professional managers who only act as the agents without any significant amount of 
shareholdings. The lower section of the figure shows that conflict of interest exists between a 
large number of minority shareholders and the controlling families who not only own the 
largest concentrated ownership but are usually inclined to dominate the management and 
board of directors by serving directly as the senior managers and directors (shown in the 
figure as the substantial overlap area between „Controlling Families‟ and „Management & 
Board of Directors‟). These family members are known as owner-managers who have 
excessive power to carry out strategies/activities or practices that benefit them but may not 
benefit the minority shareholders.  
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         Figure 2.1: Principal-Principal Problem versus Principal-Agent Problem 
Professional 
Managers 
(Agents))
Principal-Agent Conflicts 
Minority 
Shareholders 
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& Board of 
Directors
Controlling  
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Principal-Principal Conflicts Owner-
Managers
Non-family Directors 
& Outside Managers
Source: Adapted from Young et al. (2008)
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory only offers a partial view of the world and the 
author suggests that other perspectives are used, complementary to the theory in the study of 
firms. Thus, though agency theory will still form the main theoretical basis of this study, 
resource-based view (RBV) may also be relied upon when applicable to aid in the 
development of certain hypotheses in order to provide a richer and more composite 
understanding of the influence of various governance-related and organisation-related issues 
on firm performance. This is especially true for emerging economies where agency theory 
alone may not fully account for some of the phenomena observed in firms. For instance, the 
existence of business groups in emerging economies can be explained from RBV that such a 
business structure is able to provide additional resources to the group affiliates from the 
„internal market‟ created by the business group (Yiu et al., 2005). Clearly, incorporating 
other perspectives into agency theory in the study of corporate governance is an approach 
that “recognize(s) the wider environmental forces that influence the governance paradigm of 
organizations” (Christopher, 2010, p.685).  
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According to RBV, in family-controlled firms, the interaction of the family unit, the business 
unit and individual family members creates unique systemic family influences. These 
systemic interactions lead to the idiosyncratic firm-level package of resources and 
capabilities of the organisation commonly known as the „familiness‟ of the firm (Habbershon 
et al., 2003). It can be conjectured that on average the greater the ownership and control of 
the family over the firm, the more „familiness‟ the firm will have. In family business 
literature, it is contended that „familiness‟ is able to create competitive advantages for family-
controlled firms which will then have a bearing on firm performance (Habbershon et al., 
2003; Habbershon and Williams, 1999).  
 
According to RBV, resources of family-controlled firms refers not only to tangible assets, but 
also intangible assets such as capabilities, organisational processes, information, knowledge 
etc. controlled by the family that “enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies 
that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, p.101). An example of one such 
important resource is combined know-how; familiarity as well as the commitment of the 
family directors towards the business operation of the firm. As the number of family 
directors on the board increases, their efficiency and effectiveness in policy decision-making 
at board level is improved via stronger interaction and influence.  
 
2.4   Ownership Structure  
 
Ownership is considered as an important part of the corporate governance system (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997) and “firm ownership (structure) is an increasingly influential form of 
corporate governance” (Connelly et al., 2010, p.1561). The importance of ownership 
structure can be traced back to Berle and Means (1932) when they suggested that decisions 
made by corporations can be greatly influenced by their ownership structure. Porter (1998) 
also concurs with the view that ownership structure and corporate governance are important 
in strategic management of firms when he admits that: 
 
Company goals are most strongly determined by ownership 
structure, the motivation of owners and holders of debt, the 
nature of corporate governance, and the incentive processes 
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that shape the motivation of senior managers. The goals of 
publicly held corporations reflect the characteristics of that 
nation‟s capital market. (p.110)  
 
Berle and Means (1932) were among the first to study the structure of modern corporations. 
Among the distinct characteristics of modern corporations is the concept of separation of 
ownership and control. In their review of the concept, Berle and Means (1932) ask: “Have 
we any justification for assuming that those in control of the modern corporation will also 
choose to operate it in the interests of the owners?” (p.141). When ownership is dispersed, as 
is typical for UK and US firms, agency problems will stem from the conflicts of interest 
between the managers and shareholders in which the manager, acting as the agent, has the 
tendency to appropriate private benefits of control for his own consumption (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Dalton et al., 2007). In dispersed ownership, shareholder control tends to be 
weak because of a lack of monitoring. The inadequacy of shareholder monitoring can be 
explained by the so-called free-rider problem. Small shareholders with insignificant 
shareholdings are not interested in monitoring because, whilst bearing all the monitoring 
costs, they only share a tiny proportion of the benefits.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) therefore contend that the increase of corporate ownership 
among managers in Anglo-Saxon countries can reduce free-riding and agency problems. In 
the relatively dispersed ownership structures of the US and UK, the major mechanism for 
protecting shareholders from management is the effective enforcement of judicial systems 
and the „market for corporate control‟ (Zhuang et al., 2000). However, when ownership 
becomes more and more concentrated until it reaches a level where the largest owner has 
effective control of the firm, as is typical for Malaysian and most Asian firms, the nature of 
the agency problem shifts away from manager-shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the 
controlling shareholder and public minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 2002).      
 
The two opposing effects of concentrated ownership are the incentive or alignment of interest 
effect and the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002). According 
to the incentive effect, the more concentrated the ownership is in the hands of the largest 
shareholder, the stronger is that shareholder‟s incentive “to have the firm run properly, 
because having the firm running properly would raise his wealth” (Claessens et al., 2002, 
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p.2754). Thus, raising a controlling shareholder‟s ownership “improves the alignment of 
interests between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders” (Claessens and 
Fan, 2002, p.76). Gomes (2000) develops a theoretical model to show that by holding a high 
level of ownership, the owner-managers are able to commit implicitly that they do not intend 
to expropriate minority shareholders. This is due to the reason that the extraction of more 
private benefits would bring about discounted stock prices and therefore the higher the 
ownership level, the more harmful it will be to the owner-managers‟ wealth. In addition, 
concentrated ownership also effectively reduces the problem of asymmetric information for 
shareholders as occurred in the dispersed ownership structure. Large block-holders have the 
incentive and voting power to demand more information about the operation of firms; for 
instance, by having board director(s) directly representing their interests. Similarly, their 
incentive to extract private benefits will get weaker the higher the ownership level, because 
doing so would reduce the performance of the firm, therefore more seriously affecting their 
wealth. Consequently, the incentive effect results in a positive relationship between firm 
performance and the ownership level of the largest shareholder.   
 
By way of contrast, the entrenchment effect claims that the more concentrated ownership and 
thus control is in the hands of the largest shareholder, the more entrenched the shareholder is 
because with higher control power the shareholder is able to make decisions that benefit 
themselves only, without considering the impact on, and often at the expense of, the rest of 
the shareholders. At the same time, the largest shareholder is also “wealthy enough to prefer 
to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority 
shareholders” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.759). Thus the entrenchment effect suggests a 
negative relationship between firm performance and the ownership level of the largest 
shareholder (Claessens et al., 2002). Put simply, the concentrated ownership-performance 
relationship is a trade-off between the incentive/alignment effect and the entrenchment effect.  
 
It is also highlighted in the literature that this effect is especially pronounced when the 
controlling/largest shareholder makes use of some control-enhancing means such as the 
pyramidal ownership structure to disproportionately raise their control above their actual 
ownership rights. When control rights are enhanced beyond ownership stakes (due to the 
control-enhancing means), the “willingness to extract value is less restrained by the 
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controlling shareholder‟s cash-flow stake” (Claessens et al., 2002, p.2754). In other words, 
the availability of control-enhancing means leverages control power of the largest 
shareholder to make self-benefiting and value-extracting decisions at lower costs.   
  
2.4.1   Ownership Structure in East Asia and Malaysia 
 
In many East Asian countries including Malaysia, due to the concentration of high ownership, 
agency problems are mostly caused by the conflict between controlling shareholders and the 
rest of the shareholders (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) – termed as the „principal-principal 
problem‟ by Young et al. (2008). Under the principal-principal problem, the lack of 
principal-agent problems does not mean that firms will be pursuing pure profit-seeking 
activities. The interests of the controlling families involve “not only the benefits (they) 
derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary 
aspects of (their) entrepreneurial activities” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.312) which 
includes the ability to pass the firm on to subsequent generations (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 
2010). According to Demsetz and Lehn (1985), creating „non-pecuniary income‟ includes 
“the ability to deploy resources to suit one‟s personal preferences” (p.1162).  
 
Past studies such as Phan (2001) and Tian and Lau (2001) question the suitability of using 
the conventional principal-agent theory in researching corporate governance issues in 
emerging economies. The different sociological, economic and institutional fundamentals in 
emerging economies could lead to a different impact on corporate governance. For instance, 
widespread family-ownership, the intense interference of government in the corporate sector, 
the weak enforcements of rules and regulations, the existence of business groups and the 
extensive diversification of firms are among the characteristics of emerging economies that 
give rise to a different type of agency problem – as mentioned above - the principal-principal 
problem (Claessens et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008; Christopher, 2010). Moreover, the 
western model of corporate governance may not be desirable in emerging economies because 
the effects could be counterproductive due to differences in cultural and institutional settings 
including the legal system. For instance, the suggestion to increase the ownership of 
shareholders in order to curb managerial opportunism and reduce agency problems is 
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impractical in Asia as increasing ownership in the already high ownership structure will lead 
to excessive power of controlling shareholders and exacerbate the principal-principal 
problems in those countries (Young et al., 2008). 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, in many East Asian countries including Malaysia, controlling  
families are not only the dominant shareholders in many listed firms, they normally also 
dominate the boards of directors (Bruton et al., 2003; Young et al., 2001) and senior 
management positions (Claessens et al., 2000). Even when a hired professional manager is 
recruited to manage the firm, his decision-making power and scope are often rather restricted 
(Joh, 2003).  
 
In Malaysia, most of the family-controlled firms have their board chairmanship occupied by 
either a family member or a retired bureaucrats or a member of the nine royal houses of 
Malaysia. These retired bureaucrats or royal family members are usually appointed as the 
independent chairman (Gomez and Jomo, 1997) and serve mainly as nominal figures, 
potentially able to help bypass restrictive red tape and secure quick and positive responses 
from the authorities on business matters (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). In short, families 
generally have effective control in a real sense over the board and management decision-
making. As a result, various strategies/ activities or practices can be employed by the families 
to further enhance their control and/or benefits. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) describe how 
controlling owners create private benefits of control by their involvement in non-value 
maximization activities. For instance, the controlling family could utilize the business group 
under their control in order to diversify across industries to protect their private interests of 
control and facilitate their expropriation activities (Claessens et al., 1999c).  
 
Amihud and Lev (1981) and Denis et al. (1997) also point out that one of the possible ways 
for managers (including family-managers) to create private benefits is to diversify across 
various industries. Diversification may be regarded as management‟s „perquisite 
consumption‟ because of the probable direct relationship between diversification and 
reduction in business risk as well as larger managerial compensation. Business risk is defined 
as uncertainty of earnings over time due to changes in industry-specific factors. Reduction in 
business risk via diversification is particularly important for a controlling family, to diminish 
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the exposure of the family‟s wealth to industry risks (Andres, 2008). However, from the 
perspective of minority shareholders, risk reduction through firm diversification across 
industries may not be a value-added move, simply because it is more efficient and effective 
to go for stock portfolio diversification (Ross et al., 2010).   
 
Diversification into unrelated areas of business is also generally regarded as one of the 
factors that caused the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) to be more detrimental than 
expected (Fatimah, 2001). Chu (2007), in his study of ownership structure and rent-seeking 
in the Malaysian manufacturing sector also points out that diversification is among the 
mechanisms that can be used to expropriate shareholder value, especially when the 
controlling families‟ interest is comparatively large and the industries involved have low 
intensity of competition. Using a sample of 355 listed firms for the year 2000, Zuaini and 
Napier (2006), in their study of ownership structure and firm diversification, find that the 
control rights of controlling shareowners are significantly negatively associated with the 
„excess value‟ of the firms, suggesting that expropriation increases with control rights. Their 
study however does not focus on family-controlled firms.     
 
Literature that is ownership structure-specific and confined only to Malaysia is rather limited. 
Two early works on ownership structure in Malaysia are Lim (1981) and Sieh (1982), both 
using ownership data from the 1970s, who conclude in their findings that ownership structure 
in Malaysia is highly concentrated in the hands of families. Based on his study on the 100 
largest corporations in Malaysia, Lim concludes that “a few hundred families own the 
majority of stocks in Malaysia” (Lim, 1981, p.5). Both studies by Lim (1981) and Sieh (1982) 
depict that not only is ownership highly concentrated in Malaysia but more importantly the 
ownership structure in Malaysia is very stable and remains as highly concentrated today as it 
was in the 1970s. Thus the often quoted endogeneity problem such as by Demsetz (1983) in 
his ownership structure-performance related study is not a concern in the case of Malaysian 
corporations. Zhuang et al. (2000) also find that very little change has taken place in the 
ownership pattern in Malaysia over time.  
 
Finally, according to Thillainathan (1999), the high concentration of shareholding in 
Malaysia is attributed to poor enforcement of shareholder rights. Furthermore, restrictions on 
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competition in certain activities in Malaysia, such as restrictive imports and licensing 
arrangements, have led to higher returns or lower risk for controlling shareholders. Thus, 
controlling shareholders have lack of incentive to share these profits with other shareholders 
(Thillainathan, 1999). This observation is in line with Bebchuk (1999) who demonstrates that 
the lower the competitiveness of an industry; the greater the opportunity of rent-seeking
24
 
and thus the more private benefits of control can be gained from a concentrated shareholding. 
For instance, a controlling owner may prefer to use debt instead of issuing new equity to 
finance a project in an industry that is protected by government policy so that his relative 
equity interest in the firm will not be threatened and he can continue to enjoy rents without 
needing to share with new shareholders (Chu, 2007).  
 
2.5   Issue of Board Independence  
 
An independent board is usually considered to be a vital part of good corporate governance 
and its importance is normally stressed in most countries‟ code of corporate governance and 
listing requirements of national stock exchanges. In Malaysia, the Listing Requirement of 
Bursa Malaysia specifies that a listed company must have at least two directors or one-third 
of the board of directors, whichever is the higher, as independent directors (Chapter 15, 
Paragraph 15.02, Listing Requirement of Bursa Malaysia). Moreover, the listing requirement 
also states that the majority of audit committee members must be independent directors. Thus, 
from the above, it is clear that board independence is considered an important factor in 
Malaysia towards a more effective board (Foo and Mazlina, 2010).  
 
Agency theory asserts that having a sufficient number of independent directors is critical to 
ensure effective „checks and balances‟ to curb agency problems (such as self-serving 
activities) and improve firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Board independence is 
also enhanced when the chairman himself is an independent non-executive director (INED). 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that firms with independent chairman status have a higher 
disclosure level than firms with a non-independent chairman. They argue that the 
                                                          
24
 Rent-seeking is defined as an attempt to derive economic rent by manipulating the social or political 
environment in which economic activities occur. Economic rent refers to payment for goods and services 
beyond the amount needed to bring the required factors of production into a production process (Ross, 1970).  
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independence of chairmen improves the monitoring effort, since the chairman, as an 
influential figure of the board, has no personal agenda to withhold information. The result is 
improved quality of disclosure.  
 
Though agency theory has been employed as a dominant theory in explaining the board 
independence-firm performance link, some theoretical studies such as Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) have reminded of the shortcomings of agency theory and the importance of 
integrating resource-based view with agency theory in explaining the functions of the board. 
According to Hillman and Dalziel, two important functions of the board are firstly, to be 
independent in protecting the rights of all shareholders and secondly, to provide „human and 
relational capital‟ to the firm.  Directors‟ human capital includes their expertise, experience, 
knowledge and skills, whereas relational capital of directors includes the “potential 
resources embedded within and available through personal network ties with constituents in 
the environment” (Dalziel et al., 2011, p.4).  
 
From the discussion of board capital based on the resource-based view, it is believed that the 
executive directors‟ „resource‟ contributions are more prevalent compared to independence 
directors simply because of time and commitment factors. Executive directors, being „full 
time‟ directors devote much more time to the company compared to „part-time‟ independent 
directors. Moreover, executive directors, many of whom are family members, are also more 
committed and dedicated to the firm as it was founded by their forefather - such commitment 
may be lacking in independent directors.
25
 Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) for instance assert that 
independent directors tend to “quit when the firm is performing poorly” or “when they 
expect the firm to perform poorly”. In other words, they tend to “quit when they are most 
needed” (p.3) in order to protect their own reputation and to avoid the multiplication of 
workload ahead when the firm is struggling.  
 
                                                          
25
 Besides executive directors and independent directors, another category is the non-independent non-executive 
director. For family-controlled firms in Malaysia, many of these directors consist of family members who are 
not directly involved in the management of the firms but who hold substantial shares. Thus it should be noted 
that a low percentage of executive directors does not automatically mean a high independence of the board 
because the board may be populated with non-independent non-executive directors.     
57 
 
The evidence as to whether that board independence affects firm performance is unclear and 
inconsistent. Various aspects of board independence in family-controlled firms can be 
examined, including the percentage of independent directors, whether the board chair is an 
independent director, and whether the audit committee is free from non-independent directors. 
More discussions on these aspects of independence are available in the subsequent sections.  
 
The use of independent directors to measure board independence is supported by prior 
studies (John and Senbet, 1998). The meta-analysis of more than 50 past studies by Dalton et 
al. (1998) shows that there is no systematic evidence to support the high board 
independence-high firm performance hypothesis. They conclude that “neither board 
composition nor board leadership structure has been consistently linked to firm performance” 
(p.269).  Some of the latest studies such as Wintoki et al. (2010) also show that there is no 
causal relation between board structure and current firm performance.  
 
An interesting finding from Bhagat and Black (2002) shows that firms that perform badly are 
more likely to increase the number of independent directors even though this does not 
improve the firms‟ performance. In contrast, Dahya et al. (2008) find a positive relation 
between firm performance and the proportion of independent directors in their cross-country 
study consisting of the majority of developed countries. Kim and Black (2010) investigate 
the relationship between board structure and firm value for firms affiliated with chaebols in 
Korea and find a significant positive relationship. Yeh and Woidtke (2005) find that family-
controlled firms with a higher proportion of directors affiliated to the controlling family have 
relatively lower firm value compared to firms with a lower proportion in Taiwan. They 
therefore conclude that, in Taiwan, the proportion of family-affiliated directors reflects the 
quality of a firm‟s corporate governance.         
 
Prabowo and Simpson (2011) find that, in Indonesia, there is no significant relationship 
between the proportion of independent directors on the boards of family-controlled firms and 
firm performance. They assert that the inappropriate nomination and voting systems used in 
appointing independent directors in Indonesia has contributed to the failure to appoint „truly‟ 
independent directors and thus the non-relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance occurs. They further suggest that a proper appointment system that 
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accommodates the interests of minority shareholders is established in order to reduce the 
dominance of controlling families, to include a cumulative voting system as well as a 
credible nomination committee.  
 
Using a quantile regression method, Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) investigate the 
effects of board independence on different levels of firm performance in four East Asian 
countries including Malaysia. They claim that the effect of board independence and CEO 
duality on firm performance is different at different levels of firm performance or, as put 
forward by them, “...different across the conditional quantiles of the distribution of firm 
performance” (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010, p.607). In Malaysia, Foo and Mazlina 
(2010) investigate the relationship between board independence, board diligence and stock 
liquidity in Malaysia and find that more independent and diligent boards are related to higher 
stock liquidity.
26
  
 
There are many other empirical studies that do not agree with the opinion that an independent 
board adds value and thus increases shareholder returns (for instance Nicholson and Kiel, 
2007; Bonn et al., 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
 
This study does not intend to look for additional evidence on the issue (the direct effects of 
board characteristics on firm performance) but will instead investigate the moderating effects 
of board independence as well as family directors on the influence of ownership structure, 
business groups and diversification on firm performance. There is a lack of past research 
with regard to the moderating roles of the company board, especially in emerging economies 
such as Malaysia. Moreover, the inconclusive findings from the literature on the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance might be due to the existence of 
interdependent relationships amongst governance mechanisms (Rakider and Seth, 1995). For 
instance, the important role of the board as a monitoring system may rely on the presence of 
other strong monitoring mechanisms such as ownership structure. Though concentrated 
ownership is able to reduce the free-riding problems of a dispersed ownership structure, it 
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 The measures used for board independence are, among others, the percentage of independent directors on the 
board and the percentage of independent directors on the audit committee. The measures for board diligence are 
frequency of board and committee meetings.    
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may cause the board‟s monitoring to be affected if the controlling families intend to use their 
control power to interfere with the board‟s supposedly independent decision making.  
 
2.6   Family-controlled Business Groups
27
 
 
Business groups are a common form of business organisation in Asia. According to 
Claessens et al. (2006), normally in a business group, a family, a single individual or a 
coalition of families control a number of firms. The labels for business groups vary in 
different countries (Yiu et al., 2007). For instance, among Asian countries, they are known as 
keiretsu in Japan, hongs in Hong Kong, business houses in India, guanxi qiye in Taiwan and 
chaebol in Korea. The differences are not only in the labels but also in the organisational 
structure of the groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). For example, in the Korean chaebols, the 
affiliates tend to be tied by vertical integration of inputs and outputs (Chang and Hong, 2000). 
Conversely, the guanxi qiye in Taiwan focus more on partnerships amongst individual or 
family investors and a group is jointly managed as a strategy network (Yiu et al., 2007).  
 
In general, a business group is formed when independent firms are united by having the same 
controlling shareholder(s). Each firm in the business group still enjoys a certain amount of 
autonomy such as having its own board of directors and its own management team, as well 
its own shareholder base (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). It is thus different from the 
conglomerate type of business organisation found in the United States whereby the various 
subordinate businesses do not have such autonomy.  
 
Though the business group as an organisational structure is common among firms operating 
in East Asia and the rest of the world, there exists no legal, universal definition for it. In other 
words, there is no unified approach to define business groups and various definitions of 
business groups are given by different researchers. According to Yiu et al. (2007, p.1552), 
“researchers usually deploy their own definitions of what they consider a business group” 
and Claessens et al. (2006, p.6), “the definition of group membership is country-specific”. 
                                                          
27
 Though most of the business groups are family-controlled in East Asia, in some countries such as Singapore, 
some business groups are controlled by the state. This study only focuses on business groups that are family-
controlled.  
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Leff (1978) is among the first to discuss business groups and defines them, from a broad 
perspective, as a group of companies “which transact in different markets… under common 
entrepreneurial or financial control” and that they are “linked by relations of interpersonal 
trust, on the basis of a similar personal, ethnic or communal background” (Leff, 1978, 
p.663). The definition is broad as it covers firms that are linked by personal trust and similar 
social backgrounds.   
 
Recent literature such as Yiu et al. (2005) defines business groups as “a collection of legally 
independent firms that are bound by economic (such as ownership, financial and commercial) 
and social (such as family, kinship and friendship) ties” (Yiu et al., 2005, p.183). Yiu‟s 
definition is specifically pointing to not only the social ties but both the „economic and social 
ties‟. Chang and Hong (2002) characterize business groups as “a collection of formally 
(legally) independent firms under single common administrative and financial control, that 
are owned and controlled by certain families” (Chang and Hong, 2002, p.266) and Claessens 
et al. (2006) treat a business group as “a corporate organization where a number of firms are 
linked through stock-pyramids and cross-ownership” (p.1) though business groups should 
not be equated with pyramids (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) as some business groups do not 
involve pyramiding or cross-holdings.  
 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) consider business groups as a collection of “legally independent 
firms, operating in multiple (often unrelated) industries, which are bound together by 
persistent formal (e.g. equity) and informal (e.g. family) ties” (p.331). Chakrabarti et al. 
(2007) state business groups are “networks of legally independent firms linked by a set of 
formal and informal ties that coordinate their actions” (p.106). Finally Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2006) suggests that business groups are “those networks that exhibit unrelated 
diversification under common ownership” (p.419). 
 
According to Khanna and Yafeh (2007), some business groups are highly diversified and 
others are more focused. In a nutshell, business groups are generally accepted by 
contemporary researchers as a collection of firms united by „ownership and control ties‟: 
common ownership, management and board directorship, and the groups generally diversify 
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by having member firms involved in different industries. Member firms are affiliated to each 
other by the same family members acting as controlling shareholders who normally also hold 
the senior management positions or directorships of member firms. Table 2.1 provides 
definition of how business groups as defined by different East Asian countries (including 
Malaysia) in Claessens‟s et al. (2006) study. 
 
Table 2.1: Definition of Business Groups According to Country  
Country Definition 
Hong Kong  The family is the largest shareholder of the firm (firms belong to 
the same group when they are „owned‟ by the same family) 
 
Indonesia The family is the largest shareholder of the firm (firms belong to 
the same group when they are „owned‟ by the same family) 
 
Japan The company‟s CEO sits in the group‟s President‟s breakfast 
 
South Korea At least 30% of the stock of the firm is owned by other firms in the 
group 
 
Malaysia  The family is the largest owner (firms are considered as belonging 
to the same group when they have a common controlling family)  
 
Philippines A family member sits on the Management Board and/or 
the Board of Directors 
 
Singapore  The family is the largest owner (firms are considered as belonging 
to the same group when they have a common controlling family) 
 
Taiwan The firm is counted as group-affiliated if other firms in the group 
own 20% of the stock 
 
Thailand The firm is listed as a related company in the annual report of the 
leading company in the group 
Source: Adapted from Claessens et al. (2006) 
  
According to Claessens et al. (2006), some of the above definitions are based on either 
reliable or official sources from within the individual countries. For instance, the data for the 
Korean groups is obtained from the Korean Fair Trade Commission which defines affiliates 
as those that are owned at least 30% by other firms in the same group, whereas in Taiwan, a 
firm is considered as group-affiliated when at least 20% of the firm‟s share ownership is in 
the hands of other firms in the respective group. In Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and 
62 
 
Thailand, firms are considered as belonging to the same group when they share a common 
controlling family which acts as the largest shareowner of the firms.  
 
2.6.1   Family-controlled Business Groups in Malaysia 
 
Like other East Asian countries, the business group is a common form of organisational 
structure in Malaysia where most of the business groups are family-owned and controlled. 
For instance, Gomez (2006) reports that 35 of the 50 largest business groups in Malaysia are 
family-controlled and the rest are state-controlled. Since the state-controlled business groups 
in Malaysia are usually large in size, the proportion of business groups that are family-
controlled should therefore be even higher for the average sized business groups. Claessens 
et al. (2006) report that, in their sample, 56%, 56%, 45% and 37% of listed firms in Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Thailand respectively are group-affiliated. Definition wise, Zuaini 
and Napier (2006) consider a Malaysian firm in their sample as group-affiliated when it has 
the “same ultimate controlling owners with other companies in the sample or has other PLCs 
(publicly-listed corporations) in the ownership structure” (p.106). According to the data 
provided by Chang (2006), business groups accounted for approximately 25%, 24% and 39% 
of total market capitalization of the stock exchanges in Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore 
respectively in 2002. The author claimed that business groups that developed and built 
connections with the ruling political parties survived the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 
whereas business groups who lacked such connections did not.  
 
It is common to have interlocking directorship among firms affiliated to a business group. 
Interlocking directorships can be divided into two main types according to Burt (1983): i) 
ownership ties – two or more corporations are jointly controlled by a single board of 
directors, and ii) direct interlocking ties – two or more companies share one or more persons 
as directors of their respective boards. The former is rare and the latter is more common for 
Malaysian corporations. Interlocking directorship contributes to the high probability of 
family members as directors on the boards.
28
 Consequently, boards of directors in Malaysian 
family-controlled listed firms generally are not independent from family influence. Business 
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 In fact, more than 90% of the family-controlled firms sampled in this study have at least one family director. 
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groups, with their interlocking directorships and family-member managers result in high 
volumes of intercompany transactions and related party transactions (RPTs) in East Asian 
corporations. Researchers such as Cheung et al. (2009a, 2009b, and 2006) have cautioned 
that some of these transactions are suspicious as they are susceptible to controlling families‟ 
„abuse‟.29 In Malaysia, listed firms are required to abide by the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements (Section 10.02, 10.08 and 10.09) that stipulate the related party disclosure 
standards. However, loopholes in the listing requirements and the relatively weak 
enforcement of rules and regulations enable the controlling families to obtain approval to 
practise questionable RPTs and even bypass regulators‟ jurisdiction. The president of the 
Remisier Association of Malaysia, Sam Ng, admitted that „un-ignorable‟ loopholes exist in 
the current RPT approval process that need to be closed (The Star, 21 August 2010). 
Furthermore, due to the lack of detailed disclosure of these transactions in Malaysia, it is an 
extremely challenging task to conduct a serious study on RPTs in Malaysia. For instance, 
firms may record RPTs in their annual reports but are unlikely to disclose the amounts 
involved.   
 
2.6.1.1   Pyramidal (and Cross-Holding) Structures 
 
As discussed in sub-section 2.2.4, business groups also seem to be inseparable from politics 
(Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). In Malaysia, the extensive and close relationships between 
business groups and the ruling party is reported by Gomez and Jomo (1999), Gomez (2006) 
and Johnson and Mitton (2003). Business groups have existed in the Malaysian corporate 
scene since the British colonial era (Gomez 2006). During the period of the New Economic 
Plan (NEP) from 1970-1990 (as discussed in Section 2.2), many firms controlled by Chinese 
families were forced to take some accommodative measures to integrate the NEP in order to 
grow and expand. Many of these Chinese entrepreneurs chose to form close relationships 
with the influential political figures of the time, as well as the ruling political party, in order 
to continue to receive contracts and other benefits from the government (Gomez, 1999). 
Those Chinese enterprises that were successful in obtaining support from prominent 
politicians and the ruling party proliferated and expanded during the era. In order to support 
                                                          
29
 The CFA Institute published a report „Related-Party Transactions – A Cautionary Tale for Investors in Asia‟ 
(2009) to caution even the most sophisticated investors about the needs to be wary about RPTs in Asia.    
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their expansion, pyramiding was used to acquire other, or form new, businesses, being a 
particularly affordable way to acquire control of other firms using a relatively small amount 
of capital. For instance, Gomez (2006) elaborates on how the late Lee Loy Seng, one of the 
Malaysian Chinese tycoons had successfully used the pyramidal holding structure to form his 
business group: 
 
Lee discovered that Parit Perak Bhd, a quoted European 
controlled rubber company with a small paid up capital, had 
„hard cash reserves‟. Lee acquired a controlling stake in the 
company and, according to him, then „used Parit Perak money 
to buy a controlling share in Glenealy. Then Glenealy and Parit 
Perak together bought Batu Lintang. Then with the help of a 
few friends, Batu Lintang, Glenealy and Parit Perak bought 
control of Batu Kawan. We just rolled on like this‟. (p.20)     
      
Pyramidal structures involve “owning a majority of the stock of one corporation which in 
turn holds a majority of the stock of another, a process that can be repeated a number of 
times” (Claessens et al., 2000, p.93). As mentioned, pyramiding is a legal and appealing way 
for someone to control a firm without having to invest too much capital. In other words, the 
cash flow right (which is based on the capital invested) of the controlling family is lower than 
its control (voting) right in the companies at the lower tier of the pyramid. An illustration will 
clarify the advantage of pyramiding: Suppose family A has 50% share ownership of firm P, 
who in turn owns 40% of shares of firm Q and firm Q has a 50% ownership of firm R. In this 
three-tier pyramid, family A is therefore said to have only 10% (0.5 x 0.4 x 0.5) cash flow 
right of firm R. However, following the „weakest link principle‟ of Classeans (2000), the 
control right of family A over firm R is 40% since this is the lowest percentage of ownership 
in the chain of the pyramidal structure.
30
  
 
Cross-holding is another method besides the pyramidal structure to obtain control rights with 
relatively smaller investments. Cross-holding is said to occur when “a company down the 
chain of control has some shares in another company in the chain of control” (Thillainathan, 
1999, p.16). Cross-holding is, however, less popular in Malaysia compared to the pyramidal 
structure. For instance, Claessens et al. (2000) find that about 39% of their sample firms from 
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 More detailed illustrations using the sample firms in the study are provided in Chapter 4. 
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Malaysia are associated with pyramidal structure and only 14% are involved in cross-
holdings.
31
 An example of a basic cross-holding is as follows (see Figure 2.2 below): 
Suppose family B has direct control ownership of 20% and 30% over firms M and N 
respectively. Cross-holding exists when at the same time firm N also directly owns 10% of 
shares of firm M. In this case, the cash flow right of the family over M is calculated as 20% + 
(30% x 10%) = 23% but the control right over M is 20% + 10% = 30%.   
 
Figure 2.2: Illustration of Cross-holding 
 
 
 
 
            
 
                    
 
Business groups in Malaysia are like many other East Asian firms which are characterized 
not only by high concentrated ownership but also the inclination of some controlling 
shareholders to use the pyramidal structure and (to a lesser extent) cross-holdings to exert 
enhanced control power. In other words, firms which form part of the pyramidal structure are 
themselves considered group-affiliated. For instance, Faccio et al. (2001), in their study on 
the issue of expropriation in business groups in East Asia (including Malaysia), consider a 
firm in their sample as group-affiliated if it fulfils one of the following criteria:  
 
 (i)    it is controlled by a shareholder via pyramiding, i.e. 
indirectly through a chain of corporations;  
(ii)       it controls another corporation in the sample;  
(iii)    it has the same controlling shareholder as at least one 
other corporation in the sample.  
      (p.61)  
 
                                                          
31
 The actual percentage of firms in Malaysia with pyramidal or cross-holdings should be lower than the ones 
reported by Claessens et al. (2000) as their sample firms are skewed towards large firms where the chances for 
pyramiding or cross-holdings to occur are higher.   
Family B 
Firm M   Firm N 
30% 20%  
10%
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The practice of pyramiding business groups, coupled with the significant participation of 
owners in the management/directorship; corporate sector in this region is known to have an 
insider system of corporate governance (Khatri et al., 2002) which gives the controlling 
shareholders excessive power to conduct activities or practices that may not benefit the 
public minority shareholders.  
 
The problem with the pyramidal holding structure and cross-holdings is that since the cash 
flow right is lower than the control right, the controlling family may have a tendency to 
expropriate the rest of the shareholders because the costs that they need to bear are lower 
than the benefits that they can achieve. The potential for abuse is highlighted in the OECD 
report (2004, p.42):  
 
…The potential for abuse is marked where the legal system 
allows, and the market accepts, controlling shareholders to 
exercise a level of control which does not correspond to the 
level of risk that they assume as owners through exploiting 
legal devices to separate ownership from control, such as 
pyramid structures…  
 
As such, not only can business groups facilitate expropriation activities (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon, 2006), business groups with a pyramidal structure can provide incentives to 
controlling families to expropriate. For instance, the family could decide to sell an overpriced 
asset from a company at the lower tier of the pyramid to another firm at the higher tier or use 
their listed firms to purchase supplies and materials above the market price from private 
corporations owned by the family. Tunnelling activities through such transactions involving 
related parties (known as related party transactions or RPTs) under the pyramidal structure 
are well documented in a number of studies, particularly among corporations in East Asia 
such as Gordon et al. (2004), Cheung et al. (2006), Cheung et al. (2009a, 2009b), and Qian et 
al. (2011).  
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2.7   Chapter Summary 
 
The chapter began by examining, from a historical viewpoint, Malaysian governance and the 
institutional environment, focusing on political involvement in business, to provide readers 
with sufficient background information in order to better understand the issues of interest to 
the study. Moreover, this study attempts to make the case that political interference in 
corporate Malaysia has a profound adverse influence on corporate governance development 
in the country, in which the politics-business connection is particularly prevalent in large 
business groups.  
 
The earlier part of the chapter focuses on the imbalanced socio-economic conditions in the 
country that had eventually led to the implementation of the NEP in 1970. The NEP was the 
watershed, not only for the economic development of the country, but also for its corporate 
and institutional development. It is during the NEP period that the interference of politics in 
business becomes apparent. An intimate relationship was formed between politics and 
business during the Mahathir era where the founders/controlling shareholders of many 
corporations, especially the large ones, were well-connected to the group of „new rich‟ and 
political elites in the country. The lines between business, politics and the state are blurred. 
Political patronage in business has also caused the enforcement of rules and regulations to be 
difficult and the resultant weak enforcements become one of the major corporate governance 
concerns in the country.  
 
Meanwhile, many firms develop into the cronies of the ruling party and influential political 
figures in order to facilitate their engagement in both expropriation and rent-seeking 
activities. This has an overall impact on the operating efficiency and subsequently the 
performance of firms as resources are misallocated or tunnelled away from them. The section 
concludes that without a proper reform in public governance, the reform in corporate 
governance, including the associated law enforcement, will be a daunting task.  
 
The next section explained the theoretical basis of the study. Agency theory (AT) is 
employed as the main theoretical lens in examining the issues of interest in the study. As AT 
only provides a partial view of the world, resource-based view (RBV) is used to augment AT 
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as it offers a complementary view for the issues under examination. Using dual or multi-
theoretic perspectives in corporate governance-related research is encouraged and looked 
upon favourably by the literature.  
 
The subsequent sections of the chapter explicated the literature review related to the major 
themes of the study. Literature on ownership structure was first presented and discussed. It is 
acknowledged that ownership structure turns out to be the single most powerful governance 
mechanism in Malaysia. The incentive/alignment and entrenchment effects of concentrated 
ownership in family-controlled firms are explained. The study focuses discussion on the 
concentrated ownership structure and the resultant principal-principal problems in East Asia 
and Malaysia. It also offers some preliminary discussion on the firm activities/practices 
underlying concentrated ownership structure including board independence, business group 
affiliation and firm diversification.   
 
Following the preliminary discussion, full discussion is then devoted to these 
activities/practices in the ensuing sections. In the section, on the issue of board independence, 
a review from both agency theory and resource-based view is presented and followed by a 
discussion on the influence of board independence on firm performance. It is noted that this 
study will concentrate on the moderating influence of board independence. Specifically, the 
moderating influence of board independence on the performance outcome of family 
ownership and firm activities/practices such as profit redistribution in business groups and 
firm diversification are examined. In the section on family-controlled business groups, focus 
is given to the various ways of defining business groups according to the literature and 
different countries. The focus is then shifted to family-controlled business groups in 
Malaysia and the pyramidal structure in business groups.  
 
The next chapter will continue with the second part of the literature review that focuses on 
the hypotheses development. Based on arguments from the literature, four sets of hypotheses 
based on the four major themes of the study are developed.  
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review with Corresponding Hypotheses 
 
3.1   Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter is a continuation from Chapter 2. Compared to the literature review in Chapter 2 
which is broader in scope, the review in this chapter is specific as it matches the literature to 
the hypotheses. Thus the aim of the chapter is to develop hypotheses which are based on the 
justification from the arguments in the literature. Four sets of hypotheses (H1 – H4) are 
developed to represent the four major themes of the study: ownership structure, group 
affiliation and other control-enhancing means, profit redistribution and related issues, and 
firm diversification. These hypotheses will address the research questions as posed in 
Chapter 1.  
 
The chapter begins with a review related to the influence of ownership structure on firm 
efficiency and performance. Attention is given not only to the ownership of controlling 
families, but also to the potential influence of other types of block-holders in family-
controlled firms. The moderating influence of board independence on the performance 
outcome of family ownership is also discussed. It is common to see family ownership and 
control being facilitated by the formation of business groups in East Asia including Malaysia. 
Thus, in the following section, the study discusses how affiliation to family-controlled 
business groups could possibly influence the performance of firms compared to firms without 
group affiliation. The discussion then proceeds to a review of how the potential use of 
control-enhancing means (some of which are associated with business groups) by controlling 
families could influence a firm‟s performance.  
 
The phenomenon of profit redistribution in family-controlled business groups is discussed in 
the next section. The influence from the heterogeneity of business groups, as well as the 
extent of family ownership and control on the phenomenon, is also discussed. The potential 
influence of board independence on the efficiency of profit redistribution also forms part of 
the discussion. The final section of the chapter is devoted to a review centred around the 
performance outcomes of firm diversification. Specifically, the discussion is centred around 
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the moderating influence of ownership structure, control-enhancing means and board 
independence on the performance outcomes of diversification. The discussion also involves a 
comparison of diversification outcomes in group-affiliated firms and non-group firms.   
 
3.2 Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Family-controlled 
Firms  
 
This section reviews the literature and develops corresponding hypotheses pertaining to the 
influence of various ownerships on the performance of family-controlled firms. In terms of 
the conceptual framework as established in Figure 1.1, the relevant hypotheses being 
examined are those of Hypothesis Set 1 as highlighted in Figure 3.1 (shaded in purple). 
  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in a dispersed ownership structure, individual shareholders do not 
have the power or will to play an active role in the governing and monitoring of firms. 
Subsequently, shareholders will be subject to the free-riding problem as each of them will 
„hope‟ for others to make the effort to monitor management and then reap the benefits of any 
corrected management behaviour. It is believed that concentrated ownership of family firms 
in many Asian countries overcomes the free-rider problem of dispersed ownership structure 
in which controlling shareholders are non-existent (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon countries in which the free-riding problem is abated through 
strong legal protection and enforcement, shareholders in many Asian countries need to 
depend on controlling shareholders (whether they like it or not) to address the free-riding 
problem because the governments of these countries thus far have not been successful in 
providing „public goods‟ (effective law enforcement). The reduction of free-rider agency 
costs from concentrated ownership will lead to more savings and surplus resources for firms 
and increases financial returns (Miller and Le- Breton Miller, 2006).   
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Figure 3.1: The Influence of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance - Hypothesis Set 1 
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                                                                                                                   Note: 1. See „Notes to Figure 1.1‟, page 25 for the abbreviations and key to symbols     
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With the substantial ownership and control rights that they have, family firms will ensure that 
their interests will be maintained and protected. Drawing upon resource-based view (RBV), 
Carney (2005) states these are the „Personalism‟ and „Particularism‟ qualities owned by 
family firms. Personalism refers to the unique power which results from the combination of 
ownership and control held by the controlling family. Thus, the higher the ownership and 
control of the family over their firm, the less need they have “to account for their actions to 
other constituencies, giving them the discretion to act as they see fit” (Poza, 2010, p.23). 
Particularism refers to the product of the concentration of control rights and its resulting 
discretion as elaborated by Poza (2010) that “family businesses... have the particular ability 
to use idiosyncratic criteria and set goals that deviate from the typical profit-maximisation 
concerns of nonfamily firms” (p.23). It is contended that both qualities lead to advantages for 
family firms as they enhance overall efficiency of the company. Thus it is believed that the 
greater the family ownership and control, the more prevalent will be the Personalism and 
Particularism qualities of family firms.  
 
According to Carney (2005), the personalistic and particularistic tendencies of family firms 
will combine to generate competitive advantages as they enhance firm efficiency and 
facilitate the creation and utilization of „opportunistic investment‟ and „social capital‟. 
Opportunistic investment refers to the ability to allocate a firm‟s resources “without regard to 
internal and external processes of accountability” and “owner-managers may analyze their 
investment decisions on the back of an envelope or utilize heuristic methods or a mental 
calculus rather than a careful and exact accounting calculation” (Carney, 2005, p.259). Thus, 
such ability provides advantages and facilitates the fast and decisive seizure of opportunities 
that lead to improved efficiency and performance. This is especially true when “time is of the 
essence and in situations where it is „better to be always first than always right‟ ” (Carney, 
2005, p.260). Conversely, social capital refers to those stocks of social trust, norms, and 
networks that controlling families can draw upon to solve common problems or create 
common benefits among the controlling families who belong to the same social networks 
(Carney, 2005; Poza, 2010). In short, through social capital and opportunistic investment, 
personalism and particularism qualities could ultimately lead to value creation for family-
controlled firms and positively impact upon their performance.  
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From the agency theory perspective, the association between ownership structure and firm 
performance can be viewed from two different effects working in opposition to each other as 
highlighted in Section 2.4 in Chapter 2: the incentive or alignment of interest effect and the 
entrenchment effect (Morck et al., 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A higher level of 
ownership by „insiders‟ (such as owner-managers in family-controlled firms) will reduce the 
agency conflict because the interests of the insiders will converge with those of the 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, insiders (the controlling family) 
will have the incentive to improve their respective firms‟ performance and share prices as 
they reap the benefits from doing so. Also, increases in ownership of the largest shareholder 
(the controlling family) indicate that more and more family wealth is tied into the business 
and thus there will be greater incentive to increase the performance/value of the firm.    
 
Furthermore, families are more likely to have strategic interests rather than financial 
interests in the firm – in other words, family ownership is motivated not only by short term 
financial interest but also longer term non-financial goals such as creating sustainable 
competitive advantages and capabilities. As controlling shareholders, families exercise their 
ownership stakes as a means of pursuing the strategic interests of their organisations such as 
securing new markets and protecting managerial autonomy so that the owner-managers are 
able to “make tough decisions” more effectively (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p.457). 
Overall, firm performance is expected to improve and the improvement is sustainable in long 
term.   
 
In terms of empirical findings, one of the most cited works in family ownership and firm 
performance is by Anderson and Reeb (2003) which is based on family firms in the S&P 500. 
Contrary to their expectations, they find family firms perform better than non-family firms. 
Their finding has intrigued and inspired other researchers to undertake further research in this 
area. Andres (2008) contends that family ownership in Germany “can be regarded as an 
efficient ownership structure” (p.440) as they perform better than firms with dispersed and 
other types of ownership. Wiwattanakantang (2001) finds that ownership concentration is 
positively related to firm performance in Thailand, a country with a number of similarities to 
Malaysia in terms of economic development and a corporate landscape that is dominated by 
the family-controlled firms of Chinese descendants. Finally, Lins (2003) after examining 
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firms in 18 emerging economies, finds a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value. He concludes that large shareholders play a positive and 
significant role in the corporate governance of firms in emerging economies. 
 
By way of contrast, Chen et al. (2004) do not find any relationship between family 
ownership and the operating performance of family PLCs in Hong Kong, an advanced 
economy with relatively good judiciary system and law enforcement. They also find that the 
composition of the board of directors has only little impact on firm performance and dividend 
policy. Filatotchev et al. (2005) also do not find any association between family control and 
firm performance among family-controlled listed firms in Taiwan.  
 
The above discussion indicates that empirical examination based on different countries on the 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance may yield different findings. A 
likely reason for the different findings is that firms in different countries operate with a 
distinctive culture and in different legal, enforcement and institutional environments. These 
country-specific differences may thus have a significant impact on the ownership-
performance relationships (Joh, 2003; Filatotchev et al., 2005).             
 
In Malaysia, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find that the higher the concentration of ownership, 
the better the accounting performance of the listed firms but they do not report any 
significant findings in the relationship between managerial ownership and market-based 
performance. Tam and Tan (2007) find that, under the concentrated ownership setting in 
Malaysia, different types of owners exhibit distinct preferences of corporate governance 
practices. For instance, family owners are found to have a preference for CEO duality and 
such practice is found to have an impact on firm performance. However, their study does not 
consider the effects of other block-holders in family-controlled firms. 
 
Overall, the expropriation of firm resources by the controlling families at the expense of 
minority shareholders suggests a negative impact of family ownership on firm performance. 
However, the „incentive or alignment effect‟ and the distinctive family qualities or 
„familiness‟ suggest that higher family ownership is beneficial to firm performance. In 
summary, it is difficult to conjecture the overall impact of family ownership on firm 
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performance, a priori. This study infers that all the above-mentioned advantages of family 
ownership should outweigh the possibility of expropriation and thus the following hypothesis 
is proposed:            
 
H1a: The stake of ownership by the controlling family positively affects the performance 
of family-controlled firms. 
 
 However, when the insiders achieve a certain level of effective control in their ownership, 
they may have a tendency to start to engage in non-value maximising behaviour to create 
private benefits, especially when the costs of creating private benefits that they must bear are 
lower than the private benefits they enjoy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Stulz (1988), using 
his takeover model, predicts that as ownership and control increases, the negative effect on 
firm performance and value associated with the entrenchment of manager-owners will 
surpass the incentive benefits and causes the overall firm performance/value to drop. 
Empirically, by combining the two opposite effects (incentive effect and entrenchment 
effect), Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) show that ownership 
structure and firm performance has an inverted U-shaped relationship: to begin with firm 
performance improves as ownership level increases, but performance will eventually reach a 
peak and additional ownership levels beyond that will result in a decline in performance. 
This is interpreted thus: increases in managerial ownership initially provide incentives to 
managers to strive for improvement of firm performance, but thereafter managers become 
entrenched and pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders.  
 
La Porta et al. (1999) in their survey of ownership structure around the world assert that the 
greatest source of agency costs of high concentrated ownership structure is the tendency of 
controlling shareholders to „tunnel‟ the firm‟s resources for their own private benefits; in 
other words, expropriation of minority shareholders‟ wealth. Dharwadkar et al. (2000) also 
agree with this view. Firms experiencing greater expropriation of resources are likely to 
exhibit poorer performance (Joh, 2003) because expropriation is executed at the expense of 
the firm‟s efficiency. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003), whether family ownership 
hinders or helps firm performance is an empirical issue that depends on the institutional and 
political-regulatory environment of a country. Their study on family ownership and firm 
76 
 
performance among the S&P 500 firms in the US indicates that the relationship is non-linear 
and in which firm performance increases until families‟ share ownership reaches around one-
third of the total share ownership, after which firm performance begins to decline. They thus 
conclude that “when families have the greatest control of the firm, the potential for 
entrenchment and poor performance is the greatest” (Anderson and Reeb, 2003, p.1324).  
 
From the above discussion, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
 
H1b: There is an inverted U-shape relationship between family ownership and firm 
performance in family-controlled firms i.e. ownership by family positively affects firm 
performance only up to a certain threshold level beyond which the effect will be reversed.          
  
Since the board of directors is the highest authority of a firm, it has the ability to exert 
monitoring power to curb „unscrupulous‟ activities, provided it is independent from the 
owner-managers‟ influence. Thus this study intends to examine whether board independence 
moderates the effects of controlling families‟ ownership stakes on firm performance. Board 
independence and controlling family ownership may influence each other to affect firm 
performance. Thus more insights could be obtained by observing how they interact with each 
other; for instance, whether higher board independence can positively moderate the effects of 
ownership stake on firm performance.  
        
H1c: The effect of the controlling family’s ownership stake on firm performance is 
moderated by board independence. 
 
3.2.1   Various Types of Other Block-holders in Family-controlled Firms  
 
From the convergence of the interest hypothesis and the efficient monitoring hypothesis, it is 
asserted that due to the size of their holdings; block-holders (a shareholder is considered a 
block-holder if the percentage of shares held is at least 5%) have the incentive as well as the 
ability to pressurize management to take actions to improve the firm‟s performance (Brown 
et al., 2011; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). For instance, Hoskisson et al. (1994) find that the 
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number of outside block-holders as well as the percentage of equity they own may help to 
reduce the implementation of poor corporate strategy such as the over-investment of free 
cash flows into diversification projects that is value destroying but enables the owner-
managers to pursue their private benefits. They show that a reduction in poor strategy avoids 
poor performance and subsequently reduces the magnitude of corporate restructuring. Jara-
Bertin et al. (2008) find that increased shareholdings by other types of block-holders improve 
firm performance and value. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) also opine that the ownership level of large outside block-
holders in the family-owned and controlled firms can help mitigate the moral hazard conflict 
between the family and the rest of the shareholders. Moreover, the controlling family may 
need the consent of a coalition of other large block-holders before they make any decision to 
expropriate minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). As a result, the coalition, led by the 
controlling family may hold too high cash flow rights (their combined ownership level) to 
profit from their expropriation activities as the costs could be higher than the private benefits 
gained. Accordingly, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest that the alignment effect of a 
coalition of large shareowners could give rise to a positive relationship between the 
combined ownership level of the controlling coalition and firm value. However, an outside 
block-holder should not have any business relationship with the firm if it wants to be an 
effective monitor of the company (Borokhovich et al., 2006).  
 
H1d: The ownership of other unrelated block-holders in family-controlled firms positively 
affects the performance of the firms. 
 
3.2.2 Domestic Institutional Investors as Block-holders in Family-controlled 
Firms 
 
In addition, the identity of the block-holder is also important. This is because different 
investment objectives and decision-making opportunities, as well as resource endowments 
among owners, could “determine their relative power, incentives and ability to monitor 
managers” (Douma et al., 2006, p.637-638), all of which have important implications for 
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corporate strategy and performance (Douma et al., 2006; Tihanyi et al., 2003; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). For instance, certain institutional investors such as mutual funds may be 
attracted by short-term yields on their investment, while family or government may be more 
concerned over long-term investment.  
 
It is suggested that institutional investors are more likely to play leading roles in governance 
compared to other types of outside block-holders (Khan, 2006). Nonetheless, institutional 
investors are rather diverse, with pension funds, mutual (investment) funds, insurance 
companies and banks being the most important. Some institutional investors belong to the 
„pressure-resistant‟ and some to be „pressure-sensitive‟ categories (Brickley et al., 1988; 
Kochar and David, 1996; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010). According to Brickley et al. (1988), who 
are among the first to suggest the categorization, institutional investors such as pension funds, 
investment and mutual funds and foundations are likely to be „pressure-resistant‟ from 
corporate managers since they do not form business relationships with the firms in which 
they have invested. They are thus more active and likely to oppose managers on corporate 
issues than banks and insurance companies which are „pressure-sensitive‟ from corporate 
managers as they often derive benefits from their business relationship with the companies in 
which they have invested.  
 
Most of the major institutional investors in Malaysia are government-controlled or sponsored 
and need not solicit business from corporate managers, Thus they are good examples of 
pressure-resistant investors.
32
 In Malaysia, banks, and to a certain extent insurance 
companies, are considered highly regulated industries and restrictions are imposed on these 
institutions in terms of corporate shares investment.
33
 Thus, share ownership of institutional 
                                                          
32
 The five major institutional investors in Malaysia are the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) (pension fund), the 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) (investment fund), the Muslim Pilgrim Saving and Management Authority 
(LTH) (investment fund), the Armed Forces Fund (LTAT) (investment fund), and the National Social Security 
Organisation (Socso). Together, their shareholdings stand for around 70% of total institutional shareholdings in 
listed firms in Malaysia. All five are government-controlled and sponsored institutions. For example, EPF is a 
government agency under the Ministry of Finance responsible for managing pension funds for employed 
workers in Malaysia.   
33
 Banks and insurance companies in Malaysia are regulated by the Banking and Financial Act, 1989 (BAFIA 
1989). BAFIA 1989 prohibits banks from assuming any management role or taking up any board positions in 
both private and public corporations. BAFIA 1989 allows banks only to make portfolio investments in non-
financial firms up to a maximum of 20% of the bank‟s shareholders‟ funds and up to 10% of the issued share 
capital of a firm in which the investment is made.  A somewhat more lenient restriction than the one on banks is 
imposed on insurance companies.  
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investors in Malaysia mostly occurs in investment funds and pension fund. Although the 
largest domestic institutional investor in Malaysia, the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) has 
not been active in the corporate governance of the firms in which they have invested.
34
 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), the largest investment fund in Malaysia, in contrast, has 
been playing a more active role in monitoring the performance and corporate governance of 
the firms in which they have invested (Thillainathan, 1999).
35
  
 
However, according to Effiezal et al. (2008), since EPF and PNB are both public institutional 
investors (run and managed by the government), they may invest more in politically 
connected firms than in non-politically connected firms. Furthermore, some of these public 
institutional investors such as PNB
36
 are established for the purpose of increasing 
Bumiputera share ownership in corporations to help achieve the objective of the New 
Economic Policy/National Development Policy (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Fraser et al., 2006). 
Thus the ability and willingness of these institutional investors to monitor firm performance 
is yet to be fully understood.  
 
Elsewhere globally, the impact of institutional investors‟ involvement in corporate 
governance and activism on firm performance and shareholders‟ wealth is not clear. For 
instance, Choi and Cho (2003), who examine Korean Chaebols find that institutional investor 
activism is neither harmful nor beneficial to financial performance. Karpoff (2001) also finds 
no support to a link between shareholders‟ value improvement and increased shareholder 
activism. Based on the assumption that most institutional investors in Malaysia are pressure-
resistant, their presence in family-controlled firms in Malaysia might help to reduce the costs 
of the principal-principal problem and subsequently improve firm performance (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003). From the above discussion, two hypotheses related to institutional 
investors‟ ownership in family firms are developed:  
 
H1e: Ownership by domestic institutional investors in family-controlled firms is 
positively/negatively associated with firm performance. 
                                                          
34
 EPF is the sole pension fund for Malaysian civilian. Membership is mandatory for all employed Malaysian 
citizens.   
35
 It is not uncommon for PNB to have a director representing their interest on the board.  
36
 PNB is established in 1978 during the NEP period.  
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H1f: Ownership by domestic public institutional investors in family-controlled firms is 
positively/negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
3.2.3   Foreign Investors as Block-holders in Family-controlled Firms 
 
Foreign shareholdings in family-controlled firms might have significant governance 
implications which could eventually affect firm performance. Foreign holdings can be 
broadly split into categories of either „direct investment‟ or „portfolio investment‟. Direct 
investment is generally made by foreign corporations who have some sort of partnership with 
local firms, whereas portfolio investment is generally made by foreign institutional investors 
(commonly known as foreign fund managers). Thus both types of foreign investors behave in 
a different manner; the foreign institutional investors‟ investment horizon may be relatively 
shorter and they are more concerned with stock market performance of the firms, and foreign 
corporations generally intend to form longer relationships with firms and invest in companies 
which are related to their core business. For instance, Seadrill Limited, a foreign offshore oil 
drilling company invests in Sapuracrest Petroleum, a family-controlled firm in Malaysia 
which is involved in the same field. Foreign corporate investors are thus likely to have 
strategic interests
37
 – they may use their ownership stake in domestic firms as a way to 
develop their strategic interests, such as securing access to new markets or location-specific 
resources. Moreover, their ownership stakes in domestic firms also facilitates those firms 
accessing superior technical, managerial and financial resources (Chibber and Majumdar, 
1999). Their presence also exerts monitoring of the owner-managers. Thus, the presence of 
foreign corporate investors in domestic firms may produce positive impact on firm 
performance.   
 
Due to the ever increasing competition and higher corporate governance requirements post 
Asian Financial Crisis, it is more and more challenging for firms in emerging economies to 
attract the participation of foreign institutional investors in stock ownership. Meanwhile, as 
                                                          
37
 Aguilera and Jackson (2003) made a distinction between block-holders who have financial interests or 
strategic interests. They state that “financial interests are predominant when investment is motivated by the 
prospect of financial return on investment...In contrast, strategic interests are prevalent when investment is 
motivated by nonfinancial goals, such as control rights” (p.451).   
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these emerging economies liberalize their capital markets, firms find it more important than 
ever to attract foreign institutional investors to invest in them. Two company attributes that 
appear to be important for foreign fund managers to invest in a firm are good profitability 
and good corporate governance.
38
  
 
Foreign fund managers would avoid firms with poor profitability because investing in this 
type of firms would result in failure to meet their acceptable return-on-investment benchmark. 
They would also avoid investing in firms with weak corporate governance (particularly in 
emerging markets where the legal enforcement may be poor) because of the various types of 
excessive risks associated with companies with weak governance. The types of risks are 
accounting risk, asset risk and strategic policy risk (McEnally and Kim, 2008).
39
 For instance, 
asset risk refers to the risk that the firm‟s assets will be misappropriated by the controlling 
manager-owners whereas strategic policy risk refers to the risk that manager-owners may 
enter into transactions such as diversification through mergers or takeovers that may not be in 
the best interest of shareholders, but that may result in large benefits for the managers or 
directors (McEnally and Kim, 2008). Conversely, the above-mentioned risks will be lower 
for firms with strong corporate governance and the lower risks will translate into lower cost 
of equity and therefore higher value of Tobin‟s Q.  
 
More importantly, good profitability and good corporate governance are found to be 
connected in numerous studies. Young et al. (2008) believe that foreign institutional 
investors may play an important role in the process of governance reform in emerging 
economies (Young et al., 2008). Foreign institutional investors may be able to monitor better 
because they are “outside the domestic social networks from which the institutional norms of 
behaviour are generated, and they are therefore more likely to push for transparent deals...” 
(Young et al., 2008, p.212). They are therefore more „pressure-resistant‟ to owner-managers 
of firms compared to domestic investors. Thus, the better monitoring ability of pressure-
resistant foreign institutional investors helps to improve firm performance. Studies such as 
                                                          
38
 McKinsey Global investor Opinion Survey on Corporate Governance, 2002 shows that in the Asian region, 
61% (21%) of foreign institutional investors consider corporate governance as equally important to (more 
important than) financial issues such as profitability in evaluating which companies they will invest in. Only 18% 
of the respondents consider corporate governance as less important than financial issues.  
39
 See McEnally and Kim (2008) for further explanation on the risks associated with weak corporate governance. 
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Brown and Caylor (2004) and Anson et al. (2004) prove that firms performing well are more 
likely to be from among those with good corporate governance.  
 
A study conducted by an industry practitioner from Malaysia, Amar Gill on emerging 
markets [as quoted by the CFA Institute (2005)] also found that well-governed firms enjoy 
much higher above-average total five-year returns of 930%, compared to 388% for the rest of 
the firms in the study.  The McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey in 2002 shows that 
institutional investors are willing to pay a higher price for the stocks of firms with better 
corporate governance. The race to attract foreign investors has, to a certain extent, 
„encouraged‟ firms to improve their corporate governance in order to compete successfully 
with other firms. In short, firms with good governance tend to generate better results; both 
for the firms and the investors and the better results tend to attract investors, particularly 
foreign fund managers, from developed economies.        
 
Any association between foreign institutional investors‟ ownership level and firm 
performance may also simply suggest another alternative explanation: that these investors 
„cherry-pick‟ their stock investments. Studies also highlight that foreign institutional 
investors are generally more likely to have financial interests – though they may be capable 
to exert good monitoring, their focus on short term return and liquidity results in their 
unwillingness to develop a long term relationship with the firm (Douma et al., 2006). Many 
of them would prefer to „vote with their feet‟ rather than „vote with their voices‟ if their 
investments return is unsatisfactory (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Nonetheless, one can still 
argue that to be cherry-picked by foreign institutional investors, firms need to show an 
encouraging improvement in their performance, possibly accomplished by having good 
governance.  
 
In fact, good governance alone is a factor in being cherry-picked by foreign institutional 
investors. 63% of the institutional investors in the McKinsey Global Investor Opinion Survey, 
2002, say that they will avoid companies with poor corporate governance. As an illustration, 
from that survey, some questions and responses from investors: “How does corporate 
governance affect your investment decision?” in McKensey‟s survey: “Our investment group 
would never approve an investment in a company with bad governance” (U.S. investment 
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manager, USD20 billion private equity fund); “Good governance is a qualitative cut-off 
criterion” (Analyst, USD62 billion European Asset Manager); and “I simply would not buy a 
company with poor corporate governance” (CFO, USD3 billion, European Private Bank).  
 
Overall, firms that are able to attract foreign institutional investors through good governance 
are able to achieve a higher market value for their equity and thus a higher Tobin‟s Q. This is 
due to the assumption that the demand for their shares will be higher with the support and 
positive signalling of these foreign institutional investors, particularly in emerging markets 
where foreign investors are considered as the important drivers of market sentiment. 
 
H1g: Ownership by foreign institutional investors in family-controlled firms is positively 
associated with firm performance. 
 
H1h: Ownership by foreign corporations in family-controlled firms is positively associated 
with firm performance. 
 
3.2.4   The State as Block-holders in Family-controlled Firms 
 
State-owned corporations have been criticized as being inefficient and performing worse than 
other types of firm ownership (Ramaswamy, 2001; Orden and Garmendia, 2005; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). State enterprises are subject to double agency problems. First is the tendency 
of managers to pursue objectives of self-interest and second is the tendency of the state 
(politicians/bureaucrats) to use the firms under their control to pursue political objectives 
instead of the commercial objective of profit maximisation, whilst the public pays for any 
losses (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  
 
Though there are many empirical findings on the poor performance of state-owned 
corporations, there are virtually no studies that have been conducted on the performance of 
family-controlled firms with the state serving as the block-holder. It is possible that family-
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controlled firms with substantial government ownership
40
 may be able to perform better than 
family firms without government ownership due to several reasons.  
 
Firstly, family-controlled firms with government ownership are different from state-
controlled firms which often succumb to double agency problems as mentioned above. Due 
to the alignment of interest effect, owner-managers of family firms have more incentive to 
maximize the value of the firm than professional managers of state-owned firms. Secondly 
and more importantly, since government has direct interest in the ownership of these family 
firms, it suggests that these firms should have a certain degree of connection with senior 
government officials and influential political figures. Fraser et al. (2005) also use the equity 
ownership of government as one of their proxies for political patronage in examining the 
relationship between debt level and political patronage in Malaysia. In resource-based view 
(RBV), this political connectedness is beneficial for the firms as they are able to more easily 
obtain certain valuable resources and supports from the government; possibly at a cheaper 
price (Xu et al., 2010). These firms may also receive preferential treatment in government 
contracts (Faccio et al., 2006) and bank loan (Fraser et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2008). Thus, it is 
conjectured that:  
 
H1i: Ownership by government in family-controlled firms positively affects firm 
performance. 
 
3.2.5  Other Unrelated Family (Auxiliary Family) as Block-holders in Family-
controlled Firms 
 
The existence of other unrelated families as block-holders in family-controlled firms is more 
likely to pose a negative effect on firm performance. With potentially higher combined 
ownership (ownership of the controlling families plus the „auxiliary‟ families), there is a 
tendency for both families to collude for the purpose of extracting private benefits. It is 
accepted that the possibility of consensus among shareholders of different families is more 
feasible because an alliance formed by families is subject to lower costs of extracting private 
                                                          
40
 Substantial holding refers to shareholding of at least 5%. 
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benefits. In contrast, the likelihood for institutional investors to form alliances with the 
family is lower due to the fact that their investment policy is normally subject to strict 
supervision and authority monitoring, and as such, the costs of extracting private benefits 
will be much higher (Maury et al., 2005; Jara-Bertin et al., 2008). 
 
H1j: Ownership by ‘auxiliary family’ in family-controlled firms negatively affects firm 
performance. 
 
3.3   Family-controlled Business Groups: Advantages and Disadvantages 
 
This section, together with Section 3.4, reviews the literature and develops the corresponding 
hypotheses related to the influence of business group affiliation and other potential control-
enhancing means on the performance of family-controlled firms. In terms of the conceptual 
framework established, the relevant hypotheses are Hypothesis Set 2 as highlighted in Figure 
3.2 (shaded in blue).
41
  
 
The early works of Coase (1960) and Williamson (1981) contribute to the literature on 
business groups as they discuss the economic benefits of „internal market‟ as opposed to 
„external market‟. They stress the role of organisation in reducing transaction costs in various 
markets. According to Leff (1978) and Goto (1982), business groups exist because of 
imperfection in factor markets including the capital market and financial institutions. An 
important feature of market imperfection is the absence of effective intermediary institutions, 
due to which it is “costly for emerging market firms to acquire necessary inputs such as 
finance, technology, and management talent” (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, p.868).  With 
business groups, an internal market such as the internal capital market can be created within 
member firms where inputs and resources can be transferred from one firm to another with 
ease. Thus the more effective internal market of business groups – the intra-group 
transactions – compared to the external markets, the lower transaction costs for group-
affiliated firms.  
                                                          
41
 It should be noted that controlling families are able to structure business groups and use this to enhance their 
control. Thus business groups are „grouped‟ together with other control-enhancing means as depicted in 
Hypothesis Set 2.   
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Figure 3.2: The Influence of Control-enhancing Means (Including Group Affiliation) on Firm Performance - Hypothesis Set 2 
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Family-controlled business groups are more common in developing countries because the 
imperfections therein are more prevalent compared to developed countries. In these countries, 
as mentioned above, group-affiliated firms have the advantage over independent firms via 
intra-group trading and internal capital markets (Leff, 1978). This is in contrast to developed 
countries such as the US and UK where the capital, labour, raw materials as well as product 
markets function well. Business groups are formed in developing countries as the external 
markets are generally underdeveloped. A business group can take advantage of its large size 
to borrow money at a lower cost. Subsequently, it can operate an internal capital market for 
its member firms (Joh, 2003).  For instance, the internal capital market of business groups 
allows controlling shareholders to access the cash flows of all member firms, and capital can 
be transferred from one member firm to another member firm more efficiently without the 
need to rely on external markets (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).   
 
Business groups are common in developing countries because they can be used as „vehicles‟ 
by controlling shareholders to diversify across different industries in order to build their 
business empire, as the small size of the domestic market does not allow for internal 
expansion in the same business line (Leff, 1978). As such, many business groups are formed 
in Malaysia (as a small emerging economy) as a way to expand their business empire and 
provide a solution to the small domestic market (Chu and Song, 2011). In some developing 
countries such as China and India, a variety of market failures or imperfections occur 
because of asymmetric information and agency problems as illustrated by Khanna and Palepu 
(2000a) on the imperfection in capital markets: 
 
...the financial markets are characterized by inadequate 
disclosure and weak corporate governance and control. 
Intermediaries such as financial analysts, mutual funds, 
investment bankers, venture capitalists, and the financial press 
are not fully evolved. Finally, securities regulations are 
generally weak and their enforcement is erratic. (p.868)    
 
From an agency theory perspective, business groups can be regarded as “a collection of 
agency relationships between the controlling and minority shareholders” (Yiu et al., 2007, 
p.1557). The existence of family business groups raises two main concerns. First, there is a 
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greater chance of inefficient transfer of cash flows or resources from the profitable member 
firms with high cash flow, to firms with low cash flow, without considering the investment 
opportunities for each firm (Shin and Park, 1999). Second, there is a tendency of the 
controlling family to „tunnel‟ the assets and resources from the firm through pyramiding and 
cross-holdings (Bertrand et al., 2002, 2008; Johnson et al., 2000). Pyramidal structure and 
cross-holdings are the common characteristics of business groups and Claessens et al. (2000) 
state that in East Asian countries, “(t)he separation of ownership and control is most 
pronounced among family-controlled firms…” (p.81). These types of ownership structure 
allow the controlling family to expropriate the minority shareholders‟ value by „tunnelling‟ 
assets within the group (Chang, 2003). For instance, Bertrand et al. (2002, 2008) find that 
business groups are used by controlling families to tunnel resources away from minority 
shareholders. Business groups can thus be used as a tunnelling device by the controlling 
families when it engages in intra-group transactions for instance.  
 
Specifically, the controlling families can divert resources from a member firm of which they 
own less to a member firm of which they own more. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) explain that 
managers of the affiliate firms have little incentive to be efficient because they are “secure in 
the embrace of the group” (p.51). The controlling families can also sell (buy) an asset of a 
member firm of which they own less to (from) another member firm of which they own more 
at a lower (higher) price than the market price. In a nutshell, the principal-principal problem 
in business groups as explained by Dharwadkar et al. (2000) and Young et al. (2008) has led 
to more research being carried out to investigate whether business groups create or destroy 
value (due to tunnelling) for their minority shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002; Bae et al., 
2002; Johnson et al., 2000).                    
 
According to Cheong et al. (2010), who draw on the classic work of Penrose‟s (1959) 
resource-based view (RBV), some vital resources are “lumpy or indivisible and thus they 
must be purchased or installed only in certain sizes” (p.141). Thus, even without market 
imperfections, business groups have the advantage over independent or free-standing firms in 
acquiring and maintaining these resources.  
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In East Asian countries including Malaysia, business groups will continue to exist so long as 
the factor markets remain imperfect and their governments continue to influence the 
allocation of resources in the economy (Chang 2006). However, according to authors such as 
Khanna and Palepu (2000c) and Peng et al. (2005), the benefits of business groups might 
dissipate as time passes and the markets become more efficient and political interference 
subsides. Chang (2006) seconds the authors‟ view and believes that business groups in East 
Asia may need to “narrow down their business portfolios and focus upon their core 
businesses” (p.413) over time as the nations‟ capital markets and other institutions such as 
the legal institution and law enforcement develop further. This is especially true when 
business groups face intense competition from their foreign counterparts as those countries 
liberalize their markets (Peng et al., 2005).  
 
In other words, diversification within business groups and firms affiliated to groups is seen as 
undesirable, failing to promote value enhancement to the firms and groups themselves, 
particularly under the auspices of globalization and liberalization. In a more competitive 
product market, the intra-group transactions of business groups are less attractive, as stated 
by Joh (2003) that “(w)ithout competition, the seller with a captive buyer has less incentive 
to lower cost and improve quality. Likewise, a developed external capital market erodes the 
advantage of an internal market” (p.295). In short, as an economy progresses and undergoes 
liberalization, the external product, factor and capital markets will become more competitive, 
thus reducing the advantages of intra-group transactions and internal capital markets (Joh, 
2003).  
 
Moreover, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Shin and Stulz (1998) contend that internal 
capital markets in diversified groups are often inefficient. They assert that groups have the 
tendency to over-invest in weak businesses and under-invest in the stronger ones and 
ultimately lower the entire value of the group. Past research conducted on western 
conglomerates in the 1990s such as Lichtenberg (1992) and Lang and Stulz (1994) have 
already shown that the values, as well as productivity of focused (undiversified) firms, are 
generally greater than those of diversified conglomerates.     
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3.3.1   Family-controlled Business Groups and Firm Performance 
 
Business groups have received increasing attention recently from corporate governance 
researchers. The research on business groups “has recently become highly topical” (Guest 
and Sutherland, 2010, p.618). Many of these corporate governance researchers regard 
business groups as an interesting and promising area of study surrounding the conflict of 
interests between controlling and other stakeholders. In particular, controlling shareholders in 
business groups may expropriate the wealth of other shareholders through activities such as 
„tunnelling‟ 42  and excessive diversification across unrelated industries etc. (Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007; Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).  
 
On the positive side, business groups are more common in emerging economies as they are 
seen as having the ability to fill the „institutional voids‟ in these economies, as elaborated by 
Guest and Sutherland (2010) that: “(b)y compensating for imperfect or under developed 
markets in finance, labour and products, for example, they may help facilitate exchanges that 
could not happen through the market place” (p.618). The impacts are that business groups 
allow member firms to benefit from internal markets created by the group and access to 
group resources and thus enjoy lower transaction costs and better company development. The 
economic benefits of internal markets compared to external markets have been highlighted 
since by Coase (1960) and later by Williamson (1981).   
 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provide a comprehensive reviews of the advantages and 
disadvantages of business groups and ask probably the most apt question in this field of 
research: Should business groups be viewed as „paragons‟ or „parasites‟? Some research 
finds that group affiliation provides benefits for member firms and their shareholders under 
certain conditions but others find that group affiliation is harmful, especially to minority 
shareholders. Evidence from the literature with regard to the benefits and costs of business 
groups is mixed and inconclusive.  
 
                                                          
42
 Tunnelling is the term introduced by Johnson et al. (2000) to describe the activity of transferring assets and 
resources out of firms by controlling shareholders.  
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Further to the literature on the strengths and weaknesses of business groups, research has 
been extended to study the performance of group-affiliated firms compared to non-affiliated 
firms. The empirical evidence thus far is rather mixed. According to Joh (2003), Korean 
group-affiliated firms in the mid-1990s showed lower profitability than independent firms 
and when resources are transferred from one affiliate to another, they are usually wasted, 
implying that tunnelling occurs. By way of contrast, Chang and Choi (1988), who analyse 
group-affiliated firms in Korea from 1975 to 1984, find that they performed better than 
independent firms. Similarly, Khanna and Palepu (2000a), who examine the financial 
performance of group-affiliated firms in India in 1993, found that these firms performed 
better than their counterparts without group affiliation. Joh (2003) believes that differences in 
the development stages of firms partly explain the opposing findings made by himself and 
the above researchers. Chang and Choi‟s (1988) and Khanna and Palepu‟s (2000a) studies 
are based on samples drawn from the early development of each country but Joh‟s (2003) 
study is drawn from Korean firms in the mid-1990s by which point the country had already 
achieved a certain level of progress and development in its external product, factor and 
capital markets. This is evidence that as an economy progresses, the “potential benefits of 
overcoming market imperfections decreases while the cost of agency problems and conflicts 
of interest between controlling family shareholders and minority shareholders can increase” 
(Joh, 2003, p.318).     
 
In general, as discussed in the literature and shown by the empirical evidence, it is difficult to 
predict whether the benefits associated with business groups will outweigh the costs or vice 
versa because either outcome is possible. Firm performance will be positively (negatively) 
affected when the benefits (costs) outweigh the costs (benefits). Thus the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2a: Firms affiliated to a business group perform better (worse) than firms without group 
affiliation.   
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3.4   Control-enhancing Means for Controlling Families  
 
Both the pyramidal structure and cross-holdings mechanisms can be used by controlling 
families to create business groups with highly complicated structures. An example of such a 
„complicated business group structure‟ in Malaysia is the Berjaya Group, controlled by the 
Vincent Tan family.
43
 According to Khanna and Palepu (2000b), the complicated structure of 
business groups gives rise to more opportunities to expropriate. La Porta et al. (1999) also 
question whether the controlling owners of business groups create complicated ownership 
structures in order to reduce the threat to their control. Thus, business groups with more 
complicated structures are reputed to be less transparent and have more opportunities to 
engage in questionable practices at the expense of minority shareholders and firm 
performance.  
 
The above argument suggests that family business groups are not all alike as some group 
structures can be complex while others can be straightforward. For instance, a simple group 
structure in Malaysia may involve a collection of listed firms with common ownership and 
control by a family without any pyramidal structure/cross-holdings. In other words, the 
member firms of a business group are directly controlled by the same family (as the largest 
shareowner) without using pyramidal structure/cross-holdings mechanisms. However, some 
business groups in Malaysia are formed by using pyramidal structure, as acknowledged by 
Claessens et al. (2000) and in a small number, pyramidal structure and cross-holdings can be 
complicated as they involve simultaneous holdings of a listed firm‟s equity by several other 
listed firms in the group and these firms may concurrently cross-hold each other‟s shares. 
Since pyramidal structure and cross-holdings as control-enhancing mechanisms are 
associated with divergence of cash flow from control, they need to be accounted for in 
examining the impact of ownership control on firm performance.  
 
Apart from pyramids and cross-holdings, controlling families of either group-affiliated or 
non-affiliated firms could also have their control over the firms enhanced under other various 
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 This study categorizes family business groups in Malaysia into three levels of complexity: i) business groups 
with simple structures, ii) business groups with pyramidal structures, and iii) business groups with complicated 
structures. The details are discussed in sub-section 4.7.2 in Chapter 4.  
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circumstances. One such circumstance is when appointing more family members to the board 
of directors, not only to represent the interests of the family but sometimes to dominate the 
board. A board with a high presence of family directors may find it easier to carry out 
activities detrimental to firm performance such as tunnelling of company resources (Prabowo 
and Simpson, 2011). According to Prabowo and Simpson‟s (2011) findings, family control 
through family ownership and involvement on the board is negatively related to firm 
performance. They also find that family ownership is more damaging to firm performance 
whenever the family is highly involved in the board‟s decision-makings. One such scenario is 
when the family occupies the two most senior posts (Chairman of board and CEO) of the 
firm simultaneously.  
 
Another instance of enhanced family control suggested in this study is when the controlling 
family is the sole or only block-holder of the firm. The idea is that if a second party, 
unrelated to the family, has an equity stake of at least 10% in the firm, “it could be more 
difficult for the first owner to control the board of directors” (Claessens‟s et al., 2000, p.93). 
A 10% cut-off point is suggested by Claessens et al. (2000) as it is sufficient enough to cause 
concern to the family‟s level of control.                          
 
An important aspect of heterogeneity of business groups which needs to be considered and 
reviewed in this study is their size. Business groups vary in size and the size of a business 
group can be measured by total market value of the group or the number of listed affiliates in 
the group. The finding from Khanna and Palepu (2000a), in their study on Indian business 
groups, shows that the scale (size) of business groups is important in affecting the 
performance of its affiliated members. Specifically in their findings, business groups of small 
and medium sizes underperform their non-group counterparts but large business groups 
outperform their non-group counterparts. They attribute the findings to the efficient working 
of internal markets in large business groups where the benefits are more than offsetting the 
costs associated with creating and forming the structure of the business group.  
 
Moreover, the largest business groups “are able to derive economic benefits because of their 
political connections in an economy where government regulation plays an important role” 
(Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, p.888). However, the same equivalent efficiency does not exist 
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for small and medium sized business groups due to lack of managerial skills, economy of 
scale and political connections. Coupled with weak institutional development and the 
corporate governance environment in India, the agency problems are severe and cause the 
overall underperformance of small and medium sized business groups.  
 
In Malaysia, it is also well documented that many large family business groups are well 
connected to the ruling political party and influential politicians (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; 
Nazli and Weetman, 2006). In resource-based view (RBV), access to „valuable resources‟ 
through political channels may suggest an advantage to business groups which helps to 
maintain or improve firm performance. These business groups receive substantial political 
patronage and privilege from the government and influential politicians, such as being 
granted special licenses, government concessions and contracts, access to cheap credit, and 
approval to operate in lucrative economy sectors such as power generation and oil and gas 
related industries (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Gomez, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  
 
Due to the support of senior politicians, large business groups are able to secure and enjoy 
state-created „rents‟ and add to the controlling family‟s wealth. The ruling political party and 
politicians, in reply, benefit by receiving funds from corporate figures for political campaigns. 
Instances of corruption are not uncommon as political figures attempt to create personal 
wealth. The quid pro quo politico-business relationship is maintained as long as the political 
figures are in power.  
 
However, whether nepotism and cronyism help to improve or worsen firm performance is not 
clear. As discussed in Chapter 2, resources may not be efficiently allocated as they will be 
used by the owner-managers for rent-seeking activities, hence a negative effect of inefficient 
resource allocation on firm performance. Moreover, large business groups may also be more 
prone to tunnelling and expropriation activities as their group structures become more 
complicated and lack transparency. It is already argued in sub-sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 in 
Chapter 2 that the prevalence of political connection in large business groups causes the 
controlling families of those business groups to be more inclined towards expropriating 
company resources.    
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Cases of minority shareholders‟ expropriation in firms controlled by family business groups 
that are politically well connected are not unheard of in Malaysia. For instance, in the 
infamous case of the Renong Corporation, the controlling family, Halim Saad, who was also 
politically well connected, had made use of United Engineer Malaysia (UEM) (another listed 
firm controlled by Halim via the Renong Corporation) to buy out some management-
controlled shares of the financially-troubled Renong at artificially high prices. The buy-out 
directly transferred wealth to Halim Saad‟s family at the expense of the minority 
shareholders of both Renong and UEM (Moore, 1998).  
 
Another reported case involved Ting Pek Khiing, politically well connected and the founder 
and chairman of the business group, Ekran. Ekran issued shares in May 1997 with the 
intention to purchase shares from an affiliated firm which was involved in the construction of 
the Bakun Dam, the largest hydroelectric project ever undertaken in Malaysia. Instead, with 
the occurrence of the Asian Financial Crisis beginning July 1997, the funds raised from the 
share issuance was used, via third parties, to buy out Ting‟s stakes in several financially 
distressed affiliated firms of Ekran.  
 
Thus, from the above discussions, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H2b: Due to the higher tendency of expropriation, group-affiliated firms with family 
control enhanced by the pyramidal structure perform worse than all other firms without 
such enhanced control. 
 
H2c: Firms with both the chairmanship and CEO positions being occupied by family 
members perform worse than firms without such an arrangement. 
 
H2d: Firms without the presence of other block-holders besides the controlling family 
perform worse than firms with the presence of other block-holders. 
 
H2e: The extent of family directors on the board positively (negatively) affects firm 
performance.   
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H2f: The complexity of business groups negatively affects firm performance. 
 
H2g: The size of business groups positively (negatively) affects firm performance.     
 
3.5   Profit Redistribution in Family-controlled Business Groups 
 
This section reviews the literature and develops corresponding hypotheses pertaining to the 
influence of profit/resource redistribution phenomenon on the efficiency and performance of 
family-controlled firms. In terms of the conceptual framework established, the relevant 
hypotheses are Hypothesis Set 3 as highlighted in Figure 3.3 (shaded in red).  
   
As discussed earlier, the internal market of business groups facilitates the transfer of 
resources and cash flows from one affiliated firm to support the operation of another. It is not 
surprising therefore to note that “poorly performing member firms can access valuable group 
resources, including capital, managerial talent or even preferential access to government 
favours at the expense of better performing members” (Estrin et al., 2009, p.400-401). The 
redistribution of profits and resources occurs due to several possible reasons.  
 
One cause of redistribution is where families are concerned with the profit stability of the 
group rather than the profit maximization of member firms. Firms with low profits need to be 
assisted in order to continue to exist, thus the profit stability of the group is more likely to 
assure the group‟s survival (and perhaps political power) so that the family can continue to 
accrue benefits from the group (Ferris et al., 2003; Estrin et al., 2009).    
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Figure 3.3: The Influence of Profit Redistribution on Firm Efficiency and Performance - Hypothesis Set 3 
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Ferris et al. (2003), who examine Korean chaebols conclude that the costs associated with 
chaebols outweigh the benefits and thus chaebol-affiliated firms‟ return of assets is lower 
and they suffer a value loss relative to non-affiliated firms. In other words, group-affiliated 
firms have lower value relative to comparable firms without affiliation. They suggest three 
reasons for the value loss: (i) the controlling shareholders are more concerned about the 
profit stability of the group rather than the profit level of individual member firms. In other 
words, evening out returns across member firms in order to stabilize the entire group‟s profits 
is more important because this is more likely to assure the group‟s survival so that the family 
can continue to accrue benefits from the group. Estrin et al. (2009) also find such „variance-
reducing‟ redistribution among Russian business groups, (ii) the over-investment in member 
firms operating in low growth industries. This is consistent with Jensen‟s (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis that managers who have at their disposal ample free cash flows tend to over-
invest in empire building and pet projects and, (iii) the existence of cross-subsidizing the 
unprofitable and troubled member firms of the group. This practice of „propping up‟ the 
poor-performing firms in business groups is also documented in Cheung et al. (2009b), Jian 
and Wong (2010), Friedman et al. (2003) and Johnson et al. (2000). 
 
Bertrand et al. (2002) examine tunnelling activities within business houses in India and find 
evidence of earnings being transferred from member firms in which the controlling families 
have low cash flow rights to firms in which they hold high cash flow rights. Transfer of 
earnings takes place through non-operating items, such as nonrecurring gains and losses 
(Cheung et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2006). The transfer or redistribution of profits and resources 
can be done in many ways such as the manipulation of transfer price, asset transactions 
between member firms at above or below market prices and intra-group loans at a rate 
different to the market rate, etc.  
 
The above „dark side‟ of redistribution suggests that the internal monitoring mechanisms 
established in groups are not effective in addressing agency problems that arise from 
business activities, including capital investment and project selection activities (Ferris et al., 
2003). Though anecdotal evidence shows that it is not uncommon for the redistribution or 
transfer of profits or resources to take place, it is very difficult to prove such activities 
empirically because they are normally executed discreetly (George and Kabir, 2008). This 
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study will use the method employed by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) and Lincoln et al. 
(2004, 1996) in an attempt to test the inter-affiliates profit redistribution hypotheses. These 
studies deem that the outcome of profit redistribution is that affiliates with previously high 
profits will subsequently experience reduced profitability, while firms with previously low 
profits will subsequently gain.  
 
The study by Estrin et al. (2009) shows that firms affiliated with business groups in Russia 
are more profitable than non-affiliated firms. Moreover, their analysis also testifies that 
groups practice „profit redistribution‟ from stronger to weaker group members. As an 
emerging economy that is undergoing transition, Russia has many similar characteristics with 
other emerging economies such as high concentration of corporate ownership and inefficient 
external markets.             
 
It must be acknowledged that besides the above value-destroying causes, some of the motives 
behind profit and resources redistribution may add value for the shareholders and improve 
firm performance. For instance, Lewellen‟s (1971) „co-insurance effect‟, as discussed in an 
earlier section, would increase the affiliated firms‟ debt capacity which would incur higher 
tax shields and correspondingly less payment of tax. Gramlich et al. (2004) concur with the 
idea and add that the shifting of profits among member firms allows the group to reduce its 
combined tax burdens. Another sensible reason for redistribution is the requirement of funds 
to finance new investments for affiliated firms that are financially constrained (George and 
Kabir, 2008). Ferris et al. (2003) find that chaebols-affiliated firms have significantly higher 
leverage than non-affiliated firms and lower tax burdens. Cestone and Fumagalli (2005) 
show that funds are channelled to affiliated firms in business groups to help increase the 
group‟s competitiveness in the industry.  
 
From the above discussion, the hypothesis is: 
 
H3a: Redistribution within a business group leads to firms with previously high (low) 
profitability seeing their profitability reduced (improved) in the subsequent period. 
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Generally, larger business groups are involved in an extensive range of industries and have a 
higher number of affiliated firms that also vary in size. Consequently, the difference in 
profitability (profitability variance) between member firms will be greater for larger business 
groups and thus larger business groups may engage more in redistribution of earnings and 
resources (such as capital) than smaller business groups (George and Kabir, 2008).  
 
In addition, the literature also highlights that larger business groups are more inclined to have 
political connections (Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) 
and these connections may strengthen the profit redistribution efforts of the controlling 
families. Moreover, the strength or intensity of the distribution effect could be moderated by 
the strength of family control in the affiliate firms (Lincoln, 1996). Generally, the higher the 
level of family control over an affiliate, the more dominant the family will be and the easier it 
will be for them to perform more redistribution activities. Thus the hypothesis that follows is:     
 
H3b: The strength of the profit redistribution effect is affected by the size of the business 
group and the strength of family control; the larger the size of the business group and the 
greater the strength of family control, the more likely profit redistribution will be.  
           
Finally, if expropriation is expected to be more serious in group-affiliated family firms than 
in non-group family firms, some of the costs of expropriation could manifest through the 
inefficient reallocation of resources from one member firm to another member firm within 
the „internal market‟ of the business group (George and Kabir, 2008). In other words, 
resources will be reallocated from high-performing firms (with good investment prospects) to 
low-performing firms (with poor investment prospects)
44
.  
 
Oppositely, if resource allocation is efficient, more business group resources will be allocated 
to deserving good-performing firms, whereas poor-performing firms will not be subsidized. 
Following this reasoning, the implication is that if resource allocation among member firms 
is inefficient, cash flows and other resources allocated for capital investments (capital 
expenditure) of good-performing firms, on average, will not be greater than poor-performing 
                                                          
44
 Good investment prospects or opportunities refer to investments that yield positive NPV and vice versa. Thus 
firms with good investment prospects generally perform better than firms with poor investment prospects.   
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firms (they will be either the same or lower). Conversely, without the „internal market‟, non-
group firms need to rely on the external market for their capital expenditure and therefore 
only good-performing firms have both the need and ability to invest in capital expenditure 
than poor-performing firms. Thus in non-group firms, capital expenditure will be 
significantly higher for those performing well and lower for firms performing poorly.    
 
This study also intends to examine whether in group-affiliated firms there is a difference in 
the capital expenditure of „firms with high board independence‟ compared to „firms with a 
lack of board independence‟. Three distinct board characteristics are used in this study to 
describe the attributes of board independence or the lack thereof: (i) whether independent 
directors make up of least 50% of the board; (ii) whether the chairman of the board is 
independent; (iii) whether the audit committee members are all independent. A board having 
any of the above attributes, such as a higher proportion of independent directors, an 
independent chairman, or all independent directors on the audit committee would be better 
able to monitor inappropriate company activities or decisions such as capital expenditure on 
poor performing projects. As a result, the inefficient reallocation of resources (reallocation 
from good-performing to poor-performing firms) can be monitored and curbed. The outcome 
is that more resources and cash flows will be channelled to deserving firms (good-performing 
firms) from undeserving firms and vice versa. Consequently, the high performance-high 
capital expenditure and low performance-low capital expenditure relationship will be 
restored in group-affiliated firms with such attributes.  
 
Based on the above discussion, the following two hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H3c: Due to the presence of inefficient resource (profit) redistribution only in group-
affiliated firms, capital expenditures of good-performing firms will not be greater than 
poor-performing firms among group-affiliated firms; whereas capital expenditures of 
good-performing firms will be greater than poor-performing firms for the non-group firms.    
 
H3d: The board of a group-affiliated firm with certain attribute of independence curtails 
inefficient resource redistribution and thus the capital expenditures between good and 
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poor-performing firms are differentiable with good-performing firms, on average, having 
higher capital expenditure than poor-performing firms. 
 
3.6   Firm Diversification in Family-controlled Firms   
 
This section reviews the literature and develops the corresponding hypotheses related to the 
effects of firm diversification on the efficiency and performance of family-controlled firms. 
In terms of the conceptual framework established, the relevant hypotheses are Hypothesis Set 
4 as highlighted in Figure 3.4 (shaded in green).   
 
3.6.1   Firm Diversification and Performance  
 
The literature on firm diversification is voluminous, diverse and ever-growing. One of the 
most important areas of firm diversification research is concerned with the relationship 
between diversification and firm performance. Two important survey papers, Martin and 
Sayrak (2003) and Palich et al. (2000), show continuing interest exists in the subject of 
diversification-performance among researchers. Though there is no lack of prior literature on 
the diversification-performance link, very limited research work, especially in Malaysia, has 
been undertaken on the roles of corporate governance, such as ownership structure and board 
independence, in influencing the diversification-performance link. Moreover, the presence of 
business groups (which alone raise governance issues) may also affect the diversification-
performance link. This element of the diversification-performance link research is still 
lacking and this study intends to fill the gap in the literature. 
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Figure 3.4: The Influence of Firm Diversification on Firm Efficiency and Performance – Hypothesis Set 4  
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According to Gomez (2006), using diversification to expand a business has been a popular 
strategy for corporations in Malaysia ever since the British colonial period: “Chinese 
immigrants (in Malaya) diversified into any field that held out the prospect of high returns” 
(Gomez, 2006, p.124), and “Bumiputeras (the indigenous Malays) who controlled quoted 
companies began doing the same in the 1980s” (Gomez, 2006, p.124). Prior to 1997, before 
the AFC, there were signs of over-diversification in many firms in Malaysia. Most of these 
firms took the opportunity of the availability of relatively low-cost credit and bank loans to 
finance their expansion and diversification (Fatimah, 2001). Many firms were reported to 
have a very high debt-to-equity ratio prior to the AFC (Chu and Song, 2011; Suto, 2003).  
 
Initially, diversification is believed to have some economic and strategic value. However, 
over time, as firms are ambitiously involved in diversification, it is possible they will be 
diversified beyond their core competencies and capabilities – into unrelated businesses. The 
manager-owners could increase diversification to boost the chances of inefficient reallocation 
of resources, transfer pricing, insider trading or other activities that protect the interests of the 
controlling families which subsequently leads to lower firm value (Chu, 2007). Early works 
such as Palepu (1985) show that firms with unrelated diversification are less profitable than 
firms without unrelated businesses. Some researchers argue that excessive diversification is a 
reflection of poor corporate governance mechanisms.  
 
From the agency perspective, it is argued that additional power, self-pride, prestige and size-
related managerial compensation are all examples of private benefits that can be derived 
from firm diversification (Jensen, 1986). Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that diversification 
allows controlling shareholders to derive greater insider information and additional „profits‟ 
from insider trading activities in the form of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary private 
benefits.  
 
Singh et al. (2007) argue that: “…in emerging markets where proper monitoring mechanisms 
do not exist, market based checks and balances are absent, and an active market for 
corporate control is practically non-existent, agency led diversification may be a strong 
possibility” (p.340). This is especially true in a corporate sector which is dominated by 
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family firms and family business groups with “almost unchecked power and financial 
strength” (p.340).  
 
In Malaysia, diversification is a way for a firm to expand and become larger; larger firms 
stand a better chance to form „relationships‟ with political figures and „work together‟ with 
them for quid-pro-quo benefits (for instance receiving political patronage for controlling 
shareholders and funds for politicians and their ruling political party). The information 
compiled by Gomez and Jomo (1997) shows that many of the firms which are politically well 
connected to high-ranking political figures are larger firms or business groups that are widely 
diversified.   
 
Asian (including Malaysian) corporations are well known for extensive diversification 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002). Claessens et al. (2003) find that about 70% of Malaysian firms 
pursued diversification that led to misallocation of capital and resources and were thus 
inefficient. The danger of extensive diversification is that it may result in manager-owners 
expanding the firm beyond what is sensible, affecting firm performance. Examples of 
insensible motives of diversification include empire-building and the participation in pet 
projects (Thillainathan, 1999).  
 
In Anglo-Saxon countries, it is asserted that diversification is the main reason for the stock 
value of conglomerates being traded at a discount. One of the causes of discounting is agency 
problem (Amihud and Lev, 1999; Denis et al., 1999). However, the reason why agency 
problem could cause diversification discount is unclear. From the agency theory perspective, 
the intention of management to diversify could be due to the empire-building mindset. 
„Diversification discount‟, as reported in the literature, is generally interpreted as evidence of 
misalignment between the managers‟ behaviour and shareholders‟ interests and therefore is 
an example of agency problem in the corporate governance of the firms (Bru and Crespi-
Cladera, 2006). Over-diversification could be a reflection of unscrupulous investment 
behaviour of managers (Jensen, 1986). The consequences of ill-intended diversification are 
declining firm performance and destroyed firm value. Yet Fauver et al. (2003) do not find 
evidence to support diversification discount in developing countries even though it is 
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documented in developed countries. Firm diversification might bring more benefits than 
costs in emerging economies. 
 
From resource-based view, diversification can provide resources and capabilities that are 
transferable across various divisions of a firm (Martin and Sayrak, 2003). It also creates 
value by mitigating failures in product, labour and capital markets in less developed countries 
by replicating the functions of institutions that are „missing‟ in those countries (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2000a). Khanna and Palepu (2000a) find that, in India, an increase in diversification 
can reduce transaction costs and improve firm performance. Also, diversification may ease 
firms‟ access to external markets and allow them to borrow more, at a cheaper cost. This is 
because different cash flows among divisions could cancel out each other‟s cash flow 
fluctuations and stabilize the overall cash flows of the entire firm (Lewellen, 1971). From the 
perspective of creditors, the risk-reduction creates what Lewellen (1971) calls the „co-
insurance‟ of diversification where the lending has a lower default risk. Nevertheless, 
excessive borrowing in diversified firms is considered to be one of the factors which 
contributed to financial distress and bankruptcy in many firms during the 1997 AFC 
(Claessens et al., 1998a and 1998b).     
 
Chu and Song (2011) study the connections between firm diversification, capital structure 
and the role of large shareholders in Malaysian firms. They find diversification to be non-
linearly related to firm value in which a low level of diversification improves firm value and 
a high level of diversification destroys firm value. However, by covering only the 
manufacturing industry with sample data collected from the period 1994 to 2000, before 
corporate governance reform became effective in Malaysia, Chu and Song‟s study is rather 
narrow in scope.
45
  
 
Using a sample of 355 listed companies, Zuaini and Napier (2006) investigate the 
relationship between diversification and firm value in Malaysia. In contrast to what is 
claimed by some, their overall result shows no evidence of lower value for firms with a 
higher degree of diversification. Part of this study is to extend Zuaini and Napier‟s (2006) 
                                                          
45
 Corporate governance reform took place in Malaysia with the release of the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance in 2000.     
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work by including not only ownership structure but also various aspects of business groups 
(such as group size and group complexity) and board independence in the analysis of the 
diversification-performance link so that a better understanding can be obtained.        
 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) do not find any relationship between firm diversification and 
performance in Malaysia and Thailand, both economies with relatively weak institutions (e.g. 
the regulatory institutions), whereas they find that diversification is positively related to 
return on assets (ROA) for Indonesia, the economy with the least developed institutions and 
finally a negative relationship in the case of Japan and Korea, both with relatively developed 
institutional environments. They conclude that diversification is therefore beneficial only in 
economies with “substantially underdeveloped institutional environments” (Chakrabarti et 
al., 2007, p.111), whereas diversification is harmful in more developed institutional 
environments.           
 
Lee et al. (2008) contend that the „diversification premium‟ caused by the imperfection of 
input and product markets [known as „institutional voids‟ by Khanna and Palepu, (2000a, 
2000c)], as documented in some past studies of emerging economies, is not likely to stand 
the test of time. The findings of their study in Korea from 1984 to 1996 have empirically 
shown that as the markets in Korea developed and underwent institutional transition during 
the period, the premium enjoyed by diversified firms had gradually dissipated over time and 
was eventually replaced by „diversification discount‟.  
 
In Malaysian firms, „diversification premium‟ could have been replaced with „diversification 
discount‟ as a decade had passed after the Asian Financial Crisis wherein progress has been 
made with regards to corporate governance development. Therefore, on balance, it is 
acceptable to expect that the effect of diversification on firm performance is likely to be 
negative. Thus, 
 
H4a: Diversified firms underperform focused firms. 
 
H4b: The greater firm diversification is across industries, the lower is firm performance.      
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3.6.2   Firm Diversification and Efficiency   
 
According to Singh et al. (2007), one of the possibilities of poorer performance of diversified 
firms associated with diversification discount, as documented in past studies, is higher 
agency problems in these diversified firms. If diversification is agency-driven, then a 
negative relation will be expected between asset utilization efficiency and the degree of 
diversification.  
 
According to Ang et al. (2000), asset utilization efficiency can be measured by the asset 
turnover ratio (total sales/total assets) of firms. The ratio indicates how effectively owner-
managers deploy the firm‟s assets. This ratio is also used as a proxy for agency costs in 
Florackis (2008), Singh and Davidson (2003) and Fleming et al. (2005) and the explanation 
provided is that “(a) low asset turnover ratio may indicate poor investment decisions, 
insufficient effort, consumption of perquisites and purchase of unproductive products (e.g. 
office space)” (Florackis, 2008, p.45).   
 
Moreover, since the conflict of interests between owner-managers and minority shareholders 
in group-affiliated firms may be more serious than non-group firms, as discussed earlier, the 
negative relationship between asset utilization efficiency and firm diversification could be 
stronger in these firms compared to non-group firms. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H4c: Asset utilization efficiency is negatively related to the degree of firm diversification 
because firm diversification is agency-driven and this relationship is stronger for group-
affiliated firms than non-group firms.    
 
3.6.3   Roles of Business Groups in Diversification 
 
Business groups, as discussed earlier, can be summarized as “networks of legally 
independent firms linked by a set of formal and informal ties that coordinate their actions” 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p.106).  Chakrabarti et al. (2007), who examine the differences in 
109 
 
the diversification-performance link between group-affiliated firms and non-group firms in 
six East Asian countries, state that: 
 
group affiliation often affects the outcomes of diversification. 
In most cases, the outcomes of diversification differ 
significantly, though not in a consistent direction, between 
group-affiliated and non-group firms within and across 
countries….This suggests that the nature of business groups 
varies across country and institutional environments, and that 
this variation substantially affects the outcomes of their 
affiliated firms‟ diversification. (p.117) 
 
The above statement suggests that it is important to conduct more research in different 
countries and institutional environments in order to capture the „contextual variations‟ that 
can contribute to the improved understanding of the role of family business groups in 
affecting the outcomes of diversification in different countries. Khanna and Yafeh (2007), 
who perform a comprehensive review of the business group literature, also concur with 
Chakrabarti‟s et al. (2007) findings that the performance of business groups is connected to 
the specific institutional environment in which they evolve. Singh et al. (2007) argue that a 
firm‟s diversification-performance link will be moderated by it being part of a large business 
group because of the possibility of greater information asymmetries, conflict of interest 
among member firms, inefficient investment plans and cross-subsidization in large business 
groups.            
 
Do group-affiliated firms perform better in diversification compared to non-group firms? 
Will member firms in the group benefit more or less from diversifying than non-group firms? 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) provide some views on the above questions. According to them, 
business groups, as a network type of organisation, tend to diversify themselves by having 
affiliates operating in various industries. Chakrabarti et al. (2007) state that “to the extent 
that diversified groups act as internal markets for affiliated firms, there might be less need 
and fewer benefits to affiliates diversifying themselves” (p.102). Oppositely, they also 
mention that using readily available group resources may improve the outcomes of 
diversification made at the individual firm level. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence 
shows that member firms in the group do diversify (Chang and Hong, 2002). “Because of the 
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expectation that diversification occurs at the group level and not at the individual firm level” 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p.102), it is thus intriguing to find out how firm level diversification 
can be affected by group affiliation in emerging economies. 
 
Some advantages of firm level diversification in business groups are summarized by 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007). Firstly, it is claimed that member firms in the group may be able to 
diversify effectively by taking advantage of „spill-overs‟ from resource transfers within the 
group. Secondly, group affiliation may provide “reputation benefits and privileged access” 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p.106) which enable member firms to mobilize resources more 
easily or at lower prices from external parties. Member firms may also gain from the spill-
over effects of the development of “greater managerial and organizational sophistication 
and resources” (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p.106) that are expected to occur at the group level. 
Kim et al. (2004) find evidence that keiretsu-affiliated firms benefit from keiretsu‟s internal 
market when they pursue diversification compared to independent Japanese firms which 
generally do not perform well following diversification. Through diversification, business 
groups are also able to reduce risk and uncertainty in the operation of member firms (Joh, 
2003). This has the effect of reducing default and bankruptcy risks.       
  
On the contrary, inefficient transfer of resources in business groups could cause a group-
affiliated firm to relinquish potential investment opportunities if funds/resources are used by 
the controlling family to subsidize weaker affiliates in the group. Moreover, Lins and Servaes 
(2002), who examine the value of corporate diversification in seven emerging markets 
(including Malaysia), find that diversified firms are traded at a discount of 7% compared to 
focused firms and more importantly the discounts are mainly from group-affiliated 
diversified firms and less from independent diversified firms. They contend that since 
business groups are able to capture the benefits of diversification through group 
diversification, there are few reasons for individual firm diversification within groups. Thus, 
the choice to diversify in member firms is more likely an act of expropriation (Lins and 
Servaes, 2002).  
 
Finally, business groups may also be involved in corporate strategies such as using their 
member firms for excessive diversification that fulfils a personal or family agenda at the 
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expense of the firms‟ performance (Young et al., 2008, Backman, 1999) As such, agency 
problems can be more serious among these firms especially in developing countries where 
legal and regulatory systems are lacking.  
 
Why would member firms in a group diversify when their group can perform the task more 
effectively and what is the outcome of diversification in group-affiliated firms compared to 
independent (non-group) firms? According to Chakrabarti et al. (2007), research has paid 
little attention to questions which are related to firm level diversification in business groups 
such as the ones presented above, probably because past research has been “implicitly relying 
on the proposition that group diversification substitutes for and precludes affiliated-firm 
diversification” (Chakrabarti et al., 2007, p.106). It is thus the intention of this study to fill 
the gap in the literature to respond to the above question.     
 
Overall, the above discussion shows that it is important to consider group affiliation and its 
effects on the firm diversification-performance link. Thus the next hypothesis is: 
 
H4d: The greater the firm diversification, the lower is the performance of the firms. This 
relationship is more obvious (less obvious) for firms with group affiliation compared to 
firms without group affiliation.  
 
3.6.4   Size Effects of Business Groups on the Firm Diversification-Performance 
Link    
 
Not all business groups are alike. Business groups may have various features that could 
affect firm performance differently (Kim et al., 2004; Khanna and Palepu, 2000a). For 
instance, the size or scope of a business group is one such feature. Larger business groups 
consist of more member firms and are usually associated with a more complex pyramidal 
structure or cross-holdings. The complexity of the organisational structure of large business 
groups fosters greater tendency of controlling shareholders to expropriate because the 
expropriatory activities or transactions that occur within the internal market of business 
groups can be easily concealed and undiscovered. Firm diversification into various business 
112 
 
lines is an example of such activities that provides opportunities for controlling families to 
engage in expropriation activities.
46
 For instance, instead of paying dividends, the earnings 
are retained and reinvested to diversify and expand the business. In such circumstances, as 
explained above, opportunities arise, particularly for large business groups, to be involved in 
asset transactions that benefit the controlling families at the expense of firm performance and 
minority shareholders‟ interests [for example, using the target firm to purchase assets (as part 
of diversification activities) from the private companies owned by the controlling families at 
a price higher than the market rate].   
 
Moreover, expropriation tends to be more serious in business groups with political 
connections, and it is in the large business groups that the connections are more prevalent and 
clearly displayed (Searle, 1999; Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Nazli and Weetman, 2006; Sahoo, 
2010; Yeoh, 2010). Accordingly, larger business groups may tend to engage more in the 
above-mentioned „agency-driven‟ diversification which would in turn negatively affect the 
performance of group-affiliated firms.    
 
In contrast, Khanna and Palepu (2000a) observe that the majority of small and medium sized 
business groups in India do not have the “management skills, the internal processes, or the 
political connections to generate benefits from diversification” (p.888). As a result, coupled 
with the poor monitoring institutions in India, these business groups are susceptible to serious 
agency problems and consequently the member firms of these business groups generally 
perform worse than the independent firms. Moreover, large business groups have the scale 
and scope to internalize costs associated with creating internal structures and processes more 
efficiently and are subsequently capable of creating added value for member firms (Khanna 
and Palepu, 2000a). In addition, larger business groups are conceivably more able than 
smaller business groups to offer „valuable, rare and inimitable resources‟ to their member 
firms which will in turn enhance the outcome of the firms‟ diversification efforts and 
subsequently improve their performance.     
 
                                                          
46
 Diversification with the intention to expropriate firms‟ resources and minority shareholders is known as 
„agency-driven‟ or „agency-led‟ diversification. 
113 
 
A business group has a choice; whether to undertake diversification at group or firm level. A 
smaller group with a small number of firms may not be as diversified as a large group. 
However, the less diversified nature of smaller groups can be compensated for by increasing 
the diversification at firm level. In other words, the affiliated firms can be used to advance 
the group‟s activities into different industries and business sectors. With this reasoning, a 
large business group is capable of proceeding with group diversification through its 
numerous affiliated firms that are involved in different industries (Chakrabarti et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the group does not need to undertake diversification at firm level as much as a 
smaller group does. Thus, in this case, firm level diversification would be negatively related 
to the size of the business group and this in turn would affect the performance of the firms in 
the group.  
 
From the discussion in the previous section, we know that diversification may positively or 
negatively affect firm performance. Since the size of a business group could affect the way in 
which diversification is undertaken at firm level, it is thus reasonable to expect that the size 
of a business group may influence firm performance via its impact on firm level 
diversification. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4e: The size of business groups moderates the effect of firm diversification on firm 
performance.  
 
3.6.5  Roles of Ownership Structure and Control-Enhancing Means in Firm 
Diversification 
 
According to Hoskisson et al. (2005), ownership of firms is an important factor influencing 
firms‟ diversification strategies. Different types of ownership, whether insiders such as 
family owners (owner-managers) or outsiders such as institutional investors, tend to create 
different impacts on firms‟ diversification strategies. The impact of managerial ownership on 
the diversification-performance link has been studied in the west. For instance, Denis et al. 
(1997) claim that due to the alignment of interest effect, higher managerial equity ownership 
(insider ownership) is linked to activities and policies that are less destructive to firm value. 
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Thus they believe that there is an inverse relationship between the level of value-destroying 
diversification and managerial ownership. They state that agency problems are responsible 
for firms retaining value-destroying diversification strategies.  
 
Lins and Servaes (2002) find that „diversification discount‟ in emerging markets is mostly 
confined to firms where the ownership concentration level of the management is within 10% 
to 30% but not in firms with management holdings below 10%. They justify that: “at low 
levels of control, there is less of an opportunity for management to expropriate minority 
shareholders. When control becomes more concentrated, insiders become more entrenched, 
and the opportunity for minority shareholder expropriation increases” (p.26). They further 
add that “...insiders can use the diversified firm structure to allocate jobs and favors and 
generally run the firm to suit their personal interests” (p.26). An early study by Amihud and 
Lev (1981) however shows that firms without large and powerful shareholders have greater 
unrelated product diversification.
47
  
 
In contrast, Lane et al. (1998) do not find any association between ownership concentration 
and firm diversification, whilst Anderson et al. (2000) find little evidence that diversification 
discount is associated with ownership structure. It is claimed that as legal systems improve 
and shareholder activism is strong, minority shareholders are better protected, making it more 
difficult for controlling shareholders to use a diversified structure to transfer wealth to 
themselves (Lins and Servaes, 2002).     
 
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) find that pressure-sensitive owners are positively related to 
unrelated product diversification and in contrast, the relationship is negative for pressure-
resistant owners. Thus outside block-holders who are pressure-resistant such as public 
pension fund (EPF in Malaysia‟s case) and other public institutional investors (PNB, LTH, 
LTAT in Malaysia‟s case) could provide the necessary monitoring and reduce losses due to 
excessive diversification, particularly in economies with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms (Gleason et al., 2012; Hoskisson and Tuck, 1990). As mentioned in an earlier 
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 Unrelated product diversification as opposed to related product diversification, refers to diversification 
undertaken by firms to venture into a business line that is not related to the existing businesses of the firms. 
Unrelated diversification is criticized in corporate finance literature as being activities that do not create value 
with the motives behind them dubious.   
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section, the corporate governance mechanisms available in Malaysia are rather weak because 
the highly concentrated family ownership renders impotent most of the external mechanisms, 
such as the market for corporate control and the market for executives. It can thus be 
conjectured that the shareholdings of these public institutional investors may positively 
moderate the diversification-performance link.  
 
Overall, the above discussion provides an adequate basis from which to conclude that the 
moderating effect of ownership structure may affect the diversification-performance 
relationship. Hence, the following hypotheses are proposed:   
 
H4f: The diversification-performance link of firms is moderated by ownership structure. 
Specifically, the ownership of the controlling family moderates the relationship.   
 
H4g:  The diversification-performance link of firms is moderated by ownership structure. 
Specifically, the ownership of public institutional investors positively moderates the 
relationship.  
 
The ownership in, and control of group-affiliated firms is distinct from independent firms in 
that the controlling shareholders in business groups achieve their control of member firms 
through direct, as well as indirect, equity holdings using a pyramidal structure or cross-
holdings (Claessens et al., 2000). Thus this may impose additional principal-principal 
problems as indirect holdings via a pyramidal structure or cross-holdings are associated with 
higher control rights but lower cash flow (voting) rights for the controlling shareholders. As 
discussed in an earlier section, this divergence of cash flow and control rights provides better 
opportunity for the controlling shareholders to expropriate the minority shareholders. One 
such activity is to restrain dividend payments and invest free cash flows into questionable 
business diversifications for empire-building and enhanced private benefits of control. Lins 
and Servaes (2002) discover that „diversification discount‟ is commonly found in firms 
where there is a considerable difference in the management‟s cash flow rights and control 
rights. In short, the higher the family control, the higher the tendency of the controlling 
families to expropriate the firm‟s resources and to be entrenched (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).  
116 
 
 
Besides pyramiding and cross-holdings, family control (as discussed in an earlier section) 
can also be enhanced via other „routes‟ such as forming a complicated business group 
structure, appointing more family directors, having both chairmanship and CEO positions 
occupied by family members, or simply by being the only block-holder in the firm. Thus, 
these „control enhancing tools‟ could be exploited by the controlling families to approve 
more questionable diversification activities and cause the relationship between diversification 
and firm performance to be altered.  
 
From the above discussion, it is conjectured that:   
 
H4h: Ownership structure moderates the diversification-performance link in firms 
affiliated to business groups. Specifically, the extent of family ownership in group-
affiliated firms moderates the relationship. 
 
H4i: The relationship between firm diversification and performance is negatively 
moderated by the existence of ‘control enhancing means (tools)’ in the firm.   
 
3.6.6   Firm Diversification and the Board of Directors 
 
Generally, agency theory believes that more independent boards will protect shareholders‟ 
interests such as constraining the over-pursuit of diversification strategies by the managers 
(Anderson et al., 2000, Gleason et al., 2012). Accordingly, compared to management-
dominated boards, it is reasonable to expect that independent boards are linked to relatively 
lower levels of diversification. Bru and Crespi-Cladera (2006) find that group-affiliated firms 
with more family members on the board tend to have higher diversification compared to 
comparable firms with less family members on the board. In contrast, Chen et al. (2009) 
believe that corporate decisions such as diversification are generally made by management 
without direct participation of the board. Thus the asymmetric information between 
management and independent directors prevents the latter from acting independently and 
making informed decisions.  
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Chen et al. (2009), who investigate the association between the composition of the board of 
directors (including board independence) and corporate diversification in Australia, a 
developed economy, find that there is no link between the two. Specifically, they do not find 
evidence to show that a more independent board improves profitability and promotes 
shareholders‟ interests in the form of reduced corporate diversification. Thus they suggest 
revising the current requirement or recommendation in many jurisdictions that boards be 
more independent. They add that “board composition should also consider directors‟ 
knowledge, relevant expertise, availability, and length of tenure” (Chen et al., 2009, p.208). 
For instance, tenure of independent directors should be examined by regulators because over 
time, independence may be compromised (Chen et al., 2009).  
 
However, as an emerging economy, at this stage in its development of corporate governance, 
Malaysia still lags behind Australia and thus the findings in Australia by Chen et al. (2009) 
may only serve as a reference and are not directly applicable to Malaysia. On-going efforts 
by the authorities are still needed to enhance board independence in this country, as they 
explore other aspects of how a board could increase overall efficiency. A highly independent 
board may help a firm to curb unscrupulous, dubious and value-destroying diversification but 
nonetheless support diversifications that are sensible or value-adding and vice versa for 
boards with low independence. In other words, board independence may moderate the effects 
of strategic decisions such as diversification on firm performance. Thus it is conjectured that: 
 
H4j: Board independence positively moderates the effect of firm diversification on firm 
performance in Malaysia. 
 
3.7   Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter reviewed and explicated the literature that is directly linked and applied to the 
development of the hypotheses. The discussions are directed towards the influence of 
concentrated ownership structure and underlying firm strategies/activities or practices and 
their intertwined influence on the performance of family-controlled firms. Four sets of 
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hypotheses (H1 to H4) are developed based on the arguments from the literature pertaining to 
the major themes in the study, namely; ownership structure (family ownership and other 
types of block-holders), business group affiliation and other control-enhancing means 
(including a pyramidal structure, group complexity and size, family as the sole block-holder, 
family directors on the board and family occupying both the chairmanships and CEO 
positions), profit redistribution of business groups, and firm diversification. Hypotheses are 
introduced and stated sequentially as the review of literature progresses. 
 
The chapter began with a discussion on the favourable and unfavourable influences of 
concentrated family ownership on firm performance. Emphasis is given to the incentive 
(alignment of interests) effects and entrenchment (expropriation) effects of agency theory 
and the „personalism‟ and „particularism‟ effects of resource-based view. Empirical findings 
from the literature are then presented and discussed. Included in the discussion is the 
justification for the possibility of a non-linear relationship between controlling family 
ownership and firm performance. It is also hypothesized that board independence is able to 
moderate the influence of controlling family ownership on firm performance. The study then 
discussed the influence of other types of block-holders in family-controlled firms on firm 
performance. These block-holders include domestic and foreign institutional investors, 
foreign corporations, state/government and other unrelated families. It is learnt from the 
review that block-holders are very distinct from each other in terms of their roles in family-
controlled firms and that they may thus exert different influence on the efficiency and 
performance of firms.  
 
The next section explored the advantages and disadvantages of family-controlled business 
groups from theoretical perspectives, as found in the literature. The study proceeded to 
review the association between group-affiliated firms and their performance compared to 
non-affiliated firms. The review then continued with business groups that involve pyramidal 
structures and complicated group structures. Since families are able to enhance their control 
over firms affiliated to such business groups, these business groups are believed to be more 
prone to expropriation by controlling families. The review also highlighted other potential 
types of control-enhancing means, (available not only to group-affiliated firms but also to 
non-group firms) in affecting firm performance. These include the tendency to appoint more 
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family directors to the board, power concentration of controlling families by occupying the 
chairmanship and CEO positions and a controlling family being the sole block-holder of the 
firm. The review also pointed out that due to the prevalence of their connection with politics 
and government, as well as their lower transparency in business activities/transactions, large 
business groups may engage more in expropriation activities.  
 
The ensuing section reviewed the potential occurrence of profit redistribution in family 
business groups. It is argued that there exists a tendency for business groups (particularly 
large business groups with extensive family control) to redistribute resources from group 
affiliates that outperformed to affiliates that underperformed. These „propping up‟ activities 
are believed to adversely affect the shareholders of the outperforming affiliates as the 
performance of these affiliates diminishes due to the profit redistribution. They also result in 
inefficient allocation of resources within the business group, though it is hypothesized that 
higher board independence reduces such inefficiency.     
  
The study then moved on to review the influence of diversification in family-controlled firms 
on the firms‟ efficiency and performance. It is hypothesized that extensive diversification 
increases the inefficiency of asset utilization which may subsequently affect a firm‟s 
performance. The role of the business group in firm diversification was also discussed and it 
is conjectured that the size of business groups and the ownership structure of group members 
may moderate the diversification-performance outcome. From the review, the extent of 
influence of firm diversification on firm performance is also conjectured to be negatively 
moderated by control-enhancing means but positively moderated by the extent of board 
independence.     
 
The next chapter deals with the overall data collection and methodology of the study. It 
includes a brief discussion on the research philosophy and ethical issues, followed by a 
detailed discussion on the sampling and data collection process, the construction of the 
variables, the methods of analysis and the model specifications used in testing the hypotheses.  
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Finally, a summary table of the hypotheses linked back to the research questions is provided 
below (Table 3.1). The table also provides a cross reference to the key operational variables 
that appear in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of the Link between Research Questions, Hypotheses and Key  
Operational Variables  
Research 
Questions  
Hypotheses Key Operational Variables
48
 
RQ1: 
Coupled with 
the benefits 
brought about 
by the 
concentrated 
ownership 
structure, in 
what way (for 
example, 
favourably or 
unfavourably) 
will the 
concerns of 
the 
concentrated 
ownership 
structure in 
family-
controlled 
firms 
influence the 
performance 
of the firms? 
 
H1a: The stake of ownership by the controlling family 
positively affects the performance of family-controlled firms. 
 
FAMOWN (Controlling Family 
Ownership) 
 
H1b: There is an inverted U-shape relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance in family-controlled firms i.e. 
ownership by family positively affects firm performance only up 
to a certain threshold level beyond which the effect will be 
reversed. 
 
FAMOWN2 (Square of Controlling 
Family Ownership) 
 
H1d: The ownership of other unrelated block-holders in family-
controlled firms positively affects the performance of the firms. 
 
Other BHS [Other (Outside) Block-
holders] 
 
H1e Ownership by domestic institutional investors in family-
controlled firms is positively/negatively associated with firm 
performance. 
 
DOMII (Domestic Institutional 
Investors Ownership) 
 
H1f: Ownership by domestic public institutional investors in 
family-controlled firms is positively/negatively associated with 
firm performance. 
 
DOMPUBII (Domestic Public 
Institutional Investors Ownership) 
 
H1g: Ownership by foreign institutional investors in family-
controlled firms is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
FORGNII (Foreign Institutional 
Investors Ownership) 
 
H1h: Ownership by foreign corporations in family-controlled 
firms is positively associated with firm performance. 
 
FORGN (Foreign Corporations 
Ownership) 
 
H1i: Ownership by government in family-controlled firms 
positively affects firm performance. 
 
STATE (State Ownership) 
 
H1j: Ownership by „auxiliary family‟ in family-controlled firms 
negatively affects firm performance. 
 
AUXFAM (Auxiliary or Unrelated 
Families Ownership) 
 
 
RQ2: Will the 
firm activities 
H2a: Firms affiliated to a business group perform better 
(worse) than firms without group affiliation. 
 
Group (Business group affiliation) 
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 See Table 5.1 for the operationalization of the variables.  
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Research 
Questions  
Hypotheses Key Operational Variables
48
 
or practices 
underlying 
concentrated 
family 
ownership, 
namely, the 
practice of 
relying on 
control-
enhancing 
means and 
the activities 
associated 
with business 
group 
affiliation and 
firm 
diversificatio
n, be 
beneficial or 
harmful to the 
performance 
of family-
controlled 
firms? 
 
H2b: Due to the higher tendency of expropriation, group-
affiliated firms with family control enhanced by the pyramidal 
structure perform worse than all other firms without such 
enhanced control. 
 
CF/CONT (Cash Flow-to-Control 
Rights), CF/CONT_DUM (Cash Flow-
to-Control Rights Dummy) 
 
H2c: Firms with both the chairmanship and CEO positions 
being occupied by family members perform worse than firms 
without such an arrangement. 
CHR_CEO (Chairman and CEO 
positions simultaneously occupied by 
the controlling family) 
 
H2d: Firms without the presence of other block-holders besides 
the controlling family perform worse than firms with the 
presence of other block-holders. 
 
FAMONLY (Controlling family as the 
only or sole block-holder) 
 
H2e: The extent of family directors on the board positively 
(negatively) affects firm performance.  
 
FAMDIR (Family Directors on the 
Board) 
H2f: The complexity of business groups negatively affects firm 
performance. 
 
BG_S (Business Groups with Simple 
Structure), BG_PS (Business Groups 
with Pyramidal Structure), BG_CS 
(Business Groups with Complicated 
Structure) 
 
H2g: The size of business groups positively (negatively) affects 
firm performance.     
GR_A (Small size business group), 
GR_B (Intermediate size business 
group), GR_C (Large size business 
group) 
 
H3a: Redistribution within a business group leads to firms with 
previously high (low) profitability seeing their profitability 
reduced (improved) in the subsequent period. 
 
Lag (ROA) [Previous year ROA], Lag 
(Tobin‟s Q) [Previous year Tobin‟s Q] 
H3b: The strength of the profit redistribution effect is affected 
by the size of the business group and the strength of family 
control; the larger the size of the business group and the 
greater the strength of family control, the more likely profit 
redistribution will be.  
 
FAMOWN1 (Controlling family 
without majority ownership), 
FAMOWN2 (Controlling family with 
majority ownership), GR_A, GR_B, 
GR_C, Lag(ROA),  Lag(Tobin‟s Q), 
CF/CONT, CF/CONT_DUM  
 
H3c: Due to the presence of inefficient resource (profit) 
redistribution only in group-affiliated firms, capital 
expenditures of good-performing firms will not be greater than 
poor-performing firms among group-affiliated firms; whereas 
capital expenditures of good-performing firms will be greater 
than poor-performing firms for the non-group firms. 
 
CAPEX Ratio (Capital Expenditure 
Ratio) 
H4a: Diversified firms underperform focused firms. 
 
DVSF_D (Diversification Dummy) 
H4b: The greater firm diversification is across industries, the 
lower is firm performance. 
 
E (ENTROPY), HERF(Herfindahl 
Index), NUM_SEG (Number of 
Segments) 
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Research 
Questions  
Hypotheses Key Operational Variables
48
 
H4c: Asset utilization efficiency is negatively related to the 
degree of firm diversification because firm diversification is 
agency-driven and this relationship is stronger for group-
affiliated firms than non-group firms. 
 
Efficiency (Asset Turnover Ratio), 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
Group 
RQ3: What 
will be the 
moderating 
influence of 
board 
independence 
on the effects 
of family 
ownership as 
well as the 
underlying 
business 
group 
affiliation and 
diversificatio
n activities on 
firm 
performance?  
 
H1c: The effect of the controlling family‟s ownership stake on 
firm performance is moderated by board independence. 
 
 
 
PrINED (Proportion of Independent 
Directors), INDP_CHR (Independent 
Chairman), INDP_ADT (Independent 
Audit Committee), H_INDP_B (Highly 
Independent Board), FAMOWN 
 
H3d: The board of a group-affiliated firm with certain attribute 
of independence curtails inefficient resource redistribution and 
thus the capital expenditures between good and poor-
performing firms are differentiable with good-performing 
firms, on average, having higher capital expenditure than 
poor-performing firms. 
 
PrINED, INDP_CHR, INDP_ADT,  
H_INDP_B, CAPEX Ratio 
H4j: Board independence positively moderates the effect of 
firm diversification on firm performance in Malaysia. 
 
PrINED, INDP_CHR, INDP_ADT,  
H_INDP_B, E, HERF, NUM_SEG, 
DVSF_D  
 
RQ4: What 
will be the 
moderating 
influence of 
ownership 
structure as 
well as 
control-
enhancing 
means and 
business 
group 
affiliation on 
the firm 
diversificatio
n-
performance 
relation? 
 
H4d: The greater the firm diversification, the lower is the 
performance of the firms. This relationship is more obvious 
(less obvious) for firms with group affiliation compared to 
firms without group affiliation.  
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
Group 
H4e: The size of business groups moderates the effect of firm 
diversification on firm performance.  
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
GR_A, GR_B, GR_C  
 
H4f: The diversification-performance link of firms is 
moderated by ownership structure. Specifically, the ownership 
of the controlling family moderates the relationship.   
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
FAMOWN 
 
H4g:  The diversification-performance link of firms is 
moderated by ownership structure. Specifically, the ownership 
of public institutional investors positively moderates the 
relationship.  
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
DOMPUBII 
H4h: Ownership structure moderates the diversification-
performance link in firms affiliated to business groups. 
Specifically, the extent of family ownership in group-affiliated 
firms moderates the relationship. 
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
FAMOWN, Group 
H4i: The relationship between firm diversification and 
performance is negatively moderated by the existence of 
„control enhancing means (tools)‟ in the firm.   
 
E, HERF, NUM_SEG, DVSF_D, 
CF/CONT, CF/CONT_DUM, 
CHR_CEO, FAMONLY, FAMDIR, 
BG_S, BG_PS, BG_CS 
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Chapter 4 – Data and Methodology 
 
4.1   Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter begins with a brief explanation of the ethical issues involved in the study 
followed by a brief discussion on its philosophical stance. The processes of sample selection 
and data collection are explicated in the following section. Emphasis is given to justifying 
why the final selected sample of family-controlled firms should be representative of all 
publicly-listed family-controlled firms across various sectors/industries in Malaysia.  
  
Following the explanation on the sampling process, subsequent sections discuss the 
construction of the variables involved in the study. Emphasis is given to explain how the 
conceptual variables such as family ownership, group-affiliation and diversification are 
operationalized through the construction of the corresponding operational variables. An 
explanation based on previous literature is first provided on the construction of the family 
ownership variable, followed by an explanation of firm performance variables in the 
following section. Explanation is also provided regarding the winsorization
49
 of the 
performance data. Detailed explanations on the construction of other block-holders variables 
are then provided with illustrations taken from the sampled firms. This is followed by 
another sub-section which is devoted to the detail explanation on the construction of business 
group-related variables. Three types of business groups, in terms of group structure 
complexity, are constructed with illustration provided for each type. The construction of firm 
diversification variables by four various measures is explained in the sub-section that follows. 
Finally this section is completed with the discussion of the control variables used in the study 
and the justification for their inclusion.         
 
The ensuing section discusses why multiple and moderated regression analyses are chosen as 
the main tools of analysis in the study. This is followed by explanation of the development of 
various model specifications in the study. A total of thirteen specifications are used for the 
purpose of hypotheses testing. The discussion in this section is divided into several sub-
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 Winsorization is a data treatment technique. See Section 4.6 for discussion of the method. 
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sections according to the four major themes in the study, namely ownership structure, group 
affiliation and other control-enhancing means, profit redistribution, and firm diversification. 
This chapter concludes with the chapter summary.      
 
4.2   Ethical Issues in Data Collection and Sampling 
 
Ethical issues involved in this study are minimal. As this study is based on data from reliable 
secondary sources, it is not subject to the same concerns found in primary data research such 
as issues of whether there is harm to participants, lack of informed consent or invasion of 
privacy. This study is also independent of any conflicts of interest with any parties. Real-
world examples used in this study are from publicly available sources and meant for 
impartial academic purposes only. The researcher does not foresee any potential ethical or 
legal issues pertaining to the dissemination of results as no specific firms are referred to. 
 
4.3   Research Philosophy  
 
This study takes the positivist approach in which hypotheses are developed based on the 
notion that the influence of ownership structure and underlying firm activities/attributes on 
firm performance is apprehensible and can be examined and empirically tested using the 
researcher‟s tools of analysis and theoretical conjectures. Consider, as stated by sociologists 
Burrel and Morgan, that positivists “seek to explain and predict what happens in the social 
world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements” 
(Burrel and Morgan, 1979, p.5). A deductive or „top-down‟ approach is applied where the 
pre-existing theoretical basis is identified and relied upon in developing the hypotheses. 
Empirical findings from hypothesis testing will then confirm whether the hypothesis 
developed based on the theoretical arguments is supported. To achieve this objective, 
regressions are used as the main tools of analysis in this study in which the researcher 
pursues the positivists‟ understanding of the conduct of methodological process that is 
“unaffected by individual perceptual differences” (Ardalan, 2008, p.11).    
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4.4   Sample Selection and Data Collection   
 
The sample was drawn from the 632 companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia, 
the sole stock exchange in Malaysia, as in September 2007. All listed companies are 
classified by Bursa Malaysia into „sectors‟ based on their core business. This sector 
classification enables sector effects to be taken into account in the regression analysis later. 
Companies from the Second Board were excluded from the selection because the listing 
requirements of the Second Board are different from the Main Board, rendering them 
incomparable.
50
  
 
Of the eleven sectors that were identified by Bursa Malaysia, four sectors, namely „Finance‟, 
„Hotels‟, „Mining‟ and „IPC‟ were excluded from the study. The finance sector is excluded 
from the study because firms in this sector are governed by a different set of rules and 
regulations and thus make them incomparable to firms in other sectors.
51
 The exclusion of 
the finance sector is also consistent with previous studies in this area (for instance in 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Claessens et al., 2006; Jiraporn et al., 2006; Andres, 2008; Estrin 
et al., 2009). The other three sectors were excluded because the number of firms in each 
sector is too small to provide any meaningful analysis. There were only five, one, and seven 
firms from the „Hotel‟, „Mining‟ and „IPC‟ sectors respectively on Bursa Malaysia and thus 
render their statistic inferences meaningless. The remaining 565 firms were from the seven 
core sectors namely the „Consumer Products‟, „Industrial Products‟, „Technology‟, 
„Properties‟, „Trading‟, „Plantations‟, and „Construction‟.    
 
Ownership and board-related data are hand-collected from the annual reports published by 
the listed firms for the fiscal year 2007. Though this process of data collection is time-
consuming, it has a number of benefits (Fraser et al., 2006). Firstly, as the primary source of 
data, the company annual report is more accurate than other secondary data sources. In 
addition, as already highlighted in sub-section 1.7.2, all listed firms must abide by the Listing 
Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. Specifically, Paragraph 9.26 of the listing requirements 
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 For instance, the paid-up capital requirement for listing in the Second Board is different from the Main Board. 
51
 As stated in footnote 33, in Malaysia, firms in the finance sector such as banks and insurance companies are 
governed by the Banking and Financial Act, 1989. 
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states that all annual audited financial statements in the annual reports must be prepared 
according to the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the Malaysian 
Companies Act 1965. The disclosure standards in the listing requirements also make it 
mandatory for financial reports lodged with Bursa Malaysia to be approved by qualified 
auditors. As a whole, information and data based on annual reports demonstrate a high level 
of consistency in quality.  
 
Cross-sectional studies are common in the previous studies related to this area. For instance, 
Nazli and Weetman (2006) utilize data from 2001 for 87 companies in Malaysia to examine 
the issue of ownership structure, board characteristics and voluntary disclosures. Filatotchev 
et al. (2005) use a sample of 228 Taiwanese firms in 1999 to study the effects of ownership 
structure and board characteristics on firm performance. Kim K-H et al. (2008) use a 
stratified random sampling to select 290 firms from the 2002 list of Fortune 1000 firms in 
their cross-sectional study pertaining to ownership structure and firm diversification. Mak 
and Kusnadi (2005) select 279 firms from a total of 795 in Malaysia in their cross-sectional 
study related to corporate governance and firm value for the year 2000. Ayoib et al. (2003) 
select a final sample of 236 firms from 529 in their cross-sectional study of firm 
diversification for 1995 in Malaysia.  
 
This study uses Krejcie and Morgan‟s (1970) method as a starting point in selecting the 
sample size. The minimum sample size for the population size of 632 according to Krejcie 
and Morgan‟s (1970) scale is around 242.52 The final sample of 314 firms in this study is 
derived based on the following selection process: first, all 565 firms from the seven core 
sectors as mentioned above are stratified into their respective sectors. Then, firms in each 
sector are arranged based on their size (as measured by their total assets value) from the 
smallest to the largest. The researcher then employed systematic sampling in order to select 
firms in each sector (from the smallest to the largest firm in each sector) in such a way that 
two-thirds of firms from each sector are selected. This yields a total of 379 firms. Finally, of 
the 379 firms, 65 (or 17%) are firms where the largest shareholder is not a family or an 
individual but is instead government, foreign corporations (affiliates of foreign firms), 
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 Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), for instance, also make use of Krejcie and Morgan (1970) as a guideline for 
sample size selection. 
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institutional investors, widely-held corporations or firms without an ultimate owner.
53
 Since 
these firms are not in the scope of this study, they are excluded from the sample. The final 
sample derived therefore consists of 314 firms which are known as „family-owned and 
controlled firms‟ or simply „family-controlled firms‟. The sampling process is summarized in 
Table 4.1.
54
  
 
The advantage of the above process of data sampling is that it ensures that all seven core 
sectors in the stock exchange are included, with the number of observations in each sector as 
proportionate as possible to the actual number of firms in each sector of the stock exchange. 
It also ensures that firms of various sizes are satisfactorily covered in the sample.   
 
                Table 4.1: Selection Process of Sample 
 
Total number of listed firms on Bursa Malaysia (Main Board) as in Sept 
2007 
632 
less Finance, IPC, Hotel and Mining Sectors  67 
 
Remaining Firms in the Main Board 565 
 
Firms stratified into sectors and two-thirds selected from each sector using 
systematic sampling   
379 
 
less Firms whose largest ultimate owner is NOT family or individual  (state,  
foreign firms, widely-held corporations and firms without ultimate 
owners)    
65 
 
Final sample  314 
 
 
The company annual reports are available for download from the Bursa Malaysia Securities 
Berhad official website. Annual reports for 2007 and 2008 are used for the purpose of this 
study since a complete set of company annual reports are available from the website for both 
years. Since the data in this study was collected in 2010, some of the annual reports for 2009 
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  Firms are considered as „without an ultimate owner‟ when the equity stake of the largest shareholder is below 
10%.   
54
 The list of firms as per group-affiliated and non-group categories is available in Appendix 1.  
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and 2010 were unavailable from the Bursa Malaysia website. Thus using data from the 
annual reports for 2007 and 2008 reflects the latest available data at the time of collection.   
 
Table 4.2 below shows the statistical breakdown of firms in each sector for both the selected 
sample and the population (actual number of firms in each sector on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia). Overall, the number of firms included in each sector in the sample is 
representative of the actual number of firms in each sector.      
 
Table 4.2: Comparison of Sample across Sectors 
Sector Number of firms 
on Main Board
55
 
Number of Firms 
in Sample 
Construction 41 26 
Consumer Product 85 48 
Industrial Product  151 93 
Plantation 44 21 
Properties  89 45 
Technology 16 11 
Trading/Services 142 70 
Total 565 314 
 
 
Financial data necessary for the study are collected for the fiscal year 2008. This includes the 
market value and book value of ordinary shares, total debts, earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), total assets, year of firm incorporation (firm age) 
and total sales, which are all largely obtained from the Worldscope Database, except for the 
data on „year of firm incorporation‟. Due to frequently missing values for the „year of firm 
incorporation‟ on Worldscope, other sources including LexisNexis, companies‟ websites and 
other internet sources are used to complete the information. Finally, for the purpose of 
constructing firm diversification variables, two sets of diversification-related data are 
collected: the number of business segments of firms, which is collected from company 
                                                          
55
 Total number of firms listed (from the seven sectors) on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia as at 31 
September 2007. 
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annual reports, and segmental sales values which are obtained from Worldscope. Data from 
Worldscope is randomly cross-checked with company annual reports to verify accuracy.   
 
4.5   Constructing the Family Ownership Variable   
 
Since the sample in this study consists of publicly-listed firms that are family-owned and 
controlled, further clarification of family ownership in this study is essential. The criterion 
used to define a firm as family-owned and controlled is based on the „10% cut-off level‟ 
definition used in two often cited influential studies: La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et 
al. (2000). One of the reasons to use the 10% cut-off level is explained by La Porta et al. 
(1999, p.475-476):  
 
To describe control of companies, we generally look for all 
shareholders who control more than 10 percent of the votes. 
The cutoff of 10 percent is used because (1) it provides a 
significant threshold of votes; and (2) most countries mandate 
disclosure of 10 percent, and usually even lower, ownership 
stakes.   
 
According to the studies, using the 10% cut-off level, a corporation is said to have an 
ultimate controlling shareholder if this shareholder‟s direct and indirect voting rights in the 
firm exceed 10% (La Porta et al., 1999).
56
 Since members of a family are seen as persons 
acting in concert, a family firm is defined as firm that is owned by a single individual or two 
and above family members who collectively own 10% or more of the shareholdings. Thus, 
shareholdings of family members are aggregated and treated as shareholdings of the family. 
In short, following La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000), firms are known as 
family-controlled in this study if one or more family members are collectively identified as 
the largest shareholders of the firm and own at least a 10% equity stake of the company.  
 
                                                          
56
 Both La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) also use a 20% equity stake as another cut-off level 
besides the 10% level. In contrast, Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) do not set any 
specific cut-off level to define a family firm in their study, as long as the person or family is the largest block-
holder of the firm (block-holder = at least a 5% equity stake).   
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As mentioned earlier, the data related to ownership structure and control are hand-collected 
from the 2007 company annual reports. However, the influence of ownership structure on 
firm performance may only be apparent after a year. Thus to capture this effect, firm 
performance data are collected for 2008. Using this „lagged‟ measure of ownership and 
control data also implies the assertion that „ownership‟ influences „firm performance‟ and not 
the other way around. As stated in Section 4.4, all other financial data of the firms, such as 
total debts and total sales, are also collected for 2008.      
 
Ownership data is collected from the company annual reports under the section „Analysis of 
Shareholdings‟ as per the substantial shareholder disclosure requirement of Section 69D(1), 
Companies Act 1965. The Act stipulates the mandatory disclosure of substantial shareholders 
who are defined as holding more than a 5% equity stake of any firm, irrespective of their 
direct or indirect interest in the shares.  
 
The information available in the annual reports is (i) the names of all substantial shareholders 
and the percentage of their direct and indirect shareholdings; (ii) the names of all directors 
and the percentage of their direct and indirect shareholdings. As part of the Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements, family relationships or kinship must be disclosed. This information is 
provided in the „Profiles of Directors‟ Section of annual reports. The Malaysian Companies 
Act, 1965 (Section 122A) defines family members as the spouse, parent, child, brother or 
sister and the spouse of that child, brother or sister. Information pertaining to the board of 
directors such as family directors or independent directors is obtained from the „Corporate 
Information‟ and „Profiles of Directors‟ Sections of annual reports.        
 
Following Claessens et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999), this study employs the „ultimate 
owner‟ approach in determining the shareholdings of a family. Direct ownership reported in 
annual reports is often inappropriate and insufficient to determine the ownership level of a 
family, as many individuals and members of their family maintain indirect ownership of the 
listed firm through other corporations, particularly through private companies that they 
own.
57
 Thus, when the principal shareholders of a corporation are themselves corporate 
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 These private companies which are wholly owned by the family and close friends are used as „vehicles‟ to 
facilitate the control of other firms by the family.     
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entities, the major shareowners of these entities will be identified; then the major 
shareowners of the major shareowners will be identified and so on, until the identity of the 
ultimate owners/controllers of the votes are identified (La Porta et al. 1999). In addition, as 
part of the disclosure requirements, family members who own the firm indirectly through 
their privately-held or publicly-listed company(ies) will be reported in the annual reports as 
having indirect holdings in the firm with the percentage of those holdings disclosed.  
 
For instance, for one of the firms in the sample in this study – Tan Chong Motors Holdings 
Berhad – the largest direct shareholder of the firm is a private company with a 45.6% equity 
stake. There are ten members of the „Tan Family‟ reported in the annual report as each 
having indirect holdings of a 45.6% equity stake with an explanation in the report that the 
shareholdings are held through a private company. Thus the „Tan Family‟ is therefore 
regarded as the ultimate controller of the listed firm. In this study, only those firms with an 
individual person or a family as the ultimate controller will be considered. Thus, 65 firms 
from the sample in this study are excluded, as explained in the data selection section as their 
ultimate controlling owner is not a family/individual person. As previously mentioned, a 
family or individual is considered as the ultimate owner of the firm if they are collectively 
(for a family) or he/she (for an individual) is the largest shareholder and controls at least a 10% 
equity stake in the firm.
58
 An ultimate holder is someone who is not controlled by anybody 
else (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000).   
 
4.6   Firm Performance Measures 
 
Due to the lack of consensus in the literature with regard to the choice of firm performance 
measure, it is thus difficult to identify a single indicator for firm performance. This study 
opts to use both the accounting-based return on assets (ROA) and the stock-market-based 
simplified Tobin‟s Q (also known as Q) as the proxies to measure firm performance. It is 
intended that using alternate measures also helps to verify the robustness of the results 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Both measures are widely used as the only performance 
                                                          
58
 Firms in which a family or an individual appears to be the largest shareholder but nonetheless controls below 
the 10% cut-off level are considered as firms without an ultimate owner and thus as widely-held corporations.    
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measures in the past studies [such as in Khanna and Palepu (2000a), Anderson and Reeb 
(2003), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), George and Kabir (2008), Andres (2008) and Masulis et 
al. (2011)].
59
  
 
ROA is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
divided by book value of total assets. EBITDA is used to assess the operating efficiency of 
firms without being influenced by debt policy and associated amounts of interest. Q is 
defined as the sum of market value of equity and book value of total liability divided by the 
book value of total assets (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005).  
 
The researcher is aware that firm performance can be examined from different perspectives. 
The above proxies represent the examining of firm performance from two different 
perspectives. Firstly, Tobin‟s Q is a market-based measurement whereas ROA is an 
accounting-based measurement. Thus, from a time perspective, the accounting measurement 
is historical and retrospective whereas Tobin‟s Q is forward-looking. Secondly, the 
accounting measurement is affected by accounting practices, whereas Q captures the 
investors‟ value or the market assigned to the firm, based on predicted future cash flows. 
Thus Q measures what management will accomplish and ROA measures what management 
has accomplished. Both have their own advantages and disadvantages as measures of 
performance.     
 
One of the common problems of empirical studies involving firm performance data is the 
presence of outliers. Outliers in the data may distort the analysis and findings of the study. 
One way to solve the problem is to remove them from the sample. However, removing the 
outliers will cause the number of observations to decrease, hence loss of information. 
Winsorization provides an alternative method of dealing with outliers. Instead of removing 
outliers from the sample, this study winsorizes the firm performance data (the simplified 
Tobin‟s Q and ROA). For the ROA data, due to the presence of extreme values at both ends 
of the data (very high negative and positive ROA values), it is winsorized at its 1
st
 and 99
th
 
                                                          
59
 Besides Tobin‟s Q and ROA, ROE is another performance measure that is widely used. As  a robustness 
check, the researcher examined some of the hypotheses in this study using ROE as the performance measure 
and found that the findings remain qualitatively similar to the findings based on ROA (albeit weaker in terms of 
the significance level).   
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percentiles. In other words, the lowest values (those below the 1
st
 percentile) will be replaced 
with the 1
st
 percentile value and the highest values (those above the 99
th
 percentile) will be 
replaced with the 99
th
 percentile value. Whereas for the data of simplified Tobin‟s Q, due to 
the presence of extreme values only at one end of the data (very high positive Q value)
60
, 
winsorization is applied only to the extreme positive values.  
 
Winsorization has the advantage of correcting the skewness in the distribution of the data and 
improves their statistical properties (such as the normality) (Salkind, 2010). It also 
“preserves the information that a case had among the highest (or lowest) values in a 
distribution but protects against some of the harmful effects of outliers” (Salkind, 2010, 
p.1637). Winsorization at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles or the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles is common. 
The method to winsorize data at their 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles is also used, for instance, by 
Guest and Sutherland (2010) in their study of business group affiliation and firm 
performance in China. Chen and Chen (2012) winsorize their data at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles in their study of how various aspects of corporate governance structures affect the 
resource allocation efficiency of diversified firms.      
 
4.7   Constructing Other Variables 
 
4.7.1   Other Block-holder Variables  
 
The most important ownership variable in this study is the ownership stake of the controlling 
family acting as the largest shareholder. The construction of the family ownership variable is 
already explained in Section 4.5. This section explains the ownership variables of other 
block-holders in family-controlled firms. As stated earlier, a block-holder is defined as a 
shareholder with an equity stake of at least 5% in the firm.  
 
A block-holder is categorized as „State‟ if it is a statutory body established at federal or state 
level, or directly owned by the government through its ministries such as the Ministry of 
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 The fact that Tobin‟s Q cannot take a negative value leads to an extreme value only at one end of the Tobin‟s 
Q data.  
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Finance. Examples are: Khazanah Nasional Berhad (an investment holding arm wholly 
owned by the Ministry of Finance), Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and 
various State Economic Development Corporations such as Johor Corporation (owned by the 
state of Johor) and Pahang State Development Corporation (owned by the state of Pahang). A 
block-holder is categorized as „Foreign‟ if it is a corporation incorporated outside Malaysia 
or owned by a foreign government.
61
 For example, Seadrill Limited, a foreign corporation 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange is a block-holder which owns 18.5% of shares of 
Sapuracrest Petroleum; Marubeni-Itochu Steel Inc., a privately-owned corporation from 
Japan, is a block-holder which owns 18.41% of shares of Yung Kong; Tata Group from India 
is a block-holder which owns 28% of shares of Southern Steel; and Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation owns 21.39% of Sunway City. Sapuracrest Petroleum, Yung Kong, 
Southern Steel and Sunway City all are family-controlled listed firms included in this study.  
 
A block-holder is categorized as „Institution (Domestic)‟ if it is an investment-related or 
bank-related institution established in Malaysia. This includes domestic institutional 
investors (such as insurance firms, investment firms, fund managers, and pension funds) and 
financial institutions such as banks, Islamic banks and development finance institutions. A 
subset is then drawn from the „Institution (Domestic)‟ category to construct another group of 
block-holders known as „Domestic Public Institutional Investors‟. First, as institutional 
investors, they invest and manage funds on behalf of individuals. Second, as they are 
government-controlled and sponsored institutional investors and do not have business 
relationships with business corporations, they are good examples of „pressure-resistant‟ 
institutional investors. They are also the most important institutional investors in Malaysia in 
terms of their investment volume, with total shareholdings of approximately 13% of the total 
market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia (Effiezal et al., 2008).
62
 Thus, it is important to 
uncover the roles and significance of these investors‟ ownership on firm performance. 
 
                                                          
61
 Private companies that are registered as offshore companies in those offshore financial centres such as the 
British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands are normally owned by an individual or a family. These firms are not 
considered to be „Foreign‟ in this study. Information on the firm‟s country of origin is available from their 
annual reports or the „company announcements‟ section of Bursa Malaysia‟s official website.  
62
 These public institutional investors consist mainly of the five largest institutional investors introduced in sub-
section 3.2.2 in Chapter 3 – PNB, EPF, LTH, LTAT and SOCSO.  
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A block-holder is categorized as „Institutional Investors (Foreign)‟ if it is an institution from 
a foreign country which invests and manages funds on behalf of individuals or companies. 
These institutional investors consist of overseas investment institutions (fund managers), 
insurance firms, pension funds etc. Examples of domestic and foreign institutional investors 
in family-controlled firms are: Arisaig Asean Fund, a Singapore-based fund manager which 
owns 15% of Asia File Corporation; Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), the largest 
Malaysian government-controlled fund management institution which owns 19.71% of 
shares of Box-Pak and; Asian Small Companies Portfolio, a US-based (Boston) fund 
manager which owns 5.3% of shares of Kossan. Asia File Corporation, Box-Pak and Kossan 
are all family-controlled listed firms included in the study. It is relatively straightforward to 
differentiate whether an institutional investor is domestic or foreign as this information is 
generally available in the annual report or can be sourced via the internet.  
 
Finally, a block-holder is categorized as „Unrelated or Auxiliary Family/Individual‟ if the 
shareholder is a family/individual with shareholdings of at least 5% and not the largest 
shareholder of the firm.   
 
4.7.2.   Business Group Affiliation Variables 
 
Group-affiliated firms are defined in this study as firms that are under the control of the 
same/common controlling family. Control can be achieved by the controlling family either 
by direct or indirect holding of shares through another corporation(s) (which can be publicly-
listed or privately-held). A family or an individual is considered as the „controlling family‟ 
when they hold at least a 10% cut-off level of the total shares of the firm and serve as the 
largest shareholder of the company. In short, listed firms that share the same ultimate 
controlling owner are considered as affiliated to the same business group.  
 
Information on whether a firm is affiliated to a business group can be traced from company 
annual reports under the sections „Corporate Structure‟ and „Directors‟ Profile‟ (for some 
business groups some of their affiliated firms have the name of the group as part of their 
names and thus can be easily identified, for instance Lion Diversified, Lion Industries, Lion 
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Corporation and Lion Forest Industries are firms affiliated to the Lion Group).
63
 Firms are 
required to disclose in their annual report (usually in the „Directors‟ Profile‟ section) whether 
a board director also hold the directorship in another corporation(s) and the name of that 
corporation must be disclosed if it is publicly-listed. These disclosures enable the researcher 
to link firms that are affiliated to one director. Firms affiliated to the same business group can 
then be identified once it is confirmed that the director is a member of the controlling family. 
It is found that most members of controlling families with multiple directorships in more than 
one listed firm are directors occupying senior positions such as board chairman, vice 
chairman or managing director/CEO.  
 
To illustrate, the managing director of the „Lion Industries Corporation‟64 is Datuk Cheng 
Yong Kim and according to the disclosure in the „Directors‟ Profile‟ section of the 
company‟s annual report:  
 
Datuk Cheng‟s other directorships in public companies are as 
follows: 
 Managing Director of Lion Diversified Holdings 
Berhad, a public  listed company 
 Director of Lion Corporation Berhad, a public listed 
company 
 Director of Silverstone Corporation Berhad and Hy-
Line Berhad, both public companies 
 
... Datuk Cheng is the nephew of Y. Bhg. Tan Sri Cheng Heng 
Jem, a major shareholder of the Company, and his brother, Mr 
Cheng Yong Liang, is also a Director of the Company.  
 
(Lion Industries Corporation Annual Report, 2007, p.5)  
 
                                                          
63
 Though not objective, the familiarity of the researcher with business groups in Malaysia also helps to identify 
the affiliated firms.   
64
 The chairman of Lion Industries Corporation is an independent director and is thus disregarded in this case. 
Thus the next person in line is the managing director.  
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From the above information, the two publicly-listed companies‟ („Lion Diversified‟ and 
„Lion Corporation‟) annual reports will be examined for further data on affiliated firms. 
Upon examination, Tan Sri Cheng Heng Jem is identified as the chairman of „Lion 
Diversified‟ and below is another excerpt from his profile in the „Lion Diversified‟ annual 
report: 
 
Tan Sri William Cheng Heng Jem‟s other directorships in 
public companies are as follows: 
 Chairman of Lion Forest Industries Berhad and 
Silverstone Corporation Berhad 
 Chairman and Managing Director of Parkson Holdings 
Berhad, Lion Corporation Berhad and Silverstone 
Berhad 
 Director of Amsteel Corporation Berhad 
Save for Silverstone Corporation Berhad, Silverstone Berhad 
and Amsteel Corporation Berhad, all the above companies are 
listed on Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad.   
(Lion Diversified Annual Report, 2007, p.6) 
   
 
After verifying that Tan Sri Cheng Heng Jem‟s family is the controlling shareholder of the 
Lion Group, the above two excerpts allow us to compile the publicly-listed firms under the 
group; three from the first excerpt (Lion Industries, Lion Diversified, and Lion Corporation) 
plus another two from the second excerpt (Lion Forest Industries and Parkson Holdings 
Berhad), resulting in a total of five affiliated listed firms in the group.      
 
This study also separates family-controlled business groups into three different types of 
business groups based on the complexity of the group structures. The first type, known as 
„Simple Business Group‟ (BG_S), refers to business groups with affiliated firms controlled 
by the same controlling family without using a pyramidal structure – in other words, the 
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controlling family is the largest shareholder of these firms and owns the equity stake directly 
or indirectly through their closely-held companies. There is no pyramidal structure involving 
the publicly-listed affiliates in the group. The group structure diagram provided in Figure 4.2 
is an example of such business groups that is included in the sample in this study. The figure 
illustrates that all three listed companies are controlled by the „Tan Family‟ through their 
closely-held companies.  
 
The second type of business group is known as „Business Group with Pyramidal Structure‟ 
(BG_PS). As the name suggests, this type of business group involved the formation of a 
pyramidal structure: there is at least one publicly-listed affiliate in the group which is 
indirectly controlled by the family through another publicly-listed company. For example, 
Figure 4.3 illustrates one such business group taken from the sample in this study – the 
„Tradewinds Group‟. There are three listed affiliates (Tradewinds Plantations, Zelan Berhad 
and Kramat Tin Dredging) in the group that are controlled by „Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar and 
Family‟ indirectly through other publicly-listed affiliates: Tradewinds Plantations is 
controlled through Tradewinds (M) Berhad whereas Zelan and Kramat are controlled through 
MMC corporation.  
 
The cash flow-to-control rights ratio can be computed without too much difficulty for firms 
affiliated to this type of business group. As an illustration, Figure 4.1 presents the partial 
ownership structure
65
 of one of the business groups included in this study – the business 
group controlled by „Tan Chin Nam and Family‟. The founder of the group, Dato‟ Tan Chin 
Nam has retired and the group is now managed by six second-generation family members.  
 
The family has a 50.5% ownership stake in Goldis Berhad and 26% in the Wah Seong 
Corporation. Goldis Berhad in turn owns 26% of the IGB Corporation. Thus the cash flow 
rights of „Tan Chin Nam and Family‟ over the IGB Corporation through Goldis Berhad is 
calculated as 50.5%*26% = 13.13%. At the same time, collectively, the family members also 
directly own 10% of the IGB Corporation. Thus the total cash flow rights of „Tan Chin Nam 
and Family‟ over the IGB Corporation is 13.13% + 10% = 23.13%. Following the „weakest 
                                                          
65
 The partial ownership structure only illustrates the listed firms of the group. It does not include the family‟s 
closely-held companies as they are commonly wholly owned by the family (with the possibility of a few close 
allies) and thus the cash flows-to-control rights ratio involving the closely-held companies is not affected.   
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link‟ approach of Claessens et al. (2000), the control rights (also known as the voting rights) 
of the family over the IGB Corporation is 36% (10% + 26%), which is the sum of the 
weakest links in the chain of voting rights. Finally, the cash flow-to-control rights ratio is 
calculated as 23.13/36 = 0.64. As for KrisAssets Holdings Berhad, „Tan Chin Nam and 
Family‟s cash flow rights and control rights over the firm are 17.35% and 36% respectively. 
The cash flow-to-control rights ratio is therefore even lower, at 0.48. 
 
Figure 4.1: Illustration of Cash Flow-to-Control Rights   
 
 
   
                                                                       50.5%                                                 26% 
 
                    10% 
 
                                                                         26% 
 
 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                             75% 
 
 
 
The third type of business group is known as „Business Group with Complicated Structure‟ 
(BG_CS). This type of business group is introduced in this study to cater for business groups 
with highly complicated structures where the cash flow-to-control rights ratio could not be 
computed with a reasonable degree of accuracy. In this type of business group, an affiliated 
firm is usually controlled by a few other listed firms belonging to the group in a non-
straightforward manner involving complicated pyramiding and/or cross-holding. Business 
groups with cross-holding structures complicate the group ownership structure, as stated by 
Claessens et al. (2000): “The presence of cross-holdings creates some difficulties in 
Tan Chin Nam and Family 
Goldis Berhad 
IGB Corporation 
KrisAssets Holdings Berhad 
Wah Seong Corporation 
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measuring the cash flow to voting rights. Imagine that firm A owns 50% of firm B which, in 
turn, owns 25% of firm A. How should firm A be classified?” (p.93). The problem 
encountered by this study is that, as complexity of ownership structure in the group increases, 
disclosures of share ownership in the annual report are not sufficiently clear to allow for 
computation of the cash flow-to-control rights ratio. For instance, details regarding how one 
listed firm is related to another in the group may not be clearly disclosed.  
 
An illustration of a business group with a complicated structure is presented in Figure 4.4. It 
shows the group ownership structure for the Berjaya Group, one of the business groups from 
the sample in this study. The figure illustrates, for instance, that Matrix International Berhad 
is controlled by „Tan Sri Vincent Tan and Family‟ through the following means:  
 
(i) Direct ownership by the family of 50.7%;  
(ii) Indirect ownership through BJ Corporation in which the percentage of ownership 
is not separately disclosed or available as the ownership (by BJ Corporation of 
Matrix International) is indirect through other private companies owned by BJ 
Corporation (the dotted arrow line in the diagram indicates indirect ownership) 
and this ownership stake is consolidated with ownership by other private 
companies of Matrix International for a total stake of 17%;  
(iii) Indirect ownership of 3% through BJ Land and 11% through private companies 
controlled by BJ Land;  
(iv) Indirect ownership of 7% through private companies controlled by Dijaya Berhad;  
(v) Indirect ownership through private companies controlled by BJ Sports Toto with 
no exact percentage separately disclosed. It can also be seen that cross-holding 
exists between BJ Corporation and Matrix International as they own (directly and 
indirectly) each other‟s shares. Due to the complexity of the ownership structure, 
the cash flow-to-control rights ratio for the affiliates in this type of business group 
cannot be calculated with any reasonable degree of confidence.  
 
From the ownership structure perspective, it is conjectured that among the three types of 
business group, the tendency to expropriate is relatively lower in the first, moderate in the 
second and high in the third. 
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Figure 4.2: Simple Business Group (BG_S) 
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Figure 4.3: Business Group with Pyramidal Structure (BG_PS) 
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Figure 4.4: Business Group with Complicated Structure (BG_CS) 
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4.7.3   Firm Diversification Variables 
 
Firm diversification data used in this study are based on information in the „Segmental 
Disclosure‟ in „Notes to the Financial Statements‟ of company annual reports. All publicly-
listed firms in Malaysia are required by the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 to disclose their 
revenues and profits before tax for each segment of business in which they are involved. The 
disclosure of the business segment must abide by the FRS114 (Segment Reporting) issued by 
the Malaysian Accounting Standard Board (MASB).
66
 Specifically, following FRS114 
(Segment Reporting), publicly-listed firms are required to report information for business and 
geographical segments whose revenue, assets or net profit is at least 10% or more of the total 
consolidated amount.  
 
Due to controversy surrounding the appropriateness of different measures of firm 
diversification as highlighted by Robins and Wiersema (2003), this study employs several 
types of diversification measures in order to improve the robustness of the findings. The 
using of several measures of diversification is also consistent with previous studies such as 
Lee et al. (2008) and Denis et al. (1997). The construction of all diversification measures in 
this study is based on segmental disclosure in annual reports as highlighted in the above 
paragraph. Ayoib et al. (2003) and Zuaini and Napier (2006) also use segmental disclosure in 
annual reports to measure diversification for firms in Malaysia.  
 
The following measures of diversification are used in this study: 
 
(i) Dummy variable – firms are classified as „diversified‟ or „focused‟ based on the 
number of segments disclosed. Firms that fulfil the following conditions are 
classified as diversified: with more than a single segment and where the sales in 
the largest segment are less than 90% of total sales. Firms that do not fulfil the 
conditions are classified as focused (Claessens et al., 1999c; Fauver et al., 2003; 
Lins and Servaes, 2002). 
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 The reporting and disclosure requirements of FRS114 are similar to the requirements of the revised 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) 14. The new standard IFRS 8 (Operating Segments) is enforceable in 
Malaysia with effect from 2009.  
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(ii) The number of business segments as disclosed in the annual reports. This measure 
is used in Denis et al. (1997) and Zuaini and Napier (2006).   
(iii) The Herfindahl (H) Index – constructed from sales and a common measure used 
in many previous studies examining diversification issues (such as Chen and Ho, 
2000; Denis et al., 1997; Lang and Stulz, 1994).   
(iv) The Entropy measure – introduced by Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and Palepu 
(1985), also widely used by previous studies, for instance in Singh et al. (2007), 
Chakrabarti et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2008).    
 
The H index is calculated as follows for each firm i: 
 
H = Σ(Sales per segment/Total sales)2 
 
The H Index ranges from 0 to 1. The closer an H Index is to 1, the more a firm‟s sales are 
concentrated within a few of its segments, and the closer it is to 0, the greater the firm 
diversification. 
 
The Entropy (E) is calculated as follows for each firm i: 
 
E =  𝑃𝑖 ln 1/𝑃𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
where Pi is the ith business segment‟s sales divided by the firm‟s total sales, and n is number 
of firm‟s business segments. ln 1/𝑃𝑖  is the logarithm of the inverse of a business segment‟s 
sales over the total sales. The higher the E, the greater the firm diversification.   
     
4.7.4   Control Variables 
 
This study includes several control variables that are considered important in affecting firm 
performance. These variables are firm size, age, gearing ratio and sector classification. They 
are frequently used as control variables in multiple regression analysis in relevant literature. 
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For instance, the control variables used in Khanna and Palepu (2000a), Douma et al. (2006) 
and George and Kabir (2008) are very similar to those mentioned above.  
 
Firm size is measured by the total value of sales, and log transformation was applied to 
correct the positive skewness in the data distribution of the variable. Firm size is included to 
account for the possible economies of scale and scope common to large firms. A positive 
significant value for the variable in regressions indicates a positive relationship between firm 
size and performance, indicating that large firms may benefit from economies of scale and 
scope (Joh 2003). Overall, the literature recognizes the effect of firm size on performance but 
that it is ambiguous. Some researchers believe that a larger company may not be as efficient 
as a smaller company due to decreasing control by senior management over strategic and 
operating activities as firm‟s size increases. Others, such as Nenova (2003), believe that 
larger firms may be subject to greater scrutiny and it is therefore more costly for the 
controlling families to extract private benefits.  Larger firms are also associated with larger 
market power and thus better performance. 
 
Gearing ratio is measured by total debts over total assets. Jensen‟s (1986) free cash flows 
hypothesis argues that high levels of debt „discipline‟ managers, as the obligation to make 
periodic repayments of interest and principal will restrain them from using the firm‟s free 
cash flows for unproductive investments such as unnecessary diversification. The stock beta 
of firms with greater debt may also be higher, reflecting higher financial risk. This may affect 
the market value of the stock and subsequently the market-based performance of the firm 
such as the Q measure. From the governance perspective, higher gearing could also result in 
creditors monitoring management more closely. However, too much gearing may incur a 
burden of excessive interest and affect firm performance. Early studies such as Myers (1977) 
and Stulz (1988) suggest that there is a negative association between gearing and firm value.        
 
Firm age is measured by the number of years that a corporation has been incorporated and 
controls for the „life cycle effects‟ and the „learning curve‟ of firms. Older firms may be 
more prone to entrenchment by the owner-manager and may also be unable to respond 
rapidly to changes in the environment (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000). Claessens et al. (2002) 
assert that larger and older firms have better disclosure but fewer growth opportunities. Firm 
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age can be a useful proxy for a firm‟s growth opportunities (Borghesi et al., 2007). Growth 
and the variability of firm growth may decrease as firms age (Evans, 1987). Older firms are 
also normally more experienced and more established, having gone through the learning 
curve process. However, older companies may lack the dynamism of younger firms and be 
less flexible to adapt to any changes in business environments.  
 
The business sector in which a firm operates could possibly influence its performance. Seven 
sectors from Bursa Malaysia‟s sector classification system are used in this study, as 
introduced in the sampling and data collection section. A broad range of sector classification 
is used due to the reliability issue of classifying firms into more refined groupings. This is 
also consistent with common practice in the literature involving Malaysian firms (for 
instance in Tam and Tan, 2007 and Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). A substantial proportion of 
publicly-listed family firms in East Asian countries (including Malaysia) are more widely 
diversified than firms in the US and UK, in which case the validity of using highly 
differentiated classifications is questionable (Bruton et al., 2003). Sectors are dummy-coded 
for the purpose of regression analysis where one of the sectors serves as the control.   
 
The researcher acknowledges that the measurement of the above control variables is an 
inexact science. In addition, it could also be argued that other relevant factors may exist. 
Nonetheless, it is common practice in relevant literature to include the above as control 
variables and thus the researcher is confident that they are sufficient and fitting to the overall 
model specification of regression. 
 
4.8   Method of Analysis – Multiple Regression and Moderated Regression 
Analyses  
 
Regression is the main tool of analysis used in this study as it is one of the widely-used 
methods in relational research. In general, regression involves the following steps: (a) 
Specification of the model in equation form, together with the a priori theoretical basis 
relating to the sign of the coefficients of the variables; (b) Collection of data on the variables 
of the model and estimation of the coefficients of the function with appropriate regression 
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techniques and (c) Evaluation of the estimated coefficients of the function on the basis of the 
theoretical bases (for instance agency theory and resource-based view).  
 
Multiple regression analysis is chosen as the main tool of analysis in this study as it is “the 
appropriate method of analysis when the research problem involves a single metric variable 
presumed to be related to two or more independent variables” (Hair et al., 2010, p.16) In 
addition, it is also an appropriate method as the data are cross-sectional, hence do not have to 
address autocorrelation issues. It is one of the most common methods of analysis used in 
previous research exploring the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, 
organisational structures and firm performance and is used, for instance, in Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Claessens et al. (2006) and Khanna and Palepu (2000a). Specifically, multiple 
regressions based on ordinary least square (OLS) estimation technique are used to test the 
hypotheses in this study.
67
 OLS is appropriate as it is the most straightforward regression 
technique and the estimation is reliable as long as common regression problems are 
accounted for. All issues commonly associated with regression such as normality, 
multicollinearity and heteroscadasticity are addressed in the study using appropriate steps or 
measures. These are highlighted in the analysis chapter.
68
  
 
„Moderated Regression Analysis‟ (MRA) is also used in this study to predict the moderating 
effects of an independent variable on firm performance. Moderating effect (also known as 
interaction effect) occurs when the moderator variable - a second independent variable - 
changes the form or the strength of the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables (Hair, et al., 2010). MRA is a commonly used statistical method for “studies 
predicting that the impact of the moderator variable on the dependent variables fluctuates 
across different levels of independent variables” (Gani and Jermias, 2006, p.299). Hartmann 
and Moers (1999) also state that MRA is suitable in testing hypotheses involving interaction 
terms as it is “a specific application of multiple regression analysis, in which the regression 
equation contains an interaction term” (p.293).  
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 Masulis et al. (2011), Claessens et al. (2006) and Khanna and Palepu (2000a) also rely on OLS in their 
analyses.  
68
 Appendix 4 presents the statistical problems, diagnostic and remedial measures in the multivariate regression.  
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Since the research questions in this study involve the examination of „dependence 
relationship‟, the researcher had considered other available „dependence methods‟ of analysis 
before deciding upon the multiple regression method.
69
 According to Hair et al. (2010), 
depending on the task and relationship, there is a set of techniques or methods available to 
researchers when research questions involve the study of dependence relationship. The 
dependence methods available are: multiple regressions, multiple discriminant analysis, 
logistic regression, canonical correlation, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and 
conjoint analysis (Hair et al., 2010). After considering all available methods, the researcher 
found that multiple regression method is the most suitable tool of analysis for the study as it 
is capable of sustaining all the hypotheses and answering all the research questions.  
 
The other above-mentioned methods are less suitable due to the following reasons: multiple 
discriminant analysis and logistic regression are suitable in situations involving a non-metric 
(categorical) dependent variable (the dependent variable in this study involves a metric 
variable); canonical correlation is suitable when the researcher is interested in relationships 
between sets of multiple dependent and multiple independent variables, in other words, it is 
the method to accommodate multiple dependent and independent variables; conjoint analysis 
is used when the study involves only non-metric independent variables and MANOVA is 
suited to the analysis of multiple metric dependent variables and non-metric independent 
variables. Thus from the above, it is clear that the multiple regression method that is used to 
study the relationship between a metric dependent variable and a set of metric, dichotomous 
(dummy) and moderator variables is among the most suitable methods for this study.          
 
4.9   Model Specification  
 
4.9.1   Model Specification for Hypotheses Related to Ownership Structure  
 
In order to gain insight into the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance, this study uses the following regression specification: 
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 „Dependence methods or techniques‟ are one of the two classifications of multivariate analysis. The other 
classification – „Interdependence techniques‟ are used when variables cannot be classified as either dependent 
or independent. See Hair et al. (2010) for more details on multivariate analysis.  
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PERM = function (ownership variables, other control variables)   
---------- (Specification 1) 
 
where PERM refers to firm performance which is a function of ownership variables and other 
control variables.  
 
The dependent variable, PERM, is measured by ROA and Tobin‟s Q. Various types of 
ownership are used as explanatory variables. These ownership variables are denoted as 
follows: the percentage of the controlling family‟s ownership (FAMOWN) and the 
ownership percentage for each of the six categories of „other block-holders‟ in family-
controlled firms: state block-holdings (STATE), foreign block-holdings (FORGN), block-
holdings by domestic institutions (DOMII), block-holdings by domestic public institutional 
investors (DOMPUBII), block-holdings by foreign institutional investors (FORGNII) and 
block-holdings by „unrelated/auxiliary‟ family (AUXFAM). Various regression models are 
used to estimate the above basic specification.  
 
The following regression specification is used to test the moderating effects of board 
independence on the association between the controlling family‟s ownership stake and firm 
performance: 
 
PERM = function (ownership variables, BDINDP, FAMOWN*BDINDP, other control 
variables)   
---------- (Specification 2) 
 
where BDINDP refers to board independence variables.  
 
The focus in this specification is on the interaction term (FAMOWN*BDINDP) that shows 
the moderating effect of board independence. Four measures are used to indicate various 
aspects of board independence. They are: Proportion of Independent Non-executive 
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Directors on Board (PrINED)
70
, dummy variable Independent Chairman (INDP_CHR), 
dummy variable Audit Committee consists of  All Independent Directors (INDP_ADT) and 
dummy variable Highly Independent Board (H_INDP_B). H_INDP_B is created for firms 
possessing all three traits of board independence simultaneously.
71
  
 
A statistically significant positive value for the coefficients of the interaction term involving 
the board dummy variable (INDP_CHR, INDP_ADT, or H_INDP_B) indicates that the 
presence of (certain aspect of) board independence positively moderates the effects of 
FAMOWN on firm performance. An insignificant coefficient of the interaction term suggests 
that board independence does not have any moderating effect on the FAMOWN-
Performance link. As for the interaction term involving PrINED (which is a continuous 
variable), a positive significant coefficient value can be interpreted as follows: the greater the 
degree of board independence, the greater (more positive) the effect of FAMOWN on firm 
performance. An insignificant coefficient indicates the lack of moderating effect of PrINED 
on the relationship between FAMOWN and firm performance.   
 
4.9.1.1   The Issue of Endogeneity  
A common concern in the estimation of ownership structure and firm performance as 
presented above is the possibility of endogeneity problems (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Not 
only could performance be affected by the ownership structure, but the ownership structure 
itself might be affected by the performance of the firm. In other words, the controlling 
shareowners may want to increase their holdings when the firm perform well and vice versa. 
However, La Porta et al. (1999) observe that ownership structures of family firms in East 
Asian (including Malaysian) corporations is relatively stable over both the short and long 
term. For instance, family ownership remained intact even during and after the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis. Moreover, shareholdings by controlling families in Malaysia were stable 
during the four decades since the inception of the NEP and it is therefore illogical to believe 
                                                          
70
 Information on whether a director is independent is disclosed in the company annual report. The Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements define an independent director as a person who is not involved in the 
management of the firm and does not have any direct or indirect interest. 
71
 Formal definition for H_INDP_B is available in Table 5.1. 
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that controlling families have super-human ability and can see into the future and foretell 
their firm‟s performance, hence success or otherwise, of their shareholdings.  
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Andres (2008) also cast doubt on the reverse causality of 
ownership structure and firm performance. Andres (2008) contends that ownership structure 
is stable over the long term “even in economically bad times” (p.443) among family firms in 
Germany and thus shows that the reverse causality that performance causes ownership 
structure is unjustifiable. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), in investigating the effects of 
ownership structure on company performance in Europe, discover that ownership structure is 
remarkably stable even during turbulent periods. Maury and Pajuste (2005) also assert that 
ownership structures tend to be stable over the time. From the above, it is therefore sensible 
to consider ownership structure as exogenous and thus the endogeneity issue should not be a 
concern in this study. 
 
4.9.2   Model Specification for Hypotheses Related to Control-Enhancing Means 
and Family-controlled Business Groups  
 
The following regression specification will be used in order to examine whether firms 
affiliated to a business group perform better or worse than firms without group affiliation: 
 
PERMi,t  =  α + ψ(BG) + δ Ζi,t  + θ Xi,t  + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 3) 
 
where PERM  refers to firm performance, as measured by ROA and Tobin‟s Q; BG is the 
explanatory variable of interest which is dummy coded with 1 for group-affiliated firms and 
0 for independent firms. 
 
Psi (ψ) refers to the estimated coefficient for BG and measures the effect of group affiliation. 
For the hypothesis to be fully supported, ψ should be negative and statistically significant. Z 
is a vector of various ownership variables as introduced earlier and δ is the corresponding 
vector of estimated coefficient. X is a vector of control variables used in this study and θ is 
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the corresponding vector of estimated coefficient. X consists of firm size, age, gearing and 
sector affiliation. Alpha (α) is the constant term, ε is the error term and subscript i and t 
denote individual firms and time (year) respectively. 
 
As discussed in the hypotheses development in Chapter 3, size of business groups may affect 
the performance of affiliated members (Khanna and Palepu, 2000a). Thus, to analyse the 
effect of group size, a related regression model is used in which the variable BG is split into 
three group size dummies: GR_A for firms affiliated to small business groups (small 
business groups refer to business groups with two listed affiliates), GR_B for firms affiliated 
to medium business groups (business groups with three to four listed affiliates), and GR_C 
for firms affiliated to large business groups (business groups with five or more listed 
affiliates). The categorization of group size in this case is somewhat arbitrary as in Khanna 
and Palepu (2000a).    
 
This study also makes use of the following five alternative measures to account for enhanced 
family control as discussed in the hypotheses development in Chapter 3:  
 
(i) Cash flow-to-control ratio (CF/CONT);  
(ii) Group Complexity;  
(iii) Family Directors (FAMDIR);  
(iv) Both Chairmanship and CEO positions occupied by family (CHR_CEO);  
(v) The controlling family being the sole or only block-holder (FAMONLY).  
 
The regression specification used for the purpose is as follows: 
 
PERMi,t  =  α + ψ(BG) + δ Ζi,t  + φ FAMCONT + θ Xi,t  + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 4) 
 
where the new explanatory variable FAMCONT refers to the family control-enhancing 
means which is proxied by the above five respective measures. The five control-enhancing 
means are examined one at a time in separate regression models. This helps to alleviate 
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multicollinearity. The inclusion of too many variables (if they are insignificant) may also 
increase standard errors in the regressions.   
  
Under the CF/CONT variable, a family‟s control over group-affiliated firms is enhanced 
through the pyramidal structure and/or cross-holding. As explained by La Porta et al. (1999) 
and Claessens et al. (2000) among others, a pyramid enables controlling families to use a 
relatively small amount of capital investment to obtain a larger portion of control rights 
(voting rights) over firms. The divergence of cash flow-to-control rights is criticized as being 
one of the causes of expropriation of minority shareholders‟ wealth. The method used to 
calculate the ratio is explained in sub-section 4.7.2.  
 
Due to the complexity of ownership structure of three business groups (Berjaya Group, Lion 
Group and MUI Group), this study has to forgo the calculation of the cash flow-to-control 
rights ratio for eleven firms that separately belong to these business groups, as the ratio for 
these firms cannot be calculated with any reasonable degree of confidence. The exclusion of 
these firms could create a bias in the outcome of the analysis which is thus considered to be a 
limitation of the study. However, since the three business groups are also categorized as 
„business groups with complicated structure‟ (BG_CS) (the structure is depicted earlier in 
Figure 4.3), the outcome of the hypothesis testing on the firms affiliated to this structure, to a 
certain extent, may also reflect the outcome of the possibly high divergence of cash flow-to-
control rights in these firms.   
   
Under the „Group Complexity‟ measure, group-affiliated firms are classified into three 
different dummy variables according to the complexity of the group structure: (i) BG_S for 
firms affiliated to simple business groups without pyramidal structure, (ii) BG_PS for firms 
affiliated to business groups with pyramidal structure; and (iii) BG_CS for firms affiliated to 
business groups with complicated pyramidal structure. Explanation for these three types of 
group complexity is already discussed in sub-section 4.7.2.  
 
Under the FAMDIR variable, family control is measured by the proportion of family 
directors over the total number of directors on the board. Generally, a higher proportion of 
family directors indicates greater family control over the firms. Under the CHR_CEO 
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measure, firms with the two most senior positions (board chairmanship and CEO) occupied 
by family members are dummy coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Finally, under the FAMONLY 
variable, a firm is dummy coded as 1 when its controlling family acts as the only block-
holder without the presence of a second block-holder with at least a 10% shareholding. 
Family control is enhanced in this case without the presence of such second block-holder.     
 
4.9.3   Model Specification for Hypotheses Related to Profit Redistribution 
 
Following Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) and Lincoln et al. (1996, 2004), the following 
regression specification is used to test the profit redistribution hypotheses in group-affiliated 
firms: 
 
PERMi,t = α + ß (control)i,t + θ Xi,t + λ PERMi,t-1 + Ф (control)i,t* PERMi,t-1 + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 5) 
 
where: Xi,t is a vector of control variables that accounts for differences in the following: 
ownership of other block-holders, firm size, age, gearing and business sector effects. Theta (θ) 
is the corresponding vector of the estimated coefficient for the control variables. PERM is 
firm performance as measured by ROA and Tobin‟s Q. „Control‟ refers to the strength of 
family control in which FAMOWN and CF/CONT are used respectively as the proxy.    
 
Lincoln et al. (1996, 2004) suggest that the coefficient λ on the „lagged‟ profitability term 
(PERMi,t-1) would reflect the ability of business groups to redistribute profits. The lower the 
coefficient, the greater the redistribution effect, as explained by Gedajlovic and Shapiro 
(2002), that “(r)edistribution from high-profitability firms to low-profitability firms smoothes 
out performance over time and lowers the estimated coefficient on the lagged term” 
(p.568).
72
   
 
Since profit redistribution is associated with the strength of family control over the firm 
(Lincoln, 1996), the ownership level of the controlling family (FAMOWN) is used to 
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 For further explanation on the methods and technical aspects of profit redistribution in business groups, see 
Lincoln et al. (1996).  
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indicate the strength of family control in examining the profit redistribution hypothesis 
(Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; George and Kabir, 2008). The degree to which family 
ownership influences the extent of redistribution can be estimated by coefficient Ф, on the 
interaction term (FAMOWNi,t* PERMi,t-1) between family ownership and past performance 
(Lincoln et al., 1996, 2004). If Ф is a negative value and significant, then it implies that 
„family ownership‟ is associated with the redistribution of profits from higher to lower-profit 
firms. Put simply, higher performance of a group-affiliated firm in a particular year is 
followed by reduced performance in the ensuing year. Alternative measures of the strength of 
family control based on the cash flow-to-control rights ratio (CF/CONT) and the dummy 
variable of cash-flow-to-control rights ratio (CF/CONT_DUM) are also employed in separate 
regressions to examine the above profit redistribution hypothesis.   
 
To test the hypothesis that the strength of the profit distribution effect could be affected by 
the size of business groups as well as the strength of family control (Hypothesis 3b), the 
following specifications are applied to group-affiliated firms: 
 
PERMi,t = α + δ GRSZ + θ Xi,t + λ PERMi,t-1 + FAMOWNi,t 
                   + Ф FAMOWNi,t* PERMi,t-1* GRSZ + εi,t  
---------- (Specification 6a) 
 
PERMi,t = α + δ GRSZ + θ Xi,t + λ PERMi,t-1 + cash-to-control ratioi,t 
                   + Ф cash-to-control ratioi,t* PERMi,t-1* GRSZ + εi,t  
---------- (Specification 6b) 
 
PERMi,t = α + δ GRSZ + ψ Familyi,t + θ Xi,t + λ PERMi,t-1 + Ф Familyi,t*PERMi,t-1* GRSZ + 
εi,t  
---------- (Specification 6c) 
 
where: GRSZ consists of three size groupings – GR_A, GR_B and GR_C as defined earlier 
in sub-section 4.9.2. Specifications (6a) and (6b) use FAMOWN and „divergence of cash 
flow and control rights‟ respectively as the measure of the strength of family control. The 
156 
 
interaction terms employed in both specifications test the joint effect of group size and family 
control strength.     
 
In order to further examine the relationship between the rising thresholds of family control 
and profit redistribution, ownership of controlling families (FAMOWN) is split into two 
different variables: FAMOWN1 for family ownership of less than 50% and FAMOWN2 for 
family ownership of 50% and above. The choice of 50% as the cut-off point is sensible as an 
ownership level of 50% and above indicates majority ownership. The explanatory variable 
„Family‟ in Specification (6c) includes FAMOWN1 and FAMOWN2. The interactions term 
(Ф Familyi,t* PERMi,t-1* GRSZ) is employed to test the joint effect of „Family‟ and „GRSZ‟ 
on profit redistribution. For instance, the joint effect of the interaction between FAMOWN2 
and GR_C could be tested.    
 
Next, to test the hypothesis on the inefficiency of profit redistribution, both categories of 
group and non-group firms are further split into two separate sub-categories based on their 
median ROA (Q) values: a sub-category with high ROA (Q) and a sub-category with low 
ROA (Q). The capital expenditures of the two sub-categories from the group-affiliated firms 
are then compared, with a similar comparison then made for the non-group firms. If profit 
redistribution is inefficient in group-affiliated firms, capital expenditure for the group-
affiliated firms with high Q will not be statistically higher than the group-affiliated firms with 
low Q (the capital expenditure will be either the same or lower). Based on the discussion in 
Section 3.5, it is noted that inefficient profit redistribution is only associated with group-
affiliated firms and not with non-group firms. Hence, without the hypothesized inefficient 
profit redistribution, capital expenditures of good-performing firms should be greater than 
poor-performing firms in non-group firms.  
 
To test the effects of board independence on capital expenditure between good and poor-
performing firms in group-affiliated firms; the firms are first split into two sub-categories: 
firms with high ROA (Q) and firms with low ROA (Q) based on the median ROA (Q) value 
of the sample (firms with ROA (Q) above the median value are considered as high-
performing firms and vice versa for low-performing firms). Within each sub-category, firms 
are further split into two sub sub-categories: „firms with board independence‟ and „firms 
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without board independence‟. Board independence, as explained in sub-section 4.9.1, is 
operationalized respectively by three variables: PrINED, INDP_CHR, and INDP_ADT.  
 
A comparison on the level of capital expenditure is then made between the high ROA (Q) 
firms and low ROA (Q) firms within each sub sub-category of board independence. A higher 
level of capital expenditure (statistically significant) for the high ROA (Q) firms compared to 
low ROA (Q) firms in the „firms with board independence‟ and not in the „firms without 
board independence‟, suggests that board independence has the ability to curb inefficient 
profit redistribution and restore a high-performing/high capital expenditure and low-
performing/low capital expenditure relationship.  
 
4.9.4   Model Specification for Hypotheses Related to Firm Diversification  
 
The following regression specification is used to examine the hypothesis on the effect of firm 
diversification on performance (Hypothesis 4). This specification is also used to separately 
test the effect of diversification on the performance of group-affiliated firms compared to 
non-group firms:   
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + δ Ζi,t  + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 7) 
 
where: DVSF is firm diversification measured by the four diversification measures 
respectively as stated in sub-section 4.7.3: Diversification Dummy, Number of Business 
Segments, H Index, and Entropy. The focus is on the coefficient value, υ, in which a positive 
value for υ (for H index) or a negative value for υ (for the „Diversification Dummy‟, 
„Number of Segments‟ and „Entropy‟ measures) is an indication of a negative association 
between the level of firm diversification and performance, and vice versa. Z is a vector of 
various ownership variables as introduced earlier. X is a vector of other control variables, 
namely firm size, age, group, gearing and business sector effects.  
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In order to test whether firm diversification is agency-driven, the following regression 
specification is used. This specification is also used separately to test the hypothesis for 
group-affiliated firms and non-group firms:   
 
Ln (Efficiency)i,t =  α +  β DVSFi,t + + δ Ζi,t  + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 8) 
 
where: Efficiency refers to „Asset Utilization Efficiency‟ which is measured by the asset 
turnover ratio (Total Sales/Total Assets). The variable is transformed using natural log (Ln) 
since it leads to better statistical characteristics (Fleming et al., 2005). A negative value for 
coefficient β indicates that higher diversification is associated with a lower asset turnover 
ratio and suggests that diversification is agency-driven (see sub-section 3.6.2 for the 
literature). Z is a vector of ownership variables as described earlier and X is a vector of 
control variables that includes firm size, age, gearing, ROA and business sector effects. The 
inclusion of these ownership and control variables is consistent with those in Fleming et al. 
(2005).    
 
The next regression specification is used to test the hypothesis on the moderating effect of 
the size of business group on the firm diversification-performance link: 
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + δ GRSZ + β GRSZ * DVSFi,t + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 9) 
 
where: GRSZ is the dummy variable as defined in Specification 6. The moderating effects of 
different sizes of business groups on the diversification-performance link can be determined 
from the coefficients υ and β in Specification 9. Different regression models using different 
group sizes are employed in the specification. 
 
The next two regression specifications are used to examine the moderating effect of the 
ownership of controlling families (FAMOWN) and the domestic public institutional investors 
(DOMPUBII) on the diversification-performance link. The specifications are also used to 
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separately test the moderating effect of FAMOWN and DOMPUBII on the diversification-
performance link for group-affiliated firms.  
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + ω FAMOWNi,t + Ф DVSFi,t * FAMOWNi,t + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 10) 
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + ω DOMPUBIIi,t + Ф DVSFi,t * DOMPUBIIi,t + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 11) 
 
where: the moderating effect of FAMOWN and DOMPUBII on the diversification-
performance link is determined by the υ and Ф coefficients. 
 
Finally, the two regression specifications below are used to separately examine the 
moderating effects of board independence and control-enhancing means on the 
diversification-performance link:  
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + δ BDINDPi,t + γ DVSFi,t * BDINDPi,t + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 12) 
 
PERMi,t =  α + υ DVSFi,t + δ FAMCONTi,t + γ DVSFi,t * FAMCONTi,t + θ Xi,t + εi,t 
---------- (Specification 13) 
 
where: BDINDP and FAMCONT refer to board independence and control-enhancing means 
respectively, definitions of which are provided in sub-sections 4.9.1 and 4.9.2. The 
interaction terms (DVSFi,t * BDINDPi,t) and (DVSFi,t * FAMCONTi,t) are included in the 
above regressions to examine the moderating effects of BDINDP and FAMCONT on the 
diversification-performance link.  
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4.10   Chapter Summary  
 
The chapter began with a brief explanation of ethical issues in the research. Ethical issues are 
minimal, as only reliable secondary data is utilized in the study and real world illustrations 
used are from publicly-available sources.  The chapter then explained the researcher‟s 
positivist philosophical stance. Positivists believe that a phenomenon or hypothesis can be 
understood through empirical testing. Thus, a deductive approach is used in the study and, as 
the research questions demand an examination of the „dependence relationship‟, regression is 
chosen as the main tool of analysis. Other „dependence‟ methods of analysis were found to 
be inappropriate as justified in Section 4.8.  
 
The study proceeded to explicate in detail the sample selection and data collection process. 
Data relating to ownership and board of directors were collected from 2007 company annual 
reports and financial and market data for 2008 were obtained mainly from the Worldscope 
database. A total of 314 family-controlled firms were selected to represent all seven main 
business sectors. The study then provided an explanation of how the key operational 
variables are constructed. This includes ownership, business group affiliation, firm 
diversification and performance variables.  
 
The construction of the two most essential variables in the study, namely family ownership 
and firm performance variables, is explained first. The construction of the family ownership 
variable includes the criterion used to define a firm as family-controlled: – the 
family/individual should have a minimum of a 10% cut-off level of shareholding of the firm 
and act as the largest shareholder. As many controlling families maintain indirect ownership 
of publicly-listed firms through their privately-held companies, the ultimate ownership 
approach is used to determine their actual ownership of listed firms. Family relationship is 
identified as per the disclosure in the company annual reports.  
 
The selection of simplified Tobin‟s Q and ROA as the output variables of the study was then 
explained and justified. Both measures of firm performance represent two different 
perspectives with Tobin‟s Q as a market-based forward-looking performance measure and 
ROA as an accounting-based historical performance measure. Winsorization technique is 
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used to address the presence of outliers in the performance data. The researcher then 
explicated the construction of other variables including „other block-holders‟, business group 
affiliation and diversification variables. The „other block-holders‟ are classified into six 
different types, namely state, foreign corporations, domestic institutional investors and its 
subset domestic public institutional investors, foreign institutional investors, and 
unrelated/auxiliary family.  
 
The construction of the group affiliation variable and the categorization of business groups 
into three different dummy variables, according to the complexity of the group structure, 
were then explicated. Real-world corporations are used as examples to illustrate the 
construction of the three dummy variables, namely „Simple Business Groups‟, „Business 
Groups with Pyramidal Structure‟, and „Business Groups with Complicated Structure‟. Next, 
for the purpose of robustness, firm diversification variables were constructed by using four 
different measures: Entropy, Herfindahl (H) Index, Number of Business Segments, and 
Diversification Dummy. Four important variables known in the literature to affect firm 
performance are also included as control variables in the study. They are the firm size, age, 
gearing and business sector/industry effects.  
 
In the ensuing section, the researcher explained the method of analysis for the study. 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regressions and moderated regressions are applied as 
the main tools of analysis and justifications are given for their application. Appropriate 
remedial measures, which are highlighted in the next chapter, are used to address common 
problems associated with multiple and moderated regressions such as normality, 
multicollinearity, heteroscadasticity and endogeneity. Finally the chapter details the various 
specifications of model to be used in the empirical examination of the hypotheses. Based on 
earlier constructed variables, a total of 13 model specifications are constructed and 
categorized according to the major themes in the study, namely i) ownership structure, ii) 
control-enhancing means and group affiliation, iii) profit redistribution and iv) firm 
diversification. Findings and discussions based on the model specifications are presented in 
the next two chapters.   
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Chapter 5 – Findings and Discussions I – Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1   Chapter Outline  
 
This chapter deals with the descriptive statistics for the data used in the analysis. The aim is 
to describe quantitatively some of the main features of the data (e.g. data distribution such as 
percentage, central tendency of the statistics such as mean and median, and data dispersion 
such as standard deviation) so that some simple comparisons can be made between the 
data/variables. Since the descriptive statistics are intended to summarize the data sets, they 
will not be emphasized for major statistical inferences. The main inferences and conclusions 
of the study are drawn from the multiple regression analysis in the next chapter, in which all 
the variables that are relevant in a model specification are simultaneously included and tested. 
For ease of reference, a list of abbreviations used in this and the next chapter, together with a 
definition/explanation, is presented in Table 5.1 at the end of the chapter outline.   
 
Both the „Findings and Discussions‟ chapters (this chapter and the next) are written from the 
approach that discussion of results and implications appears immediately after the analysis of 
data for each sub-section is presented and completed. This approach serves best in providing 
continuity of discussion and the advantage of being able to conveniently check or refer back 
to the statistics from which the discussions or implications are drawn.  
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Table 5.1: List of Abbreviations, Variables and Operationalization   
 
Abbreviation  Variable Operationalization 
 
ROA 
 
Return on Assets  
 
 
EBITDA / Total assets 
 
Tobin‟s Q or Q Simplified Tobin‟s Q (Market value of equity + Book value of total liability) / Book 
value of assets  
 
FAMOWN Controlling Family Ownership Percentage of shareholding by the controlling family or 
individual person. A firm is defined as family-controlled if the 
family is the largest block-holder with at least 10% of 
shareholdings.    
 
STATE State Ownership Percentage of block shareholding by the government in a 
family-controlled firm. 
 
FORGN Foreign Corporations Ownership 
 
Percentage of block shareholding by foreign corporations in a 
family-controlled firm. 
 
DOMII Domestic Institutional Investors 
Ownership 
Percentage of block shareholding by domestic institutional 
investors in a family-controlled firm. 
 
DOMPUBII Domestic Public Institutional 
Investors Ownership  
Percentage of block shareholding by domestic public 
institutional investors in a family-controlled firm. 
 
FORGNII Foreign Institutional Investors 
Ownership  
Percentage of block shareholding by foreign institutional 
investors in a family-controlled firm. 
 
AUXFAM Auxiliary or Unrelated Families 
Ownership 
Percentage of block shareholding by auxiliary or unrelated 
families in a family-controlled firm. 
 
Other BHS Other (Outside) Block-holders Combined percentage of shareholding by all the block-holders 
except the controlling family in a family-controlled firm.  
 
PrINED Proportion of Independent 
Directors 
 
Number of independent directors / Total number of directors 
on the board   
 
INDP_CHR Independent Chairman  Dummy is 1 if chairman of the board is an independent 
director; 0 otherwise. 
 
INDP_ADT Independent Audit Committee  Dummy is 1 if all the audit committee members are 
independent directors; 0 otherwise.  
 
H_INDP_B Highly Independent Board  Dummy is 1 if the following are satisfied: at least half of the 
board members are independent directors, chairman is an 
independent director, and all the audit committee members are 
independent directors; 0 otherwise. 
 
CF/CONT Cash Flow-to-Control Rights Cash flow rights / control rights 
 
CF/CONT_DUM Cash Flow-to-Control Rights 
Dummy 
 
Dummy is 1 if the ratio of cash flow-to-control right is below 
1.00; zero if the ratio is 1.00.  
 
FAMDIR Family Directors on the Board Number of family directors / Total number of directors  
CHR_CEO Chairman and CEO positions 
simultaneously occupied by the 
controlling family 
Dummy is 1 if the board chair and CEO positions are 
simultaneously occupied by the controlling family; 0 
otherwise. 
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FAMONLY Controlling family as the only or 
sole block-holder 
Dummy is 1 if the controlling family is the sole block-holder 
of the firm without the presence of a second block-holder who 
has at least a 10% shareholding; 0 otherwise.  
 
Group Business Group-affiliated 
 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group; zero 
otherwise. A firm is considered as group-affiliated if it shares 
the same controlling family with other publicly-listed firm(s). 
   
BG_S Business Groups with Simple 
Structure  
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group without 
a pyramidal structure; 0 otherwise. 
 
BG_PS Business Groups with Pyramidal 
Structure   
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group with a 
pyramidal structure; 0 otherwise.   
 
BG_CS Business Groups with Complicated 
Structure 
Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group with 
complicated structure (contains complex network of pyramid 
and cross-holding) in which the cash flow-to-control rights 
ratio is indeterminate; 0 otherwise.   
 
Lag (ROA) Previous year ROA  ROA for fiscal year 2007 
 
Lag (Tobin‟s Q) Previous year Tobin‟s Q  Tobin‟s Q for fiscal year 2007 
 
GR_A Small size business group Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group with 
only two publicly-listed affiliates; 0 otherwise.   
 
GR_B Intermediate size business group Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group with 
three to four publicly-listed affiliates; 0 otherwise.  
 
GR_C Large size business group Dummy is 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group with 
five or more publicly-listed affiliates; 0 otherwise.  
 
FAMOWN1 Controlling family without 
majority ownership  
 
Percentage of family shareholding below 50%.   
 
FAMOWN2 Controlling family with majority 
ownership  
Percentage of family shareholding of 50% and above. 
 
 
CAPEX Ratio Capital Expenditure Ratio Capital expenditure/ Total assets  
 
E ENTROPY or E value E = ∑Pi LN (1/Pi) where Pi is the i-th business segment‟s sales 
divided by the firm‟s total sales. The higher the E, the greater 
the firm diversification. 
 
HERF Herfindahl or H Index  H = Σ(Sales per segment/Total sales)
2. The lower the H, the 
greater is firm diversification. 
 
NUM_SEG Number of Segments  Number of business segments as reported in company annual 
reports. 
 
DVSF_D Diversification Dummy  Dummy is 1 if the firm has more than a single business 
segment and where the sales in the largest segment are less 
than 90% of total sales; 0 otherwise. 
 
Efficiency Asset Turnover Ratio Total sales / Total assets  
 
Sales Total Sales Total sales or revenues in Ringgit Malaysia  
 
Gearing Gearing Ratio Total debts / Total assets 
 
Age of firm  Age of firms in years Number of years since incorporation of a firm   
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5.2   Firm Performance Data     
 
The section begins with a presentation of the descriptive statistics for the dependent or output 
variable: firm performance. Descriptive statistics on the performance measures of the sample 
firms are depicted in Table 5.2 below. The maximum value of ROA (Tobin‟s Q) is close to 
53% (7.00) whereas the lowest value is close to -80% (0.33). The distribution of the statistics 
is centred at the value of 9.19% (0.87) with the median of 9.07% (0.76).  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics – Firm Performance  
  
 
 
Between the two performance measures, Tobin‟s Q is especially affected by the general stock 
market movement. The mean of 0.87 (based on the end of 2008 data) may reflect the overall 
bearish market that existed during the period. The benchmark of Bursa Malaysia KLCI stood 
at 877 points at the end of 2008. This is significantly lower than the index recorded for the 
same period in the three years before 2008: 899 (end of 2005), 1096 (end of 2006) and 1445 
(end of 2007). Overall, the stock market performance was encouraging and exhibited an 
upward trend from 2005 to 2007. However, the performance deteriorated in 2008 as a result 
of the US credit crisis that occurred during the year. The stock market recovered in 2009 and 
2010 with the index stood at 1273 and 1519 respectively at the end of both years. Tobin‟s Q 
in this study, on average, would have been higher if the trough period of the economy cycle 
(i.e. 2008) is avoided. Put differently, the mean value of less than 1.00 for Tobin‟s Q in this 
study, to a large extent, is explainable by the deteriorating market condition in 2008.
73
      
 
                                                          
73
 As stated in Table 5.1, Tobin‟s Q is calculated as the ratio of market value of equity plus total liability 
divided by the book value of total assets of the firm. It should be noted that the market value of equity will 
generally be greater than its book value when the economy is growing satisfactorily. Tobin‟s Q will be greater 
than 1.00 in such circumstances. Conversely, when the economy stalls or slows down, the declining stock 
market may cause the market value of equity to fall below its book value and Tobin‟s Q will therefore fall 
below 1.00.     
Performance 
Measure 
Mean  Median Maximum  Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
 
ROA (%) 
 
9.19 
 
9.07 
 
52.74 
 
-79.76 
 
9.18 
 
Tobin‟s Q 
 
0.87 
 
0.76 
 
6.91 
 
0.33 
 
0.53 
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5.3   Ownership Data     
 
Table 5.3 depicts the descriptive statistics for the various types of block-holders.
74
 The 
statistics show that the ownership level of family-controlled firms in Malaysia is highly 
concentrated with a mean of 37.97%. This figure is comparable to the 38.45% average 
ownership of family-controlled firms reported by Tam and Tan (2007) with their sample size 
of 150 listed firms in Malaysia.
75
  
 
All other types of block-holder (STATE, FORGN, FORGNII, DOMII, DOMPUBII and 
AUXFAM), on average, account for only a small percentage of the equity of the sampled 
firms. However, the mean statistics are greatly „averaged down‟ by the fact that these „other 
block- holders‟ do not appear in every single firm and in fact the involvement of some of 
these block-holders in firms is rather limited. STATE, FORGN, FORGNII, DOMII, 
DOMPUBII and  AUXFAM  appear in 19, 17, 34, 111,  105 and 135  firms respectively from  
 
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics – Ownership Data 
Ownership of 
Various Block-
holders (%) 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
FAMOWN 37.97 37.36 71.77 6.00 15.14 
STATE 0.86 (14.16) 0 (14.99) 26.04 0 3.72 
FORGN 0.76 (14.03) 0 (10.23) 30.27 0 3.84 
DOMII 3.60 (10.18) 0 (8.62) 29.87 0 5.88 
DOMPUBII 3.33 (9.96) 0 (8.55) 29.87 0 5.68 
FORGNII 1.09 (10.11) 0 (7.84) 27.54 0 3.85 
AUXFAM 6.29 (14.62) 0 (11.37) 38.32 0 9.33 
 
 
the total of 314 firms in the sample. The numbers suggest that these block-holders, 
particularly state and foreign, are rather selective in choosing which family-controlled firms 
                                                          
74
 See Table 5.1 for explanation of abbreviations.  
75
 Family-controlled firms are known as „individual firms‟ in Tam and Tan (2007). 
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they wanted to invest in. It is therefore important to find out in the multivariate analysis 
whether the equity stake of the different identity block-holders influences the performance of 
the firms differently.   
 
Moreover, though foreigners‟ equity participation is not widespread in family-controlled 
firms in Malaysia, they actually form a considerable fraction of the daily stock trading on 
Bursa Malaysia. For instance, on average, the daily trading participation disclosed in the 
Bursa Malaysia official website for the month of June 2011 shows that foreign participation 
accounts for about one-third of the total trading value.
76
 Foreign investors are also viewed as 
an important element affecting market sentiment.  
 
Separate statistics (shown in parentheses in the table) for each type of block-holder are 
computed for the purpose of showing the mean and median of the sub-sample firms that 
contain only that particular type of block-holder. The statistics portray that the average stakes 
held by each type of block-holder are quite substantial, in the range between 10-15% with the 
maximum percentage approaching 30% for most types of block-holder and 38.32% for 
AUXFAM.  
 
The next section presents the descriptive statistics of another set of data which are applied 
throughout the entire multiple regression analysis – the control variables data. 
 
5.4   Control Variables Data     
 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables: sales, gearing ratio and 
age of firm since incorporation. A family firm of an average size (mean value) in the sample 
generates about RM813 million of annual sales. However, the median firm size is much 
smaller at around RM293 million. The large difference between the mean and the median 
indicates that the distribution of sales is skewed and not symmetrical. Thus data 
                                                          
76
 Foreigners only hold a small portion of stocks but account for one-third of the daily trading value suggesting 
that the ownership structure is highly concentrated in that most of the stocks are „non-publicly tradable‟ in the 
real sense. Non-tradable stocks refer mainly to the long-term holdings of the controlling family and other major 
shareholders as well as other restricted holdings such as employee share schemes. In other words, the 
percentage of free-float stocks in Malaysia is low and continues to be problematic.   
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transformation is made by taking the natural log for the variable in order to normalize the 
distribution before multivariate analysis is performed. The average gearing ratio is 23% and 
the mean age of firms is 24.5 years which is slightly younger than the mean of 28.8 years 
reported by Claessens et al. (2000) for Malaysian firms.
77
 It also shows that family firms in 
Malaysia are relatively young compared to, for example, the average age of 82 years reported 
in Andres (2008) for Germany firms.  
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics – Control Variables 
Firm variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Sales (RM „000) 
 
813,623 293,335 14,665,369 8,740 1,524,205 
Gearing ratio  
 
0.230 0.228 0.789 0.000 0.170 
Age of firm (years) 24.5 19 95 1 17.33 
 
 
5.5   Other Relevant Data 
 
Table 5.5 shows the data on variables related to board independence. On average, about 43% 
(45% in group-affiliated firms) of board directors are categorized as independent non-
executive directors. This percentage is above the one-third independent directors requirement 
set by the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). However, the minimum value 
of 22% for the variable is below the MCCG requirement. The highest percentage of 
independent directors in the sample firms is 75% (71% in group-affiliated firms). The next 
three variables, INDP_CHR, INDP_ADT and H_INDP_B are dummy variables. The data 
shows that about 32% of the firms (32% in group-affiliated firms) have independent 
chairmen, about 32% of the firms (26% in group-affiliated firms) have their audit committee 
consisting of only independent directors, and only 22 or 7% of the firms are considered as 
having a „highly independent board‟ (H_INDP_B).  
 
                                                          
77
 Claessens‟s et al. (2000) sample selection criterion is not based solely on family-controlled firms. Their 
sample includes all types of firms. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics – Board Independence  
Board 
Independence 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
PrINED 
 
0.43 0.41 0.75 0.22 0.11 
PrINED 
(group-affiliated 
firms only) 
0.45 0.43 0.71 0.22 0.11 
Board 
Independence 
(Dummy 
Variables) 
 
 
 
                         
Yes (1) 
 
 
Percentage 
                
 
No (0)                
 
  
 
Percentage 
 
INDP_CHR 
 
                           
99 Firms 
 
 31.5% 
     
215 Firms                       
 
68.5% 
INDP_CHR 
(group-affiliated 
firms only) 
 
                        48 Firms   31.6% 104 Firms 68.4% 
INDP_ADT                            99 Firms  31.5% 215 Firms 68.5% 
 
INDP_ADT 
(group-affiliated 
firms only) 
 
                            
39 Firms 
 
 25.7% 
 
113 Firms 
 
74.3% 
H_INDP_B                22 Firms   7.0% 292 Firms  93% 
     
Table 5.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables of control-enhancing means. The 
mean for the ratio of cash flow-to-control rights for the controlling family is 0.94. The 
median of 1.00 shows that the majority of firms do not have divergence in cash flow and 
control rights. The mean is higher than that of 0.85 reported in Claessens et al. (2000) but the 
median is the same as Claessens et al. (2000). The higher mean in this study is partly caused 
by the exclusion of the 11 firms whose CF/CONT ratio cannot be determined due to 
insufficient information on the highly complex pyramidal and cross-holding structures 
involved in these firms. Another likely reason for the difference in the mean value is the 
different sampling selection used by Claessens et al. (2000). Their sample of 236 Malaysian 
firms consists of the largest 100 Malaysian firms in terms of market capitalization. Group-
affiliated firms with pyramidal structure tend to be larger in size compared to non-group 
firms.
78
 Thus a sampling method that is skewed towards large firms tends to find more 
group-affiliated firms with divergence in cash flow to control rights.   
                                                          
78
 The difference in the size (by total sales) of group and non-group firms is shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics – Control-enhancing Means  
Family Control  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
 
CF/CONT 
 
0.944 1.000 1.000 0.250 0.147 
FAMDIR   
 
0.27 0.29 0.83 0.00 0.20 
 
Family Control (Dummy 
variable) 
 
 
Yes (1) 
 
 
No (0) 
 
CHR_CEO 
 
126 
 
188 
 
FAMONLY 
 
 
195 
 
119 
 
Structure of Business 
Group 
 
BG_S 
 
BG_PS 
 
BG_CS 
 
      Total 
 
Number of firms 
 
51 
 
90 
 
11 
 
152 
 
Number of business 
groups 
 
32 
 
45 
 
3 
 
80 
 
 
Conversely, sampling in this study is carried out to ensure that selection of firms is balanced 
as far as firm size is concerned.
79
 The exclusion of the 11 firms is however compensated by 
the use of BG_CS, the dummy variable that indicates „business groups with complicated 
structure‟ whereby the 11 firms fall into the group. These 11 firms belong to three separate 
business groups from the total of 80 groups in the study.  
 
Family business groups with pyramidal ownership structure are common in Malaysia, as the 
table shows, the majority of business groups in this study (45 out of 80 business groups or 
56%) are associated with pyramidal structure (BG_PS). The number of firms affiliated to this 
type of business group is 90 (or 59% of group-affiliated firms). As for the business groups 
with simple structure (BG_S), 32 business groups (or 40% of the total number of business 
groups) belong to this category and the number of firms involved is 51 (or 34% of group-
affiliated firms). 
                                                          
79
 Details of the sampling method are available in Section 4.4 in Chapter 4.   
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The next variable in the list is FAMDIR. On average, 27% of board directors are family 
directors (with median = 29%). The highest percentage of boards with family directors is 83% 
and the lowest is 0%. Dummy variables, CHR_CEO and FAMONLY, depict that 126 firms 
(or 40% of firms) have both the chairmanship and CEO positions occupied by family 
members and 195 firms (or 62% of firms) have the controlling family as the sole or only 
block-holder in the firm.  
 
Table 5.7a shows the key statistical features of diverse measures of diversification used in 
this study. The mean (median) values of the Entropy, H Index and Number of Segments are 
0.420 (0.360), 0.763 (0.813) and 2.69 (2.5) respectively. As a comparison, Zuaini and Napier 
(2006) report an Herfindahl Index of 0.71 and an average number of 2.36 segments from 
their sample of 355 Malaysian firms in 2001, whereas Ayoib et al. (2003) report an average 
number of 2.30 segments from their sample of 219 Malaysian firms in 1995. This suggests 
that the firm diversification scenario has changed little since before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis.   
 
Table 5.7a: Descriptive Statistics – Firm Diversification Data  
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
 
Entropy 
 
0.420 0.360 1.630 0.000 0.415 
Herfindahl   
 
0.763 0.813 1.000 0.225 0.235 
Number of Segments 2.690 2.500 9.000 1.000 1.598 
 
Efficiency 
(asset turnover ratio) 
 
0.829 0.729 6.873 0.035 0.659 
 
Diversification  
Dummy 
 
1= 153 firms 
 
0 = 161 firms 
 
The diversification dummy variable shows that 153 firms (or 49% of firms) are considered as 
diversified, whereas 161 firms (or 51% of firms) are considered as non-diversified or focused 
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firms. As a comparison over time, using 2001 data, Zuaini and Napier (2006) report that 55% 
of their 355 sample firms in Malaysia are diversified and 45% are focused, whereas 
Claessens et al. (2003) based on the data in the period 1990-1996 before the Asian Financial 
Crisis, discover that 70% of their sample firms from Malaysia are diversified. This may 
indicate that the percentage of focused firms has increased over the years since the AFC.  
 
Efficiency (asset turnover ratio) is the output variable specifically applied in the hypothesis 
related to firm diversification. The statistics show that the average asset turnover ratio is 
about 0.83 (with maximum value = 6.87 and minimum value = 0.035). Asset turnover ratio 
depends substantially on the type of business sector; thus the inclusion of „business sector‟ as 
a control variable in the regression analysis is crucial.    
 
Table 5.7b describes the number of business segments among group-affiliated and non-group 
firms as well as firms in the full sample. It shows that the percentages of firms operating in 
one and two business segments are higher for non-group firms, compared to group-affiliated 
firms. Most of the diversified group-affiliated firms have three to four lines of business 
segments, whereas most of the diversified non-group firms operate within two to three 
business segments.  
 
None of the non-group firms operate with seven or more segments whereas there are a couple 
of group-affiliated firms with seven segments and two group-affiliated firms each with eight 
and nine segments. There are no firms with ten or more business segments. The overall 
observation suggests that group-affiliated firms may be more diversified than non-group 
firms. This observation is consistent with Lin and Servaes (2002), who find that group firms 
are more likely to be diversified compared to non-group firms. It is intriguing to discover, via 
the multivariate analysis, whether there is a difference between the performance of 
diversified group firms and diversified non-group firms in Malaysia especially when the 
closer political connection in business groups may have an influence on the performance 
outcome of diversified group firms. Controlling families of business groups who enjoy 
political support may use firm diversification as a means of expropriation and cause the 
performance of affiliates to be adversely affected.   
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Table 5.7b: Descriptive Statistics – Firm Diversification Data: Group and Non-group   
Comparison  
Number of 
Segments 
Non-group firms Group Firms Full Sample 
 
Number % Number % Number % Cumu. % 
1 55 33.9 47 30.9 102 32.5 32.5 
2 37 22.8 18 11.8 55 17.5 50.0 
3 31 19.1 28 18.4 59 18.8 68.8 
4 26 16.1 33 21.7 59 18.8 87.6 
5 9 5.6 14 9.2 23 7.3 94.9 
6 4 2.5 6 3.9 10 3.2 98.1 
7 0 0.0 4 2.6 4 1.3 99.4 
8 0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.3 99.7 
9 0 0.0 1 0.7 1 0.3 100.0 
Total 162 100.0 152 100.0 314 100.0 100.0 
Note: Cumu. % = Cumulative % 
 
5.6   Tests of Mean Difference and Median Difference between Group and 
Non-Group Firms 
 
Table 5.8 presents the descriptive statistics for a variety of attributes of group-affiliated firms 
compared to non-group firms. It also presents the p-value of the t-test for the mean 
differences as well as the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the median differences between 
group firms and non-group firms.  
 
5.6.1   Ownership Structure  
 
Panel A of the table shows the differences in ownership structure between group and non-
group firms. It can be seen that the average ownership by controlling families (FAMOWN) 
in group firms is 35.56%, which is lower than the average family ownership of 40.23% for 
non-group firms. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The significant 
difference implies that utilizing business groups allows controlling families to exercise 
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Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics – Tests of Mean Difference and Median Difference Between Group and Non-Group Firms 
Variable Non-Group Group t-test Wilcoxon test 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev p-value of mean 
differences 
p-value of median 
differences 
Panel A 
FAMOWN (%) 40.23 40.69 14.35 35.56 34.27 15.63 0.006*** 0.003*** 
STATE (%) 0.36 0.00 2.55 1.39 0.00 4.60 0.014** 0.257 
DOMII (%) 3.46 0.00 5.94 3.74 0.00 5.84 0.675 0.371 
DOMPUBII (%) 3.03 0.00 5.53 3.65 0.00 5.84 0.337 0.232 
FORGNII (%) 1.06 0.00 3.69 1.13 0.00 4.03 0.875 0.928 
FORGN (%) 0.39 0.00 2.90 1.16 0.00 4.62 0.077* 0.353 
AUXFAM (%) 7.49 0.00 10.18 5.00 0.00 8.16 0.017** 0.059* 
Panel B 
CF/CONT 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.88 1.00 0.20 0.000*** 0.000*** 
FAMDIR 0.30 0.33 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.004*** 0.003*** 
CHR_CEO 0.47 -- -- 0.33 -- -- 0.011** -- 
FAMONLY 0.60 -- -- 0.64 -- -- 0.403 -- 
Panel C 
Entropy 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.47 0.37 0.46 0.048** 0.122 
Herfindahl 0.78 0.82 0.21 0.74 0.81 0.25 0.127 0.171 
Num of Segments 2.44 2.00 1.37 2.96 3.00 1.77 0.004*** 0.020** 
DVSF_D 0.47 -- -- 0.50 -- -- 0.663  
         
Efficiency (asset 
turnover)  
0.91 0.89 0.57 0.74 0.58 0.74 0.017** 0.000*** 
Panel D 
Sales  
(RM „000) 
436,998 235,999 665,161 1,215,027 466,531 2,007,369 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age  
(years) 
18.26 14.5 11.60 31.15 29.50 19.81 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Gearing 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.088* 0.039** 
Panel E 
Lag (ROA) (%) 11.10 10.69 7.20 9.74 9.32 7.52 0.103 0.093* 
Lag (Tobin‟s Q)  1.10 0.91 0.55 1.13 0.96 0.52 0.731 0.360 
ROA (%) 9.74 10.13 7.62 8.96 8.40 6.88 0.341 0.100* 
Tobin‟s Q 0.83 0.74 0.33 0.84 0.78 0.32 0.608 0.395 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%
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control over affiliated firms without having to invest too much equity capital compared to the 
investment in non-group firms as explained in sub-section 2.6.1.1 in Chapter 2.        
 
As for the ownership of other types of block-holder, direct involvement of the state (STATE) 
in the equity holdings of family firms on average (mean) is higher in group firms compared 
to non-group firms. However, group firms have a lower percentage of shareholdings by 
unrelated or auxiliary families (AUXFAM). AUXFAM holds on average 5% of the shares of 
group firms compared to 7.49% for non-group firms and the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  
 
In contrast, group firms have a higher percentage of shareholdings by FORGN (foreign 
corporations/government ownership) compared to non-group firms but the mean difference is 
only statistically significant at the 10% level. Finally, group firms do not seem to be different 
from non-group firms in shareholdings by all three categories of institutional investors‟ 
holdings (DOMII, DOMPUBII and FORGNII). It suggests that institutional investors, 
regardless of whether foreign or domestic, do not have a preference for group firms over non-
group firms and vice versa in making their investments in family-controlled firms. 
 
5.6.2   Control-Enhancing Means 
 
In Panel B, statistics comparison of various control-enhancing means is made between group 
firms and non-group firms. The mean and median for the cash flow-to-control rights 
(CF/CONT) for group firms is statistically different from non-group firms. The reason for the 
difference is straightforward: divergence of cash flow rights to control rights is the result of 
pyramidal ownership structure. By definition, independent firms do not contain a pyramidal 
structure. Pyramidal structure
80
 is a feature that exists only in some business groups. 
 
In contrast, controlling families in non-group firms are able to enhance their control by 
having, on average, a larger proportion of family directors (FAMDIR) compared to group 
firms. On average, 30% of board directors in non-group firms are family directors (with
                                                          
80
 In other words, pyramidal structure is a subset of business groups. See sub-section 4.7.2 for an elaboration on 
pyramidal structure and the various structures of business groups. 
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median=33%) compared to the average of 24% (with median=25%) in group firms. The 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The lower mean for group-affiliated 
firms may simply result from family members dispersing and joining the boards of different 
affiliates in the group.   
 
Controlling families of non-group firms also have greater power concentration compared to 
group firms, in terms of the mean percentage of family members monopolising both the 
board chairmanship and CEO positions simultaneously (CHR_CEO) (47% for non-group 
firms compared to 33% for group firms). The mean difference is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. The lower CHR_CEO in group firms might be caused by controlling families 
appointing more non-family close allies into those positions where family members are 
unable to monitor all the affiliates or member firms in the group. Finally, on average, 
controlling families in 60% of non-group firms and 64% of group firms, enhance their 
ownership by acting as the sole block-holder of firms. The mean difference is statistically 
insignificant.    
 
5.6.3   Firm Diversification  
 
Panel C shows the comparison of diversification measures between group and non-group 
firms. The mean (median) values of Entropy for group and non-group firms are 0.47 (0.37) 
and 0.37 (0.34) respectively. The mean difference is statistically significant at 5% level. This 
indicates that group firms, on average, are more diversified than non-group firms. The 
comparison is consistent with the finding by Chakrabarti et al. (2007) that group-affiliated 
firms in Malaysia and Indonesia are more diversified than non-group firms by Entropy, in 
their study across six Asian countries including Malaysia. However, their study also shows 
that group firms in Thailand are more focused than non-group firms, whereas in Singapore 
both types of firm are similar in terms of diversification.  
Group firms are also more diversified than non-group firms according to the „Number of 
Segments‟ measure. On average, each group firm has 2.96 segments (with median=3) 
compared to 2.44 segments for a non-group firm (with median=2). Both the mean and 
median difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The Herfindahl Index and 
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Diversification Dummy also show that group firms are more diversified than non-group firms 
though their mean difference is statistically insignificant.  
Overall, the diversification measures show that, in Malaysia, group firms are more 
diversified than non-group firms. Lins and Servaes (2002) in their study of seven Asian 
countries in 1995, also find a significant difference between the percentage of group firms in 
their sample that are diversified (31.5%) and the percentage of non-group firms that are 
diversified (25.8%). A similar conclusion is also reached in Claessens‟s et al. (1999c) study 
on minority shareholders‟ expropriation and firm diversification in East Asia. All findings 
that group-affiliated firms are more diversified than non-group firms cast doubt on group-
affiliated firms‟ motives to diversify. As explained by Lins and Servaes (2002), since group 
affiliation already provides the benefits of an internal market, and if a firm diversifies to 
create an internal market, then less and not more diversification at the firm level should be 
expected from group-affiliated firms.     
The final variable in Panel C is the „efficiency‟ variable. Group firms are found to have 
statistically significantly lower efficiency in terms of their asset turnover ratio compared to 
non-group firms. Inferences on whether the lower efficiency in group firms is related to 
agency-driven diversification, as proposed by Singh et al. (2007), will be confirmed in the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
5.6.4   Control Variables 
 
Panel D exhibits that group firms on average are larger in size, as measured by the total sales, 
compared to non-group firms. The median value of firm size for group firms is almost twice 
the median value of non-group firms. The mean difference and median difference for group 
and non-group firms are statistically significant at the 1% level. The noticeably large 
variation in the size of group firms (as measured by the standard deviation) indicates that 
business groups on average consist of a mixture of large and small affiliates.  
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Group firms are also relatively older than non-group firms with an average age of 31 years 
(with median=30 years) compared to only 18 years (with median=15 years) for non-group 
firms. This suggests that controlling families on average need a longer time to develop their 
businesses from a small independent firm to a business group. The findings of larger size and 
older age for group firms compared to non-group firms are consistent with those in Khanna 
and Palepu (2000a) for firms in India. Natural log transformation is applied to the firm size 
and age variables in the multivariate analysis of this study to accommodate their non-normal 
distribution (as indicated by the large difference between the mean and the median). Finally 
group firms, on average, are also found to have higher debts than non-group firms. 
 
5.6.5   Firm Performance 
 
Despite the various types of significant differences as reported above between group and 
non-group firms, there is generally a lack of significant difference in the performance of 
these two types of firms. In Panel E, the mean (median) ROA and the mean (median) Tobin‟s 
Q for the affiliated firms are 8.96% (8.40%) and 0.84 (0.78) respectively. The comparable 
figures for non-group firms are 9.74% (10.13%) and 0.83 (0.74). Except for the difference in 
the median ROA, all other performance comparisons between group and non-group firms are 
statistically insignificant. The results from the comparison between the lagged values of 
ROA and Tobin‟s Q between group and non-group firms are qualitatively similar to the 
results of ROA and Tobin‟s Q. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) also find no difference in the 
mean performance of group firms compared to non-group firms in India in terms of ROA and 
Tobin‟s Q.  
 
5.7   Further Analysis on Business Groups and the Group-affiliated Firms 
 
Table 5.9a exhibits the distribution of firms and groups according to three different group 
sizes. The group size is determined by the number of listed firms in a business group. The 
highest percentage of firms (37%) are affiliated to GR_A (small business groups with two 
listed firms) followed by GR_B (intermediate business groups with three to four listed firms) 
(34%) and GR_C (large business groups with at least five listed firms) (29%). As for the 
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distribution of groups across the three group sizes, the majority of business groups (41 out of 
the total of 80 business groups or 51.25%) belong to GR_A, 28 groups or 35% belong to 
GR_B and 11 groups or 13.75% belong to GR_C.  
 
Table 5.9a: Descriptive Statistics – Size of Business Groups 
 
Table 5.9b presents the performance statistics of group-affiliated firms based on group 
heterogeneity. Two aspects of group heterogeneity are examined: group size and group 
complexity. In terms of group size, GR_B (the intermediate size business group) has the 
highest mean of ROA while GR_C has the highest mean of Tobin‟s Q. 
 
Table 5.9b: Descriptive Statistics - Group Size and Group Complexity with Firm 
Performance 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
 
Group Size ROA Q ROA Q ROA Q 
GR_ A 8.91 0.75 8.57 0.70* 5.88** 0.29 
GR_ B 9.34 0.89 8.22 0.80* 6.90 0.31 
GR_ C 8.55 0.91 8.12 0.82* 8.07 0.34 
Group 
Complexity 
      
BG_S 8.96 0.80 8.41 0.73 6.11** 0.34 
BG_PS 8.99 0.86 8.43 0.80* 6.89 0.29 
BG_CS 8.66 0.90 4.90 0.76 10.24 0.45 
 
Non-group 
firms 
 
9.74 
 
0.83 
 
10.13 
 
0.74 
 
7.62 
 
0.33 
 Note: 1. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
           2. Comparisons of mean, median and standard deviation are made with non-group firms. The mean 
difference is tested with the t-test, the median difference with the Wilcoxon-test and standard deviation 
difference with the F-test.  
 
Group Size Firms Groups 
 Number Percentage  Number  Percentage 
GR_A – Small 56 36.84 41 51.25 
GR_B - Medium  52 34.21 28 35.00 
GR_C – Large  44 28.95 11 13.75 
Total 152 100.00 80 100.00 
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Non-group firms are included in the table for comparison purposes. The comparison shows 
that the difference in mean and median for ROA between each of the sub-groups and the 
non-group firms are statistically insignificant while the differences in mean and median for 
Tobin‟s Q are statistically significant at the 10% level.   
 
The second part of the table presents the performance comparison in terms of complexity of 
group structure. Overall, the mean and median ROA as well as Tobin‟s Q for firms in all 
three levels of group complexity are relatively close and their differences with the non-group 
firms are mostly statistically insignificant.  
Table 5.9c depicts the statistics of diversification in group firms according to group size and 
group complexity. In terms of group size, firms in GR_B are more diversified than firms in 
GR_A and GR_C according to all diversification measures. The mean, median and standard 
deviation of various diversification measures in GR_B are statistically significantly (at 
various significance levels) greater than for non-group firms. 
 
Table 5.9c: Descriptive Statistics – Group Size and Group Complexity with Firm 
Diversification 
 Mean Median Std Dev 
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GR_ A 0.38 0.79 2.54 0.34 0.84 2.00 0.40 0.23 1.37 
 
GR_ B 0.58*** 0.68*** 3.42*** 0.69*** 0.60*** 3.50*** 0.49** 0.27* 1.84** 
 
GR_ C 0.44 0.76 2.95** 0.32 0.83 3.00 0.48** 0.25 2.02*** 
Group 
Complexity 
         
BG_S 0.42 0.77 2.86** 0.37 0.81 3.00** 0.40 0.23 1.34 
BG_PS 0.48** 0.73* 2.94** 0.40 0.81 3.00 0.48*** 0.26** 1.93*** 
BG_CS 0.60* 0.70 3.55*** 0.34 0.81 4.00* 0.57 0.29 2.16 
Non-group 
firms 
 
0.37 
 
0.78 
 
2.44 
 
0.34 
 
0.82 
 
2.00 
 
0.36 
 
0.21 
 
1.37 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. # Segment = Number of Segments. 
Comparisons of mean, median and standard deviation are made with non-group firms. The mean difference is 
tested with the t-test, the median difference with the Wilcoxon-test and standard deviation difference with the F-
test.  
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In terms of group complexity, a general trend of diversification is observed in that the level 
of diversification increases as the business group structure becomes more and more complex. 
Specifically, non-group firms have the lowest diversification level, followed by firms in 
business groups with simple structure (BG_S), followed by firms in business groups with 
pyramidal structure (BG_PS). Firms affiliated to business groups with complicated structure 
(BG_CS) are the most diversified of all. The observation is inconsistent with the „substitution 
proposition‟ that diversification at the group level (having affiliates operating in different 
industries) is able to substitute diversification at the firm level and thus group-affiliated firms 
do not need to diversify as the task can be more effectively fulfilled at the group level 
(Charkrabarti et al., 2007). It is thus intriguing to find out in the multivariate analysis 
whether the more diversified nature of group firms compared to non-group firms is 
associated with lower performance. Statistical evidence of lower performance in this case 
may indicate that the diversification is agency-driven and the decision to diversify is more 
likely an act of expropriation (Lins and Servaes, 2002).  
 
The section concludes with statistics related to the breakdown of controlling family 
ownership (FAMOWN) into low (FAMOWN1) and high (FAMOWN2) ownership levels in 
group-affiliated firms. Table 5.10 shows that 123 of 152 group-affiliated firms (or 80.92%) 
have family ownership of below 50% and only 29 group firms (or 19.08%) have family 
ownership of 50% and above. 
 
Table 5.10: Descriptive Statistics – Family Ownership Classification for Group-
affiliated Firms 
FAMOWN Firms 
 Number Percentage of Total 
FAMOWN1 123 80.92 
FAMOWN2 29 19.08 
Total 152 100.00 
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5.8   Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
Tables 5.11a to 5.11c present the Pearson Correlation Matrix for the full sample in the study. 
The correlation matrix is performed before the multiple regression analysis is conducted with 
the purpose of checking for potential multicollinearity as well as the „one-to-one relationship‟ 
between firm performance and the explanatory variables. Similar matrices for the sub-sample 
of group firms are available in Appendix 5.  
 
The tables depict that overall, the correlations between the explanatory variables are low. 
Only a small number of explanatory variables show comparatively higher correlations 
between themselves. Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) will be computed for these variables 
before the multiple regression analysis is conducted and any serious multicollinearity as 
indicated by the VIF value will be appropriately addressed.    
 
Table 5.11a shows that the ROA is significantly positively related to FAMOWN, 
DOMPUBII and Log Sales and significantly negatively related to gearing at the 5% 
significance level (shaded area). As for Tobin‟s Q, it is significantly positively related to 
STATE, FORGNII and Log Sales (shaded area). However, these relationships need to be 
tested again in the multivariate analysis as many other factors must be accounted for. The 
matrix in Table 5.11b shows that ROA is significantly positively (at the 5% level) related to 
FAMOWN1 as well as FAMDIR and CHR_CEO but negatively related to FAMONLY. As 
for Tobin‟s Q, it is significantly negatively related to CF/CONT. As expected, the table also 
shows that both ROA and Q are highly correlated to their respective lagged value. Finally 
ROA in Table 5.11c is significantly related to Entropy and Herfindahl, indicating that 
diversification is inversely related to ROA. 
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Table 5.11a: Pearson Correlation Matrix (I) – Full Sample 
Variable F
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FAMOWN 1.00 
             
 
  Other BHS -0.30 1.00 
            
 
  STATE -0.03 0.20 1.00 
           
 
  DOMII -0.06 0.38 -0.07 1.00 
          
 
  DOMPUBII -0.06 0.38 -0.06 0.96 1.00 
         
 
  FORGNII -0.11 0.26 0.03 0.01 -0.02 1.00 
        
 
  FORGN -0.04 0.21 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 1.00 
       
 
  AUXFAM -0.24 0.66 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 1.00 
      
 
  Log Sales 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.15 -0.21 1.00 
     
 
  Log Age -0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 -0.13 0.17 1.00 
    
 
  Gearing -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 -0.10 0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.33 0.03 1.00 
   
 
  PrINED -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00 
  
 
  INDP_CHR -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.22 1.00 
 
 
  INDP_ADT -0.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 -0.14 -0.09 0.29 0.07 1.00  
  H_INDP_B -0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.38 0.40 0.40 1.00 
  ROA 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.00 -0.06 0.27 -0.05 -0.25 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 1.00 
 Tobin's Q 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.07 0.22 -0.03 -0.08 0.30 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 0.45 1.00 
Group -0.15 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.10 -0.13 0.27 0.34 0.10 0.17 0.00 -0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.11 (bold figures in the table) are significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 5.11b: Pearson Correlation Matrix (II) - Full sample 
Variable F
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FAMOWN1  1.00 
        
   
FAMOWN2  -0.76 1.00 
       
   
CF/CONT 0.17 0.26 1.00 
      
   
FAMDIR  -0.02 0.17 0.14 1.00 
     
   
CHR_CEO 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.37 1.00 
    
   
FAMONLY  -0.07 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.09 1.00 
   
   
H_INDP_B  -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.20 -0.22 0.01 1.00 
  
   
Lag (ROA)  0.21 -0.09 0.08 0.12 0.06 -0.08 -0.08 1.00 
 
   
Lag (Q) 0.11 -0.13 -0.12 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 0.51 1.00    
BG_S -0.03 0.11 0.17 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 1.00   
BG_PS 0.01 -0.14 -0.58 -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.09 -0.28 1.00  
BG_CS 0.05 0.06 NA -0.05 0.06 0.15 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.12 1.00 
FAMOWN -0.15 0.76 0.42 0.41 0.23 0.19 -0.12 0.14 -0.05 0.02 -0.21 0.07 
STATE 0.09 -0.08 -0.15 -0.06 -0.07 -0.23 0.00 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.12 -0.04 
DOMII -0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.05 -0.30 -0.03 0.10 0.12 -0.05 0.10 -0.06 
DOMPUBII  -0.06 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.05 -0.30 -0.06 0.11 0.12 -0.05 0.12 -0.06 
FORGNII 0.07 -0.14 0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09 0.03 0.06 0.23 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
FORGN  0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 -0.20 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.10 -0.03 
AUXFAM  0.08 -0.18 0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.49 0.01 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 -0.10 -0.12 
Log Sales 0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.03 -0.00 -0.07 0.24 0.27 -0.10 0.32 0.15 
Log Age -0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.03 -0.08 -0.11 0.13 0.19 0.18 
Gearing -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.16 -0.04 -0.08 0.12 0.12 
ROA  0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.14 0.13 -0.11 -0.05 0.66 0.44 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 Q 0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.09 0.41 0.77 -0.04 0.05 0.04 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.11 (bold figures in the table) are significant at p < 0.05 
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Table 5.11c: Pearson Correlation Matrix (III) - Full Sample 
Variable Entropy Herf # Segments DVSF_D PrINED INDP_CHR INDP_ADT 
 
H_INDP_B 
Entropy 1.00 
      
 
Herf -0.98 1.00 
     
 
# Segments 0.80 -0.73 1.00 
    
 
DVSF_D  0.84 -0.86 0.65 1.00 
   
 
PrINED 0.14 -0.14 0.14 0.10 1.00 
  
 
INDP_CHR 0.03 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.22 1.00 
 
 
INDP_ADT 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.29 0.07 1.00  
H_INDP_B 0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.38 0.40 0.40 1.00 
FAMOWN 0.07 -0.08 0.01 0.13 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.12 
STATE -0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 0.00 
DOMII  -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 
DOMPUBII  -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06 
FORGNII  -0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.03 
FORGN  0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
AUXFAM  -0.07 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.01 
CF/CONT  0.17 -0.17 0.12 0.19 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.02 
FAMDIR  -0.08 0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.26 -0.12 -0.10 -0.20 
CHR_CEO  -0.08 0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.56 -0.09 -0.22 
FAMONLY  0.06 -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.01 
Log Sales 0.17 -0.12 0.31 0.11 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
Log Age 0.20 -0.18 0.20 0.15 0.04 -0.01 -0.14 0.03 
Gearing 0.12 -0.12 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 
ROA  -0.14 0.14 -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
Q  -0.07 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 -0.09 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.11 (bold figures in the table) are significant at p < 0.05 
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5.9   Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter reported various descriptive statistics and findings pertaining to the variables 
employed in this study. The variables are grouped into their respective types and the statistics 
for the variables are reported according to the types of variables. These include the firm 
performance, ownership, control variables and other relevant and governance-related 
variables such as board independence, control-enhancing means and firm diversification 
variables. The statistics presented include the mean, median, maximum and minimum values 
and the standard deviation for continuous variables and the number and percentage of 
occurrences for the dummy variables.  
 
Since business group affiliation forms a substantial part of the study, the subsequent section 
presented the findings on the univariate tests of mean difference and median difference of the 
variables between group-affiliated firms and non-group firms. The mean difference is tested 
with the t-test and the median difference with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. Comparing 
and inspecting the differences in the variables between group and non-group firms is among 
the first stages of analysis to comprehend the possible performance outcomes of the variables 
prior to being subjected to the multivariate analysis tests in the next chapter.  
 
The next section presented further analyses of group affiliation by examining the 
heterogeneity of business groups. Two aspects of group heterogeneity are examined: group 
size and group complexity. Descriptive statistics of firm performance and diversification, 
based on various group sizes and group complexities, are examined and comparisons drawn 
with non-group firms.  
 
The final section of the chapter examined and presented the results of the Pearson Correlation 
Matrix for the variables in the study. Examination of correlations between variables is the 
first step to diagnose potential multicollinearity problems prior to the multiple and moderated 
regression analyses performed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 – Findings and Discussions II – Multivariate Analysis  
 
6.1   Chapter Outline  
 
This chapter builds on the initial analysis of the descriptive statistics undertaken in the 
preceding chapter.
81
 The main purpose of this chapter is to present the analyses and findings 
of the study based mainly on the multiple and moderated regressions. Statistical inferences 
from the regression analyses and subsequent discussions are drawn and offered together with 
implications within the context of relevant theories and literature in response to the research 
questions.   
 
Commonly encountered regression problems including normality, multicollinearity and 
heteroscadasticity etc. are diagnosed with a standard statistical process. Detection of 
problems will be addressed and rectified accordingly prior to the regression. In order to 
ensure the presentation of analysis is straightforward and focused, most of the statistical 
tables presented in this chapter report results that are directly related to the hypothesis being 
tested. Additional information on the results is available in Appendix 6 at the end of the 
thesis.       
            
The multiple and moderated regression analyses are carried out in accordance with the 
sequence of the 13 Model Specifications as discussed in Section 4.9 in Chapter 4. 
Specifically, the chapter is organized into sections based on the four main themes of study as 
introduced in Chapter 1. For the ease of comprehension, a „section summary‟ that 
summarizes the main findings from the section is presented at the end of each theme. Again, 
it should be noted that all four major themes in the study (Theme I, II, III and IV) are 
directed towards a common aim: to examine the direct, as well as moderating (indirect), 
influence of ownership structure and underlying firm activities/strategies or practices on the 
performance of family-controlled firms.    
 
                                                          
81
 As such, readers are advised to refer to the descriptive statistics in Chapter 5 before proceeding with the 
multivariate analysis in this chapter.    
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The next section begins with the findings and discussions of Theme I, i.e. the influence of 
ownership structure and associated moderating influence of board independence. Upon 
presenting the summary for the section, the chapter proceeds with the findings and 
discussions of Theme II – business group affiliation and other control-enhancing means – 
and its corresponding section summary. This is then followed by Theme III – profit 
redistribution issues – and its corresponding section summary.  
 
The findings and discussions on the final theme of study, Theme IV (firm diversification-
related issues) are presented in two sections. The first section deals with the association 
between firm diversification, efficiency and performance in group and non-group firms. 
Since large business groups are more likely to be associated with politics/government, the 
effects of group size are also given due attention. The second section deals with the 
associated moderating influence of other governance-related variables such as ownership 
structure and board independence on the diversification-performance link.         
 
The chapter concludes with a section summarizing the main findings (with implications) 
from all four themes of study.  
 
The next section discusses the findings from Theme I.      
 
6.2   Theme I: Influence of Ownership Structure and Board Independence   
Moderating Effects on Firm Performance  
 
The results of the multiple regression for Specification 1
82
 are presented in Tables 6.1a and 
Table 6.1b. Sector dummies are included in all five models in the tables [Model (1) to Model 
(5)] to account for any sector-specific factors that could influence firm performance. 
Heteroscedasticity is diagnosed by the White-test
83
 and any heteroscedasticity problems in 
the regression, the standard errors will be corrected using „White‟s Heteroscedasticity-
consistent Standard Errors‟.  
                                                          
82
 The model specifications are discussed in Section 4.9 in Chapter 4. 
83
 Heteroscedasticity is present when the χ2 statistic of homoscedasticty is rejected at the 5% significant level 
(Griffiths et al., 2011; Gujarati, 2004). The statistical software helps in identifying the significant level.    
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Table 6.1a: Influence of Ownership Structure on ROA   
Explanatory 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FAMOWN  0.054** 0.055** 0.218** 0.219** 
FAMOWN
2
    -0.002* -0.002* 
Other BHS  0.038    
STATE   0.138* 0.133* 0.132* 
DOMII   0.035 0.031  
DOMPUBII     0.021 
FORGNII   0.144* 0.133* 0.134* 
FORGN   -0.006 -0.021 -0.022 
AUXFAM   0.021 0.013 0.012 
Log Sales 2.251*** 2.175*** 2.140*** 2.131*** 2.133*** 
Log Age -0.950** -0.875* -0.884* -0.854* -0.858* 
Gearing -16.121*** -15.643*** -15.756*** -15.984*** -16.038*** 
Sector Effect 
Included 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.258 0.265 0.263 0.266 0.265 
F-statistic 13.080*** 11.234*** 8.430*** 8.079*** 8.067*** 
Observations 314 314 314 314 314 
Table 6.1b: Influence of Ownership Structure on Tobin’s Q   
Explanatory 
Variable  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FAMOWN  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
FAMOWN
2
    0.000  
Other BHS  0.002    
STATE   0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 
DOMII   0.003 0.003  
DOMPUBII     0.002 
FORGNII   0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 
FORGN   -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
AUXFAM   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Log Sales 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 
Log Age -0.006 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
Gearing -0.066 -0.062 -0.056 -0.057 -0.059 
Sector Effect 
Included 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R
2
 0.140 0.138 0.172 0.169 0.170 
F-statistic 6.680*** 5.564*** 5.320*** 4.972*** 5.287*** 
Observations   314 314 314 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.1a and Table 6.1b: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The values 
in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
 
Model (1) is the base model with only control variables included. It shows that the 
accounting-based performance, ROA and market-based performance, Tobin‟s Q, are both 
significantly positively related to firm size, as measured by log sales; thus the larger the firm 
size, the better the firm performance. Firm performance is only significantly negatively 
related to the age of firms and the gearing ratio in terms of ROA. This suggests that younger 
190 
 
firms outperform older firms and firms with higher debt levels underperform firms with 
lower debt. The F-test indicates that the explanatory variables are overall statistically 
significant in explaining firm performance in the model. The adjusted R
2
 in the range of 10% 
to 30% in both the ROA and Q measures is comparable to past studies in similar areas such 
those by Andres (2008) and Charkrabarti et al. (2007).  
 
6.2.1   Controlling Family  
 
Model (2) shows the results of including the controlling family‟s ownership level 
(FAMOWN) and all other types of block-holder (Other BHS) in the analysis. It is observed 
that the FAMOWN coefficient is positive and statistically significant according to the ROA 
performance measure. The coefficient of 0.054 can be interpreted as: an increase of 1% in the 
ownership of controlling families will lead to a 0.054% increase in the ROA, in other words, 
a family-controlled firm with an ownership level of 10% higher will have an improved ROA 
of 0.54%. However, a similar relationship is not significant when firm performance is 
measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
Thus the finding based on ROA supports the idea that the advantages brought about by 
family ownership, namely the „incentive or alignment of interest effect‟ from agency theory, 
as well as the distinct qualities of „personalism‟ and „particularism‟ as suggested by Carney 
(2005) and Poza (2010), are more prevalent than the costs associated with family ownership, 
namely expropriation and entrenchment effects. The finding in this study is also consistent 
with that of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in their study on the positive relationship between the 
combined ownership of the top five shareholders and firm performance in Malaysia. In 
conclusion, Hypothesis (1a) is partially supported in this study as the positive family 
ownership-performance link is found to be significant only by the ROA measure but not the 
Tobin‟s Q measure. The difference in the performance outcome between ROA and Tobin‟s Q 
may reflect that market (as represented by Tobin‟s Q) may have a different perception 
towards family ownership than what is indicated by the accounting measure (ROA).  
As for the „Other BHS‟ variable, though its coefficients in both the ROA and Q measures 
show the correct positive sign as predicted by Hypothesis (1d), it is insignificant. Thus the 
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hypothesis that the combined ownership level of all other types of block-holders in family-
controlled firms positively affects firm performance is not supported. This suggests that by 
combining the ownership level of all block-holders and treating them as a homogenous group 
of block-holders, without differentiating their identity, may not help to explain their effects 
on firm performance, as different types of block-holders have different shareholding 
objectives (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000; Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003).  
 
6.2.2   State Ownership 
 
In Model (3), the block-holders are split into five different types according to their identity in 
order to examine the effect of each type of block-holder on firm performance.  The result 
shows that both the ROA and Q have a significant positive relationship with STATE at the 
10% significant level. This supports (albeit weakly) Hypotheses (1i) that ownership by the 
state in family-controlled firms improves the performance of the firms. State holdings in 
family-controlled firms can be indicative that the state is serious about forming „partnerships‟ 
with controlling families who are seen as more committed in their management of the firm, 
compared to the professional managers of state-controlled firms.   
For instance, in an educational article by the CFA Malaysia
84
 published in the New Straits 
Times (a major local English language newspaper) on the 11 December 2006, the author (an 
industry practitioner) highlights that one of the factors that leads to the success of Far East 
Holding Berhad, one of the good-performing family-controlled firms, is the firm‟s unique 
shareholding structure in which the state government is the second largest shareholder. 
Though the company is linked to the state, it is managed by a family which also acts as the 
largest shareholder. The partnership between the state and the family is mutually beneficial, 
reinforcing each other‟s strengths and compensating for each other‟s weaknesses. From 
resource-based view (RBV), family firms with the state as the major partner have better 
access to government resources and such partnerships also help to remove the inefficiency 
often associated with state-run corporations.     
                                                          
84
 CFA Malaysia is an association of local investment professionals. It is one of the CFA Institute member 
societies.   
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6.2.3   Foreign Institutional Investors’ Ownership 
 
Apart from STATE, firm performance is also significantly positively related to FORGNII by 
both the ROA (at the 10% level) and Tobin‟s Q (at the 5% level) [see Models (3), (4) and 
(5)]. The significant relationship between Tobin‟s Q and FORGNII may imply that foreign 
institutional investors are more concerned about their market returns and thus cherry-pick the 
firms with higher Tobin‟s Q. This vein of argument is provided, for instance, by Douma et al. 
(2006) who find that in India, shareholdings by foreign institutional investors are only related 
to the market-based performance measure and not the accounting-based performance 
measure.  
However, the finding in this study is not fully consistent with Douma‟s et al. (2006) 
argument, as the ROA in this study (besides Tobin‟s Q) is also positively significantly related 
to FORGNII (though at a lower significance level). This may imply that foreign fund 
managers may not only cherry-pick the „winners‟ but, as contended by Young et al. (2008), 
collectively they (with their „pressure-resistant‟ status) could form an important force, able to 
influence and pressurize owner-managers to improve the firm‟s corporate governance and 
transparency in corporate dealings. In essence, the superior monitoring ability of these 
foreign investors is associated with decreased agency costs and thus improved ROA. The 
finding is consistent with McKinsey & Company‟s (2002) global survey that foreign 
institutional investors are willing to pay a 22% premium for a well-governed company in 
Malaysia. Overall, Hypothesis (1g) is supported.  
 
6.2.4   Foreign Corporations’ Ownership 
 
This study does not find any significant relationship between the shareholdings of foreign 
corporations (FORGN) in family-controlled firms and the performance of these firms. Hence, 
Hypothesis (1h) is not supported. Thus there is a lack of evidence to suggest that partnership 
with foreign corporations enhances the performance of family-controlled firms. The reason 
or purpose for foreign corporations to establish joint ventures or become equity partners with 
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local firms varies (Harrigan, 2003) and may not be based on the profitability of the local 
partner per se. For instance, partnership through equity participation could give foreign 
corporations the advantage of accessing scarce resources or raw materials which would 
otherwise be difficult to obtain. In this case, the benefits are afforded to the foreign 
corporation but not the local partner. Partnership with local firms could also be a strategy for 
foreign corporations to penetrate the local market (Harrigan, 2003). This again may benefit 
the foreign corporations but not necessarily the local partner.  
 
6.2.5   Unrelated Family Ownership 
 
No significant relationship is found between the shareholdings of auxiliary/unrelated families 
(AUXFAM) and firm performance in this study. The finding suggests that auxiliary families 
may be merely passive block-holders and do not monitor nor participate in the management 
of the company. Alternatively, their relationship with the controlling families could be rather 
subtle and their influence on firm performance is thus not easily observable. Overall, 
Hypothesis (1j) is not supported. 
 
6.2.6   Domestic Institutional Investors’ Ownership 
 
Findings in this study also show that both domestic institutional investors‟ shareholdings 
(DOMII) and domestic public institutional investors‟ shareholdings (DOMPUBII) are not 
significantly related to firm performance [see Models (3), (4) and (5)]. Therefore, the 
assertion that pressure-resistant groups, such as public institutional investors, are able to exert 
their influence and monitoring capabilities to improve firm performance and shareholders‟ 
value, as argued by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), is not supported by this study. It can be 
contended that monitoring activities and shareholder activism (if any) of public institutional 
investors in Malaysia, including their combined efforts in the Minority Shareholder 
Watchdog Group (MSWG), thus far have not been translated into noticeable improvement in 
the performance of the firms in which they invested. The finding is consistent with Choi and 
Cho‟s (2003) finding in Korea that institutional investor activism is neither harmful nor 
beneficial to firms‟ financial performance.  
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The failure to improve performance by these investors through effective monitoring could be 
related to some of the constraints they faced. For instance, the establishment of PNB is a 
product of the NEP which is related to the government‟s objective of increasing 
Bumiputera‟s ownership and control in corporations. PNB may thus be more inclined 
towards an ethnic-based investment style
85
 and invests in firms which are politically-
connected rather than firms which have good governance and performance.  
Being the largest institutional investors with the most extensive investments in existence in 
Malaysia, the EPF
86
, in contrast, faces a different set of problems in that its massive fund size 
complicates and curtails its investment flexibility in the relatively small capital market of 
Malaysia. Comments by the research head of a securities firm in Malaysia aptly describe the 
dilemma faced by EPF, “…it is no use being the biggest fish in a small pond….When this 
happens, your strategy is very limited and you cannot liquidate easily. It is difficult to get out 
as you always need to be holding the baby. The result is sub-par performance” (The Star, 6 
April 2010). Thus, as far as EPF‟s investment is concerned, it has a limited range of firms to 
choose from. In other words, whether they „like it or not‟, EPF needs to invest in these firms 
and thus „cannot be too particular‟ about the monitoring aspects and performance of these 
firms.
87
         
 
6.2.7   Non-linearity Issue 
 
The square term of FAMOWN is included in Model (4) in the table to examine the potential 
non-linear relationship of FAMOWN and firm performance. The use of the square term to 
measure the non-linear relationship is consistent with past studies such as Andres (2008), 
Mak and Yusnadi (2005), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
The result shows that there exists only weak evidence of a non-linear relationship between 
the controlling family‟s shareholdings (FAMOWN) and ROA. Specifically, the ROA 
improves as FAMOWN increases, up to a level beyond which the relationship is reversed, in 
                                                          
85
 The Malaysian Prime Minister, Najib Razak, announced in July 2009 that the ethnic-based investment laws 
were to be altered to reduce preference being given to the local ethnic Malay elite in the ownership of 
companies (http://xml.wsws.org/articles/2009/jul2009/mala-j24.shtml, accessed 27 April 2011).  
86
 The fund size for EPF was RM260 billion in December 2005, making it one of the largest institutional 
investors in the Asian region.  
87
 EPF is heavily restricted to invest in firms listed in overseas exchanges.  
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which ROA begins to decline with further increases in FAMOWN. The inflection point of 
FAMOWN is found at 50.82% which is computed based on the maximization rule.
88
 
However, no evidence of non-linear relationship is found between FAMOWN and Tobin‟s Q.  
 
The next sub-section examines the moderating effects of board independence on the 
ownership-performance link.        
    
6.2.8   Board Independence Moderating Effect 
 
Tables 6.2a and 6.2b present the results for the moderating influence of board independence 
on the ownership-performance link. Four attributes of board independence (PrINED, 
INDP_CHR, INDP_ADT and H_INDP_B) are used for the purpose. In Model (1), 
interaction term (FAMOWN′ *PrINED) is used to test the moderating effect of PrINED. 
Since the use of interaction term increases the chances of multicollinearity, all regression 
models are first checked for multicollinearity by calculating the VIF. The calculation shows 
that multicollinearity in Model (1) is high with the VIF value exceeding 10.0. Thus the 
variable FAMOWN is replaced by FAMOWN′ which is equal to (FAMOWN - mean value 
of FAMOWN) and PrINED is replaced with PrINED′ which is equal to (PrINED - mean 
value of PrINED).
89
 The recalculation of VIF using these centred variables shows that VIF 
has declined to only 1.23, an acceptable level.
90
  
 
The results for all four models [Model (1) to Model (4)] in the table show that all four 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant for both ROA and Tobin‟s Q measures. Thus it 
can be concluded that overall, board independence does not have any moderating effect on 
the ownership-performance link. Thus Hypothesis (1c) is not supported. 
                                                          
88
 Maximization rule is performed by first taking the differentiation of ROA with respect to FAMOWN 
[d(ROA)/d(FAMOWN) and then the maximum (inflection) point of FAMOWN can be found by equating the 
equation to 0 and solving for FAMOWN.  
89
 „Mean-centring‟ is recommended as a way to alleviate the multicollinearity problem involving interaction 
terms (Aiken and West, 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003).   
90
 VIF=1/ (1-Rj
2
) where Rj
2 
is the coefficient of determination of the „auxiliary regression‟ that includes all the 
explanatory variables except the jth explanatory variable. As a comparison, regressions were first run using the 
original interaction terms (FAMOWN*PrINED) and then re-run using the „centred variables‟ (FAMOWN′ 
*PrINED′) and the results were compared. The results from the comparison shows that the coefficient value of 
the interaction term and its corresponding p-value remain much the same. 
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Table 6.2a: Moderating Influence of Board Independence on ROA   
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FAMOWN′ 0.050 0.048* 0.052** 0.049** 
FAMOWN′ *PrINED′ 0.000    
FAMOWN′ *INDP_CHR  0.022   
FAMOWN′ *INDP_ADT   0.008  
FAMOWN′ *H_INDP_B    0.053 
PrINED′ -5.688*    
INDP_CHR  0.076   
INDP_ADT   -0.591  
H_INDP_B    -0.321 
Adjusted R
2
 0.264 0.258 0.259 0.259 
F-statistic 7.619*** 7.405*** 7.439*** 7.430*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
Table 6.2b: Moderating Influence of Board Independence on Tobin’s Q   
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FAMOWN′ -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAMOWN′ *PrINED′ 0.004    
FAMOWN′ *INDP_CHR  0.001   
FAMOWN′ *INDP_ADT   -0.001  
FAMOWN′ *H_INDP_B    -0.002 
PrINED′ -0.175    
INDP_CHR  -0.001   
INDP_ADT   -0.054  
H_INDP_B    -0.119** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.170 0.166 0.172 0.174 
F-statistic 4.765*** 4.673*** 4.830*** 4.873*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.2a and Table 6.2b:  
1.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
2.  The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
3.  All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression 
(not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the regression is available in 
Appendix 6. 
 
The findings complement the prior study by Zunaidah and Fauzias (2008) in Malaysia who 
investigate the moderating effects of board duality, board independence and board size on the 
effects of three types of ownership (government, foreign and managerial) on firm value. 
Overall, the findings in this study are consistent with Zunaidah and Fauzias (2008), who also 
report a statistically insignificant moderating effect of board independence on the effects of 
government, foreign, and managerial ownerships respectively on firm value.  
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The insignificant role of the above four attributes of board independence in moderating the 
effects of ownership on firm performance renders dubious the independent status and 
capacity of independent directors.
91
 Specifically, many scholars and practitioners have been 
questioning whether independent directors, especially in the emerging economies, are truly 
independent and capable of monitoring controlling shareholders.  
For instance, the professional body for investment professionals, the CFA Institute, admits 
that the lack of truly independent directors on corporate boards is a major issue throughout 
Asia and they elaborate that “(t)his problem originates in the substantial power a controlling 
shareholder has to influence director nomination and appointment” (CFA Institute, 2010, 
p.5). The fact that some independent directors have been serving for over three decades, as is 
the case with about 20 listed firms in Malaysia, is seen as a governance issue as “the risk that 
independence may be undermined by long tenure cannot be disregarded,” as noted by the 
Securities Commission Malaysia in its Capital Market Masterplan 2 (The Star, 18 June 2011). 
Moreover, since most of the controlling families in Malaysia also occupy at least one of the 
two senior positions in their firms (CEO or board chairmanship), an independent director will 
be “completely at the will of the owner and has no effective way to override (the family‟s) 
decisions” (Kennon, 2004, p.2).  
 
6.3   Summary on Theme I  
 
The main findings thus far from Theme I of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 
 The extent of controlling families‟ ownership positively influences firm performance 
(ROA) at least up to the point where the controlling families begin to attain a majority 
ownership level (50%). The finding implies that the benefits of family ownership 
outweigh the principal-principal problems associated with family ownership. 
 
                                                          
91
 Policy implications based on this issue are discussed in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7. 
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 There is mild evidence to suggest that excessive family ownership (and thus control) 
is detrimental to firm performance (ROA). Specifically, ownership is considered as 
excessive when families obtain majority ownership control.    
 
 There is a positive relationship between the extent of state ownership in family-
controlled firms and firm performance. Greater state ownership improves the 
performance of family-controlled firms.  
 
 The extent of foreign institutional investors‟ ownership in family-controlled firms is 
also found to positively influence firm performance. However, the ownership of 
foreign corporations is found to be unrelated to firms‟ performance. 
 
 Ownership by domestic institutional investors including its subset ownership, the 
domestic public institutional investors‟ ownership in family-controlled firms is 
unrelated to firm performance. This finding may imply limited ability and effort on 
the part of domestic institutional investors in Malaysia, as well as constraints faced by 
them, to exert effective monitoring to reduce the principal-principal related agency 
costs and improve firm performance. 
        
 All four different attributes of board independence, namely proportion of independent 
directors, independent board chairmen, a fully independent audit committee and a 
„highly independent board‟ are found to be insignificant in influencing the family 
ownership-performance relationship. This finding may have an implication on the 
issue of truly independent directors in Malaysia.         
 
The next section examines the second theme of the study – the influence of family-controlled 
business groups and other control-enhancing means.   
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6.4   Theme II: Influence of Business Group Affiliation and Other Control-
enhancing Means on Firm Performance  
 
6.4.1   Influence of Business Group Affiliation 
 
In order to discover whether group-affiliated firms outperform or underperform their non-
group counterparts, Specification 3 is estimated and the findings are presented in Tables 6.3a 
and 6.3b.  
Three different regression models [Model (1) to Model (3)] are presented in each table to 
accommodate different configurations of variables. In Model (1), the regression is estimated 
without including the ownership variables. A similar model but consists of ownership 
variables is presented in Model (2).  
Both Models (1) and (2) of Table 6.3a show that group-affiliated firms significantly 
underperform non-group firms when performance is measured by ROA. The estimated 
negative coefficients for group-affiliated firms suggest that the ROA for these firms on 
average is 1.9% to 2.0% lower than their non-group counterparts.  
The lower performance of group-affiliated firms found in this study is consistent with the 
findings by Joh (2003) with data from the period 1993-1997 in Korea and George and Kabir 
(2008) with data from 2000 in India (studies with the „new data‟) but is in contradiction to 
the findings by Chang and Choi (1988) with data from the period 1975-1984 in Korea and 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) with data from 1993 in India (studies with the „old data‟), who 
find that group-affiliated firms outperform non-group firms. Following Chang (2006) and 
Peng et al. (2005), a possible interpretation of such an observation is as follows:   
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      Table 6.3a: Influence of Business Group Affiliation and Group Size on ROA  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
FAMOWN  0.045** 0.046** 
Group -1.992** -1.911**  
GR_A   -1.358 
GR_B   -1.752 
GR_C   -3.024** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.271 0.274 0.273 
F-statistic 12.625*** 8.380*** 7.538*** 
Observations 314 314 314 
      Table 6.3b: Influence of Business Group Affiliation and Group Size on Tobin’s Q  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
FAMOWN  0.000 0.000 
Group -0.039 -0.047  
GR_A   -0.097** 
GR_B   -0.021 
GR_C   0.003 
Adjusted R
2
 0.141 0.173 0.176 
F-statistic 6.119*** 5.093*** 4.708*** 
Observations  314 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.3a and Table 6.3b:  
1.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
2.  The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
3. Model (1) does not include any ownership variables. Models (2) and (3) include all ownership variables.  
Control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above). A similar table but 
one which contains all variables used in the regression is available in Appendix 6.  
 
The time lapse between the data used in Joh (2003) and Chang and Choi (1988) for Korea is 
roughly 10 years and in George and Kabir (2008) and Khanna and Palepu (2000a) for India is 
roughly seven years. Thus the findings in this study that are consistent with the „new data‟ 
studies but which contradict the „old data‟ studies (as elaborated in sub-section 3.3.1 in 
Chapter 3) may suggest that Malaysia‟s external markets, including its capital market, have 
progressed and are already operating at a relatively more efficient and developed stage and as 
such the roles of the „internal markets‟ of business groups may have shrunk and their 
advantages dissipated. This is especially so when a country such as Malaysia is in the midst 
of undergoing a liberalization and globalization process. The relatively more developed 
capital market in Malaysia compared to many other emerging economies is acknowledged by 
authors such as Singh and Zainal (2005) and Claessens et al. (2000).  
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In short, the findings based on ROA do not support the „institutional voids hypothesis‟92 but 
are instead more inclined towards supporting the „conflict of interests and expropriation‟ 
hypothesis. The findings suggest that intra-group transactions among affiliates of business 
groups may be inefficient and group affiliates may be subject to higher degrees of 
expropriation by controlling families. The Tobin‟s Q of group-affiliated firms is also lower 
than non-group firms (though statistically insignificant) as shown by the negative coefficients 
of the „group‟ variable in Models (1) and (2) in Table 6.3b. 
 
6.4.2   Influence of Group Size 
 
In order to discover the effects of group size on firm performance, group-affiliated firms are 
categorized into three sub-groups in Model (3) based on the size of business groups: small 
(GR_A), intermediate (GR_B) and large (GR_C). Based on the ROA, the findings show that 
firms in all three sizes of business group underperform the non-group firms as shown by their 
negative coefficients. Their respective ROAs are found to be 1.36%, 1.75% and 3.02% lower 
than in non-group firms. It shows that the larger the business group, the lower the ROA of 
the affiliated firms. Nonetheless, only the coefficient of GR_C is statistically significant.  
The findings suggest that firms affiliated to large business groups have the worst 
performance of all. The findings are consistent with Joh (2003) but they are opposed to 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) who find that firms affiliated to large business groups 
outperform firms affiliated to small and medium size business groups, and George and Kabir 
(2008) who do not find any difference in the performance of firms belonging to different 
group sizes.  
From the findings in this study, it could therefore be interpreted that affiliates belonging to 
large business groups in Malaysia may be more likely to succumb to the „governance 
problems‟ of business groups, with firm performance suffering as a result. For instance, large 
business groups may be subject to a greater lack of transparency in their business deals and 
                                                          
92
 „Institutional voids‟ give rise to economic advantages for internal markets of business groups when the 
external markets are relatively more underdeveloped. See Section 3.3 in Chapter 3 for more explanation of 
business groups‟ internal markets.   
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transactions. The greater and enhanced power gained by controlling families from controlling 
the larger business group, such as greater accessibility to more resources and political 
connections, may not be utilized by the families for the benefits of the affiliated firms or the 
minority shareholders. Instead, the business group may be „exploited‟ by the controlling 
family to facilitate their private or family-interested agendas which may not necessarily be 
profit-maximization oriented but will instead serve other purposes such as empire building 
and tunnelling-related activities. This includes unjust related party transactions (Cheung et al., 
2006, 2009a, 2009b) as well as other unethical transactions (Young et al., 2008) which may 
be linked to politicians.    
Meanwhile, only firms affiliated to GR_A are found by Tobin‟s Q to significantly 
underperform. Specifically, firms affiliated to GR_A are valued at a discount of 11.1% 
compared to non-group firms (calculated as the coefficient value of 0.097 divided by 0.87, 
the sample mean of Tobin‟s Q). The finding may be interpreted as follows: as far as the 
market is concerned, firms in small business groups may inherit the „worst of both worlds‟ – 
where affiliation to a business group is perceived by the market as being more prone to the 
controlling family‟s resource and wealth expropriation activities compared to non-group 
firms as “controlling shareholders have more tools to divert firm resources through the 
transfer of assets from one subsidiary to another” (Joh, 2003, p.288) and; being a small 
business group is perceived as inadequate in creating a feasible structure for the proper 
functioning of internal markets. Small business groups may also lack the political 
connections to be „eligible‟ for preferential treatment and privileges. 
 
6.4.3   Influence of Control-enhancing Means 
 
The findings on the influence of control-enhancing means on ROA and Tobin‟s Q are 
presented in Tables 6.4a and 6.4b respectively.  
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Table 6.4a: Influence of Control-enhancing Means on ROA  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
FAMOWN 0.053** 0.053** 0.019 0.040* 0.045** 0.041* 
CF/CONT 1.528      
CF/CONT_DUM  -0.624     
FAMDIR    5.699***    
CHR_CEO     0.784   
FAMONLY      -2.020**  
BG_S      -1.484* 
BG_PS      -2.224*** 
BG_CS      -1.925 
Group   -1.649** -1.806** -1.843**  
Adjusted R
2
 0.253 0.253 0.291 0.274 0.279 0.270 
F-statistic 7.385*** 7.385*** 8.546*** 7.952*** 8.142*** 7.432*** 
Observations  303 303 314 314 314 314 
Table 6.4b: Influence of Control-enhancing Means on Tobin’s Q  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FAMOWN 0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
CF/CONT -0.254      
CF/CONT_DUM  0.076     
FAMDIR    0.173*    
CHR_CEO     0.006   
FAMONLY      -0.035  
BG_S      -0.037 
BG_PS      -0.057 
BG_CS      -0.023 
Group   -0.039 -0.047 -0.046  
Adjusted R
2
 0.165 0.160 0.179 0.170 0.171 0.168 
F-statistic 4.727*** 4.596*** 5.019*** 4.780*** 4.809*** 4.512*** 
Observations  303 303 314 314 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.4a and Table 6.4b:  
1.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
2.  The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
3.  All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression 
(not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the regression is available in 
Appendix 6. 
 
6.4.3.1   Divergence of Cash Flow-to-Control Rights 
The influence of the divergence of cash flow-to-control rights (CF/CONT) and its dummy 
variable (CF/CONT_DUM) on firm performance is shown in Models (1) and (2). The 
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coefficients in both Models (1) and (2) show that ROA are negatively affected by the 
divergence of cash flow-to-control rights, though the evidence lacks statistical support.
93
  
Meanwhile, Tobin‟s Q is found to be unrelated to the divergence of cash flow-to-control 
rights. This finding is consistent with Andres (2008) who also finds an insignificant 
relationship between the cash flow-to-control rights disparity and Tobin‟s Q for German 
firms, and Zuaini and Napier (2006) who find an insignificant relationship between the cash 
flow-to-control rights ratio and a firm‟s excess value. The finding in this study however 
contrasts with Claessens et al. (2002) who show that firms with a lower cash flow-to-control 
rights ratio have lower market value in East Asian countries.  
6.4.3.2   Family Directors on Board 
The influence of „proportion of family directors on Board‟ (FAMDIR) as a control-enhancing 
means is examined in Model (3). The results show that FAMDIR positively affects firm 
performance in both ROA and Tobin‟s Q. Hypothesis (2e) is thus supported. This suggests 
that the higher the proportion of family directors on the board, the higher the performance of 
the firm. This contradicts the findings by Prabowo and Simpson (2011).  
The finding in this study thus implies that the call to increase the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors (INED) in Malaysian family-controlled firms should be carefully 
considered before proceeding with the idea. It should be noted that an increase in the 
proportion of INED on the board indicates a direct decrease in the proportion of family 
directors.
94
 The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance‟s (MCCG) current requirement, 
and the listing requirement to have at least one-third of the board consist of INED may be 
sufficient currently and any call to increase the proportion to one-half, as practiced by some 
Anglo-Saxon nations such as the US, the UK and Australia, should be examined with 
prudence. In other words, more studies need to be carried out before any conclusions can be 
drawn regarding the debate on the correct proportion of independent directors. Moreover, the 
                                                          
93
 The lack of statistical evidence could be caused by the exclusion of the 11 firms with an indeterminate cash 
flow-to-control rights ratio as explained in Chapter 4.  
94
 This is because family directors are non-independent.  
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readiness of a country to have more independent directors in firms is also an issue for 
discussion as highlighted in the paragraph below.       
As far as the „market for independent directors‟ is concerned, Malaysia is at a different stage 
of development compared to the US and the UK. The market for independent directors in 
Malaysia is rather small and confined to mostly retired politicians, retired senior government 
officials, retired army personnel, police and members of the royal family
95
, compared to the 
US where the boards of many listed firms in the New York Stock Exchange are studded with 
business/corporate leaders such as finance and investment wizards, dons of leading 
universities, successful businessmen and current CEOs of other listed companies. Thus it is 
suggested that more training opportunities are needed for independent directors in Malaysia 
in order to increase the supply of „credible‟ independent directors in the future, to prepare for 
increases in the proportion of independent directors on company boards. Simply increasing 
the number for the sake of greater proportion is ineffective in Malaysia currently as this is 
likely to lead to compliance in „form‟ but not in „substance‟ of good governance.      
Thus the concern in Malaysia is more about the quality
96
 of independent directors than the 
quantity. The finding suggests that as far as the prevalence of family directors is concerned, 
this control-enhancing means is not necessarily a bad thing. By concentrating board control 
and equity ownership, family members will have the will (incentive/commitment), ability 
(decision making) and large capacity (voting rights) to achieve, through which their 
„personalism‟ and „particularism‟ qualities will be fully realized.      
 
6.4.3.3   Family (i) Occupying Board Chairmanship and CEO Positions, (ii) Acting as Sole  
Block-holder  
Control-enhancing means from the perspectives of power concentration and ownership 
concentration is examined in Model (4) and Model (5) respectively. Power concentration is 
achieved if family members serve in the two most senior corporate positions, namely Board 
                                                          
95
 Compared to one royal house in most countries with a monarchy system, Malaysia has nine royal houses 
from the nine Malay states of Malaysia. Many members of these royal families are involved in businesses and 
company boards of directors.     
96
 See, for instance, Gallo (2005) for a discussion on the issue of the quality of independent directors.  
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Chair and CEO (CHR_CEO), whereas ownership concentration is enhanced if no other 
block-holders are present in the firm besides the controlling family (FAMONLY). The 
findings show that the coefficient of CHR_CEO is statistically insignificant. Thus there is no 
evidence to suggest that the power concentration achieved by the controlling family 
occupying the highest positions has a detrimental effect on firm performance.   
In contrast, both ROA and Tobin‟s Q are found to be negatively related to FAMONLY. 
However, the relationship is only significant in ROA (at the 5% level).
97
 The coefficient 
shows that ROA is 2.02% lower in family firms without the presence of a second block-
holder. The finding is thus consistent with the explanation posed by Claessens et al. (2000) 
that a 10% ownership by the second block-holder is adequate to undermine controlling 
families‟ control over their firms, potentially causing more caution in their business decisions 
and policies.   
6.4.3.4   Complexity of Business Group Structure  
Findings related to the complexity of group structures are presented in Model (6). The overall 
finding shows that all three variables of group structure complexity (BG_S, BG_PS and 
BG_CS) have negative coefficients as expected in both the ROA and Tobin‟s Q measures. 
However, only the BG_S and BG_PS coefficients are statistically significant according to the 
ROA measure. The coefficient for BG_CS is statistically insignificant. Although there is a 
lack of statistical evidence of direct influence of BG_CS on firm performance, performance-
reducing expropriation activities can still occur in this type of group structure through its 
influence on other aspects of firm activities such as diversification. This is to be examined in 
the subsequent section.           
The overall observation of the different types of family control-enhancing means from Model 
(1) to Model (6) suggests that all have very different influences on firm performance in terms 
of the direction and magnitude of influence. It also infers that not all control-enhancing 
means are harmful to firm performance.  
                                                          
97
 Model (5) is also re-run (not reported) without the inclusion of the ownership variables of the non-largest 
block-holders. The coefficient of FAMONLY remains significant at the 5% level. 
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6.5   Summary on Theme II  
 
The main findings thus far from Theme II of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Firms affiliated to family-controlled business groups underperform (in ROA) 
unaffiliated or non-group family-controlled firms. The finding illuminates the more 
serious principal-principal agency problems in business groups that outweigh the 
diminished benefits of their internal markets (as the external capital market in 
Malaysia progresses and is deemed more advanced than many other emerging 
economies).  
 
 In terms of group sizes, firms affiliated to large business groups have the poorest 
performance (in ROA) than all other firms in the sample. The finding suggests that 
large business groups may be subject to the greatest amount of governance problems 
that reduce firm performance, including a greater lack of transparency in business 
deals that facilitate expropriation activities such as „tunnelling‟. The closer 
connection of large business groups to politics and political interference may lead to 
the „selective imposition of rules and regulations‟ that shields controlling families 
from facing the consequences of any unethical or illegal business activities.        
 
 The proportion of family directors on a company board is found to positively 
influence the performance of family-controlled firms. This finding may have an 
implication for the debate on the correct proportion of independent directors on a 
board, particularly in Malaysia where the commitment and contributions of family 
directors may well be greater than those of a less true, less qualified independent 
director.     
 
 More training is thus needed to improve the quality of independent directors 
including the quality of true independence so that the „market for credible 
independent directors‟ will expand and the country will be better prepared to increase 
the proportion of independent directors. 
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 The performance of family-controlled firms deteriorates in firms where the 
controlling families act as the sole block-holder (with no presence of a second block-
holder). This finding implies that a second block-holder may be able to alleviate the 
principal-principal agency problems in family-controlled firms and thus improve firm 
performance.  
      
The next section examines the theme of issues related to profit redistribution in business 
groups.   
 
6.6 Theme III: Issues on Profit/Resource Redistribution and Firm 
Performance 
 
The findings on the effects of profit redistribution in group-affiliated firms are presented in 
Table 6.5a. As asserted by Lincoln et al. (1996, 2004), profit redistribution is facilitated by 
the extent or strength of family control. In Models (1) and (4), the strength of family control 
is proxied by the controlling family‟s ownership level (FAMOWN). FAMOWN′, which 
equals to (FAMOWN - mean value of FAMOWN), is used in substitution of FAMOWN to 
alleviate the multicollinearity problem.  
It is observed that the coefficients of the interaction terms in Model (1) and Model (4) are 
insignificant. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that „family ownership‟ is used to facilitate 
the redistribution of profits in business groups.  
 
The divergence of cash flow-to-control rights can enhance a family‟s control over its firms 
(Andres, 2008) and greater divergence of cash flow-to-control rights is associated with 
stronger incentives to expropriate (Bertrand et al., 2002). In Model (2) and Model (5), the 
strength of family control is proxied by such divergence (CF/CONT). Similarly, as in the 
case of FAMOWN, multicollinearity is substantially reduced to an acceptable level by 
employing CF/CONT′ which equals to (CF/CONT - mean value of CF/CONT).98   
                                                          
98
 For comparison, regression is run with CF/CONT and re-run with CF/CONT‟. It is found that the significant 
level of the interaction term remains unaffected.    
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Table 6.5a: Profit Redistribution Effects and Firm Performance 
Explanatory Variable  (1) ROA (2) ROA  (3) ROA (4) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(5) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(6) 
Tobin‟s Q 
Lag (ROA) 0.371*** 0.389*** 0.332***    
Lag (Q)    0.455*** 0.468*** 0.529*** 
FAMOWN′ 0.007 0.040 0.043 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
FAMOWN′ * Lag (ROA) 0.003      
FAMOWN′ * Lag (Q)    0.004   
CF/CONT′  1.421   -0.647***  
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)  -0.232     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)     0.468***  
CF/CONT_DUM   -1.023   0.268*** 
CF/CONT_DUM* Lag 
(ROA) 
  0.166    
CF/CONT_DUM* Lag 
(Q) 
     -0.222*** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.427 0.417 0.423 0.624 0.642 0.643 
F-statistic 7.614*** 6.563*** 6.703*** 15.770*** 14.967*** 15.006*** 
Observations  152 141 141 152 141 141 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6.  
 
It is observed that the interaction term in Model (2) is statistically insignificant but that the 
interaction term in Model (5) is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding infers 
that a group affiliate with greater (poorer) Tobin‟s Q in one year experiences a decline (an 
increase) in Tobin‟s Q in the following year. Specifically, when the divergence of cash flow-
to-control rights increases; the more likely a decline (which is statistically significant) in 
Tobin‟s Q will occur in the case of firms with previous higher Tobin‟s Q and the more likely 
an improvement (which is statistically significant) in Tobin‟s Q will occur in the case of 
firms with previously lower Tobin‟s Q.  
The significant finding of profit redistribution with Tobin‟s Q which is insignificant with 
ROA does not come as a total surprise. As it was already been reported in Chapter 5 (see 
Appendix 5a), the correlation between both performance measures is only 0.42 for the sub-
sample of group-affiliated firms. Both measures are thus not closely correlated. As Tobin‟s Q 
depends on market perception (and also market sentiment) of what the management of a firm 
is capable of doing in the coming years (which in turn depends on factors such as 
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macroeconomic outlook), it is therefore distinguishable from ROA which is solely based on 
the earnings generated from past firm activities and market condition. The failure of ROA to 
capture profit redistribution might also be due to the practice of „earnings management‟ to 
mask the effect of such redistribution.   
Based on the theoretical models of Lincoln et al. (1996) and Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002), 
the above finding is considered consistent with evidence of profit redistribution from good-
performing affiliates to poor-performing affiliates. Adopting the explanation put forward by 
Bertrand et al. (2002), the finding indicates that the market, to some extent, recognizes and 
„prices in‟ the practice of profit/resources redistribution. In other words, even though ROA 
failed to reflect the practice of profit redistribution in this study, the market (i.e. Tobin‟s Q) 
may still be aware (and probably has long been aware) of such practice of tunnelling out of 
resources from good performing firms and transferring them to (prop up) weak performing 
firms. In this case, the awareness and anticipation of the market toward profit redistribution 
may not be necessarily formed or created based on the reported accounting figures but 
instead on the market‟s ability to recognize profit redistribution which may be learned from 
experience, anecdotal evidence or dissemination of information through media.
99
 Ultimately, 
firms with good (poor) previous performance that have more resources/profit tunnelled out 
(tunnelled in) are valued less (more) by the market in the current period. The finding is 
overall consistent with the „tunnelling and propping‟ hypothesis suggested in the literature 
(Friedman et al., 2003; Cheung et al., 2009b).     
The above finding remains qualitatively similar when the variable CF/CONT is substituted 
with a dummy variable (CF/CONT_DUM). It suggests that in firms that are associated with 
divergence of cash flow-to-control rights (dummy value is 1), a decline in Tobin‟s Q will be 
observed in the case of firms with previously higher Tobin‟s Q, while an improvement in 
Tobin‟s Q will be observed in firms with previously lower Tobin‟s Q. The use of a dummy 
variable (CF/CONT_DUM) in this case is comparable to the use of the business group 
dummy variable in Estrin‟s et al. (2009) model. The finding is consistent with Estrin et al. 
                                                          
99
 The Genting‟s case as highlighted in sub-section 1.3.2 is an example of such public awareness (as 
spearheaded by the MSWG) of the potential profit redistribution.  
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(2009) who also obtain a statistically significant result for profit redistribution in business 
groups in Russia. 
        
6.6.1   Group Size Effect and Family Ownership Effect 
 
Tables 6.5b and 6.5c present further findings on the issue of profit redistribution by 
examining the relationship between different sizes of business group and profit redistribution. 
Models (1) to (3) utilize FAMOWN as the measure of family control whereas Models (4) to 
(6) and Models (7) to (9) use CF/CONT and the dummy of CF/CONT respectively to 
measure enhanced family control.   
Key interest lies in the interaction terms in each of the nine models in the tables.
100
 The 
results show that the interaction terms in all nine models are statistically insignificant based 
on the ROA measure. However, the interaction terms involving the large group size (GR_C) 
are statistically significant based on Tobin‟s Q [see Models (3), (6) and (9)]. Thus, the 
findings from the three models imply that a greater strength of family control, as proxied by 
the FAMOWN and CF/CONT variables, facilitates profit redistribution in large business 
groups. The finding that large business groups are more inclined towards profit redistribution 
is consistent with George and Kabir (2008) who find similar results. Overall, with the 
significant findings in Tobin‟s Q but not in ROA, Hypothesis (3b) is partially supported.    
As earlier findings evidence that large business groups (GR_C) are involved in profit 
redistribution, it is thus important to examine whether such profit redistribution in large 
business groups is associated with different strengths in family control. For this purpose, 
family ownership (FAMOWN) is split into two variables: FAMOWN1 (family ownership 
below 50%) and FAMOWN2 (family ownership of 50% and above) as shown in Table 
6.5d.
101
  
 
 
                                                          
100
 The models in the tables were estimated without the inclusion of the ownership variables of the non-largest 
block-holders (STATE, FORGNII etc.). As a robustness test, the regressions were re-run with the complete set 
of ownership variables included. The results remained qualitatively similar and thus were not presented. 
101
 Piecewise method as per Morck et al. (1988) is used in grouping FAMOWN1 and FAMOWN2.   
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Table 6.5b: Profit Redistribution and ROA – Group Size Effect  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lag (ROA) 0.365*** 0.401*** 0.312*** 0.414*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.413*** 0.385*** 
FAMOWN 0.036 0.045* 0.033 0.056** 0.056** 0.055** 0.054** 0.056** 0.056** 
CF/CONT′    -1.429 -2.937 -2.006    
CF/CONT_DUM       0.682 1.350 0.762 
GR_A 1.077 1.238  1.528 1.454  1.083 1.494  
GR_B 1.669 2.710* 0.353 2.003* 2.050* 0.641 2.006* 2.307* 0.630 
GR_C   -2.788*   -1.420   -1.898 
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_A 0.000         
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_B  -0.003        
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_C   0.004       
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_A    -0.407      
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_B     0.175     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_C      -0.094    
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_A       0.118   
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_B        -0.084  
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_C         0.116 
Adjusted R
2
 0.436 0.440 0.445 0.431 0.428 0.427 0.431 0.430 0.433 
F-statistic 9.324*** 9.475*** 9.637*** 8.070*** 7.985*** 7.969*** 8.063*** 8.036*** 8.113*** 
Observations  152 152 152 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. Control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6. 
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Table 6.5c: Profit Redistribution and Tobin’s Q – Group Size Effect  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lag (Q) 0.399*** 0.452*** 0.477*** 0.448*** 0.473*** 0.494*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 0.500*** 
FAMOWN -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 
CF/CONT′    -0.155 0.084 -0.265    
CF/CONT_DUM       0.045 -0.019 0.085* 
GR_A -0.165** -0.025  -0.012 -0.021  0.004 -0.019  
GR_B 0.036 0.063 0.072* 0.071 0.063 0.066* 0.071 0.021 0.070* 
GR_C   0.156*   0.031   0.084* 
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_A 0.004         
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_B  0.000        
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_C   -0.003**       
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_A    0.183      
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_B     -0.372     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_C      0.374***    
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_A       -0.044   
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_B        0.132  
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_C         -0.143*** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.639 0.619 0.629 0.622 0.639 0.653 0.617 0.630 0.645 
F-statistic 20.116*** 18.524*** 19.272*** 16.335*** 17.529*** 18.552*** 16.066*** 16.864*** 17.921*** 
Observations  152 152 152 141 141 141 141 141 141 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. Control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regressions is available in Appendix 6 
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The findings show that only the interaction terms associated with FAMOWN2 [see Model (2) 
and Model (4) in Table 6.5d] are statistically significant. The negative coefficients indicate 
that firms with good (poor) previous performance experience a decline (an improvement) in 
their performance the following year. The interaction terms associated with FAMOWN1 
[Model (1) and Model (3)] are statistically insignificant. This observation suggests that the 
occurrence of profit redistribution is prevalent in firms that are members of large business 
groups (GR_C) where the controlling families have outright (majority) control of firms. The 
finding is in line with Anderson and Reeb‟s (2003, p.1324) argument that the potential for 
entrenchment is the greatest “when families have the greatest control of the firm”. Overall, 
the finding is consistent with Hypothesis (3b) that greater strength of family control 
facilitates profit redistribution.      
 
           Table 6.5d: Profit Redistribution– Large Group Size and Family Ownership  
Classification Effects  
Explanatory Variable  (1) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(2) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(3) 
Tobin‟s Q 
(4) 
Tobin‟s Q 
Lag (Q) 0.450*** 0.437*** 0.456*** 0.434*** 
FAMOWN1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAMOWN2 0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.001 
GR_B 0.077* 0.078** 0.063 0.066* 
GR_C 0.030 0.062 0.036 0.052 
FAMOWN1*Lag(Q)*GR_C 0.000  -0.001  
FAMOWN2*Lag(Q)*GR_C  -0.003**  -0.003** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.617 0.627 0.617 0.626 
F-statistic 17.226*** 17.887*** 13.186*** 13.616*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. Models (1) and (2) exclude „other types of block-holders‟ variables. Models (3) and (4) 
include all „other types of block-holders‟ variables. Control variables and sector effects are 
included in all regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all 
variables used in the regression is available in Appendix 6. 
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6.6.2 Efficiency of Profit/Resource Redistribution and Board Independence 
Moderating Effect 
 
6.6.2.1   Firm Efficiency Issue 
Findings on the efficiency of profit redistribution are presented in Table 6.6a. The 
comparison of the CAPEX Ratio between group and non-group firms shows that the mean 
values of CAPEX Ratio for group-affiliated firms with „high‟ and „low‟ ROA (Tobin‟s Q) 
are 5.71% (5.64%) and 4.57% (4.64%) respectively. The mean difference is statistically 
insignificant in both performance measures. In contrast, the equivalent mean values for the 
non-group firms with „high‟ and „low‟ ROA (Tobin‟s Q) are 7.11% (8.47%) and 5.05% 
(3.69%) respectively. The mean difference is statistically significant in both performance 
measures.  
 
    Table 6.6a: Firm Performance and Capital Expenditure Ratio – Comparison 
Between Group and Non-group Firms 
 Group Firms Non-Group Firms 
Firm Performance: ROA  Number 
of firms  
Mean 
ROA 
CAPEX 
Ratio: 
Mean 
value  
Number 
of firms 
Mean 
ROA 
CAPEX 
Ratio: 
Mean 
value 
Firms with High ROA  76 14.13% 5.71% 81 15.59% 7.11% 
Firms with Low ROA 75 3.79% 4.57% 81 3.89% 5.05% 
p-value  
(mean difference between 
high and  low performing 
firms) 
  0.157   0.036** 
Firm Performance: Tobin‟s 
Q  
      
       
Firms with High Q  76 1.069 5.64% 81 1.056 8.47% 
Firms with Low Q 75 0.619 4.64% 81 0.594 3.69% 
p-value  
(mean difference between 
high and low performing 
firms) 
  0.187   0.000*** 
        Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
                  2. CAPEX Ratio = Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 
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It can thus be interpreted that the lack of significant difference in the CAPEX Ratio between 
the high-performance and the low-performance group-affiliated firms suggests considerable 
inefficiency in the allocation of resources in group-affiliated firms. The finding thus justifies 
and complements the earlier finding of underperformance of group-affiliated firms. 
Specifically, the underperformance of group-affiliated firms can be partly explained by the 
inefficient redistribution of resources from the more deserving (high-performing) affiliates to 
the less deserving (low-performing) affiliates.  The finding thus supports Hypothesis (3c). 
 
6.6.2.2   Board Independence Moderating Effect 
The findings on the influence of board independence on the CAPEX Ratio of high 
performance and low performance firms in group-affiliated firms are shown in Table 6.6b. 
Three attributes of board independence are examined, namely proportion of independent 
directors (PrINED), independent chairman (INDP_CHR) and all independent audit 
committee members (INDP_ADT). The results are presented in three separate panels (Panels 
A, B and C) in the table.  
 
In Panel A, the mean of CAPEX Ratio in firms with „high‟ performance (High ROA as well 
as High Q) is statistically significantly (at the 5% level for ROA and the 10% level for 
Tobin‟s Q) higher than the mean of CAPEX Ratio in the firms with „low‟ performance (Low 
ROA as well as Low Q) in the firms associated with a high proportion of independent 
directors (50% and above) (shaded in the table). In comparison, no such significant 
difference is found in firms associated with low proportion of independent directors (below 
50%).      
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Table 6.6b: Firm Performance and Capital Expenditure Ratio in Group-affiliated 
Firms– Board Independence Moderating Influence  
Panel A: Proportion of Independent Director  
 50%  and above Below 50% 
 Number of 
firms  
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value  
Number of 
firms 
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value 
Firms with High ROA  32 6.99% 43 4.76% 
Firms with Low ROA 32 2.70% 44 5.94% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and  
low performing firms) 
 0.016**  0.414 
     
Firms with High Q  34 6.46% 41 4.97% 
Firms with Low Q 30 3.01% 46 5.70% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and 
low performing firms) 
 0.054*  0.611 
Panel B: Independent Chairman  
 Yes No 
 Number of 
firms  
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value  
Number of 
firms 
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value 
Firms with High ROA  23 5.37% 52 5.86% 
Firms with Low ROA 24 5.97% 52 3.93% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and  
low performing firms) 
 0.769  0.158 
     
Firms with High Q  25 5.83% 50 5.55% 
Firms with Low Q 22 5.50% 54 4.29% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and 
low performing firms) 
 0.869  0.357 
Panel C: Independent Audit Committees  
 Yes No 
 Number of 
firms  
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value  
Number of 
firms 
CAPEX Ratio: 
Mean value 
Firms with High ROA  20 4.59% 55 6.12% 
Firms with Low ROA 18 5.65% 58 4.24% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and  
low performing firms) 
 0.589  0.168 
     
Firms with High Q  15 4.03% 60 6.05% 
Firms with Low Q 23 5.78% 53 4.14% 
p-value  
(mean difference between high and 
low performing firms) 
 0.383  0.163 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. CAPEX Ratio = Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 
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Thus the finding suggests that a corporate board containing a majority of independent 
directors is able to positively moderate the allocation of resources in group-affiliated firms in 
which affiliates that are more deserving (good-performing affiliates)
102
 receive more 
allocation on capital expenditures and affiliates that are less deserving (poor-performing 
affiliates) receive less allocation. In other words, boards with a majority of independent 
directors may be able to alleviate the inefficient allocation of resources in business groups as 
found in sub-section 6.6.2.1.      
However, all other mean differences in CAPEX Ratio between „high‟ and „low‟ performance 
firms in Panel B (Independent Chairman) and Panel C (Independent Audit Committees) are 
statistically insignificant. Overall, out of the three attributes of board independence, since 
only „Proportion of Independent Directors‟ exhibits the statistically significant moderating 
effect, it can thus be concluded that there is an overall lack of support for Hypothesis (3d).  
 
6.7   Summary on Theme III  
 
The main findings from Theme III of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 
 The findings on the occurrence of inefficient profit redistribution (profit being 
redistributed from good-performing affiliates to poor-performing affiliates within a 
business group) are mixed. No evidence on profit redistribution is found when ROA 
is used as the performance measure. However, a significant result on profit 
redistribution is found when Tobin‟s Q is used as the performance measure (in which 
the divergence of cash flow-to-control rights positively moderates redistribution).  
 
 The incidence of profit redistribution implies an expropriation act that adversely 
affects the performance of high-performing affiliates and their shareholders‟ interests.   
 
 Group size analysis reveals that profit redistribution is mainly associated with large 
business groups. Both the extent of family ownership and the divergence of cash 
                                                          
102
 Good-performing firms deserve higher allocation of capital expenditure because they are more capable of 
finding and investing in projects with greater positive NPVs that in turn lead to the firm‟s improved 
performance.    
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flow-to-control rights are shown as facilitating profit redistribution. Further 
examination shows that profit redistribution is found mostly in large business groups 
where the strength of family control is greater, not lesser and where the family‟s 
greater strength of control is outright (majority) family ownership.  
 
 Inefficient profit redistribution is explained by an inefficient allocation of capital 
expenditure in group-affiliated firms, exhibited by a lack of significant difference 
between the capital expenditure ratio of high-performing affiliates and low-
performing affiliates. In contrast, this difference is significant in non-group affiliated 
firms, indicating that without business group-driven profit redistribution, efficient 
allocation of capital expenditure can be attained.  
 
 Of the three different attributes of board independence, only the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is found to be significant in moderating the 
allocation of capital expenditure between high-performing and low-performing 
group-affiliated firms. This finding again may have an implication on the issue of 
truly independent directors in Malaysia. 
 
The subsequent sections discuss the findings on the effects of firm diversification on 
efficiency and performance as well as the moderating influence of other governance-related 
firm activities or practices on the diversification-performance link.   
6.8 Theme IV.I: Issues on Firm Diversification, Efficiency and 
Performance 
 
6.8.1   Firm Diversification and Performance 
 
The association between firm diversification and performance is examined and presented in 
Table 6.7a. Four measures of firm diversification are employed for the purpose. All four 
diversification measures show that firm performance (in both ROA and Tobin‟s Q) is 
negatively related to firm diversification. As shown in the table, evidence of the negative 
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relationship is sufficiently strong, statistically, in Tobin‟s Q, but is rather weak in the ROA 
measure.  
Table 6.7a: Firm Diversification and Performance 
 ROA Tobin‟s Q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
ENTROPY -1.220*    -0.087**    
HERF  2.034    0.119*   
NUM_SEG   -0.354*    -0.026**  
DVSF_D                -0.155    -0.015 
Group -1.848** -1.864** -1.833** -1.913** -0.043 -0.045 -0.042 -0.048 
FAMOWN 0.047** 0.047** 0.044** 0.045** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R
2
 0.276 0.275 0.276 0.272 0.181 0.177 0.184 0.171 
F-statistic 8.005*** 7.993*** 8.028*** 7.864*** 5.067*** 4.954*** 5.140*** 4.790*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6. 
 
The finding suggests that market-based performance (Tobin‟s Q) is more susceptible to firm 
diversification compared to accounting-based performance (ROA). It also implies that the 
market does not respond well to firm diversification and will react negatively to an increase 
in the level of firm diversification by marking down the value of firms with higher 
diversification. The market may suspect that diversification is practiced mainly to enhance 
the interest of controlling families, for instance, by reducing the risk of their undiversified 
family wealth. In other words, the reduction in firm and industry-specific risks as a result of 
firm diversification mainly benefits the controlling family and not the minority shareholders 
as they can always reduce their exposure to firm-specific risks through portfolio 
diversification (Claessens et al., 1999c). In addition, the market may also be concerned about 
controlling families using diversification to extract private benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 1999c). The act of diversification is seen as an entrenched 
behaviour of controlling families.     
The effect of firm diversification on performance can be quantified by using the coefficients 
reported in the table. For instance, the NUM_SEG coefficient of -0.354 (-0.026) with ROA 
(Tobin‟s Q) as the performance measure means that every additional increase in the number 
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of business segments reduces ROA (Tobin‟s Q) by 0.354% (0.026). Thus, ROA (Tobin‟s Q), 
for a firm with five business segments, for instance, will be 1.77% (0.13) lower than firms 
with a single business segment.
103
 This is translated into ROA (Tobin‟s Q) of 19% (15%) 
lower than firms with a single business segment.
104
  
It should also be noted that the insignificance of diversification dummy (DVSF_D) in both 
ROA and Tobin‟s Q suggests that performance of firms is not related to whether a firm is 
categorized as a focused firm or a diversified firm per se. It is rather the level of firm 
diversification that has an important impact on firm performance. The fact that a firm with 
nine business segments is treated as equivalent to a firm with two business segments in the 
DVSF_D dummy (both are assigned dummy value =1) may explain the insignificance of 
DVSF_D on firm performance. Thus, the overall finding supports Hypothesis (4b) but does 
not support Hypothesis (4a).  
The finding is consistent with the call by some researchers such as Chang (2006) that 
business groups and their affiliates should limit their business portfolios in order to maintain 
focus on their core business area.
105
 This is an important lesson for family-controlled 
business groups as well as independent firms in Malaysia because as the institutional settings, 
including the capital markets, are improving, it will be increasingly difficult to reap the 
alleged benefits of diversification. As reasoned by Charkrabarti et al. (2007), positive 
outcomes of firm diversification are only possible in the most underdeveloped institutional 
environments. Thus, the fact that Malaysia‟s capital market is more developed (compared to 
many other emerging economies such as Thailand and Indonesia) (Singh and Zainal, 2005; 
Claessens et al., 2000) may offer an explanation for the negative outcome of diversification 
in this study.  
 
The negative diversification-performance link, which is believed to be caused largely by 
principal-principal agency problems is further examined in the next section.     
 
                                                          
103
 Five business segments x 0.354% = 1.77% for ROA; five business segments x 0.026 = 0.13 for Tobin‟s Q. 
104
 The calculation is based on the mean ROA (mean Tobin‟s Q) of 9.19% (0.87) in the sample: (1.77%/9.19%) 
= 0.19 for ROA and (0.13/0.87) = 0.15 for Tobin‟s Q. 
105
 It is evidenced from descriptive statistics in Table 5.7b in Chapter 5 that firms affiliated to business groups 
are more diversified than firms without group affiliation.  
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6.8.2   Firm Diversification and Efficiency        
               
The findings on whether firm diversification is agency-driven are presented in Tables 6.7b 
and 6.7c. It should be noted that asset turnover ratio or asset utilization (as a proxy to agency 
costs) is used as the dependent variable in this case (Ang et al., 2000; Florackis, 2008).  
Table 6.7b: Influence of Firm Diversification on Firm Efficiency                                         
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
ENTROPY -0.405***    
HERF  0.641***   
NUM_SEG   -0.098***  
DVSF_D    -0.244*** 
ROA 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
GROUP -0.266*** -0.272*** -0.265*** -0.287*** 
FAMOWN -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
Adjusted R
2
 0.579 0.574 0.573 0.565 
F-statistic 24.885*** 24.367*** 24.285*** 23.542*** 
Observations 314 314 314 314 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6. 
                       
Table 6.7c: Firm Diversification and Efficiency – Comparison between Group and Non-
group Firms              
 Group Non-Group 
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
ENTROPY -0.439 
*** 
   -0.156*    
HERF  0.714 
*** 
   0.234*   
NUM_SEG   -0.108 
*** 
   -0.024  
DVSF_D    -0.331***    -0.095 
ROA 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
FAMOWN -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Adjusted R
2
 0.463 0.455 0.454 0.446 0.748 0.747 0.745 0.747 
F-statistic 8.616*** 8.355*** 8.340*** 8.111*** 29.117*** 29.008*** 28.741*** 28.978*** 
Observations 151 151 151 151 162 162 162 162 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6. 
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All four measures of firm diversification in Table 6.7b show that there is a highly significant 
negative relationship between asset utilization and firm diversification. In other words, the 
higher the firm diversification, the less efficient is the asset utilization. The finding thus 
offers an explanation for the negative performance outcome of diversification found in sub-
section 6.8.1. The negative influence of firm diversification on asset utilization suggests that 
severe wastages of assets/resources caused by agency problems occur alongside firm 
diversification (Ang et al., 2000; Fleming et al., 2005 and Chu, 2007). Instances of resource 
expropriation, manager-owners‟ entrenchment and other activities that enhance only the 
interests of controlling families cause adverse effects on firm efficiency and performance. 
A controlling family may try to convince its shareholders that there is a need to diversify but 
instead use diversification activities to justify the move to retain more earnings
106
 and invest 
in considerable amounts of assets to increase opportunities to expropriate the assets/resources 
of the firm. These include asset tunnelling and asset transfer, asset purchase and asset selling 
at non-market price, assets swap and other unfair insiders‟ asset transactions.   
6.8.2.1   Group Firms versus Non-group Firms 
 
Splitting the sample into group-affiliated firms and non-group firms in Table 6.7c reveals that 
the negative relationship between firm diversification and asset utilization stems mainly from 
group-affiliated firms, as the relationship is highly significant at 1%, compared to a much 
weaker significant level in non-group firms. The finding implies that group-affiliated firms 
are more prone to greater agency-driven diversification than non-group firms. This may 
provide an explanation for the underperformance of group-affiliated firms compared to non-
group firms, as found in sub-section 6.4.1. It is also consistent with arguments posed by 
researchers such as Young et al. (2008), Claessens et al. (2006), La Porta et al. (2003) and 
Khanna and Rivkin (2001) that the more complex ownership structures of business groups 
over non-group firms provide more opportunities for controlling families to capture more 
private benefits (through diversification).  
                                                          
106
 Another perspective of examining expropriation according to Faccio et al. (2001) is from the dividends 
payouts. This perspective believes that the reluctance to pay higher dividends and the tendency to retain more 
earnings among firms in Asia indicates their readiness to expropriate.   
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For instance, diversification by acquisitions among Korean business groups (chaebols) is 
used by controlling shareholders as a way to increase their own wealth at the expense of 
other shareholders (Bae et al., 2002). Expropriatory intra-group and insiders‟ asset 
transactions that lead to lower efficiency of asset utilization occur more frequently in group-
affiliated firms than in non-group firms. Overall, this finding, together with the previous 
finding, supports Hypothesis (4c).  
 
The next section continues with findings on whether group affiliation and group size 
influences the diversification-performance outcome.   
 
6.8.3 Moderating Influence of Group Affiliation on Firm Diversification-
Performance Link 
It is observed from Panel A in Table 6.8a that when the firms are split into group and non-
group firms, no significant relationship is found between the four diversification measures 
and the ROA of non-group firms but a significant (at the 10% level) negative relationship is 
found for the group firms (except for the diversification dummy, DVSF_D). The finding 
offers an explanation for the lower ROA of group-affiliated firms than non-group firms as 
found in sub-section 6.4.1. Hypothesis (4d) is thus supported according to ROA.  
 
The finding is consistent with that of Lins and Servaes (2002) that the „diversification 
discounts‟ found in their study involving seven emerging markets in East Asia come mainly 
from group-affiliated firms rather than non-group firms. It is also consistent with the finding 
by Claessens et al. (1999c) regarding nine East Asian countries that group-affiliated firms are 
associated with poorer diversification performance compared to non-group firms.  
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Table 6.8a: Firm Diversification and Performance – Comparison between Group and  
Non-group Firms              
 Panel A: ROA 
 Group   Non-Group 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
ENTROPY -1.693*    -0.139    
HERF  2.734*    0.307   
NUM_SEG   -0.459*    -0.229  
DVSF_D    -0.850    0.548 
Adjusted R
2
 0.315 0.313 0.314 0.307 0.269 0.269 0.271 0.270 
F-statistic 5.332*** 5.290*** 5.329*** 5.174*** 4.706*** 4.706*** 4.732*** 4.728*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 162 162 162 162 
 Panel B: Tobin‟s Q 
 Group Non-Group 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
ENTROPY -0.066    -0.076    
HERF  0.071    0.099   
NUM_SEG   -0.022*    -0.031*  
DVSF_D    -0.001    -0.001 
Adjusted R
2
 0.173 0.168 0.177 0.165 0.271 0.268 0.278 0.265 
F-statistic 2.973*** 2.905*** 3.029*** 2.866*** 4.737*** 4.690*** 4.880*** 4.619*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 162 162 162 162 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above). A similar table but one which contains all variables used in the 
regression is available in Appendix 6. 
 
This study thus far has proven that group firms are found to be more diversified than non-
group firms. Diversifications are in turn associated with poorer firm performance because of 
the agency costs associated with them. It can therefore be concluded that the poorer 
performance of group firms is partly due to the greater agency-driven diversification in these 
firms compared to non-group firms. The finding that diversification is detrimental to the 
performance of group-affiliated firms is consistent with the earlier finding of prevalent 
inefficiency of asset utilization in these firms as found in sub-section 6.8.2.   
Moreover, as reasoned by Lins and Servaes (2002), the finding implies that since some of the 
advantages of diversification can be captured through a group structure, it is hard for 
affiliated firms to justify their diversification and thus if they do diversify, the decision to 
diversify is more likely to be made by the controlling families to serve their own interests and 
not those of the minority shareholders.  
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It should also be noted that the findings in this study do not support the „spill-over benefits of 
group affiliation to firm level diversification‟ hypothesis [as explained in Charkrabarti et al. 
(2007)] but are instead more consistent with the expropriation hypothesis as explained above. 
Claessens et al. (1999c) also find in their study that evidence of diversification discounts 
associated with group-affiliated firms is consistent with the expropriation hypotheses.  
 
As for the Tobin‟s Q measure, the findings from Panel B show that overall there is no 
difference between group and non-group firms in terms of their diversification-performance 
link. Most of the diversification measures in both group and non-group firms are statistically 
insignificant. Thus, group affiliation does not influence the diversification-performance link 
as far as Tobin‟s Q is concerned. A possible reason for the lack of statistical significance in 
this case could be the cancelling out of costs and benefits associated with firm diversification.                  
The next sub-section continues with the findings on the influence of group size on the 
diversification-performance link.  
 
6.8.4   Group Size Effect on Firm Diversification-Performance Link 
 
Further findings on the influence of group size on the performance outcome of diversification 
are shown in Table 6.8b. The key interest lies in the interaction terms involving the various 
group sizes in the table.  
6.8.4.1   Small Business Groups (GR_A) 
The findings regarding small business groups (GR_A) show that overall there is weak 
evidence to suggest that GR_A positively moderates the firm diversification-performance 
link [see the interaction terms in Model (1) and Model (4)].   
The moderating influence of GR_A can be computed by adding the diversification measure 
variable and the interaction term variable together. For instance, the moderating influence of 
GR_A on the diversification-ROA link in Model (1) of Panel A can be computed as 
(ENTROPY + ENTROPY*GR_A)  =  -3.237 + 4.225 =  0.988 which  can  be  interpreted  as  
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Table 6.8b: Firm Diversification and Performance – Group Size Effect  
 ROA Tobin‟s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
ENTROPY -3.237** -1.452 -1.033 -0.121* -0.088 -0.003 
ENTROPY*GR_A 4.225*   0.168   
ENTROPY*GR_B  -1.185   0.048  
ENTROPY*GR_C   -3.131   -0.232** 
GR_A 0.741 2.387*  -0.143* -0.082  
GR_B 2.027 2.422 -0.781 -0.005 -0.041 0.049 
GR_C   -1.025   0.177** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.336 0.320 0.327 0.179 0.167 0.189 
F-statistic 5.017*** 4.741*** 4.870*** 2.731*** 2.597*** 2.852*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 152 152 
 Panel B: Herfindahl 
HERF 5.837** 2.027 1.678 0.165 0.115 -0.036 
HERF*GR_A -7.778*   -0.264   
HERF*GR_B  2.830   -0.100  
HERF*GR_C   5.833   0.435** 
GR_A 8.486** 2.390**  0.127 -0.083  
GR_B 2.049 -0.232 -0.788 -0.011 0.049 0.046 
GR_C   -6.832*   -0.254 
Adjusted R
2
 0.335 0.319 0.325 0.171 0.162 0.184 
F-statistic 5.004*** 4.719*** 4.829*** 2.639*** 2.540*** 2.791*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 152 152 
 Panel C: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.626* -0.582 -0.333 -0.032* -0.033 -0.006 
NUM_SEG*GR_A 0.480   0.036   
NUM_SEG*GR_B  0.159   0.023  
NUM_SEG*GR_C   -0.511   -0.049* 
GR_A 1.072 2.285*  -0.173 -0.084  
GR_B 1.803 1.218 -0.759 -0.007 -0.088 0.050 
GR_C   -0.889   0.217** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.321 0.318 0.322 0.178 0.174 0.188 
F-statistic 4.753*** 4.714*** 4.777*** 2.719*** 2.680*** 2.844*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 152 152 
 Panel D: Diversification Dummy 
DVSF_D -1.895 -0.257 -0.616 -0.108* 0.001 0.075 
DVSF_D*GR_A 2.548   0.263**   
DVSF_D*GR_B  -1.873   -0.015  
DVSF_D*GR_C   -1.034   -0.299** 
GR_A 1.156 2.314*  -0.194** -0.083  
GR_B 1.628 2.588 -0.820 -0.014 -0.021 0.034 
GR_C   -1.741   0.224** 
Adjusted R
2
 0.316 0.312 0.309 0.199 0.158 0.202 
F-statistic 4.678*** 4.606*** 4.558*** 2.975*** 2.492*** 3.015*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 152 152 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above).  
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follows: every 0.1 increase in the Entropy value
107
 of firms affiliated to small business 
groups will lead to an improvement of ROA of the firms by approximately 0.1% (0.1x0.988% 
= 0.0988% ≈ 0.1%). Similarly, the moderating influence of GR_A on Tobin‟s Q in Model (4) 
of Panel D is computed as -0.108 + 0.263 = 0.155 which is interpreted as follows: a 
diversified firm affiliated to a small business group has 0.155 greater Tobin‟s Q compared to 
a similar diversified firm not in GR_A. Thus, a small group size positively moderates the 
outcome of diversification in group-affiliated firms.   
 
The findings on small size business groups do not support Khanna and Palepu‟s (2000a) 
observation in India that the majority of small and medium size business groups have issues 
such as incompetent management, serious agency problems and lack of advantages of 
political connection that prevent their firms from generating benefits from diversification. 
This inconsistency in findings could be due to the differences in the country-specific and 
institutional environment factors in both countries as these lead to variations in the nature of 
business groups in each country. 
6.8.4.2   Intermediate and Large Business Groups (GR_B and GR_C) 
The findings on intermediate business groups (GR_B) show that there is an insignificant 
influence of GR_B on the performance outcome of diversification (all the interaction terms 
involving GR_B are statistically insignificant) [see Model (2) and Model (5)].  
The findings on large business groups (GR_C) show that GR_C negatively moderates the 
diversification-performance link. The moderating influence is statistically significant in the 
case of Tobin‟s Q though it lacks the statistical significance in ROA [see the interaction 
terms in Model (3) and Model (6)].   
The moderating influence of large group size can be quantified as follows: as an illustration, 
the influence of GR_C in Model (6) of Panel B is computed as -0.036 + 0.435 = 0.399 which 
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 Increases in Entropy equals increases in the diversification level.  
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can be interpreted as follows: for every 0.1 decrease in Herfindahl
108
 of firms affiliated to 
GR_C, the Tobin‟s Q of the firms will decline by about 0.04 (0.1x0.399 = 0.0399 ≈ 0.04).  
This observation implies that market-based performance of firms deteriorates as the 
diversification level increases for firms affiliated to large business groups. In other words, the 
higher the diversification level of firms affiliated to large business groups, the more they will 
see their value being marked down by the market. The market does not buy the idea of 
operating across various industries for a firm that is part of a much larger network of listed 
firms under the control of a single family. Again, the finding does not support Khanna and 
Palepu‟s (2000a) observation in India that large business groups have more advantages that 
enhance the performance outcome of firm diversification compared to small and medium size 
business groups.  
6.8.4.3   The Presence of Trend Across the Moderating Influence of Various Group Sizes     
The overall finding suggests the presence of an overall trend in the moderating effects of 
group sizes on the firm diversification-performance link. Specifically, the moderating 
influence tends to be positive in small business groups, neutral in intermediate business 
groups and, negative in large business groups. Possible reasons for this trend could be 
proposed as follows; first, when the business group is small (for instance with only two listed 
affiliates), firm diversification is able to complement and contribute to the task of creating 
internal markets in the group and the affiliates enjoy the benefits brought about by those 
internal markets. This infers that without firm-level diversification, there could be a capacity 
limit for a small business group to create a sufficiently large internal market to benefit the 
group and the firms therein. In addition, small business groups as defined in this study have 
up to only two listed firms in the group. The group structure is therefore straightforward and 
uncomplicated and without a complex pyramidal or cross-holdings structure, reduces the 
groups‟ exposure to expropriation through diversification compared to larger business groups. 
For instance, the move to diversify or to further increase the diversification level of a 
member firm in a small business group cannot be as easily concealed and remain 
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 Increases in Herfindahl equals decreases in the diversification level.   
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undiscovered as in large, complicated groups. Thus, „ill-intended‟ diversification could be 
reduced.  
However, as business groups grow from small to intermediate (groups with three to four 
listed affiliates), the „complementary‟ role of firm-level diversification on the formation of 
the internal market of the group begins to decrease. At the same time, group structure 
becomes more complicated and divergence of cash flow-to-control rights can now be found 
in some group affiliates. Thus the benefits and costs of firm diversification for such business 
groups may well cancel each other out and result in neutral influence on the diversification-
performance link.    
Finally, as business groups progress from intermediate to large (with five or more listed 
affiliates), the motive of controlling families to diversify or increase the diversification level 
of member firms becomes questionable. Thus, as opposed to small business groups, agency-
led diversification in firms affiliated to large groups will be more pervasive as the large, more 
complicated group structure network provides a suitable condition for controlling families to 
expropriate through diversification. The low transparency that is often associated with large 
business groups helps to conceal the groups‟ activities (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b). 
Moreover, large and agglomerate business groups often have more complicated pyramidal or 
cross-holding structures and thus agency costs through diversification are greater, as the costs 
that controlling families incur will be less than any personal gain or utility from expropriation 
(Claessens et al., 2006).  
6.8.4.4   Corporate Environment in Malaysia 
The corporate environment in Malaysia may exacerbate the situation as many large business 
groups are closely linked, either formally or informally, to the ruling party or senior 
government officials (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). The negative outcome of diversification 
associated with firms belonging to large business groups may suggest that they are not taking 
advantage of the political connections they have in order to improve the outcome of that 
diversification. One possible reason could be that close political connection is used by 
controlling families to advance diversification activities for personal or family interests rather 
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than the interests of other shareholders. Personal interest, wealth, or utility gained by 
controlling families from diversification activities in this case outweighs the wealth that 
controlling families need to forgo due to poor diversification results (i.e. reduced firm 
performance) (Lins and Servaes, 2002).  
For instance, a firm affiliated to a large business group may choose to enter into a 
diversification deal involving a director or his crony (for instance the firm may decide to 
acquire a director-owned private company operating in a different business sector
109
) who 
has close political contacts, rather than an arm‟s length diversification deal even though the 
deal with the director or his crony is not the best deal.
110
 This is because the close 
relationship with the director may facilitate more rent-seeking activities
111
 for the controlling 
family and provide opportunities to secure future contracts, credit or other benefits from the 
ruling political party.  
It is reported by Claessens et al. (2000) that, in Malaysia, the top 15 families control 
corporate assets worth 76.2% of the country‟s GDP compared to only 2.1% in Japan and 2.9% 
in the US.
112
 This percentage is one of the highest in Asia and suggests that families with 
large business groups could be highly influential and „lobby‟ the government into 
implementing policies that are in their favour and „interfere‟ in policies that are „unfriendly‟ 
to them, such as a stricter takeover policy that may hinder their self-interested takeover-and-
diversify activities. In addition, Johnson and Mitton (2003) state that there is a greater chance 
for the owner-managers of politically-connected firms, particularly in large business groups, 
to misappropriate the firm‟s resources. A diversified structure undeniably facilitates such 
misappropriation. All the above reasons may thus contribute to the poor results of 
diversification in firms affiliated to the large business groups in this study.  
6.9   Summary on Theme IV.I  
 
The main findings from Theme IV.I of the study can be summarized as follows: 
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 The firm diversification level increases after acquiring the private company from the director.  
110
 A deal with someone who is politically well-connected, in exchange for „rents‟, is a rent-seeking behaviour.  
111
 Corruption is conduct that is sometimes associated with rent-seeking is corruption.  
112
 Appendix 3 provides a list of the 40 richest Malaysians and their main sources of wealth. 
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 In general, the level of firm diversification is found to have a significant negative 
relationship with firm performance. This finding may imply that firm diversification 
is more of an act of owner-manager entrenchment and an extraction of private 
benefits. It may also imply diminished benefits of diversification as the institutions 
and external markets in Malaysia improve.  
 
 The extent of firm diversification is significantly negatively related to the efficiency 
of asset utilization. Thus the declining efficiency in asset utilization as firm 
diversification increases may offer an explanation to the negative diversification-
performance relationship.  
 
 Further analysis reveals that inefficient asset utilization related to firm diversification 
is more prevalent in group-affiliated firms than in non-group firms. This finding 
subsequently explains the more significant negative relationship between 
diversification and firm performance in group-affiliated firms as opposed to non-
group firms. 
 
 Compared to non-group firms, the more significant finding on the negative 
relationship between firm diversification and efficiency and performance in group-
affiliated firms implies that agency-driven diversification is more prevalent in group-
affiliated firms.  
 
 Further examination of group-affiliated firms suggests the existence of an overall 
trend in the influence of various group sizes on the performance outcome of firm 
diversification. Specifically, the weak positive moderating influence found in firms 
affiliated to small business groups develops into a neutral moderating influence in 
firms affiliated to intermediate business groups and eventually into a negative 
moderating influence in firms affiliated to large business groups.  
 
 The above trend may imply that the benefits (agency costs) of firm diversification are 
greater (smaller) in small business groups than in intermediate and large business 
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groups. However the benefits diminish while agency costs rise and the trend 
continues as business groups expand and become larger.  
 
 Agency costs are greater and more prevalent in the firm diversification of large 
business groups than in small and intermediate business groups due to the various 
governance problems that are more profound in large business groups. These include 
lower transparency, a larger and more complex network of affiliates and closer 
political ties that facilitate and provide more opportunities to the controlling families 
to practice diversification-related expropriation.  
 
The next section discusses the findings on the moderating influence of various governance-
related mechanisms and practices on the firm diversification-performance link.  
 
6.10 Theme IV.II: Moderating Influence on the Firm Diversification-
Performance Link 
6.10.1 Moderating Influence of Ownership Structure on the Firm 
Diversification-Performance Link 
Results for the moderating influence of ownership structure on the performance outcome of 
firm diversification for the full sample and the sub-sample of group-affiliated firms are 
shown in Tables 6.9a and 6.9b. 
 
The key interest lies in the interaction term in each model. The findings show that although 
all interaction terms involving controlling family ownership (FAMOWN) are negative 
(indicating the negative moderating influence of family ownership on the diversification 
outcome); they are insignificant and the magnitudes of the coefficients are small in relation to 
the coefficients of the diversification measures [see Model (1) and Model (3) in both 
tables].
113
 Thus both Hypotheses (4f) and (4h) are not supported. 
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 The regression is also run using Herfindahl and diversification Dummy (DVSF_D) and the results are 
qualitatively similar (and thus not reported).   
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Table 6.9a: Firm Diversification and Tobin’s Q – Influence of Ownership Structure  
 Group Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
ENTROPY -0.066 -0.049 -0.089** -0.072* 
ENTROPY* FAMOWN′ -0.001  -0.001  
ENTROPY*DOMPUBII  -0.006  -0.006 
FAMOWN′ -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 
DOMPUBII 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 
Adjusted R
2
 0.167 0.168 0.176 0.177 
F-statistic 2.777*** 2.795*** 4.943*** 4.973*** 
Observations  152 152 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.024* -0.027* -0.028** -0.026** 
NUM_SEG* FAMOWN′ -0.001  -0.001  
NUM_SEG*DOMPUBII  0.001  0.000 
FAMOWN′ 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
DOMPUBII -0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.002 
Adjusted R
2
 0.173 0.172 0.182 0.179 
F-statistic 2.857*** 2.847*** 5.105*** 5.019*** 
Observations  152 152 314 314 
Table 6.9b: Firm Diversification and ROA – Influence of Ownership Structure  
 Group Full Sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
ENTROPY -1.719 -1.595 -1.330 -1.369 
ENTROPY* FAMOWN′ -0.031  -0.015  
ENTROPY*DOMPUBII  -0.032  0.007 
FAMOWN′ 0.062 0.046 0.062* 0.056** 
DOMPUBII -0.032 -0.021 0.019 0.016 
Adjusted R
2
 0.310 0.309 0.262 0.262 
F-statistic 4.998*** 4.979*** 7.550*** 7.544*** 
Observations  152 152 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.477 -0.319 -0.401* -0.300 
NUM_SEG* FAMOWN′ -0.004  -0.004  
NUM_SEG*DOMPUBII  -0.037  -0.027 
FAMOWN′ 0.053 0.043 0.063 0.054** 
DOMPUBII -0.044 0.050 0.014 0.076 
Adjusted R
2
 0.309 0.311 0.263 0.264 
F-statistic 4.981*** 5.018*** 7.581*** 7.607*** 
Observations  152 152 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.9a and Table 6.9b:  
1.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
2.  The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
3. All other block-holders ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above).   
 
The findings also show that all the interaction terms involving the ownership of public 
institutional investors (DOMPUBII) are insignificant [see Model (2) and Model (4) in both 
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tables]. Thus there is no evidence to suggest that the so-called „pressure-resistant‟ 
institutional investors (such as the EPF and PNB) are able to exert effective monitoring over 
controlling families to curb performance-reducing diversification as found in Theme IV.I. 
The creation by the five prominent public institutional investors in Malaysia of the Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) as a non-profitable organisation demonstrates that 
they are willing to engage in shareholder activism. However, it is possible that these 
investors lack the ability (even if they have the will) to effectively influence owner-managers 
to be prudent in their diversification activities. In confronting more dominant controlling 
families, the institutional investors have, in fact, limited power to interfere in their pursuit of 
their diversification plan. Overall, Hypothesis (4g) is not supported. 
 
Overall, this study does not find any evidence of ownership structure moderating the 
diversification outcome in family-controlled firms in Malaysia. This finding is inconsistent 
with George (2007) who finds that corporate and director ownerships interact with firm 
diversification to positively affect firm performance. It is also contradictory with Fauver et al. 
(2003) who find that a lower (higher) firm value is recorded for a diversified firm compared 
to a focused firm at the lower (higher) level of individual and institution ownership. The 
finding in this study is however consistent with Lane et al. (1998) who find little relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm diversification, and Anderson et al. (2000) who 
do not find any association between ownership structure and diversification discount.         
 
6.10.2 Moderating Influence of Board Independence on the Firm Diversification-
Performance Link 
The examination of the moderating role of board independence on the diversification 
outcome shows that of the four different attributes of board independence, only „All Audit 
Committee Members are Independent Directors‟ (INDP_ADT) proves to be statistically 
significant in positively moderating the influence of diversification on firms‟ ROA [see the 
interaction terms in Model (3) in Table 6.10a]. The other two attributes of board 
independence; Proportion of Independent Directors (PrINED) and Independent Chairman 
(INDP_CHR) are found to be insignificant in moderating the diversification-performance 
link  [Models  (1) and  (2)  in Tables  6.10a and  6.10b].  Finally,  Highly Independent  Board  
236 
 
        Table 6.10a: Firm Diversification and ROA – Influence of Board Independence    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
Entropy -1.109 -2.075** -2.397** -1.603* 
Entropy*Pr_INED′ -2.462    
Entropy*INDP_CHR  2.287   
Entropy* INDP_ADT   3.904**  
Entropy* H_INDP_B    3.644 
Pr_INED′ -3.915    
INDP_CHR  -0.931   
INDP_ADT   -2.218*  
H_INDP_B    -2.298 
Adjusted R2 0.266 0.264 0.271 0.263 
F-statistic 7.291*** 7.233*** 7.476*** 7.211*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.323 -0.459* -0.697** -0.473* 
NUM_SEG *Pr_INED′ 0.899    
NUM_SEG*INDP_CHR  0.249   
NUM_SEG*INDP_ADT   1.274***  
NUM_SEG* H_INDP_B    1.679* 
Pr_INED′ -7.480    
INDP_CHR  -0.706   
INDP_ADT   -3.957**  
H_INDP_B    -5.234* 
Adjusted R2 0.267 0.262 0.277 0.268 
F-statistic 7.324*** 7.162*** 7.669*** 7.358*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
      Table 6.10b: Firm Diversification and Tobin’s Q – Influence of Board Independence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
Entropy -0.083** -0.080* -0.102** -0.097** 
Entropy*Pr_INED′ -0.147    
Entropy*INDP_CHR  -0.032   
Entropy* INDP_ADT   0.049  
Entropy* H_INDP_B    0.143 
Pr_INED′ -0.062    
INDP_CHR  0.013   
INDP_ADT   -0.073  
H_INDP_B    -0.171* 
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.175 0.181 0.183 
F-statistic 4.789*** 4.689*** 4.847*** 4.900*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.026** -0.020* -0.034*** -0.030*** 
NUM_SEG *Pr_INED′ -0.015    
NUM_SEG*INDP_CHR  -0.028   
NUM_SEG*INDP_ADT   0.027  
NUM_SEG* H_INDP_B    0.071* 
Pr_INED′ -0.085    
INDP_CHR  0.064   
INDP_ADT   -0.126*  
H_INDP_B    -0.302** 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.181 0.187 0.190 
F-statistic 4.797*** 4.848*** 4.998*** 5.085*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
Notes to Table 6.10a and Table 6.10b:  
1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above).    
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(H_INDP_B)
114
, an overall attribute of independence that combines all the other three 
attributes, is found to have an overall insignificant to weak positive moderating influence on 
the diversification-performance link [see Model (4) in Tables 6.10a and 6.10b].  
 
6.10.2.1   All Audit Committee Members are Independent Directors (INDP_ADT) 
 
The significant positive moderating influence of INDP_ADT as mentioned above is found to 
be capable of reversing the apparently negative relationship between diversification and 
performance. For instance, the Entropy coefficient of -2.397 [see Model (3) in Panel A of 
Table 6.10a] indicates that firm performance is negatively related to diversification. However, 
with the interaction term coefficient of 3.904, which is greater than 2.397, it suggests that 
when a firm‟s audit committee members are all independent directors, it is possible to reverse 
the negative relationship between firm diversification and performance to a positive one. The 
net effect is computed as 3.904 + (-2.397) = 1.507 which can be interpreted as follows: for 
every 0.1 increase in the Entropy value, the ROA will improve by 0.15% in firms with 
INDP_ADT. Similarly, with „Number of Business Segments‟ (NUM_SEG) as the 
diversification measure [see Model (3) of Panel B in Table 6.10a], the net effect of 
diversification (with INDP_ADT as the moderator) on firm performance is computed as 
1.274 + (-0.697) = 0.577 which can be interpreted as follows: an increase in every business 
segment is associated with an improved ROA of 0.58% in firms with INDP_ADT. The 
positive moderating influence of INDP_ADT is also found when Tobin‟s Q is used as the 
performance measure, but the influence is statistically insignificant [see Model (3) in Table 
6.10b].  
 
The findings suggest that a board‟s audit committee, composed entirely of independent 
directors, may be the solution to improve the diversification-ROA relationship. The finding is 
in parallel with Chen and Chen (2012) who find a significant positive relationship between 
audit committee quality and investment efficiency of diversified firms. Their study shows a 
reduced diversification discount in firms associated with high quality audit committees which 
                                                          
114
 See Table 5.1 for the definition of H_INDP_B.  
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is proxied by two distinct measures, one of which is „audit committee composed entirely of 
independent directors‟.       
However, it is important to highlight that 99 firms in this study achieve the status of „audit 
committee consists of all independent directors‟ on a voluntary basis. This indicates that 
these firms may be more genuinely committed to maintaining independence, at least in their 
audit committees. The outcome might be different if authorities were to force the rules that 
firms must have fully independent audit committees, as without firstly addressing the issue of 
objectivity in the nomination, appointment and removal process of independent directors, 
enforcing rules will only result in compliance with the form but not the substance of 
independence. This is consistent with the view of the CFA Institute (2010) that one of the 
major obstacles to finding truly independent directors in Asia is related to the current process 
of nominating and appointing independent directors which does not preclude controlling 
shareholders from interfering in the process.
115
  
6.10.2.2   Issue of Board Independence Revisited 
  
Various explanations or interpretations could possibly be arrived at from the several 
insignificant results shown in Tables 6.10a and 6.10b with regards to the moderating 
influence of board independence. Nonetheless, one particular reason that needs to be 
examined is the independent status of the directors appointed (whether an independent 
director or chairman is truly independent). Perhaps the independent status of the 
„independent chairman‟ and thus his effectiveness to monitor management, is most 
questionable in Malaysia. A chairman that is „independent on paper‟ may essentially be a 
figurehead for the board. It is not uncommon for controlling families to invite former 
ministers, ex-politicians, former government senior officials, ex-police chiefs, ex-army chiefs 
and the like to take on the role. As these chairmen are usually offered the post by controlling 
families, it will be an unpublicised appointment to protect the interests of the controlling 
families and as Monks (2006) [as cited in the CFA Institute (2010, p.32)] states: “there is 
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 See CFA Institute (2010) for some proposals to increase the probability of appointing a truly independent 
director.  
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always reluctance to confront, embarrass and combat someone who has conferred a favour, 
there is always reluctance to join a club just to attack it, irrespective of the issues involved”.      
 
In short, the above findings indicate that there is an overall lack of meaningful evidence to 
support the hypothesis that „board independence‟ positively moderates the influence of firm 
diversification on performance. Thus, Hypothesis (4j) cannot be convincingly supported.    
 
6.10.3 Moderating Influence of Control-enhancing Means on the Firm 
Diversification-Performance Link 
The results on the moderating influence of the control-enhancing means available to 
controlling families show that they are mostly insignificant in moderating the performance 
outcome of firm diversification, except for the control-enhancing means pertaining to the 
complexity of business group structure (see the interaction terms in Model (1) to Model (4) 
in Tables 6.11a and 6.11b).     
 
Thus as far as control-enhancing means are concerned (except for the complexity of business 
group structure), there is no evidence found in this study to suggest that they significantly 
moderate the influence of diversification on firm performance. Though the finding is unable 
to support the assertion in the literature, such as by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Claessens 
et al. (2002), that firm performance may be affected by the higher tendency towards 
expropriation following the enhanced control of controlling families, it neither refutes it, as 
the occurrence of expropriation is not necessarily related to firm diversification. 
 
Moreover, since activities of expropriation such as tunnelling of resources are deemed as 
unethical and are sometimes illicit, they normally occur in a subtle manner. As a result, 
attempting to find any empirical evidence of a relationship suggestive of expropriation is not 
easy. Alternatively, the benefits and costs of control-enhancing means may cancel each other 
out and firm performance is left unaffected. It should also be highlighted that not all control-
enhancing means are „bad‟. Some will still contribute in a positive way to firm performance 
despite the „costs‟ that are often associated with them. For instance, as reasoned earlier, a 
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Table 6.11a: Firm Diversification and ROA – Influence of Control-enhancing Means  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
Entropy -0.622 -0.394 -0.615 -0.288 -1.289* -1.734* -0.874 
Entropy* CF/CONT′ -5.351       
Entropy* FAMDIR  -2.380      
Entropy* CHR_CEO   -1.758     
Entropy* FAMONLY    -1.651    
Entropy* BG_S     0.494   
Entropy* BG_PS      1.375  
Entropy* BG_CS       -4.906* 
CF/CONT′ 3.577       
FAMDIR  7.046**      
CHR_CEO   1.659*     
FAMONLY    -1.462    
BG_S     -1.625 -1.411 -1.425 
BG_PS     -2.143** -2.761** -2.146** 
BG_CS     -1.878 -1.768 0.996 
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.282 0.266 0.272 0.269 0.271 0.274 
F-statistic 6.655*** 7.818*** 7.314*** 7.486*** 6.767*** 6.806*** 6.900*** 
Observations  303 314 314 314 314 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.290 -0.192 -0.315 -0.313 -0.438* -0.488* -0.306 
NUM_SEG * CF/CONT′ -0.720       
NUM_SEG * FAMDIR  -0.467      
NUM_SEG * CHR_CEO   -0.230     
NUM_SEG * FAMONLY    -0.161    
NUM_SEG * BG_S     0.585   
NUM_SEG * BG_PS      0.280  
NUM_SEG * BG_CS       -0.934 
CF/CONT′ 4.034       
FAMDIR  7.202**      
CHR_CEO   1.663     
FAMONLY    -1.772    
BG_S     -2.959 -1.271 -1.342 
BG_PS     -2.165** -2.970** -2.240** 
BG_CS     -1.756 -1.723 1.362 
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.282 0.266 0.271 0.272 0.271 0.273 
F-statistic 6.657*** 7.834*** 7.315*** 7.466*** 6.845*** 6.824*** 6.868*** 
Observations  303 314 314 314 314 314 314 
Note:* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression  (not shown above) 
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Table 6.11b: Firm Diversification and Tobin’s Q –Influence  of Control-Enhancing Means 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Panel A: Entropy 
Entropy 0.015 -0.077 -0.085* -0.090 -0.119*** -0.096** -0.068* 
Entropy* CF/CONT′ -0.755       
Entropy* FAMDIR  -0.014      
Entropy* CHR_CEO   -0.012     
Entropy* FAMONLY    -0.001    
Entropy* BG_S     0.214**   
Entropy* BG_PS      0.025  
Entropy* BG_CS       -0.276** 
CF/CONT′ -0.038       
FAMDIR  0.169      
CHR_CEO   0.012     
FAMONLY    -0.041    
BG_S     -0.119* -0.033 -0.033 
BG_PS     -0.048 -0.063 -0.052 
BG_CS     -0.010 -0.019 0.142 
Adjusted R2 0.177 0.183 0.175 0.176 0.183 0.173 0.180 
F-statistic 4.599*** 4.883*** 4.684*** 4.723*** 4.504*** 4.281*** 4.445*** 
Observations  303 314 314 314 314 314 314 
 Panel B: Number of Segments 
NUM_SEG -0.006 -0.018 -0.029** -0.032* -0.032*** -0.036** -0.023** 
NUM_SEG * CF/CONT′ -0.170       
NUM_SEG * FAMDIR  -0.026      
NUM_SEG * CHR_CEO   0.003     
NUM_SEG * FAMONLY    0.007    
NUM_SEG * BG_S     0.045   
NUM_SEG * BG_PS      0.023  
NUM_SEG * BG_CS       -0.062 
CF/CONT′ 0.269       
FAMDIR  0.235      
CHR_CEO   0.007     
FAMONLY    -0.061    
BG_S     -0.152 -0.021 -0.027 
BG_PS     -0.053 -0.118** -0.058 
BG_CS     -0.010 -0.007 0.196 
Adjusted R2 0.180 0.186 0.178 0.180 0.181 0.179 0.182 
F-statistic 4.676*** 4.973*** 4.767*** 4.806*** 4.464*** 4.420*** 4.475*** 
Observations  303 314 314 314 314 314 314 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the regression (not shown above) 
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higher proportion of family directors on the board (FAMDIR) might be better than a higher 
proportion of independent directors as far as Malaysia‟s current scenario is concerned. 
 
6.10.3.1   Complexity of Business Group Structure  
 
Having business groups particularly those with a pyramidal structure is one way to enhance 
control for controlling families. Moreover, as explained in Section 3.4 in Chapter 3, the 
controlling families of business groups may create complicated ownership structures to 
reduce the threat to their control and consequently their tendency to expropriate may increase 
as the group structure becomes more complex and as such less transparent. The moderating 
influence of the three different levels of group complexity (BG_S, BG_PS, and BG_CS) on 
the diversification outcome is shown in the interaction terms from Model (5) to Model (7) in 
Tables 6.11a and 6.11b.  
 
An overall weak evidence of positive moderating influence of „business groups with simple 
structure‟ (BG_S) is found in the study as all the interaction terms involving BG_S [see 
Model (5)] are positive with one of them statistically significant at 5%-level. Thus the 
findings, albeit weak, might suggest that not only small business groups (GR_A) have the 
potential positive moderating effect on the diversification outcome (as found in sub-section 
6.8.4), business group with simple structure (BG_S) may also contribute towards better 
diversification-performance relationship. The absence of pyramidal and cross-holding 
structures in BG_S may imply a lower tendency towards expropriation and subsequently less 
value-destroying diversification. In comparison, no significant influence of „business group 
with pyramidal structure‟ (BG_PS) is found in the study as all the interaction terms involving 
BG_PS [see Model (6)] are statistically insignificant. 
 
On the contrary, the findings indicate that, overall, „business groups with complicated 
structure‟ (BG_CS) negatively moderates the diversification outcome. All the interaction 
terms involving BG_CS [see Model (7)] in Table 6.11a and Table 6.11b are negative with 
two statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. These findings are further 
supported by the significant results from the additional test as shown in Table 6.11c [see 
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Models (3) and (6) in the table] where the interaction terms are negatively statistically 
significant at the 5% level.   
The descriptive statistics from Section 5.7 in Chapter 5 have shown that firms affiliated to 
BG_CS have the highest level of diversification among all the firms in the sample. The 
finding here therefore suggests that the high diversification observed in these firms is more 
value-destroying than value-adding and may thus be a reflection and manifestation of 
substantial occurrence of principal-principal problems in firms affiliated to BG_CS.  
 
Another observation to be highlighted is that BG_CS, as defined in this study, is actually the 
smaller subset of GR_C which is defined as large business groups with at least five listed 
affiliates. Thus BG_CS can be considered as not only business groups with complicated 
structures and complex networks that link the affiliates but also business groups with a large 
number of listed affiliates. This is particularly the type of business group that, according to 
Lins and Servaes (2002), should not have a high level of firm-level diversification because 
the diversification needed to create the benefits of internal markets has already been provided 
at the group-level by the large number of listed member firms operating across various 
industries. Thus the poor diversification outcome of firms affiliated to BG_CS in this study is 
in parallel with the author‟s observations that high diversification at the firm level in business 
groups is more likely to be agency-driven.  
Table 6.11c: Effect of Group Structure Complexity on the Diversification-Performance 
Link - Supplementary Test 
 ROA Tobin‟s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DVSF_D -0.248 -0.376 0.107 -0.039 -0.015 0.001 
DVSF_D * BG_S 0.638   0.155   
DVSF_D * BG_PS  0.882   0.001  
DVSF_D * BG_CS   -6.657**   -0.420** 
BG_S -1.774 -1.491 -1.472 -0.107 -0.037 -0.036 
BG_PS -2.226** -2.651** -2.213** -0.058 -0.058 -0.057 
BG_CS -1.908 -1.853 2.326 -0.017 -0.023 0.245 
Adjusted R
2
 0.265 0.266 0.272 0.171 0.163 0.177 
F-statistic 6.654*** 6.667*** 6.850*** 4.222*** 4.044*** 4.361*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 314 314 
Note: 1.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.  
          2. The values in the table show the coefficients of the variables.  
          3. All other block-holder ownership variables, control variables and sector effects are included in the 
regression (not shown above).  
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The lack of transparency in firm activities including diversification-related activities due to 
complex group structures reinforces observations concerning the agency-driven nature of 
diversification. Moreover, the finding in this section provides further support to earlier 
findings and explanations that the close political connection of large family-controlled 
business groups does not help to improve the diversification outcome of their affiliates.  
Finally the finding in this section also has an interesting link with the findings by Claessens 
et al. (1999c). According to these authors, not only is firm diversification found to be 
positively related to diversification discount but also firms with higher divergence of cash 
flow-to-control rights have higher diversification. The findings in this study are comparable 
to Claessens et al. (1999c) in that firms affiliated to BG_CS are firms whose cash flow-to-
control rights are indeterminate in this study due to their highly complicated and complex 
group ownership structure. Though the firms in BG_CS may not be equivalent to the firms 
with high divergence of cash flow-to-control rights as in Claessens‟s et al. (1999c) study, the 
two control-enhancing means should be comparable as far as the inclination of the 
controlling families to use them to expropriate the firms‟ resources is concerned.      
6.11   Summary on Theme IV.II  
 
The main findings from Theme IV.II can be summarized as follows: 
 
 The study does not find any significant moderating influence of family ownership and 
domestic public institutional investors‟ ownership on the performance outcome of 
firm diversification. The insignificant moderating influence of domestic institutional 
investors‟ ownership may again imply limited ability and effort on the part of public 
institutional investors in Malaysia and constraints faced by them to exert effective 
monitoring to curb agency-driven diversification. 
 
 In general, of the four various attributes of board independence, only the „All Audit 
Committee Members are Independent Directors‟ attribute is found to be significant in 
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positively moderating the firm diversification-performance link. This finding has two 
important implications:  
 
o (i) An audit committee‟s fully independent status achieved on a voluntary 
basis implies a firm‟s commitment to a higher governance standard in not only 
form but substance also. The monitoring effort of such an audit committee is 
thus more effective in reducing agency-driven diversification and promoting 
prudent diversification decisions. 
 
o (ii) The lack of significant findings from other board independence attributes 
may again have an implication on the issue of truly independent directors in 
Malaysia, including the interference of controlling families in the process of 
nomination, appointment and removal of independent directors. 
 
 Except for „complexity of business group structure‟, the study fails to find any 
significant moderating influence of the various control-enhancing means on the 
performance outcome of firm diversification.   
 
 The complexity of business group structure shows that „business groups with 
complicated structure‟ negatively moderates the performance outcome of firm 
diversification. Since firms affiliated to such business groups have the most extensive 
diversification, the finding implies that the extensive diversification is most likely to 
be agency-driven and thus performance-reducing.  
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6.12   Chapter Summary 
 
The analysis and discussions from the entire chapter can be summarized into nine main 
findings and implications as follows: 
  
1. The ownership level of controlling families by itself is not detrimental to firm 
performance. The finding shows that ownership level is positively significantly 
related to the ROA performance measure
116
 – indicating the beneficial effects of 
family ownership. Increasing ownership by controlling families not only helps to curb 
the traditional agency problem of dispersed ownership structure, but the „incentive or 
alignment of interest effects‟ from concentrated ownership are more than offsetting 
the effects of owner-managers‟ entrenchment and expropriation. In principle, higher 
family ownership indicates a higher commitment of controlling families to improve 
firm performance as their wealth increases in tandem with improved performance.   
 
However, there is weak statistical evidence that the ROA performance measure is 
inversely related to the level of family ownership when controlling families have 
gained control of more than half of a firm‟s ownership. In this case, controlling 
families are more likely to expropriate or intensify their expropriation activities at the 
expense of overall firm efficiency and performance. This finding is in line with 
Shleifer and Vishny‟s (1997) observations that controlling shareholders that have 
„near full control‟ of firms may be wealthy enough to prefer to make use of the firms 
to maximize the private benefits of control rather than their wealth.  
 
2. In general, the identity of block-holders is somewhat important in influencing the 
performance of family-controlled firms. Specifically, two distinguished types of 
block-holders are found to be associated with greater performance of family-
controlled firms: foreign institutional investors and state/government block-holders. 
The study however does not find any significant influence of other types of block-
holders, namely domestic institutional investors, foreign corporations and 
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 The finding though is insignificant according to Tobin‟s Q performance measure.    
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auxiliary/unrelated family ownership, on firm performance. Meanwhile, this study 
lacks the evidence to suggest that ownership structure moderates the effects of firm 
diversification on performance. 
 
3. The findings on the influence of control-enhancing means employed by or associated 
with controlling families are overall mixed. In other words, the findings show that 
control-enhancing means can be „bad‟, „irrelevant‟ or even (surprisingly) „good‟ in 
influencing firm performance. Since the influence of each control-enhancing means 
on firm performance can be different, care should be taken not to categorize all as bad. 
The findings show that one of the family control-enhancing means, the proportion of 
family directors on the board is positively associated with firm performance.  
 
In contrast, „controlling family as the sole block-holder‟ as a control-enhancing 
means is negatively associated with the ROA performance measure. This suggests 
that unchecked family control (without the presence of a second block-holder) is bad 
for firm performance; this once again concurs with Shleifer and Vishny‟s (1997) 
observations. The study however does not find any evidence that „family members 
occupying both the CEO and chairmanship positions‟ is detrimental to firm 
performance.   
 
4. Overall, „board independence‟ does not interact with ownership structure to affect 
firm performance. In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that board 
independence influences the effects of ownership structure on firm performance. In 
the meantime, examination of the influence of board independence on the resource 
allocation (as measured by the capital expenditure ratio) of high-performing 
compared to low-performing firms in group-affiliated firms reveals that, among the 
three different attributes of board independence, only „proportion of independent 
directors‟ is found to positively affect the relationship between firm performance and 
resource allocation. In other words, in firms with a high proportion of independent 
directors, good-performing (deserving) firms received a significantly greater capital 
expenditure ratio and conversely poor-performing firms are associated with a lower 
capital expenditure ratio. Such a relationship (of efficient allocation of resources) 
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does not exist in firms with a low proportion of independent directors. Thus, it is 
implied that a high proportion of independent directors is able to curb the generally 
inefficient allocation of resources associated with group-affiliated firms.  
 
5. Among the three different attributes of board independence (proportion of 
independent directors, independent chairman and independent audit committee), only 
independent audit committee is found to positively moderate the effect of firm 
diversification on the ROA performance measure. In other words, the extent of 
diversification in firms associated with independent audit committees is positively 
related to ROA. Conversely, there is only weak evidence that a board with „an overall 
high degree of independence‟ (from all three attributes combined) positively 
moderates the diversification-performance relationship.       
 
6. Firms affiliated to family-controlled business groups are associated with poorer 
performance compared to firms without such affiliation (independent firms) 
particularly according to the ROA performance measure. Moreover, empirical 
evidence suggests that heterogeneity in family business groups, namely group size 
and group structure is important in explaining firm performance. Specifically, firms 
affiliated to large business groups and groups with pyramidal ownership structures 
perform worse than the remaining firms in the sample in terms of ROA. Moreover, 
allocation of resources as measured by the capital expenditure ratio is found to be 
inefficient in firms affiliated to business groups, whereas such inefficiency is not 
found in non-group firms. The inefficient allocation of resources may offer an 
explanation for the overall underperformance of group-affiliated firms compared to 
independent firms.   
 
7. In terms of the profit/resource redistribution hypothesis, there are a few noteworthy 
findings. Firstly, inefficient profit redistribution is found to occur among group-
affiliated firms whereby the divergence of cash flow-to-control rights positively 
moderates redistribution. This indicates that the higher the divergence of cash flow-
to-control rights, the greater the enhanced family control over the affiliates to 
facilitate such redistribution within the business group. Inefficient profit/resource 
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redistribution occurs where profits/resources are redistributed or transferred from 
good-performing firms, as measured by high Tobin‟s Q, to poorer performing firms 
as measured by low Tobin‟s Q.  
 
Secondly, the findings suggest that inefficient profit redistribution is concentrated 
mainly in large business groups rather than in small and intermediate size business 
groups, as far as Tobin‟s Q is concerned. The occurrence of profit redistribution 
within large business groups is „facilitated‟ by the extent of family ownership as well 
as the divergence of cash flow-to-control rights. In other words, the greater the family 
ownership or the divergence of cash flow-to-control rights, the greater the strength of 
family control over the affiliates to facilitate the redistribution, and thus more such 
redistribution will occur. Finally, the finding shows that inefficient profit 
redistribution is most severe in large business groups in which the controlling families 
have outright (majority) control ownership of the affiliates.  
 
In short, the finding implies that controlling families with excessive or enhanced 
control exploit their power to facilitate profit redistribution with the likely intention of 
stabilizing overall group profitability and thus the survivor of the group
117
 at the 
expense of the profitability of good-performing affiliates. This entrenched behaviour 
of controlling families adversely affects the interests of minority shareholders of 
good-performing affiliates. 
 
8. With regards to the examination of the firm diversification-related hypotheses, firstly, 
it is found that overall the extent of firm diversification is negatively associated with 
firm performance. Not only does diversification negatively affect accounting 
performance (ROA), the market (Tobin‟s Q) also does not respond well to the 
diversification and hence the more extensive the diversification is, the more the firm 
value will be marked down by the market. When the firms are separated into group-
affiliated and non-group affiliated categories, it is revealed that the underperformance 
of diversification in terms of ROA is associated mainly with group-affiliated firms 
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 The continuing survivor of the entire business group will ensure continuous private benefits for the 
controlling families of large business groups. 
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and not unaffiliated firms. It is also found that firm diversification is inversely related 
to the efficiency of asset utilization which is measured by the asset turnover ratio. 
This means that the greater the diversification, the less efficient the asset utilization 
and this relationship is particularly more noticeable in group-affiliated firms than in 
non-group firms. It suggests greater agency costs associated with diversified group-
affiliated firms compared to diversified non-group firms. This observation offers an 
explanation for the poorer performance of firms with extensive diversification, 
particularly those that are group-affiliated.  
 
9. The findings also reveal that the poor outcome of firm diversification, as measured by 
Tobin‟s Q in group-affiliated firms, is concentrated mainly in firms affiliated to large 
business groups as opposed to small and intermediate business groups. The evidence 
also shows that there is a negative relationship between diversification and 
performance in firms affiliated to business groups with complicated group structure 
compared to firms affiliated to business groups without complicated group structure. 
On the contrary, there is weak evidence to suggest that diversification in firms 
affiliated to small business groups and business groups without pyramidal structure is 
positively related to firm performance. Overall, the evidence (albeit weak) indicates 
that the size and the complexity of business groups negatively moderate the 
diversification-performance link. In other words, the larger the business group and the 
more complicated the group structure, the more detrimental the diversification to the 
performance of affiliated firms. This observation thus supports the expropriation 
hypothesis that the controlling families of large, complicated business groups are 
more inclined to expropriate the firms‟ resources in the name of diversification.              
 
The overall conclusion of the study is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion  
 
7.1   Chapter Outline 
 
This chapter consists of five sections. Armed with new findings, the first section discusses 
and revisits the literature review. It intends to draw the reader‟s attention to two fundamental 
points of the research: the reason why the research is undertaken and how the main findings 
are assessed and justified against related prior studies. This is followed by a section which 
discusses the policy implications of the study. The section emphasizes why Malaysia should 
have its own set of corporate governance problems and solutions which are different from 
those of the West but that nonetheless, this should not deter policy-makers learning from the 
western experience. Another important section included in this chapter is the contribution of 
the study to professional practice. This section begins with some discussion on the influence 
of the study on the professionalism of the researcher. It is followed by discussions on how 
the findings and knowledge obtained from the study can contribute to professional practice 
where corporate governance-related issues are emphasized and applied.   
 
Since no study is perfect, the last section of the chapter is devoted to discussion of the 
limitations of the study. The limitations are divided into „methodological limitations‟ and 
other „general limitations‟. Some limitations also illuminate opportunities for further study. 
Thus, embedded in this section are suggestions for future research. The chapter ends with a 
section of concluding remarks.    
   
7.2   Discussions and Literature Review Revisited   
The review paper by Young et al. (2008) and the survey paper by Claessens and Fan (2002) 
point out that principal-principal conflicts in emerging economies and East Asia (including 
Malaysia) are exacerbated, among other factors, by extensive family ownership and control, 
weak legal protection of minority shareholders, low corporate transparency associated with a 
relationship-based corporate environment, and the prevalence of business group structures 
and extensive firm diversification that underlie concentrated ownership structure. Thus, 
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based on the sample of 314 publicly-listed firms in Malaysia, this study is an attempt to 
explore the concerns as highlighted by Young et al. (2008) and Claessens and Fan (2002).  
Specifically, the study examined the influence of concentrated ownership and the underlying 
firm activities or practices on the performance of family-controlled firms. Both direct and 
moderating influences were examined by employing a multiple-regression analysis combined 
with the moderated regression technique. A number of noteworthy findings can be drawn 
from the study. To facilitate the discussion, the findings are grouped into the following 
divisions: findings surrounding concentrated ownership and control-enhancing issues; 
findings surrounding business group affiliation; findings surrounding diversification-related 
issues; and findings on the moderating role of board independence.  
 
Issues of Ownership Structure and Control-enhancing Means  
 
Firstly, the finding surrounding ownership and control issues shows that in general family 
ownership per se is beneficial to firm performance (as measured in ROA). This finding is 
consistent with the incentive or alignment of interest effects from agency theory (e.g. Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Morck, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) as well as the personalism and 
particularism effects of resource-based view (Carney, 2005; Poza, 2010). Empirically, it is 
consistent with other family ownership-related studies such as Anderson and Reeb (2003) in 
the US and Andres (2008) in Germany. The finding in this study implies that improved firm 
performance derived from the advantages associated with family ownership can occur in both 
developed economies as well as emerging economies, such as Malaysia.  
 
The finding is however inconsistent with that of Filatotchev et al. (2005) who assert that the 
cancelling out of entrenchment and incentive effects results in the „non-relationship‟ finding 
in their study on family ownership and firm performance in Taiwan. Finally, the finding is 
also in line with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who find a significant positive relationship 
between the combined ownership of the top five shareholders and accounting performance 
(ROA) but not the market-based performance (Tobin‟s Q) in Malaysian corporations. The 
following interpretation by the authors of their findings is also relevant to the findings in this 
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study
118
: the ability of concentrated ownership to improve firm performance is reflected in 
the enhanced accounting performance of firms but the market perceives that concentrated 
ownership may lead to ineffective monitoring and it is also not ideal for an emerging market 
which is attempting to attract more investors. Thus a higher valuation may be given by the 
market to firms with more diffused, and not concentrated, ownership.        
 
There is also evidence (albeit weak) from the findings in this study that supports the original 
proposal of Morck et al. (1988) and Stulz (1988) that when controlling shareholders have 
achieved a high level of effective control in their ownership, they will become more 
entrenched and more engaged in self-benefit or expropriation activities at the expense of firm 
performance. Other previous findings by authors such as Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) also support such an observation. In other words, the positive 
relationship of family ownership and firm performance may not be entirely linear, but may 
instead exhibit a concave downward relation especially towards the high end of family 
holdings when the deterioration of firm performance sets in. Nonetheless, other researchers, 
such as Andres (2008) and Chen et al. (2004), do not find a non-linear relationship between 
family ownership and firm performance. Thus, overall, it can be concluded that the presence 
of non-linearity in the ownership and performance relationship is an empirical issue that 
depends on the context in which the relationship is examined.    
 
The study also found that state ownership is positively significantly related to the 
performance of family-controlled firms. The finding is inconsistent with the typical view and 
previous studies that state ownership or state-owned organisations in competitive markets are 
inferior to those in private ownership and that state ownership is subject to „double agency 
problems‟ (Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Ramaswamy, 2001; Boycko et al., 1996). 
However, the main difference in this study compared to previous studies is that it does not 
involve state-dominated ownership but rather state ownership in family-controlled firms. 
Few studies of situations where ownership is mixed between family and state have been 
undertaken in the past. One such study is by Sun et al. (2002) in China who found a positive 
relationship between state ownership and performance of firms which had just experienced 
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 Because this study also finds a significant relationship with ROA but not with Tobin‟s Q.  
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an ownership change from being purely state-owned to partially state-owned and partially 
family-owned.  
 
The positive relationship between foreign institutional investors‟ shareholding and the 
performance of family-controlled firms found in this study is consistent with the literature 
that foreign institutional investors are seen as capable of exerting effective monitoring of 
owner-managers due to their „special‟ status and „pressure-resistant‟ status as explained in 
Young et al. (2008). The finding is also consistent with the practitioner survey conducted by 
McKinsey & Company (2002) on the foreign institutional investors‟ views on the association 
between their willingness to invest and the governance and performance of firms.     
 
However, this study does not find any relationship between the shareholdings of domestic 
public institutional investors (mainly the EPF and the PNB)
119
 in family-controlled firms and 
their performance. It implies that thus far public institutional investors in Malaysia have not 
been effective in monitoring and improving the performance of family-controlled firms in 
which they hold substantial shares. The finding is inconsistent with the literature in that the 
„pressure-resistant‟ status of some institutional investors such as pension funds and mutual 
funds lends itself to a more active monitoring role and also the higher possibility of 
challenging questionable decisions made by management (Brickley et al., 1988; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003; Kochar and David, 1996). Such an expected outcome from supposedly 
„pressure-resistant‟ investors in Malaysia does not materialize, possibly due to the „unique 
situation‟ faced by these investors. Specifically, the PNB may be giving priority to achieving 
the objective of increasing the Bumiputera‟s corporate ownership and not monitoring for 
enhanced firm performance, whereas the EPF‟s investment is seriously limited by the 
relatively small number of firms and the small market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia 
compared to the sheer size of its investment fund.          
 
The findings show that as far as the control-enhancing means are concerned, their influence 
on firm performance depends on the type of control-enhancing means employed. Specifically, 
two significant findings can be highlighted. First, the „proportion of family directors on the 
board‟ is positively associated with firm performance. This implies that the benefits (based 
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on resource-based view) derived from increased family participation on the board via family 
directors outweigh the agency costs associated with it. It suggests that controlling family 
directors are able to plough back more than they may have detracted from the firm (at least in 
the case of appointing family members as directors).  
 
The finding however contradicts with the findings by Yeh and Woidtke (2005) and Prabowo 
and Simpson (2011) in Indonesia for instance that „family directors on the board‟ is a 
control-enhancing means that is detrimental to firm performance. They contend their finding 
implies that the entrenchment effect due to family involvement in the board is greater than 
the „alignment effect‟. The finding from this study however proves otherwise. The 
contradictory findings of the two studies could be due to „contextual factors‟ as firms in 
Malaysia and Indonesia are subject to many country-specific contexts such as legal systems, 
accounting, audit and disclosure standards, cultural and socio-economic status and the 
severity of corruption. In addition, a comparison of corporate governance country 
assessments conducted by the World Bank (2004, 2005) on Malaysia and Indonesia shows 
that the extent of the observance of good governance is higher in Malaysia than Indonesia in 
virtually all categories of corporate governance practices.  
 
Second, family control that is enhanced by controlling families being the sole block-holder 
without the presence of a second block-holder is negatively associated with firm performance. 
This implies that expropriation of minority shareholders can be great without the presence of 
a second block-holder to monitor the controlling family. This finding is consistent (albeit 
weakly) with studies such as Dahya et al. (2008), Claessens et al. (2000), and Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon (2000) who assert that a second block-holder particularly with a block-holding of 
at least 10% would be sufficient to balance the power and dominance of the controlling 
family.  
 
The finding is however inconsistent with Yeh and Woidtke (2005) who do not find any 
significant relationship between the presence of a second large shareholder and firm 
performance. Their insignificant result could be due to the fact that they use a 5% 
shareholding as the acceptable level to acknowledge the presence of a second block-holder, 
whereas this current study and others, such as Dahya et al. (2008) and Claessens et al. (2000), 
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suggest a minimum of a 10% shareholding to be sufficient to „cause concern‟ for the 
controlling families.  
 
Business Group Affiliation and Related Issues  
 
Findings surrounding group affiliation show that overall, firms affiliated to a business group 
perform worse than unaffiliated, freestanding firms. Firms affiliated to business groups also 
succumb to inefficient allocation of resources which may explain their underperformance 
compared to unaffiliated firms. This finding is consistent with Joh (2003) but is opposed to 
that of Chang and Choi (1988). These studies were conducted among Korean firms with 
more than a 10-year time lapse between the samples used in both studies. This study is also 
consistent with George and Kabir (2008) but is opposed to that of Khanna and Palepu 
(2000a). Again, these studies were conducted in the same country, India, but with a time 
lapse of seven years between the samples used in both studies. The above observations may 
imply that the time period is a crucial factor affecting the results of the studies; as proposed 
by Chang (2006) and Peng et al. (2005), as time passes, the economy progresses and 
institutions develop and improve and the „internal market‟ benefits of business groups that 
could fill the „institutional voids‟ in the economy gradually disappear. Therefore, Malaysia 
with its more developed external markets including its capital markets (compared to other 
emerging economies) (Claessens et al., 2000; Singh and Zainal, 2005) and the poorer 
performance of group-affiliated firms as found in this study, looking to the future, 
justification for the existence of business groups in Malaysia could be undermined.                        
 
The more detailed analysis shows that firms affiliated to „large‟ business groups perform 
worse than other firms in the sample. This finding is again consistent with Joh (2003) but 
inconsistent with Khanna and Palepu (2000a) and George and Kabir (2008). According to 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a), one of the reasons for the positive relationship between large 
business groups and firm performance in their study in India is that large business groups are 
able to derive economic benefits from their closer ties with politics and the government (e.g. 
better access to the state‟s resources, contracts and trade protection).  
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However, the similarly close connections of large business groups with the ruling party and 
government in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Searle, 1999; Nazli and Weetman, 2006; 
Yeoh, 2010) do not translate into improved, but instead poorer, firm performance. One 
possibility for such a discrepancy in both studies could be due to the much larger size of 
domestic market in India than Malaysia; the effects from its economic benefits (which are 
brought about by the political connections) are intensified by large economies of scale. 
Consequently, the benefits turn out to be greater than the costs associated with expropriation 
even though expropriation is likely to be more serious in business groups with political 
connections or protection. As a result, the performance of firms affiliated to large business 
groups improves in India. However, in Malaysia, such „synergy‟ from the economic benefits 
of political connections and the resultant economies of scale is relatively small due to the 
small domestic market. As a result, the smaller economic benefits are outweighed by the 
agency costs of expropriation and thus firm performance suffers.       
 
The evidence of profit redistribution in business groups in this study is mixed. There is 
significant evidence of profit redistribution from good-performing group affiliates to poor-
performing affiliates when Tobin‟s Q is used as the performance measure but not when the 
ROA is used. The significant finding with Tobin‟s Q implies that the market is able to price 
in the practice of profit redistribution which is facilitated by the divergence of cash flow-to-
control rights. The overall finding on profit redistribution in this study is thus partially in line 
with the significant evidence found in Lincoln et al. (1996), Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002), 
Bertrand et al. (2002) and George and Kabir (2008). The finding is also consistent with the 
„propping up hypothesis‟ of Friedman et al. (2003) and Cheung et al. (2006, 2009b) in which 
profits or resources are redistributed to „prop up‟ underperforming firms.    
 
Further analysis revealed that profit redistribution is found to be associated with large 
business groups rather than small and intermediate size business groups. The finding is 
consistent with George and Kabir (2008) who also find a similar result in India. It is found 
that the extent of family ownership positively moderates profit redistribution in large 
business groups, particularly when the controlling families have outright (majority) 
ownership control over the firms. It can be argued from the finding that since large business 
groups are generally more inclined to political connections, profit redistribution with the 
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intention to stabilize a group‟s profitability becomes more critical for large business groups 
because, as explained by Estrin et al. (2009), group stability would be seen as a means to 
maintain a group‟s (and thus its controlling family‟s) political power and political 
connections. It can therefore be suggested that profit redistribution serves more the agenda of 
controlling families at the expense of the performance of good-performing affiliates and their 
minority shareholders.  
 
Firm Diversification and Related Issues 
 
Findings surrounding firm diversification show that in general diversification is not 
beneficial to firm performance as increases in firm diversification are associated with 
deteriorating performance. This is particularly true for group-affiliated firms. The finding is 
in line with the explanation by Singh et al. (2007) that the probability of agency-driven and 
thus value-destroying diversification is greater in situations where the market for corporate 
control is inactive and where the corporate sector is dominated by family-controlled business 
groups and concentrated family ownership. The finding thus implies that principal-principal 
agency costs of diversification in family-controlled firms in Malaysia outweigh 
diversification benefits of resource-based view as explained by Martin and Sayrak (2003). 
The finding that diversification performance is worse in group-affiliated firms than in non-
group firms is also consistent with Lins and Servaes‟s (2002) and Chakrabarti‟s et al. (2007) 
proposal that there is a lack of valid reasons to diversify at the firm level when the task can 
be more efficiently fulfilled at the group level.            
 
Further evidence reveals that the poor performance outcome of firm diversification may be 
explained by the poor efficiency of asset utilization. This is consistent with Ang‟s et al. 
(2000) proposal [later followed by others such as Fleming et al. (2005) and Florackis (2008)] 
that a firm‟s agency costs can be measured by the efficiency of its asset utilization.                      
 
The findings in this study also highlighted that the effect of diversification on the 
performance of group-affiliated firms is negatively moderated by the size as well as the 
complexity of business groups. This infers that diversification is more detrimental to 
performance in firms affiliated to „large‟ business groups and business groups with 
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„complicated‟ structures than small and intermediate size business groups and business 
groups without complicated structures. These findings are in line with the viewpoints of La 
Porta et al. (1999), Khanna and Palepu (2000b) and Young et al. (2008) that complicated 
business groups are sometimes formed by controlling shareholders to reduce the threat to 
their control and to enable them to engage in various questionable practices or business deals 
(including firm diversification) for expropriation purposes. Moreover, business groups, 
particularly those large in size or with complicated structures, are also more likely to be 
linked to the “political apparatus in the country (that) also insulate them from external 
interference and monitoring” (Khanna and Palepu, 2000b, p.265). In short, the findings 
support the idea that firm diversification in large or complicated business groups is likely to 
be used by controlling families to advance personal, family or political agendas to the 
detriment of firm performance.  
 
Board Independence Issues 
 
Finally, findings on the moderating roles of board independence show that, overall, the 
influence of board independence in moderating the effects of ownership and other underlying 
firm activities/governance-related variables on firm performance is rather limited. This 
observation is inconsistent, for instance, with Dahya et al. (2008) who find a significant 
positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and Tobin‟s Q based on 
their study across 22 countries, the majority of which were developed countries (such as the 
US, the UK, Japan, Canada and other western European countries) and a handful of emerging 
countries. The authors assert that a robust market for independent directors exists in the 
board membership of the firms in their sample. Also, as they contend, the independent 
directors in their sample have an incentive to monitor the controlling shareholders because 
“failure to monitor could mean a loss in their human capital in terms of the lost 
opportunities for other board positions” (Dahya et al., 2008, p.96).  
 
In contrast, and as discussed earlier, unlike developed countries, Malaysia lacks a credible 
market for independent directors. In fact, the pool of independent directors in Malaysia has 
always been confined to individuals with backgrounds that are associated with politics, 
government and royal families. It can thus be asserted that the above statement by Dahya et 
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al. (2008) is likely not the case in Malaysia because the appointment of these Malaysian 
directors is a result of their background. With many of them serving in the figurehead role, 
there is virtually no risk of forfeiting directorship opportunities in other firms even if their 
„monitoring‟ is essentially non-existent. Thus, in general, the finding on the moderating 
influence of independent directors in Malaysia implies that they may not be truly 
independent from the controlling families, to exert effective monitoring for the enhancement 
of firm performance.                          
 
Only in two instances in this study is board independence able to exert positive moderating 
effects. First it is found that group-affiliated firms with a „high‟ proportion of independent 
directors are associated with more efficient allocation of resources compared to their 
counterparts who have a „low‟ proportion of independent directors. Second, firms in which 
the board‟s audit committee is fully occupied by independent directors positively moderate 
the effect of firm diversification on ROA. This finding is comparable to Chen and Chen 
(2012) who find a significant positive relationship between the investment efficiency of 
diversified firms and an audit committee composed entirely of independent directors.  
 
The above two instances suggest that it is not all bleak for the independent director role in 
Malaysia. It is believed that through proper implementation of trainings and enhanced public 
awareness, corporate Malaysia will be able to produce more credible independent directors in 
the future and a clearer relationship between greater board independence and enhanced firm 
performance will be observed.        
 
The next section discusses the policy implications of the findings in this study. 
 
7.3   Policy Implications  
  
Some implications for policy-makers can be drawn from the findings in this study. Firstly, 
the findings reflect that corporate governance issues in emerging economies such as Malaysia 
may require different solutions from those produced by the conventional agency theory 
perspective that neglects institutional differences (Lubatkin et al., 2005). Using policy 
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designed for developed countries may not necessarily be effective and may even be 
counterproductive for developing countries. For instance, using increasing ownership to 
solve the agency problem as suggested in the Jensen and Meckling hypothesis (1976) may 
not work in the case of principal- principal conflicts. The findings in this study indicate that 
giving more control to already powerful controlling families (e.g. when they have the 
majority ownership and control) may further enhance their ability to expropriate and cause 
firm performance to deteriorate.  
 
However, the findings at the same time also point out that when controlling families do not 
have the absolute ownership and control over the firm (i.e. non-majority ownership); 
increasing their ownership level is actually beneficial to firm performance. Therefore, it is 
proposed that regulators formulate policies that are able to encourage controlling families to 
keep their ownership level below majority. For instance, incentive measures such as tax 
incentives can be considered for such purpose. At the same time, policy-makers should have 
a clear direction in addressing the „ownership-performance‟ issue in family-controlled firms. 
It is therefore proposed that policy-makers should be striving towards exploiting the strength 
of family ownership as a governance mechanism. This can be done by directing policies and 
plans that help to curb the potential power-abusing of controlling families but nonetheless 
preserve the uniqueness/traits of „familiness‟ and the positive characteristics of the family 
form of governance (such as personalism and particularism) that give advantages to family-
controlled firms. For instance, as evidenced from this study, promoting a second block-
holder with shareholding of at least ten percent or above in family-controlled firms is an 
example in which the dominance of controlling families can be counter-balanced with their 
„familiness‟ remains intact.   
 
Over reliance on corporate governance codes from the West should also be avoided as can be 
seen in the case of independent directors versus family directors in this study. The proposal 
by certain parties such as the Securities Commission Malaysia in their latest issue of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) (that will take effect from 31 
December 2012) to increase the minimum stipulated proportion of independent directors in 
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publicly listed firms from the current one-third to one-half of the board
120
, as practiced in the 
US, might result in unexpected negative outcomes in firm performance. This is because 
increasing the number of independent directors on the board may only fulfil the requirement 
on paper and not in substance. Another alternative explanation for possible negative outcome 
is that the additional costs associated with more independence cause firm performance to be 
adversely affected. Moreover, an increase in the proportion of independent directors will 
directly affect the number of family directors. A lower proportion of family directors is 
associated with deteriorating firm performance as evidenced in this study. The implication to 
policy-makers such as the Securities Commission Malaysia is that they should recognize that 
future governance frameworks of organisations and corporate governance codes should be 
drafted to account for the fact that conceptualization of corporate governance should not be 
limited to the agency theory perspective only. Broader environmental influencing forces that 
can be conceptualized by other perspectives such as resource-based view should be 
considered so that the gap between theory and practice in corporate governance can be 
reduced. 
 
Secondly, the policy-makers should formulate more strategies to attract more foreign 
institutional investors to invest in publicly-listed firms in Malaysia. Controlling families may 
realize that reducing their expropriation activities and improving their corporate governance 
is worthwhile as this will draw more foreign institutional investment into their stocks. The 
subsequent increase in their wealth due to the improving valuation of their stock will more 
than offset their forgone private gains from expropriation activities. Some of the 
strategies/policies that policy-makers can consider are as follows: First, improving the tax 
treatment to foreign institutional investors in respect of income from stocks and capital gains. 
It is a straight forward way to pull more foreign investors into the market. Second, further 
liberalization of capital market such as easing of the quota requirement for Bumiputera 
ownership in Malaysian listed firms should also be studied. Third, due to the nature of 
concentrated ownership structure, the free float level of stocks
121
 in Malaysia is rather low. 
According to the chief executive officer of Bursa Malaysia, the current free float level of 40-
                                                          
120
 This proposal is currently targeted at firms with boards of directors where the chairman is not an independent 
director.  
121
 Free float refers to the proportion of shares that are held by minority shareholders who are likely to be 
willing to trade. 
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45% for the overall stock market in Malaysia should be further increased to 60% (The Edge, 
1 July, 2009). Increasing the free float level is an important step to enhance the vibrancy of 
Bursa Malaysia and subsequently, attract more foreign investors. As far as family-controlled 
firms are concerned, under the current setting, policies should be directed to encourage those 
controlling families with majority ownership to dispose some of their shareholdings to free 
up more shares for foreign investors. A low level of free float tends to create liquidity 
problems that may deter foreign investors from investing in the market.                                          
 
Though increasing foreign investors‟ ownership may contribute to improved corporate 
governance and performance, the same cannot be said to domestic public institutional 
investors even though they are also deemed as a group of „pressure-resistant‟ investors. As 
already discussed in the earlier chapters, the constraints and political „reality‟ faced by the 
top domestic institutional investors in Malaysia (i.e. EPF and PNB) could have prohibited 
them from exerting effective control and monitor on the owner-managers. Political will is 
thus needed to „free‟ the domestic public institutional investors from being continually 
„hijacked‟ by the ruling party for political agenda. For instance, the investment ideology of 
PNB should be updated in accordance with the economic development and improvement in 
the social status in the country. Likewise, EPF should not “always need to be holding the 
baby”122 (The Star, 6 April 2010) and instead should be allowed to increase their proportion 
of investment in overseas so that a more selective choice can be made in respect of their 
investment in Bursa Malaysia. The above suggestions will then make possible to both 
institutional investors (EPF and PNB) to be more engaged with owner-managers to improve 
their corporate governance. Malaysia will then be more ready to have a similar code as the 
UK Stewardship Code 2010 that releases the guidelines for institutional investors on how to 
enhance the quality of engagement with their investee companies.           
 
Thirdly, the findings on group affiliation issues imply that regulators such as the Securities 
Commission should pay more attention to business group activities, particularly those carried 
out by business groups that are large in size and complicated in their group structure. 
Authorities such as Bursa Malaysia may need to revise their listing requirements and 
regulations to curb potential expropriation by controlling shareholders. One potential area of 
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  See sub-section 6.2.6 for the first appearance of the phrase.   
264 
 
abuse, particularly by the controlling families of large and complex business groups, is 
related party transactions (RPTs). Profit redistribution is often an RPT. Due to the large 
number of affiliates and the complex relationships among them, transparency in RPTs may 
be low in large and complex business groups. Thus Bursa Malaysia needs to upgrade its 
regulations on RPTs in order to ensure that public shareholders and the affiliates of business 
groups will not be taken for granted by controlling shareholders in RPTs. 
 
The experiences of the US and UK in dealing with pyramidal business groups by relying on 
takeover rules (in the case of the UK) and tax reform (in the case of the US) are illuminating. 
Pyramidal business groups persisted in the UK until the 1970s when the takeover rule was 
amended by the British government to „get rid‟ of business groups, after pressure from 
institutional investors who were dismayed over corporate governance problems in business 
groups (Morck, 2005). In the US, pyramidal business groups disappeared from the corporate 
scene much earlier. It is believed that the existence of pyramidal business groups is one of 
the factors which lead to the 1929 Great Depression in the US (Morck, 2005). Business 
groups were prevalent in the US prior to the corporate tax reform by the Roosevelt 
Administration in 1935. The tax reform caused the earnings of firms at the lower tier of the 
pyramid to be taxed repeatedly as they moved up the multiple tiers of the pyramidal structure. 
This caused the structure to be unviable and pyramidal business groups were forced to sell 
off subsidiaries or buy them outright and consequently pyramids became extinct (Schneider, 
2009).  
 
Though drastic reform, as seen in the US and UK, to eliminate pyramidal business groups 
may not be practical in Malaysia for the foreseeable future due to the different institutional 
background, the lesson that can be learned is for government to consider minor reform 
initially, for example, of takeover rules or the tax policy to create incentives for business 
groups to retain a certain size or level of group structure complexity, or otherwise penalize 
them if their group structure exceeds a certain size or level of complexity. Since the findings 
in this study have shown that business groups that are large in size and complicated in group 
structure are associated with high agency problems and thus poorer firm efficiency and 
performance, a plausible solution is to control their group size and complexity. To achieve 
that objective, government reformers must be fully empowered to execute the task despite 
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expected resistance from certain groups such as political elites or government officials who 
are allies of the controlling families of the business groups. For that to happen, political will 
is important to first reform public governance in order to effectively control problems such as 
cronyism, corruption and money politics and to reduce political interference in businesses.             
 
Fourthly, the issue of firm diversification is associated with takeover policy. The generally 
unfavourable outcomes of firm diversification in this study imply that diversification is 
pursued by controlling families for the consumption of private benefits which adversely 
impacts firm efficiency and performance. This suggests that there may be weaknesses in the 
regulation of takeovers and disclosure requirements on transactions between bidder and seller 
as well as the disclosure requirements of diversification. Controlling families could increase 
firm diversification through takeovers that increase the probability of minority shareholder 
oppression such as misallocation of resources, transfer pricing and insider trading. The 
finding that negative outcomes of diversification are more prevalent in firms affiliated to 
large business groups and business groups with complicated structures again implies that 
poor corporate transparency in these business groups leads to severe expropriation. This 
consequently reaffirms the researcher‟s earlier suggestion that the size, as well as the 
complexity of business group structures, is worthy of regulators‟ attention.     
 
Finally, the findings on the moderating roles or influence of board independence in this study 
imply that the current process of nominating and appointing independent directors may need 
to be revised as it does not contain a proper system to prohibit controlling families from 
influencing the appointment of independent directors.
123
 Thus more diligence is required to 
ensure that the independent directors appointed are truly independent. The weakness of the 
current appointment system often leaves public shareholders with little alternative but to 
approve the „whole package‟ proposed by the controlling shareholders.   
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 For more details on the guideline in appointing independent directors to the board, see the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (Revised 2007), p.11.   
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7.4   Contribution to Professional Practice 
 
As a full-time university academic in the field of finance who is also a CFA
124
 charterholder, 
the author also practices freelance investment consulting. The findings in this study can be 
used to further enhance his career in both teaching (including research) and consulting. 
Corporate governance, as a standalone subject, has become an important taught course in 
business schools, an important element in corporate finance teaching lately and an important 
consideration in the investment arena. As discussed in earlier chapters, corporate governance 
concerns in Malaysia surround issues inherent in concentrated ownership structures. Thus the 
knowledge acquired from the study can be applied directly to classroom teaching and 
investment consultancy work. The author acknowledges frustration in relation to the failure 
of some teaching to provide students with knowledge of a real-world view and case studies 
of corporate Malaysia. As virtually all textbooks and references are written by authors from 
the US and UK, it is difficult to source teaching materials that reflect the corporate 
environment and practice in Malaysia. Therefore, the author plans to use as much material as 
possible from this study in his teaching of „Corporate Finance‟ and „Corporate Governance‟ 
modules for the final year undergraduate and postgraduate programmes offered within the 
business school of the university.      
 
The emphasis of the dispersed ownership structure and the traditional principal-agent 
problem as the theoretical basis in writing corporate finance and corporate governance 
textbooks by US and UK authors [including the two popular corporate finance texts: 
Principles of Corporate Finance by Brealey et al. (2007) and Corporate Finance by Ross et 
al. (2010)] does not reflect the corporate reality in Malaysia, though they still serve well in 
equipping students with rigorous finance theories and applications from a Western 
perspective. This study helps to close the gap in corporate governance and finance teaching 
at university level in this country in several ways. The „literature review section‟ can be used 
to enrich teaching materials relevant to Malaysian corporations. Many useful journal articles 
cited in the study can be compiled as suitable references for relevant courses. Most 
importantly, the „analysis and findings section‟ in this study contributes to filling the gap of 
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 CFA stands for Chartered Financial Analyst. It is a professional qualification in finance and investment 
awarded by the CFA Institute. The details are available from the CFA Institute website.  
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discussing real-world Malaysian corporate governance-related issues in classroom teaching. 
The „methodology section‟ of the study is useful as a reference for students who are 
interested in writing a research paper or dissertation in a similar area.  
 
Since 2003, the author has been involved in conducting classes and providing training for 
investment professionals preparing for professional examinations. He plans to apply the 
knowledge acquired from this study to expand his teaching to encompass adult corporate 
training, involving corporate finance/governance, as there is an increasing demand for such 
training for company secretaries, executives and directors. With a doctorate in business, the 
author believes that it would be a good starting point for him to become an effective trainer 
for the corporate training and investor education programmes. Some of these training 
programmes are offered by the HRDB-registered Training Providers.
125
 They include the 
training arms of regulators such as Bursa Malaysia and Companies Commission of Malaysia 
(CCM) and non-profit organizations such as the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) and the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). Likewise, the 
author may have more opportunities to join as a trainer/consultant at the University‟s Centre 
for Consultancy & Development (CCD) that provides company in-house training 
programmes and consultancy work. In short, the education and training gained by the author 
throughout his DBA research that emphasize on practicality are valuable in helping him to 
meet some of the challenges as a corporate trainer in the future. Finally, the study also 
contributes to the scholarly activities of the author. For instance, a paper co-written by the 
author and his supervisors at an earlier stage of the study was submitted on 31 October 2011 
for consideration of journal publication.               
         
This study makes a contribution to consulting firms providing corporate governance 
consultancy service to corporate clients in Malaysia. It informs corporate governance 
consultants, among others, about the most recent issues and concerns of corporate 
governance and development in the emerging economies of East Asia (including Malaysia). 
As previously unseen emphasis is now placed on corporate governance in the corporate 
sector, following development in advanced economies such as the US, corporate governance 
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 These are the training providers registered with the Human Resource Development Berhad (HRDB) of the 
Ministry of Human Resource, Malaysia. 
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consultancy work is expected to become more important in the future in emerging economies. 
Conventional corporate governance consultancy normally focuses on the issue of board 
governance and may overlook other aspects of corporate governance. As this study has 
shown, corporate governance of family-controlled firms in Malaysia is more complicated 
than the issue of board governance as it involves various governance issues that are linked to 
concentrated ownership structure. Thus the knowledge provided in this study illuminates how 
other governance issues are useful and can be incorporated into consultancy work. For 
instance, many poorly managed companies could be significantly improved if the knowledge 
of ownership structure and its related governance issues involving the use of control-
enhancing means, business group affiliation, firm diversification and board independence 
were properly understood and utilized to brainstorm for better solutions to corporate strategy 
and governance issues faced by corporate clients.  
 
Specifically, the findings reveal a few key dimensions of concentrated ownership structure 
that corporate governance consultants in Malaysia can (and should) be looking at: the 
transparency issue of firms affiliated to business groups, the sensibleness and disclosure issue 
of profit redistribution (including related party transactions), the mitigation of undue firm 
diversification, the quality of board independence, and the participation of a second block-
holder. Even the most sensitive issue of ownership structure including the searching and fine-
tuning for an appropriate level of family ownership can be explored together with the 
controlling families as the finding in this study has indicated their relevance to firm 
performance. 
 
It is nonetheless acknowledged that solutions to corporate governance issues are potentially 
much more challenging in Malaysia compared to the US and UK due to the dominance of 
controlling families who may be reluctant to co-operate. However, not all the families are 
closed-minded on governance-related issues. It is not impossible to convince some 
controlling families in finding solutions to governance issues their firms face when they 
realize that they will be disadvantaged in the longer term by resisting the global movement of 
corporate governance. Moreover, with further liberalization in the capital market, global 
investor community has the ability to devise inducements that will encourage controlling 
families voluntarily to make some concessions to improve their corporate governance. Many 
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family-controlled firms that have just passed over the business to the next generation have 
also started to think about „professionalizing‟ their firms. All of the above present 
opportunities for consulting firms to introduce the above mentioned „different dimensions‟ of 
corporate strategy and governance plans for their clients.  
    
This study helps investment professionals such as analysts and fund managers to understand 
not only how, but why, firm performance could be influenced by ownership structure and the 
underlying firm attributes and activities. Investment professionals will be informed by the 
findings as to how different firm structures determine corporate governance and the effects of 
those firm-level governance choices on firm performance. The oft-cited global survey by the 
renowned management consulting firm McKinsey & Company in 2002 shows that 
institutional investors value corporate governance and are willing to pay a premium for 
stocks of well-governed companies. Thus the knowledge from this study may help enhance 
the process of investment decision-makings, particularly the corporate governance risk 
assessment/analysis for investments such as „corporate governance screening process‟, before 
a particular stock/firm is considered for investment. The findings could thus be used as a 
reference guide by the professionals to enhance or complement their existing corporate 
governance risk assessment/analysis. Such enhancement to the risk assessment is particularly 
relevant to investment professionals that are involved in long-term investment industries such 
as pension funds and insurance companies.      
 
Specifically, it would be useful if the findings on the influence of concentrated ownership 
and its underlying „governance-concerned firm activities/strategies or practices‟, together 
with their moderating effects, on firm performance, could be adopted into the governance 
risk assessment or screening process. This can increase the chances that firms selected into 
the investment portfolio are those that bear lower risk of expropriation and possess better 
overall governance structures to support sustainable growth over the long term. For instance, 
the negative findings of firms affiliated to business groups with opaque ownership structure, 
extensive firm diversification particularly when it occurs in group-affiliated firms, and firms 
without participation of a second block-holder could all well serve as among the key risks 
and potential red flags in the risk assessment of investment analysis. Conversely, the 
generally insignificant findings of the moderating roles of board independence (such as the 
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proportion of independent directors on the board) may indicate that the independence exists 
only „on paper‟ and will thus have minimal bearing on firm performance. Therefore, 
investment analysts should be more cautious in using such criteria as „board independence‟ 
in their „positive screening‟126 of stocks. The study reveals that more homework needs to be 
done by investment analysts than merely relying on what appears on the documentation. It 
informs the investment professionals what to look for in their governance assessment or 
screening process and what some of the important ownership and underlying firm activities 
are that need to be given due attention. In short, the findings indicate to investment 
professionals what matters and what does not really matter in Malaysia with respect to 
corporate governance analysis for investment decisions.  
 
Discussion from the above paragraph suggests that the findings in this study could serve as a 
starting point for investment analysts to develop a series of indicators of the „potential risks 
of expropriation by controlling families‟ and subsequently, class the firms into a few 
different groups based on the scores obtained from the indicators. Different weights can also 
be assigned to individual indicators by the analysts based on their assessment of each 
indicator‟s overall importance to successful corporate governance, i.e. minimization of the 
potential expropriation risks. As an illustration, firms can either be classed as having high, 
moderate or low potential expropriation risks with respect to the total scores received. In this 
way, it helps the analysts to better identify firms where corporate governance is, or may be, 
problematic. It should nevertheless be reminded that such consideration given to the risk 
assessment does not mean that investment professionals should totally rule out the possibility 
of investing in family-controlled firms with a high risk of expropriation, but rather that they 
should ensure that they are fully aware of the risks associated with investing in such firms 
and have already explicitly considered the governance issues of these firms before investing.   
 
Another related area of contribution is that the knowledge gained from the study helps 
investment professionals in introducing and managing various types of corporate 
governance-related investment funds; for instance, funds that are based on ownership 
structure and control or funds that take into consideration variables of governance concerned 
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 „Positive screening‟ involves investing in firms with a commitment to responsible business practices such as 
favouring investments with best corporate governance practice, whereas „negative screening‟ involves avoiding 
investments that do not meet certain criteria/standard of the investment policy statement. 
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such as group affiliation and firm diversification. This study is also useful for investment 
professionals to offer „shareholder engagement‟127 funds where firms selected into the fund 
will be engaged to improve their governance-related activities and policy. According to the 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA, 2007), one of the problems in introducing 
shareholder engagement corporate governance-related funds in Asia is a lack of experts who 
have both investment and corporate governance experience and competency to run such 
funds. The knowledge from this study contributes towards the management of such funds. 
Moreover, the knowledge from this study also contributes to introducing various types of 
„family-controlled‟ funds – funds investing exclusively in stocks of family-controlled firms. 
Professionals from countries such as Germany have introduced such funds and received a 
good response from investors (Jaskiewicz and Klein, 2005).       
 
7.5   Limitations of Study and Suggestions for Future Research   
 
The results drawn from this study should be interpreted with the limitations in mind. Some 
limitations represent potential opportunities for further investigation in future studies. The 
limitations can be grouped into methodological limitations and other general limitations. 
Below are the points of discussion:  
 
7.5.1   Methodological Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
 
1. The analysis was conducted using cross-sectional data for a single year. Since 
collection of a full spectrum of ownership structure data is a highly time-consuming 
task, the time constraints of the study do not allow for multiple-year data collection. 
This limitation precluded the opportunity of employing panel data sets to perform a 
longitudinal/panel data analysis. Future study should attempt to employ a panel data 
study. As panel data integrate both cross-sectional and time-series data of the same 
variables, they can be more informative and can more easily illuminate effects or 
                                                          
127
 Shareholder engagement is an investment approach associated with „engagement with the firm‟ rather than 
stock picking. Institutional investors directly engage with the company board/management to seek changes to 
company strategies/activities, policy, or even replacement of chairman or CEO (ACGA, 2007). CalPERS is 
among the pioneers that implement the „shareholder engagement‟ approach in investment. More details are 
available from CalPERS‟ official website.   
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measure relationships that simply cannot be detected in pure cross-section or pure 
time-series data analysis (Nazrul et al., 2008; Gujarati, 2004). Thus the results might 
differ if analysis based on panel data is used.   
 
2. Another caveat is related to the model specification used. Though the study has 
attempted to include relevant variables, including the control variables in the 
regression analysis (as guided by the literature), it should be disclosed that the 
specifications of model employed may not be completely error-free. One potential 
problem that is sometimes associated with cross-sectional regression is 
misspecification of model. For instance the specification employed might encounter 
the problem of a missing variable. The relationship (or non-relationship) observed in 
the regression might be caused by the unobserved excluded variable, causing the 
inferences from the regression to be biased.    
 
3. Though this study highlighted the close relationship between business and politics in 
Malaysia, due to the unavailability of data, it is difficult to explicitly assign a variable 
as the proxy for the firms that have close political connection versus firms that do not. 
This however is partly compensated as, from the literature, for example, by Gomez 
and Jomo (1997), Johnson and Mitton (2003) and Gomez (2006), it can be perceived 
that generally, firms that are affiliated to „large‟ and „complex‟ business groups are 
more likely to be closely associated with senior government officials and politicians. 
Attention to business-political connections in this study is paid particularly to these 
firms whereby specific variables are assigned to represent them in the analysis. The 
caveat is that focusing on firms affiliated to large and complex business groups may 
falsely signal that political interference in business is not a concern in firms that do 
not belong to these groups. As discussed in the literature review section, due to its 
peculiar affirmative economic policy, political interference in Malaysian business is 
wide-ranging, regardless of the size of firms or business groups. The attention paid to 
firms affiliated to large and complicated groups only serves to indicate that political 
connection is more pronounced in these firms compared to other firms.    
 
4. The study offered in the methodology chapter the reasons why endogeneity in the 
regression with the family ownership variable is unlikely to be serious. Endogeneity 
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is also unlikely in other variables such as group affiliation. In Malaysia, firms do not 
choose which business group they want to join; it is the controlling families who 
decide how they want to create their group structure. Thus the argument that group 
affiliation, including affiliation to certain group sizes, is affected by firm performance 
is unlikely. Nonetheless, since endogeneity problems may cause biased results and 
although they are unlikely to be serious in this study, the possibility of some level of 
endogeneity in some variables cannot be totally ruled out. In this case, future 
researchers may want to consider other more advanced statistical techniques such as 
the two-stage least square model (2SLS) to explicitly account for the possibility of 
endogeneity in the regressions.  
 
5. The size of business groups in this study is proxied by the number of publicly-listed 
firms affiliated to the group. However, the size of business groups can also be 
measured differently, such as by total value. It is possible that some business groups 
may be large in terms of their total group value but have few listed affiliates as most 
of the member firms are unlisted. Thus measuring business groups solely by the 
number of listed firms may not reflect the true size of the business group in terms of 
its total group value. The inability to include unlisted firms in the analysis may cause 
biased results. This is acknowledged by Claessens et al. (2002) who also only include 
the listed firms in their study of ownership and business groups in Asia. This 
limitation is however not believed to be serious as large business groups usually tend 
to have many member firms, therefore the chances of more member firms being listed 
in the exchange are also higher.  
 
6. As far as profit redistribution in business groups is concerned, this study relies only 
on the analysis of a one-year interval. However, the assumption that the one-year gap 
is sufficient for finding evidence (if any) of profit redistribution may not be true for 
some affiliated firms as a gestation period longer than one year may be required. This 
means that the findings on profit redistribution may not capture all possibilities of 
profit redistribution that occur for longer than a single year.   
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7.5.2    General Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 
1. Since the 2008 data on firm performance is used in the analysis, the findings in this 
study may thus be more reflective of the slower pace of Malaysian economic growth 
of 4.6% recorded for that year than the stable economic growth of around 6% for the 
country.
128
 Future research may investigate the finding differentials under different 
economic conditions. This is because according to Johnson and Mitton (2003) and 
Lins (2003), the inclination of controlling shareholders to expropriate a firm‟s 
resources will be higher during a period of economic downturn. Though the economic 
climate of 2008 for Malaysia is not considered as „bad‟, it was by no means a 
satisfactory growth for the country. Thus by conducting further study for a different 
time period when economic growth is stable; comparison with the findings in this 
study can be drawn in order to verify whether they have changed or remain 
unaffected. This has an implication for our understanding of shareholder 
expropriation and firm performance.   
 
2. The performance measures used in this study (i.e. ROA and Tobin‟s Q) depend on the 
reliability of financial statements as reported in company annual reports. However, 
the caveat is that the results of the study could be biased to the extent of „earnings 
management‟ practices among controlling families. However it is widely recognized 
that Malaysia has one of the highest standards of financial reporting in Asia (for 
instance Malaysia‟s financial reporting standard is equal to that of Singapore) and 
thus the incidence and seriousness of earnings management will not be critical to the 
extent of „mistrusting‟ of financial statements among investors.      
 
3. The findings in this study should be interpreted with caution as the results of 
hypothesis testing by using the accounting-based performance, ROA and the market-
based performance, Tobin‟s Q, in some instances do not support each other. In other 
words, a significant relationship based on ROA is accompanied by an insignificant 
relationship when performance is measured by Tobin‟s Q and vice versa, though in 
                                                          
128
 The slower economic growth in 2008 was due to global financial turmoil and the deterioration of the global 
economic environment.    
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many instances, the relationships observed from the regressions based on both the 
ROA and Tobin‟s Q measures are often similar. Claessens et al. (2006) opine that the 
potential benefits and costs of the issues involved, such as group affiliation, that are 
identified in the literature do not necessarily translate equally into the various 
measures of performance. Thus, there is a need for future empirical research to 
investigate the causes of such variations.  
 
4. The measure of „family‟ used in this study can also be fine-grained to provide more 
insight into the issues involved. Specifically, Miller et al. (2007) comment that a 
distinction can be made between family-controlled firms that are controlled by lone 
individuals in which no relatives of the individual are involved in the ownership or 
management, and „true‟ family businesses in which multiple family members 
participate either as substantial shareowners or/and managers. In addition, family-
controlled firms can also be refined based on whether the firms are run by the family 
members or professional managers. More and more family businesses have begun to 
recruit outside professional managers though the families are still the de facto 
controllers of the firms. It would thus be interesting for future study to examine the 
effects of the above „variations‟ of family-controlled firms on the issues involved and 
in doing so adding to the diversity and richness of literature on family firms.    
 
5. This study does not separate firm diversification into related and unrelated 
diversification. Since the unfavourable performance outcomes of diversification as 
reported in this study imply that diversification of firms is agency-driven, future work 
can examine whether such outcomes are sensitive to the separation of related and 
unrelated diversification. This illuminates whether unrelated diversification is more 
agency-driven than related diversification. Moreover, such separation allows the 
researcher to conduct a series of tests to examine whether ownership- and other 
governance-related variables influence the outcomes of why some diversified firms 
diversify more into related businesses and some diversify more into unrelated 
businesses. For instance, future study could examine whether there is a difference in 
the level of related and unrelated diversification between group-affiliated firms and 
unaffiliated firms. Such a finding may clarify why the diversification outcome of 
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group-affiliated firms is generally worse than that of non-group firms as found in this 
study.      
 
6. The lack of evidence on the moderating role of board independence in this study may 
be due to the fact that many independent directors are not truly independent in 
exerting their monitoring roles. Future work can focus on collecting primary data to 
find out how an independent director is appointed. Some independent directors are 
appointed as they are recommended by the controlling family or its affiliates and 
some are appointed based on their connection to the government or politics. Thus it is 
intriguing to segregate these so-called independent directors from the rest and 
examine whether the moderating influence of independent directors is affected by 
such segregation. Future work can also extend the concept in this study of board 
independence to include other board qualities such as board integrity and diversity.  
 
7.6   Concluding Remarks of the Study 
 
This study examined how the performance of family-controlled firms can be influenced by a 
concentrated ownership structure and the firm activities/strategies or practices underlying the 
structure. As mentioned at the beginning of the thesis in Section 1.3 in Chapter 1, 
concentrated ownership structure, together with the legal system and the corporate board 
structure, form the three main pillars of the governance system that Malaysia has relied upon 
for many years. The overall finding in this study shows that concentrated ownership per se 
may not be harmful to firm performance and the interests of minority shareholders. However, 
the concern of the governance system is that concentrated ownership has become 
substantially more dominant than the other two pillars. This is attributable to the undue 
political interference in business that has contributed, to a certain extent, to weak 
enforcement of rules
129
 as well as a lack of credible and truly independent board. This 
imbalance causes concentrated ownership and control to be unchecked and grants the 
                                                          
129
 Though weak enforcement of rules is one of the important issues affecting corporate governance in East Asia 
including Malaysia, it is not directly examined in this particular thesis. As the issue may have a profound impact 
on some of the research questions examined in this study, it would be interesting to consider it for future, post-
doctoral research. A cross-country study with various level of enforcement (such as the ones in Appendix 2) 
may be able to provide more insight of how different level of enforcement would affect the findings to the 
research questions in this study.             
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controlling families opportunities, coupled with control-enhancing means including business 
groups practicing activities/strategies or practices such as diversification and resource 
redistribution, to expropriate firms‟ resources. This causes firm performance and minority 
shareholders‟ interests to be adversely affected.  
 
As a way forward for family-controlled firms in Malaysia, the question of whether 
concentrated ownership will, and should, continue to persist in the future depends very much 
on the direction set forward by the policy-makers, which in turn will be influenced to a 
certain extent by the forces of global governance reform. One of the on-going debates in 
respect of global governance reform is the question of whether there should be a global 
convergence of corporate governance systems towards a unified system of Anglo-American 
corporate governance (that prioritises shareholders‟ protection through rules and effective 
enforcements; improvement of external governance mechanisms such as the markets for 
corporate control, professional executives, and independent directors; the dilution of 
concentrated ownership; and the dismantling of business groups). It is believed that total 
convergence may not be possible for most countries (including Malaysia) due to the different 
national policy, legal system, institutional setting and culture. Thus, the potential 
expropriation issues in the context of principal-principal conflict as investigated in this study 
will continue to persist in the foreseeable future. Consequently, policy-makers should strive 
towards developing a governance system that is capable of preventing the dominance of 
concentrated ownership and instead exploit its strength as a governance mechanism to help 
contribute towards one that leads to more efficient allocation of resources; to enhance the 
ability of firms to compete internationally and to subsequently promote more investment and 
higher economic growth and development in the country. 
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Firms Selected for the Study   
Group-affiliated Firms 
APL INDUSTRIES LINEAR CORP BHD   EASTERN & ORIENTAL   PARKSON HOLDINGS   
BOXPAK (MALAYSIA)  MWE HOLDINGS BERHAD  KURNIA SETIA BHD   SCOMI GROUP BHD   
BREM HOLDINGS AIC CORPORATION BHD   LINGUI DEVELOPMENT SCOMI MARINE BHD   
CEPATWAWASAN GRP   BOLTON BHD SAPURA RESOURCES BHD   MALAYAN UNITED INDS  
CHIN TECK PLANTATIONS HEITECH PADU BERHAD   UNITED PLANTATIONS   PADIBERAS  
DPS RESOURCES BHD  LCTH CORP BHD   HAP SENG CONSOLIDATE  PAN MALAYSIA CORP  
EMIVEST BHD  MALPAC HOLDINGS BHD   HAP SENG PLANTATION   TRADEWINDS (M) BHD   
EONMETALL GRP BHD  MULTIPURPOSE HOLDING MALAYSIAN MOSAICS   YTL CEMENT BERHAD   
FAVELLE FAVCO BERHAD   PARAMOUNT CORP BHD   RANHILL BERHAD   YTL CORPORATION   
FIAMMA HOLDINGS BHD SYMPHONY HOUSE BHD   SEG INTERNATIONAL  YTL LAND & DEVELOP 
HIL INDUSTRIES BHD  UNITED MALAYAN LAND   SUNWAY HOLDINGS BHD   MUI PROPERTIES BHD   
INTEGRAX BHD   WIJAYA BARU GLOBAL   ANCOM BHD TRADEWINDS CORP BHD   
IOI PROP MIECO CHIPBOARD  BATU KAWAN TRADEWINDS PLANTATION 
KINSTEEL BHD   GUH HOLDINGS BHD   D&O VENTURES ZELAN  
KNUSFORD BHD  LEADER UNIVERSAL   GOLDIS BHD   MMC CORPORATION BHD   
LEADER STEEL   PETRA PERDANA BERHAD   IGB CORPORATION BHD  MELEWAR INDUSTR GROUP 
LEONG HUP HOLDINGS   ASIAN PAC HOLDINGS   JAYA TIASA HOLDINGS BHD MYCRON STEEL BHD 
MUHIBBAH ENGINEERING  PELIKAN INT'L CORP  KRISASSETS HLDGS  BERJAYA CORP 
PRESS METAL BHD AMALGAMATED IND'L   MTD ACPI ENGINEERING  KELADI MAJU 
PROGRESSIVE IMPACT   APM AUTOMOTIVE   MTD CAPITAL BHD MARCO HOLDINGS BHD  
SKPRES BHD EKOWOOD INTN'L BHD  NAIM HOLDINGS BERHAD   MATRIX INTERNATIONAL 
SOUTH MALAYSIA   FACB INDUSTRIES NYLEX (M) BHD THE STORE CORP 
VERSATILE CREATIVE  GLENEALY PLANTATIONS SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BERJAYA LAND BHD   
YEE LEE CORPORATION   JOHAN HOLDINGS BHD UBG BHD BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO 
YNH PROPERTY BHD  KARAMBUNAI CORP BHD KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG DIJAYA CORPORATION   
A & M REALTY BERHAD   KHEE SAN MEGA FIRST CORP   GOH BAN HUAT BERHAD   
CRESCENDO CORP BHD LONDON BISCUIT ADVANCE SYNERGY MALAYSIA AICA 
GROMUTUAL BERHAD   MEDA INCORPORATED  ASTRO ALL ASIA NETWORK  TMC LIFE SCI BHD   
HUNZA PROPERTIES BHD   OSK PROPERTY HLDGS  MULPHA INTERNATIONAL  MALAYSIAN BULK   
IOI CORPORATION PUTRAJAYA PERDANA   SARAWAK PLANTATION  PPB GROUP BHD   
KIAN JOO CAN FACTORY   SAPURA INDUSTRIAL   TA ANN HOLDINGS TRANSMILE GROUP 
KIM LOONG RESOURCES   SAPURACREST PETROLEUM TANJONG PUBLIC LIIMITED HONG LEONG INDUS BHD   
METROD (MALAYSIA)   SUNWAY CITY BERHAD   LION CORP BHD HUME IND 
MHC PLANTATIONS BHD   TALIWORKS CORP   LION DIVERSIFIED MSIAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIES 
NEGRI SEMBILAN OIL   TAN CHONG MOTOR  RESORTS WORLD BHD   NARRA IND 
PETRA ENERGY BERHAD   TSH RESOURCES BERHAD   ASIATIC DEVELOPMENT  SOUTHERN STEEL BHD  
SUPERMAX CORP BHD   WARISAN TC HOLDINGS  GENTING  GUOCOLAND 
TITAN CHEM CORP BHD  CAHYA MATA SARAWAK   LION INDUSTRIES CORP TASEK CORPORATION   
    
Independent (Non-group affiliated) Firms 
ADVENTA BHD KIA LIM BERHAD   UNIMECH GROUP BHD   CNI HOLDINGS BERHAD   
AHMAD ZAKI RES  KIM HIN INDUSTRY BHD   UNISEM (M) BERHAD   COUNTRY HEIGHTS  
APB RESOURCE KKB ENGINEERING   UNITED ULI CORPOR  DIALOG GROUP 
APOLLO FOOD HOLDINGS   KOSSAN RUBBER   UPA CORP BHD  DUFU TECHNOLOGY CORP   
ASAS DUNIA BERHAD  KSL HOLDINGS BHD  V.S. INDUSTRY ENCORP BERHAD  
ASIA FILE CORP BHD KWANTAS CORP BHD   VOIR HOLDINGS BERHAD   FRONTKEN CORP BHD   
BANENG HOLDINGS BHD  LATITUDE TREE   WHITE HORSE BERHAD   GOPENG BERHAD   
BINA PURI HOLDINGS   LBS BINA GROUP BHD  XIAN LENG HOLDINGS   IQ GROUP HLDGS   
BP PLASTICS HLDG BHD  LII HEN INDUSTRIES   YUNG KONG   KENCANA PETRO 
CB IND PRODUCT HLDGS   LOH & LOH CORP   ZHULIAN CORPORATION   KONSORTIUM LOGISTIK   
CHOO BEE METAL IND   MAH SING GROUP BHD   ANN JOO KRETAM HOLDINGS BHD   
CLASSIC SCENIC BHD   MALAYAN FLOUR MILLS  ASIA PACIFIC LAND  LCL CORPORATION BHD   
CENTURY BOND BHD MALAYSIAN AE MODELS  BLD PLANTATION BHD   LEWEKO RESOURCES BHD  
COCOALAND HLDGS  MAMEEDOUBLE DECKER  COASTAL CONTRACTS   METRONIC GLOBAL BHD   
COMPUGATES HLDGS  MENANG CORPORATION   DAIMAN DEVELOPMENT   MITRAJAYA HOLDINGS   
CREST BUILDER HLDGS   MINHO (M) BERHAD   ENG TEKNOLOGI HLDGS   MUDAJAYA GROUP BHD   
DEGEM BHD MINTYE INDUSTRIES   ENGTEX GROUP BHD   NAIM INDAH CORP BHD  
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DELEUM BERHAD   MUDA HOLDINGS BERHAD   FARLIM GROUP   OCB BERHAD  
DELLOYD VENTURES BHD   NEW HOONG FATT  KECK SENG (M) BHD   PATIMAS COMPUTERS   
DKLS INDUSTRIES   NOTION VTEC BHD KNM PROTASCO BHD   
DOLOMITE CORPORATION  NPC RESOURCES BHD   MAHAJAYA BERHAD   SRII BHD 
DXN HOLDINGS BHD   NV MULTI   MALTON BHD   SUMATEC RESOURCES  
EFFICIENT ESOL BHD   ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BHD METRO KAJANG HLDGS   TANJUNG OFFSHORE BHD   
ENG KAH CORPORATION  PADINI HOLDINGS BHD MK LAND TEXCHEM RESOURCES   
EP MANUFACTURING  PENTAMASTER CORP  PANTECH GROUP TRC SYNERGY BHD   
FITTERS DIVERSIFIED   POH HUAT RES HLDGS   PINTARAS JAYA BHD WCT BERHAD   
GLOBETRONICS  PRINSIPTEK CORP BHD   SUIWAH CORPORATION ANALABS RESOURCES BHD 
GUAN CHONG BERHAD   PULAI SPRINGS BHD   TANCO HOLDINGS BHD  UCHI TECHNOLOGIES   
HAIO ENTERPRISE PW CONSOLIDATED BHD   TOP GLOVE  ORIENTAL INTEREST   
HEVEABOARD BERHAD   QL RESOURCES BHD   WTK HOLDINGS BHD   ASTINO BHD 
HEXZA CORP BHD SARAWAK OIL PALMS  APEX HEALTHCARE BHD  SANBUMI HOLDINGS BHD   
HIROTAKO HLDGS BHD  SPKSENTOSA CORP   YILAI BHD   HO WAH GENTING BHD   
HOCK SENG LEE BERHAD   SUCCESS TRANSFORMER  EVERGREEN FIBREBOARD  DAIBOCHI PLASTIC  
HUP SENG INDUSTRIES   SWEE JOO BHD MAXTRAL INDUSTRY BHD   JOBSTREET CORP BHD  
HYTEX INTEGRATED BHD   TEK SENG HLDGS BHD   JADI IMAGING HLDGS   FURQAN BUSINESS ORG   
IBERHAD   THONG GUAN INDUS   MAXBIZ CORPORATION  FOUNTAIN VIEW DEVPMT   
IPMUDA BERHAD   THREEA RESOURCES   SERN KOU RESRCS BHD   NOMAD GROUP  
JOHORE TIN BERHAD   TOMEI CONS BHD   ORNAPAPER BHD   SALCON BERHAD   
KBB RESOURCES BHD TONG HERR RES   AIRASIA NAM FATT CORP BHD  
KBES BERHAD   TRIUMPHAL ASSOCIATES  AJIYA  
KEN HOLDINGS BERHAD   TSR CAPITAL BHD  ALAM MARITIM RESRCS   
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Appendix 2: Corporate Governance Practice – Scores on Regulations and Enforcement  
 
Tables below show the comparisons between Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong in terms 
of the scores (over the scale of 10) of their corporate governance practices: 
 
Country Score 
on 
regulations 
(2002) 
Score 
on 
regulations 
(2003) 
Score 
on 
regulations 
(2004) 
Score 
on 
regulations 
(2005) 
Score 
on 
regulations 
(2007) 
Score 
on 
regulations 
(2010) 
HONG KONG 8 8 6.6 6.4 6.0 5.9 
MALAYSIA 9 9 7.1 5.9 4.4 4.9 
SINGAPORE 8 8.5 7.9 7.4 7.0 6.5 
 
Country Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2002) 
Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2003) 
Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2004) 
Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2005) 
Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2007) 
Score 
on 
enforcement 
(2010) 
HONG KONG 6 6.5 5.8 5.8 5.6 6.3 
MALAYSIA 2.5 3.5 5.0 4.9 3.5 3.8 
SINGAPORE 7 7.5 6.5 5.6 5.0 6.0 
Sources: Low (2004) for 2002 to 2004 data and 2005 to 2010 data are extracted from „CG Watch 2005‟, „CG 
Watch 2007‟ and „CG Watch 2010‟ reports which are downloadable from the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA) website: http://www.acga-asia.org, accessed 24
th
 January, 2011 
  
Malaysia‟s „scores on enforcement‟ remained low and behind those of Singapore and Hong 
Kong and its „scores on regulations‟ have declined more than that of Singapore and Hong 
Kong since 2005. 
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Appendix 3: 40 Richest Malaysians in Year 2008 and Their Main Sources of Wealth  
Ranking Name Wealth Business 
Group 
Independent 
Firm 
Banking 
1 Robert Kuok Hock Nien RM 58.110 billion     
2 Tan Sri T. Ananda Krishnan RM 19.625 billion     
3 Tan Sri Lee Shin Cheng RM 14.943 billion     
4 Tan Sri Quek Leng Chan RM 11.098 billion     
5 Tan Sri Syed Mokhtar Albukhary RM 8.550 billion     
6 Tan Sri Teh Hong Piow RM 8.06 billion     
7 Tan Sri Tiong Hiew King RM 3.87 billion     
8 Tan Sri Vincent Tan RM 3.40 billion     
9 Tan Sri Lim Kok Thay RM 3.16 billion     
10 Tan Sri Azman Hashim RM 2.87 billion     
11 Datuk Lee Yeow Chor RM 2.33 billion     
12 Lee Yeow Seng RM 2.29 billion     
13 Tan Sri Yeoh Tiong Lay RM 1.74 billion     
14 Ong Beng Seng RM 1.73 billion     
15 Tan Sri Jeffrey Cheah Fook Ling RM 1.49 billion     
16 Datuk Yaw Teck Seng RM 1.39 billion     
17 Datuk Seri Lee Oi Hian RM 1.304 billion     
18 Datuk Lee Hau Hian RM 1.301 billion     
19 Tan Sri Francis Yeoh Sock Ping RM 0.99 billion     
20 Datuk Mokhzani Mahathir RM 0.97 billion     
21 Datuk Yeoh Seok Hong RM 0.883 billion     
22 Datuk Yeoh Seok Kian RM 0.881 billion     
23 Datuk Micheal Yeoh Sock Siong RM 0.87 billion     
24 Datuk Mark Yeoh Seok Kah RM 0.86 billion     
25 Tan Sri Hamdan Mohamad RM 0.85 billion     
26 Raja Eleena Raja Azlan Shah RM 0.83 billion     
27 Tan Sri Dr Lim Wee Chai RM 0.78 billion     
28 Tan Sri Kua Sian Kooi RM 0.75 billion     
29 Puan Sri Chong Chook Yew RM 0.71 billion     
30 Datuk Tony Tiah Thee Kian RM 0.67 billion     
31 Datuk Tan Chin Nam RM 0.61 billion     
32 Tan Sri Rozali Ismail RM 0.59 billion     
33 Shaari Ismail RM 0.57 billion     
34 Datuk Seri Panglima Lau Cho Kun RM 0.533 billion     
35 Datuk Lin Yun Ling RM 0.532 billion     
36 Datuk Seri Liew Kee Sin RM 0.52 billion     
37 Ong Leong Huat RM 0.50 billion     
38 Datuk Abdul Hamed Sepawi RM 0.49 billion     
39 Datuk Tony Fernandes RM 0.47 billion     
40 Kwan Ngen Chung RM 0.40 billion     
Source: Malaysian Business (February 2008 Issue) 
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Appendix 4: Statistical Problems, Diagnostic and Remedial Measures in Multivariate  
                      Regression 
 
 Statistical Problem Diagnostic Measure   Remedial Measure  (if problem exists) 
1. Non-Normality Histogram – visual examination of normal 
distribution 
Kurtosis and Skewness of Distribution – a 
normal distribution will have a value of 0 for 
skewness and 3 for kurtosis.  
Normal Probability Plot – a normal distribution 
forms a straight diagonal line, and the plotted 
data values are compared with the diagonal. If a 
distribution is normal, the line representing the 
actual data distribution closely follows the 
diagonal.   
 Data transformation (for instance, 
taking natural log of total sales and 
firm age). Such transformation also 
helps in achieving homoscadasticity. 
 
 Impacts due to sample size – larger 
sample sizes reduce the detrimental 
effects of non-normality. 
2. Multicollinearity Correlation Matrix – shows the „one-to-one‟ 
relationship between two independent 
variables. See Section 5.8 for the details.    
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) –            
VIF=1/ (1-Rj
2) where Rj
2 is the coefficient of 
determination of the „auxiliary regression‟ that 
includes all the explanatory variables except the 
jth explanatory variable. See next column for 
the interpretation. 
 
 
 Technically, the common cut-off 
threshold for VIF is 10.00. However, 
practically, the tolerance level in this 
study is set at 4.00.  
 
 A variable that causes 
multicollinearity will need to be 
removed from the regressions.   
 
 For multicollinearity involving 
interaction terms, see sub-section 
6.2.8 for explanation.   
3. Heteroscadasticity  Examination of Residual Plots – the presence of 
heteroscadasticity is indicated by the plots of 
least squares residuals that are not constant 
against the explanatory/independent variable 
(e.g. increases or decrease).  
White Test – in this test, heteroscedasticity is 
present when the Chi-square (χ2) statistic of 
homoscedasticty is rejected at the 5% 
significant level (Griffiths et al., 2011; Gujarati, 
2004). The statistical software helps in 
identifying the significant level.    
 Data transformation (see point 1 
above). 
 
 „White‟s Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent Standard Errors‟ is used 
to correct the standard errors in the 
presence of heteroscadasticity.  
 
4. Correlated Errors Examination of  Residual Plots – if the errors 
are serially correlated, then a large residual 
should generally be followed by another large 
residual; a small residual is likely to be 
followed by another small residual; and positive 
followed by positive and negative followed by 
negative. Thus, long runs of positive residuals 
or/and long runs of negative residuals indicate 
the presence of correlated errors.  
Durbin-Watson Test – following the general 
guide (Griffiths et al., 2011), values of 1.6 or 
less are suggestive of correlated errors.   
 „Newey-West Standard-Errors‟ is 
used to correct the standard errors in 
the presence of correlated errors. It 
was applied in some of the 
hypotheses in this study as a 
comparison to using only White‟s 
standard errors. The outcomes are 
qualitatively similar in both methods. 
Thus only regressions with White‟s 
standard errors are reported.  
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Appendix 5 (a): Pearson Correlation Matrix (II) - Group Sub-Sample Only 
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D
  
FAMOWN1  1.00 
         
FAMOWN2  -0.76 1.00 
        
CF/CONT  0.17 0.26 1.00 
       
FAMDIR  -0.02 0.17 0.13 1.00 
      
CHR_CEO 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.52 1.00 
     
FAMONLY  -0.07 0.21 0.04 0.17 0.28 1.00 
    
H_INDP_B  -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.21 -0.20 0.06 1.00 
   
Lag(ROA)  0.21 -0.09 0.07 0.04 -0.08 -0.13 0.00 1.00 
  
Lag(Q) 0.11 -0.13 -0.18 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.51 1.00 
 
DVSF_D  -0.13 0.26 0.31 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.08 0.01 1.00 
GR_A -0.06 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.08 -0.13 -0.14 
GR_B  0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.14 
GR_C 0.01 0.07 -0.15 -0.13 0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.01 0.15 0.00 
FAMOWN  -0.15 0.76 0.55 0.23 0.19 0.24 -0.07 0.07 -0.09 0.26 
STATE  0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.34 0.01 0.13 0.21 -0.13 
DOMII  -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 -0.31 -0.01 0.05 0.10 0.05 
DOMPUBII  -0.06 -0.03 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.32 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.06 
FORGNII  0.07 -0.14 0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.05 
FORGN  0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.16 -0.10 -0.24 -0.03 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 
AUXFAM  0.08 -0.18 0.13 -0.14 -0.19 -0.46 -0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.09 
Log Sales 0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.32 0.26 0.23 
Log Age -0.02 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.20 
Gearing -0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.05 0.19 
ROA  0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.59 0.41 -0.04 
Q 0.04 -0.03 -0.17 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.35 0.77 0.06 
A7 
 
 
 (Continued) 
 G
R
_
A
 
G
R
_
B
  
G
R
_
C
 
F
A
M
O
W
N
  
S
T
A
T
E
  
D
O
M
II
  
D
O
M
P
U
B
II
  
F
O
R
G
N
II
  
F
O
R
G
N
  
A
U
X
F
A
M
  
L
o
g
 S
al
es
 
L
o
g
 A
g
e 
G
ea
ri
n
g
 
R
O
A
  
GR_A 1.00 
         
  
   
GR_B  -0.55 1.00 
        
  
   
GR_C -0.49 -0.46 1.00 
           
FAMOWN  -0.04 -0.06 0.11 1.00 
          
STATE  -0.14 0.19 -0.05 -0.04 1.00 
         
DOMII  0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 
        
DOMPUBII  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.07 0.99 1.00 
       
FORGNII  0.09 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 0.07 -0.04 -0.04 1.00 
      
FORGN  -0.11 0.01 0.10 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 1.00 
     
AUXFAM  0.08 0.03 -0.12 -0.20 -0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 1.00   
   
Log Sales -0.23 0.05 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.15 -0.23 1.00 
   
Log Age -0.11 -0.01 0.13 0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.12 1.00 
  
Gearing -0.11 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.10 0.14 -0.11 0.39 0.13 1.00 
 
ROA  0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.33 0.03 -0.20 1.00 
Q -0.23 0.10 0.13 -0.02 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.42 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.16 (bold figures in the table) are significant at p < 0.05 
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(b): Pearson Correlation Matrix (III) - Group Sub-Sample 
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Entropy 1.00 
      
 
  
  
Herf -0.99 1.00 
     
 
  
  
# Segments 0.81 -0.75 1.00 
    
 
   
DVSF_D  0.84 -0.86 0.71 1.00 
   
 
   
PrINED 0.12 -0.12 0.10 0.09 1.00 
  
 
   
INDP_CHR 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.33 1.00 
 
 
   
INDP_ADT 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.30 0.09 1.00  
   H_INDP_B 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.36 0.43 0.50 1.00 
   
GR_A -0.14 0.13 -0.18 -0.14 -0.02 0.04 0.05 0.13 1.00 
  
GR_B  0.18 -0.18 0.19 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.18 -0.06 -0.55 1.00   
GR_C -0.04 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.24 -0.08 -0.49 -0.46 1.00 
FAMOWN 0.22 -0.23 0.15 0.26 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.11 
STATE -0.13 0.13 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.01 -0.14 0.19 -0.05 
DOMII  0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.13 -0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
DOMPUBII  0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.13 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FORGNII  0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.09 -0.02 -0.08 
FORGN  0.00 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 0.10 
AUXFAM  -0.14 0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.12 
CF/CONT  0.31 -0.30 0.27 0.31 0.10 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.17 -0.04 -0.15 
FAMDIR  0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.26 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 0.16 -0.04 -0.13 
CHR_CEO  -0.03 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.48 -0.12 -0.20 0.10 -0.15 0.05 
FAMONLY  0.09 -0.08 0.08 0.05 0.13 -0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.02 
Log Sales 0.24 -0.22 0.38 0.23 0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.23 0.05 0.19 
Log Age 0.19 -0.18 0.22 0.20 0.09 -0.04 -0.14 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.13 
Gearing 0.16 -0.14 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.03 -0.11 0.05 0.07 
ROA  -0.08 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.04 
Q  -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.23 0.10 0.13 
Note: Correlation coefficients greater than or equal to 0.16 (bold figures in the table) are significant at p < 0.05 
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Note to Appendix 5(a) and 5(b): 
Matrix in Appendix 5(a) shows that ROA is significantly positively related to FAMOWN1, STATE and Log Sales and negatively related 
to Gearing whereas Tobin‟s Q is significantly positively related to STATE and Log Sales and negatively related to CF/CONT and GR_A 
(shaded area). Appendix 5(b) shows that Tobin‟s Q is significantly negatively related to GR_A (shaded area) whereas ROA is not 
significantly related to any explanatory variables in the sample of group-affiliated firms.  
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Appendix 6  
(a): Appendix to Table 6.2a: Moderating Effects of Board Independence on ROA   
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FAMOWN′ 0.050 0.048* 0.052** 0.049** 
FAMOWN′ *PrINED′ 0.000    
FAMOWN′ *INDP_CHR  0.022   
FAMOWN′ *INDP_ADT   0.008  
FAMOWN′ *H_INDP_B    0.053 
STATE 0.128 0.140* 0.142* 0.142* 
DOMII 0.026 0.035 0.032 0.034 
FORGNII 0.149* 0.148* 0.141* 0.147* 
FORGN -0.013 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 
AUXFAM 0.014 0.021 0.019 0.020 
PrINED′ -5.688*    
INDP_CHR  0.076   
INDP_ADT   -0.591  
H_INDP_B    -0.321 
Log Sales 2.149*** 2.138*** 2.137*** 2.139*** 
Log Age -0.856* -0.875* -0.937* -0.886* 
Gearing -15.897*** -15.834*** -15.934*** -15.912*** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.264 0.258 0.259 0.259 
F-statistic 7.619*** 7.405*** 7.439*** 7.430*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 
 
(b): Appendix to Table 6.2b: Moderating Effects of Board Independence on Tobin’s Q   
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FAMOWN′ -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAMOWN′ *PrINED′ 0.004    
FAMOWN′ *INDP_CHR  0.001   
FAMOWN′ *INDP_ADT   -0.001  
FAMOWN′ *H_INDP_B    -0.002 
STATE 0.008 0.008* 0.008* 0.008 
DOMII 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
FORGNII 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.015** 
FORGN -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
AUXFAM -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
PrINED′ -0.175    
INDP_CHR  -0.001   
INDP_ADT   -0.054  
H_INDP_B    -0.119** 
Log Sales 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 
Log Age -0.005 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
Gearing -0.061 -0.059 -0.071 -0.059 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.170 0.166 0.172 0.174 
F-statistic 4.765*** 4.673*** 4.830*** 4.873*** 
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(c): Appendix to Table 6.3a: Influence of Business Group-affiliation and Group Size on ROA  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
FAMOWN  0.045** 0.046** 
STATE  0.161* 0.161* 
DOMII  0.039 0.037 
FORGNII  0.138* 0.126** 
FORGN  0.004 0.012 
AUXFAM  0.012 0.010 
Group -1.992** -1.911**  
GR_A   -1.358 
GR_B   -1.752 
GR_C   -3.024** 
Log Sales 2.426*** 2.302*** 2.357*** 
Log Age -0.593 -0.561 -0.495 
Gearing -15.993*** -15.721*** -15.786*** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.271 0.274 0.273 
F-statistic 12.625*** 8.380*** 7.538*** 
Observations 314 314 314 
 
(d): Appendix to Table 6.3b: Influence of Business Group-affiliation and Group Size on Tobin’s Q  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
FAMOWN  0.000 0.000 
STATE  0.009* 0.008* 
DOMII  0.003 0.003 
FORGNII  0.015** 0.015** 
FORGN  -0.005 -0.005 
AUXFAM  -0.001 -0.001 
Group -0.039 -0.047  
GR_A   -0.097** 
GR_B   -0.021 
GR_C   0.003 
Log Sales 0.075*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 
Log Age 0.001 0.003 -0.001 
Gearing -0.063 -0.055 -0.056 
Sector Effect Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.141 0.173 0.176 
F-statistic 6.119*** 5.093*** 4.708*** 
Observations  314 314 314 
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(e): Appendix to Table 6.4a: Influence of Control-Enhancing Means on ROA  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
FAMOWN 0.053** 0.053** 0.019 0.040* 0.045** 0.041* 
STATE 0.151* 0.147* 0.169** 0.168** 0.071 0.160* 
DOMII 0.041 0.040 0.044 0.036 -0.026 0.041 
FORGNII 0.138* 0.139* 0.144* 0.141* 0.107 0.132* 
FORGN -0.003 -0.003 0.021 0.003 -0.071 0.003 
AUXFAM 0.017 0.017 0.026 0.016 -0.051 0.011 
CF/CONT 1.528      
CF/CONT_DUM  -0.624     
FAMDIR    5.699***    
CHR_CEO     0.784   
FAMONLY      -2.020**  
BG_S      -1.484* 
BG_PS      -2.224*** 
BG_CS      -1.925 
Group   -1.649** -1.806** -1.843**  
Log Sales 2.032*** 2.033*** 2.328*** 2.306*** 2.293*** 2.347*** 
Log Age -0.843* -0.852* -0.619 -0.582 -0.533 -0.569 
Gearing -15.454*** -15.464*** -15.902*** -15.595*** -15.588*** -15.632*** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.253 0.253 0.291 0.274 0.279 0.270 
F-statistic 7.385*** 7.385*** 8.546*** 7.952*** 8.142*** 7.432*** 
Observations  303 303 314 314 314 314 
 
(f): Appendix to Table 6.4b: Influence of Control-Enhancing Means on Tobin’s Q  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FAMOWN 0.002* 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STATE 0.008 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 0.007 0.009* 
DOMII 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
FORGNII 0.016** 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.014** 0.014** 
FORGN -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 
AUXFAM 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
CF/CONT -0.254      
CF/CONT_DUM  0.076     
FAMDIR    0.173*    
CHR_CEO     0.006   
FAMONLY      -0.035  
BG_S      -0.037 
BG_PS      -0.057 
BG_CS      -0.023 
Group   -0.039 -0.047 -0.046  
Log Sales 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
Log Age -0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 
Gearing -0.060 -0.061 -0.061 -0.054 -0.053 -0.055 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.165 0.160 0.179 0.170 0.171 0.168 
F-statistic 4.727*** 4.596*** 5.019*** 4.780*** 4.809*** 4.512*** 
Observations  303 303 314 314 314 314 
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(g): Appendix to Table 6.5a: Profit Redistribution Effects and Firm Performance 
Explanatory Variable  (1) ROA (2) ROA  (3) ROA (4) Tobin‟s 
Q 
(5) Tobin‟s 
Q 
(6) Tobin‟s 
Q 
Lag (ROA) 0.371*** 0.389*** 0.332***    
Lag (Q)    0.455*** 0.468*** 0.529*** 
FAMOWN′ 0.007 0.040 0.043 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
FAMOWN′ * Lag (ROA) 0.003      
FAMOWN′ * Lag (Q)    0.004   
CF/CONT′  1.421   -0.647***  
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)  -0.232     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)     0.468***  
CF/CONT_DUM   -1.023   0.268*** 
CF/CONT_DUM* Lag 
(ROA)  
 
0.166  
 
 
CF/CONT_DUM* Lag 
(Q)  
  
 
 
-0.222*** 
STATE 0.127* 0.167** 0.177** 0.003 0.004 0.004 
DOMII -0.039 -0.021 -0.019 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
FORGNII -0.025 -0.013 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
FORGN -0.044 -0.033 -0.038 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
AUXFAM -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
Log Sales 1.570*** 1.069** 1.062** 0.020 0.014 0.014 
Log Age 0.334 0.355 0.300 0.041* 0.058*** 0.059*** 
Gearing -9.129*** -6.852** -6.861** 0.117 0.089 0.091 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.427 0.417 0.423 0.624 0.642 0.643 
F-statistic 7.614*** 6.563*** 6.703*** 15.770*** 14.967*** 15.006*** 
Observations  152 141 141 152 141 141 
 
A14 
 
(h): Appendix to Table 6.5b: Profit Redistribution with ROA – Group Size Effect  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Lag (ROA) 0.365*** 0.401*** 0.312*** 0.414*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.413*** 0.385*** 
FAMOWN 0.036 0.045* 0.033 0.056** 0.056** 0.055** 0.054** 0.056** 0.056** 
CF/CONT′    -1.429 -2.937 -2.006    
CF/CONT_DUM       0.682 1.350 0.762 
GR_A 1.077 1.238  1.528 1.454  1.083 1.494  
GR_B 1.669 2.710* 0.353 2.003* 2.050* 0.641 2.006* 2.307* 0.630 
GR_C   -2.788*   -1.420   -1.898 
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_A 0.000         
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_B  -0.003        
FAMOWN* Lag (ROA)*GR_C   0.004       
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_A    -0.407      
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_B     0.175     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (ROA)*GR_C      -0.094    
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_A       0.118   
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_B        -0.084  
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (ROA)*GR_C         0.116 
Log Sales 1.539*** 1.534*** 1.524*** 1.101*** 1.123*** 1.105*** 1.110*** 1.112*** 1.077*** 
Log Age 0.384 0.382 0.347 0.398 0.392 0.382 0.442 0.470 0.393 
Gearing -9.085*** -9.194*** -9.142*** -7.302** -7.584** -7.432** -7.495** -7.576** -7.342** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.436 0.440 0.445 0.431 0.428 0.427 0.431 0.430 0.433 
F-statistic 9.324*** 9.475*** 9.637*** 8.070*** 7.985*** 7.969*** 8.063*** 8.036*** 8.113*** 
Observations  152 152 152 141 141 141 141 141 141 
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(i): Appendix to Table 6.5c: Profit Redistribution with Tobin’s Q – Group Size Effect  
Explanatory Variable  (1) (2) (3) 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Lag (Q) 0.399*** 0.452*** 0.477*** 0.448*** 0.473*** 0.494*** 0.457*** 0.458*** 0.500*** 
FAMOWN -0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 
CF/CONT′    -0.155 0.084 -0.265    
CF/CONT_DUM       0.045 -0.019 0.085* 
GR_A -0.165** -0.025  -0.012 -0.021  0.004 -0.019  
GR_B 0.036 0.063 0.072* 0.071 0.063 0.066* 0.071 0.021 0.070* 
GR_C   0.156*   0.031   0.084* 
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_A 0.004         
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_B  0.000        
FAMOWN* Lag (Q)*GR_C   -0.003**       
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_A    0.183      
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_B     -0.372     
CF/CONT′ * Lag (Q)*GR_C      0.374***    
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_A       -0.044   
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_B        0.132  
CF/CONT_DUM * Lag (Q)*GR_C         -0.143*** 
Log Sales 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 
Log Age 0.047** 0.041* 0.044** 0.046** 0.050** 0.057*** 0.047** 0.050** 0.055** 
Gearing 0.123 0.122 0.113 0.104 0.135 0.116 0.102 0.131 0.120 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.639 0.619 0.629 0.622 0.639 0.653 0.617 0.630 0.645 
F-statistic 20.116*** 18.524*** 19.272*** 16.335*** 17.529*** 18.552*** 16.066*** 16.864*** 17.921*** 
Observations  152 152 152 141 141 141 141 141 141 
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(j): Appendix to Table 6.5d: Profit Redistribution– Large Group Size and Family Ownership 
Classification Effects  
Explanatory Variable  (1) Tobin‟s 
Q 
(2) Tobin‟s 
Q 
(3) Tobin‟s 
Q 
(4) Tobin‟s 
Q 
Lag (Q) 0.450*** 0.437*** 0.456*** 0.434*** 
FAMOWN1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FAMOWN2 0.001 0.002* 0.000 0.001 
GR_B 0.077* 0.078** 0.063 0.066* 
GR_C 0.030 0.062 0.036 0.052 
FAMOWN1*Lag(Q)*GR_C 0.000  -0.001  
FAMOWN2*Lag(Q)*GR_C  -0.003**  -0.003** 
STATE   0.004 0.004 
DOMII   -0.004 -0.003 
FORGNII   -0.007 -0.006 
FORGN   -0.001 -0.002 
AUXFAM   -0.001 0.000 
Log Sales 0.012 0.017 0.018 0.023 
Log Age 0.040* 0.041** 0.041* 0.042* 
Gearing 0.117 0.104 0.100 0.091 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.617 0.627 0.617 0.626 
F-statistic 17.226*** 17.887*** 13.186*** 13.616*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 
 
(k): Appendix to Table 6.7a: Firm Diversification and Performance 
 ROA Tobin‟s Q 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
ENTROPY -1.220*    -0.087**    
HERF  2.034    0.119*   
NUM_SEG   -0.354*    -0.026**  
DVSF_D                -0.155    -0.015 
Group -1.848** -1.864** -1.833** -1.913** -0.043 -0.045 -0.042 -0.048 
FAMOWN 0.047** 0.047** 0.044** 0.045** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STATE 0.149* 0.150* 0.152* 0.160* 0.008* 0.008 0.008 0.008* 
DOMII 0.037 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 
FORGNII 0.125* 0.127* 0.119 0.136* 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.014** 
FORGN -0.004 -0.003 -0.012 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
AUXFAM 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Log Sales 2.347*** 2.328*** 2.439*** 2.306*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.071*** 
Log Age -0.451 -0.460 -0.460 -0.545 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.004 
Gearing -15.502*** 
-
15.457*** 
-
15.707*** 
-
15.665*** -0.040 -0.040 -0.054 -0.050 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.276 0.275 0.276 0.272 0.181 0.177 0.184 0.171 
F-statistic 8.005*** 7.993*** 8.028*** 7.864*** 5.067*** 4.954*** 5.140*** 4.790*** 
Observations  314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 
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(l): Appendix to Table 6.7b: Effects of Firm Diversification on Firm Efficiency                            
 (2)  (2) (3) (4) 
ENTROPY -0.405***    
HERF  0.641***   
NUM_SEG   -0.098***  
DVSF_D    -0.244*** 
ROA 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
GROUP -0.266*** -0.272*** -0.265*** -0.287*** 
FAMOWN -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
STATE -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 
DOMII -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 
FORGNII -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.014 
FORGN 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002 
AUXFAM -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
LN SALES 0.313*** 0.305*** 0.336*** 0.301*** 
LNAGE -0.095** -0.100** -0.151** -0.106** 
GEARING -0.312 -0.298 -0.383 -0.270 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.579 0.574 0.573 0.565 
F-statistic 24.885*** 24.367*** 24.285*** 23.542*** 
Observations 314 314 314 314 
                                
(m): Appendix to Table 6.7c: Firm Diversification and Efficiency – Comparison between Group and Non-
group Firms                       
 Group Non-Group 
Variable (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ENTROPY -0.439 
*** 
   
-0.156* 
   
HERF 
 
0.714 
*** 
  
 0.234* 
  
NUM_SEG  
 
-0.108 
*** 
  
 -0.024 
 
DVSF_D    -0.331***    -0.095 
ROA 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 
FAMOWN -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
STATE -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.010 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
DOMII 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
FORGNII -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 
FORGN 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
AUXFAM -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
LNSALES 0.185*** 0.177*** 0.208*** 0.173*** 0.472*** 0.469*** 0.477*** 0.469*** 
LNAGE -0.122* -0.129* -0.118 -0.130* -0.076 -0.077 -0.086 -0.080 
GEARING 0.117 0.130 0.109 0.224 -0.629*** -0.623*** -0.671*** -0.619** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.463 0.455 0.454 0.446 0.748 0.747 0.745 0.747 
F-statistic 8.616*** 8.355*** 8.340*** 8.111*** 29.117*** 29.008*** 28.741*** 28.978*** 
Observations 151 151 151 151 162 162 162 162 
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(n): Appendix to Table 6.8a: Firm Diversification and Performance – Comparison between Group and 
Non-group Firms              
 Panel A: ROA 
 Group   Non-Group 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
ENTROPY -1.693*    -0.139    
HERF  2.734*    0.307   
NUM_SEG   -0.459*    -0.229  
DVSF_D    -0.850    0.548 
Log Sales 2.554*** 2.530*** 2.665*** 2.507*** 2.087*** 2.084*** 2.150*** 2.089*** 
Log Age 0.278 0.252 0.317 0.204 -1.656** -1.652** -1.648** -1.713** 
Gearing 
-13.347 
*** 
-13.334 
*** 
-13.387 
*** 
-13.204 
*** 
-16.634 
*** 
-16.613 
*** 
-16.753 
*** 
-16.859 
*** 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.315 0.313 0.314 0.307 0.269 0.269 0.271 0.270 
F-statistic 5.332*** 5.290*** 5.329*** 5.174*** 4.706*** 4.706*** 4.732*** 4.728*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 162 162 162 162 
 Panel B: Tobin‟s Q 
 Group Non-Group 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
ENTROPY -0.066    -0.076    
HERF  0.071    0.099   
NUM_SEG   -0.022*    -0.031*  
DVSF_D    -0.001    -0.001 
Log Sales 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.073*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 
Log Age 0.035 0.032 0.038 0.029 -0.011 -0.012 -0.014 -0.017 
Gearing -0.066 -0.067 -0.066 -0.071 0.010 0.011 -0.017 -0.004 
Sector Effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 0.173 0.168 0.177 0.165 0.271 0.268 0.278 0.265 
F-statistic 2.973*** 2.905*** 3.029*** 2.866*** 4.737*** 4.690*** 4.880*** 4.619*** 
Observations  152 152 152 152 162 162 162 162 
Note: All other ownership variables are included in all regressions but are not shown above. 
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